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This thesis examines the way medical concepts have been used in
penal discourse, in Britain, since the middle of the nineteenth
century. By doing this it tries to contribute to our knowledge and
understanding of "medical" styles of penal control and to show, in
particular, how these differ from classical or 'juridical' forms of
penal intervention.
A methodological presupposition - which is substantiated throughout
the thesis - is that it is necessary to analyse the meaning of medical
concepts in penal discourse in their own terms. If we want to
understand these concepts we have to look in detail at the way they
are employed and elaborated in penal discourse. Ve cannot rely upon
analogies with clinical medicine to determine their meaning. Apart
from strictly methodological concerns, there are two substantive
reasons for this: (a) medical concepts are employed within penal
discourse as much for their rhetorical power and practical
convenience, as for their explanatory utility; and (b) medical
concepts are generally used in penal discourse to express a social-
psychological - as apposed to an organicist - perception of criminals
and their treatment.
The analysis of medical concepts in penal discourse is presented
through two case studies. The first of these examines the way the
terms "inebriety" and "alcoholism" have been used in discourses on
"inebriate (or alcoholic) offenders", and also examines what is meant
by the term "treatment" when it is used in the context of the
treatment of inebriate offenders. The second study traces the various
ways in which the terms "moral insanity", "moral imbecility" and
"psychopathy" have been employed in penal discourses. One point which
clearly emerges from these studies is that the use of medical concepts
in penal discourse does not imply a clear break with traditional
punitive responses to crime. Rather, punitive and medical conceptions
of crime and treatment have been harmonized, to a considerable extent,
to bring about more subtle changes in penal thought, policy, practice
and institutions. The thesis concludes by looking at the implications
of the study for our understanding and assessment of psychological
theories of crime and therapeutic approaches to social control.
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MEDICAL CONCEPTS AND PENAL POLICY
TTTRODUCTIOff
Since the second half of the nineteenth century the term 'treatment'
and other medical-sounding terms, such as 'inebriety' and
'psychopathy', have been used regularly in the discourses of penal
policy in Britain. This thesis will examine what is meant by these
terms when they are used in this context. It will therefore describe
some of the policies, practices and institutions which are typically
referred to as constituting 'penal treatment' and it will examine the
way in which those who deal with offenders ascertain, describe and
explain conditions, such as inebriety and psychopathy, which are often
referred to as illnesses. On the basis of this investigation it will
be argued that the term 'treatment', as used in the discourses of
penal policy, generally refers to an activity which differs
substantially - in terms of its objectives, methods and underlying
logic - from a medical model of treatment. It will also be argued that
those who deal with offenders tend to employ medical-sounding concepts
in a manner quite different to the way illness categories are employed
in a medical model of illness.
The main purpose of this exercise is to help us to understand the
distinctive features and the social consequences of modern forms of
penal control. Sociologists have regarded the increasing use of
medical terminology in the discourses of penal policy as a sign of a
more general transformation in the rationale and methods of social
control in modern industrial societies, a transformation which is
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generally summed up in terms such as 'the medicalization of deviance
and social control' (Conrad 1981). Sociologists such as Conrad (ibid),
Zola (1972) and Box (1980) and legal theorists such as Kittrie (1971)
have argued that - contrary to the conventional wisdom which regards
medicalization as a humanitarian and progressive development - the
medicalization of social control has in fact been detrimental to human
rights and progressive politics. In this thesis I will argue that
while there has been a transformation, since the second half of the
nineteenth century, in the rationale and methods of penal control,
those sociologists who subscribe to 'the medicalization thesis' have
mis-understood, in fundamental ways, the nature and consequences of
this transformation. One of the main reasons for this mis¬
understanding, I will argue, is that these sociologists have mis¬
interpreted the way in which medical-sounding terms, such as
'treatment', are employed in the discourses of penal policy. They have
tended, for instance, to presume that the term 'treatment' carries the
same meaning when it is employed in the discourses of penal policy as
it does when it is employed in the context of somatic medicine. This
thesis sets out to demonstrate that this presumption is quite
mistaken.
While intended primarily as a contribution to our understanding of
modern forms of penal control, it is hoped that the thesis will also
contribute to our understanding of social policy in general. The
tendency towards the use of medical terminology in the discourses of
penal policy was not an isolated development, rather it formed part of
a more widespread tendency towards the use of medical terminology in
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the discourses of social policy. For instance, the tendency to use the
term 'treatment' in the context of penal policy coincided with a
tendency to use the term in the fields of poor law administration (see
Williams 1981: ch.3) and special education (see Nokes 1967: ch.6).
Similarly, there has been a tendency to use medical terminology in the
discussion of a wide range of social phenomena, such as sexuality (see
Foucault 1979). Some sociologists have regarded this increasing use of
medical terminology in non-medical contexts as forming part of a
transformation in the way society is governed, a transformation which
has been characterised, variously, as the 'medicalisation of life'
(Lasch 1980), the 'triumph of the therapeutic' (Sieff 1966) and the
rise of 'the therapeutic state' (Kittrie 1971; Lasch 1980). Once again
writers such as Kittrie and Lasch are concerned to contest the
conventional evaluation of this development, as progressive and
humanitarian, and to reveal its more disturbing aspects.
I would agree with these writers that the use of medical terminology
in discourses of social policy and social phenomena forms part of a
transformation which has taken place, in Britain and other modern
industrial societies, since the mid-nineteenth century, in the
rationale and methods of social policy. However, if we are to
understand the nature and consequences of this transformation it is
necessary to understand how medical-sounding terminology is used in
these other areas of social policy. Such an investigation might put in
question the characterisation of this development as the
'medicalisation of life' or the 'rise of the therapeutic state' and
might also put in question the negative evaluation of the development.
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If the arguments of this thesis are correct then it might be
asserted, with some justification, that the use of medical-sounding
terminology in discussions of penal policy is inappropriate. It might
be argued that, by using medical-sounding words, those who deal with
offenders help to create a misleading image of the practices which
they undertake, of the institutions in which they work, and of the
knowledges which they employ. So why do those who deal with offenders
use words which have overtones of medical practice? Why have they not
tried to develop an alternative idiom, one which clearly conveys the
differences between 'penal treatment' and medical treatment? What is
the attraction of medical-sounding concepts? In order to answer these
questions it is necessary to consider the prestige of modern medicine
and the associated persuasive power of medical imagery.
The prestige of modern medicine derives, in large part, from the
success it has had in combatting the problem of illness and disease.
Medicine is a professionally organised social practice which not only
aims to ameliorate human suffering but also, to a considerable extent,
succeeds in achieving this objective. However, before the nineteenth
century, medicine's capacity to undertake effective interventions into
the problem of bodily illness was quite limited. The ability of
medicine to provide effective remedies for ill health was greatly
advanced in the nineteenth century by the application of the methods
and logic of the natural sciences - and particulary the sciences of
biology and chemistry - to the analysis of bodily processes and
functions (Hirst and Woolley 1982: 100).1
In the second half of the nineteenth century the increasing capacity
of medicine to understand and effectively intervene into the problem
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of ill health inspired those concerned with other social problems,
such as the problem of crime, to follow its example. It also inspired
members of the medical profession to apply themselves to other social
problems such as crime. By applying medical-scientific methods and
reasoning to the analysis of criminality, penal reformers - many of
whom were also medical professionals - hoped to obtain a level of
success in controlling and eliminating crime similar to that which
medicine had achieved in controlling and eliminating illness. For some
this meant that penal policy had to be put, like medicine, on a
scientific basis. The following, from an article titled 'Science
Approaches the Lawbreaker' , published in 1928, typifies this view.
. . . the methods employed by the Man of Science should be extended
from the care and treatment of the body to the care and treatment of
the soul . . . Science has already rescued the body of man from the
unscientific hands of the medieval practitioner who, ignorant of the
true causes of the maladies he has sought to cure, had recourse to
remedies which we now see were not calculated to produce the desired
results . . . All that now remains is to allow the Men of Science in
a similar manner to rescue the soul of man out of the hands of the
medieval psychologist - whose way of thinking underlies and is
exemplified by our present penal methods. (Gardner 1928: 205)
We might interpret Gardner as arguing simply for the introduction of
scientific rationality into penal practice. Gardner uses the progress
of medicine as a model, an example of what can be achieved when
scientific rationality is applied to human problems. But in the second
half of the nineteenth century, the idea of modelling penal practice
upon medicine was often taken much further than this. For some
'criminologists' it was not simply scientific reasoning, but
biological science itself, which was to be applied to the analysis of
criminality. Just as doctors had successfully utilised biological
science in analysing and treating bodily illness, many criminologists
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attempted to analyse criminality and to deal with it as a
physiological abnormality; criminality was reduced to biological
processes.2 Medical terminology was therefore adopted in discussions
of criminality and penal policy as part of an actual attempt to apply
medical methods and reasoning to the problem of crime. There appears
to have been a real hope that, by adopting a medical approach, the
causes of criminality could be better understood and the problem of
crime better controlled.
There was however an additional advantage to be obtained from the
utilisation of medical concepts. By framing its theories and
propositions in medical-scientific terms, the new 'natural science
criminology' could utilise the scientific status, social prestige and
caring image of medicine in order to promote its radical theories and
penal programme. Because of the social standing and scientific
reputation of medicine, penal reform proposals were likely to meet
with greater success if they were expressed in the idiom of medical
science.
Even so, this natural science criminology - despite gaining
considerable popular appeal - failed to make a deep impact upon the
thinking of penal officials and correspondingly failed to translate
its programme of penal reform into official policy.3 However, at
roughly the same time as this natural science criminology appeared,
there also emerged another form of criminology, one which differed
substantially - in terms of its theories of criminality and in terms
of its penal reform programme - from natural science criminology. This
other criminology was much more subtle, moderate and compromising than
natural science criminology and, largely because of this, it had a far
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greater impact upon official penal policy. One of the key
distinctinctive features of this more moderate criminology was that it
analysed criminality, not so much as a biologically-based condition,
but as a socio-psychological abnormality. The terminology of
physiological medicine was therefore somewhat inconsistent with the
propositions of this 'social psychiatric criminology'.
Nevertheless this new social psychiatric criminology continued to
utilise medical terminology; it employed medical terminology
metaphorically in describing and explaining its concepts, theories and
penal reform proposals. One of the main reasons for this, I would
suggest, is that the proponents of social psychiatric criminology
found the medical metaphor tactically useful in promoting their
theories and policy proposals. Although medical terminology was
somewhat inconsistent with the actual propositions of social
psychiatric criminology, it was nevertheless useful to employ such
terminology because of its persuasive power (cf. Garland 1985: ch.6).
Through the use of medical metaphor, the proponents the new social
psychiatric criminology could draw upon the respectability of medical
interventions. I would suggest therefore that medical terminology was
retained partly because it allowed the proponents of socio-
psychological criminology to utilise the scientific prestige and
social standing of somatic medicine in promoting their own, not
specifically medical, programme.
This is not to suggest that medical terminology was employed as part
of some cynical public relations exercise. It should be stressed that
many of those involved in penal reform have been medically qualified
professionals. The increasing use of medical terminology in penal
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policy discussions is also part of a broader development whereby the
prestige of medicine has been such that members of the medical
profession have been seen as competent in fields far removed from
their immediate area of expertise. It is also likely that those who
employed medical terminology were themselves attracted by the idea
that what they were doing, within the field of penal practices, was
analogous to what doctors were doing in the field of somatic medicine.
The use of medical terminology in discussions of penal policy is a
reflection of the social and professional aspirations of those who
deal with offenders. As Peter Nokes (1967) has argued, the treatment
role is a highly sought after one in 'the welfare professions' because
of the prestige which it bestows upon those who occupy it.
This helps to explain how medical-sounding concepts came to be
employed in discussions of penal policy and why such terminology was
still used long after it had become, strictly speaking, inappropriate
in terms of the actual propositions and policies being discussed.
However, it is still necessary, if we are to understand modern forms
of penal control, to examine what is meant by medical-sounding terms
when they are used within the context of penal policy. This is the
task which I will address in this thesis.
I will start, in this chapter, by discussing the critics of
medicalization - since it is they who have analysed this phenomenon
most explicitly and, in my view, have most clearly misunderstood its
meaning - looking in particular at the way these critics have
conceptualized and evaluated the transformations which have taken
place in the rationale and methods of social control since the second
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half of the nineteenth century. In the rest of the thesis I will
present two case studies: the first will examine penal discourse
regarding the 'treatment' of inebriates and alcoholic offenders since
the second half of the nineteenth century; the second examines penal
discourse with regard to the problem of moral insanity and psychopathy
since the 1830s. In each of these studies it will be possible to
examine the emergence and development of medical-sounding terminology
and to assess the way in which such terminology is used. It will also
be possible to look at the way in which the emergence of such
terminology relates to changes in the rationale and methods of penal
control. On the basis of these studies I will argue that the
'medicalisation thesis' misunderstands the way terms such as
'treatment' are used in discussions of penal policy and hence
misunderstands the nature and the consequences of the changes which
have taken place in the rationale and methods of penal control since
the mid-nineteenth century.
THE JURIDICAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL CQ1TTROL
As I have indicated, a major argument of my thesis is that many of
the criticisms which have been made of 'the medicalization of social
control' are based upon a mistaken and inadequate understanding of the
changes which have taken place in the rationale and methods of social
control since the second half of the nineteenth century. Proponents of
the 'medicalization thesis' have conceptualized this change as being
away from a juridical (or legal) approach to social control and
towards a therapeutic (or medical) approach (e.g. Zola 1972). In order
to assess the accuracy and adequacy of this assumption, it is
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necessary to look in detail at what is meant by a 'juridical approach
to social control' and a 'therapeutic approach to social control'
respectively. I will start by constructing an ideal type of 'the
juridical approach to social control, trying to identify its central,
distinctive features.
Ideological basis
The juridical approach to social control is based within - and
indeed forms an important constitutive part of - a wider ideology of
liberalism. The overriding objective of liberalism is to secure a
political system in which the freedom of individuals is maximised.
Freedom, in liberal theory, is conceived in 'negative' terms as the
absence of constraint or compulsion (see Young 1980: 122). So,
according to liberal ideology, people should be "entitled to do what
they want as long as they do not transgress the rules which have been
set up beforehand by themselves or their representatives and which are
there to prevent destructive clashes of interests" (Bankowski 1989:
2>.
Social control is therefore highly problematic within liberal
ideology. Social control constrains and compels; it interferes with
the individual's right to do what he wants. Penal methods of social
control, such as imprisonment, are particularly problematic, since
imprisonment constrains and compels almost absolutely. Imprisonment
appears to be almost the ultimate negation of freedom.
Ve might ask then how social control, and particularly penal forms
of social control, are justified within liberal ideology. The answer
can be found in the above quotation from Bankowski's characterisation
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of 'democratic liberty'. A limited amount of social control is
regarded as necessary in order to prevent "destructive clashes of
interest". If everybody does what they want, then some people will
inevitably interfere with the freedom of others. The objective of
maximising the freedom of each individual would thereby be frustrated.
It is therefore necessary that individuals obey a set of rules
designed to prevent individuals interfering with the rights of others.
It is true that in being compelled to obey these rules the freedom of
individuals is restricted to a certain degree, but this is necessary
in order to prevent some individuals from making even greater
encroachments upon the freedom of others. Each individual must
surrender a small portion of his freedom, in exchange for the
protection of his remaining freedom.
The form and objectives of juridical social control
This liberal conception of the relationship between freedom and
social control dictates a particular form of social control. Social
control is to be achieved through the instrument of law. A set of
rules, specifying conduct which is prohibited, is declared. Steps are
then taken to ensure that individuals do not transgress these rules.
Liberalism therefore favours a prohibitory form of social control. The
objective is to induce people to conduct themselves within certain
limits. As long as their behaviour remains within the limits imposed
by law, people should be subject to no other form of constraint or
compulsion. The purpose of social control is to prevent people from
breaking the law and thereby harming others; it is not the business of
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social control to compel people to adopt better ways of behaving. As
the nineteenth century liberal theorist J. S. Mill put it:
. . . the only purpose for which power can rightly be exercised over
any member of a civilised community against his will is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not
sufficient warrant" (Mill, quoted in Greenwood and Young 1980)
Methods of social control: (a) deterrence
Making rules is one thing, getting people to obey them is an
entirely different matter. I will now go on to look at the
liberalism's preferred methods of inducing conformity to the law.
The main 'technique' of social control suggested by liberalism is
the use of deterrent punishment.A Liberal penal theorists, such as
Bentham, Beccaria and Feuerbach, argued that the punishment of those
who transgressed the criminal law would prevent the commission of
further offences - either by the offender or by others tempted to
commit crime - since people would try to avoid having similar
punishments inflicted upon themselves.5 In other words, social control
was to be achieved by making an example of the convicted offender.
However, for liberal penal theorists the practice of punishment had to
conform to certain conditions if it was to function as an effective
deterrent, Before outlining these conditions it is necessary to look
closer at the concept of deterrent punishment.
An essential ingredient of punishment is that "it involves a
deliberate and avoidable infliction of suffering" upon the offender
(cf. Honderich 1976: 11). In liberal penal theory this ingredient was
refined so that punishment was conceived, not so much the direct
infliction of corporal suffering, but as the deprivation of a good, or
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the removal of something desired (ibid). Within liberalism, the most
symbolic punishment is imprisonment, the deprivation of liberty. The
offender, who has broken the rules which are there to protect the
freedom of others, has his own right to freedom suspended. Other
punishments favoured in liberal societies, such as the monetary fine,
also involve depriving the offender of something which liberal
ideology regards as highly valuable. Essentially, then, punishment is
something which is calculated to harm the offender. It is something
which is intended to cause the offender pain.
When considering deterrence it is useful to bear in mind another
ingredient of punishment, its stigmatizing affect. Although this is
not always the result of a deliberate policy, punishment generally
causes disgrace, humiliation and shame. So, in being punished the
offender is made to suffer in a two ways; first, the rights which he
would normally enjoy as a citizen are suspended; and secondly, he
incurs the pain of injured reputation, property, or person.
Liberal penal theorists assumed that since punishment is something
painful and disgraceful, individuals would try to avoid it. This
assumption rests upon a definite perception of the criminal actor.
This perception consisted of two interrelated elements: free will and
rationality.
Free will: The idea of deterrent punishment assumes that people,
including criminals, are self-governing individuals, with the capacity
to direct and control their own behaviour through an act of will. This
conception of human action provides a moral justification for
punishment, since it allows criminal actions to be construed as the
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product of a conscious choice to commit crime; hence the criminal can
be held to be morally responsible for his offence and thus deserving
of punishment. Vhat is important here though is that the idea of
deterrent punishment, likewise, presupposes crime to be a 'wilful'
act. Deterrence presumes that persons have the ability to choose
whether to act in a lawful or unlawful manner. This can be seen most
clearly when it is stated the other way round: if a person was not
capable of acting in accordance with free will, if his actions were
determined by forces beyond his control, then that person would commit
a crime, if he were destined to do so, regardless of what the
consequences might be.
Rationality. The concept of deterrent punishment also presupposes
that people will act in a manner calculated to be advantageous to
themselves. People will follow (what they calculate to be) the most
profitable course of action. They will always do what they think it is
in their best interest to do. It is important to point out, however,
that deterrence does not necessarily presume that this process of
calculation is a conscious one. Hence to state this presumption in the
vocabulary of the utilitarian 'psychology' from which it was derived:
all persons follow a course of action calculated - albeit unknowingly
- to maximize their pleasure and to minimize their pain. Or, to quote
Bentham:
Each individual conducts himself, albeit unknowingly, according to a
well or ill-made calculus of pleasures and pains. Should he foresee
that a pain will be the consequence of an act which pleases him,
this idea will act with a certain force so as to divert him from
that action. If the total value of pain appears greater to him than
the total value of the pleasure, the repulsive force will be
greater; the act will not occur. (Bentham, quoted in Pasquino 1980)
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Hence should a person foresee that punishment (which, as we have
seen, is essentially something painful) will be the consequence of a
criminal action (which might in itself bring profit or pleasure) then
that person will be diverted from the criminal act, provided that the
threatened punishment is severe enough to outweigh the pleasure to be
gained from committing the offence. So, it is presumed to be possible
to prevent crime by impressing upon citizens the realization that the
commission of a crime will be followed by the imposition of a
punishment which would more than offset the advantage to be gained
from the crime.
In the above quotation from Bentham there are two crucial points:
first, the person must foresee that punishment will be the consequence
of a crime; secondly, the punishment must be sufficient to outweigh
the profit of the offence. These two factors impose certain conditions
upon the practice of punishment, which must be adhered to if
punishment is to function as an effective deterrent.
Publicity: If people are to foresee that crime will be followed by
punishment, then it is necessary to 'advertise' the fact. What has to
be maximized, therefore, is not so much the penalty itself, but its
representation (Foucault 1977b: 94-5). This point has been well
illustrated by Pasquino, who cites the following two remarks from
Bentham. I have repeated then here since, as Pasquino states, they
throw light upon the 'punitive rationality' of liberal theory.
(a) "If an abridged edition of the penal code were to be published,
illustrated with woodcuts showing the specific penalty laid down for
each kind of crime, this would act as an imposing commentary,
a sensible image of the law. Each person would then be led to think
to himself: this is what I must suffer if I should break the law."
(b) "The penal scene is located in the neighbourhood of a
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metropolis, the place which contains assembled the greatest number
of men and of those among them who most need to have displayed before
their eyes the punishment of crime. The appearance of the building,
the singularity of its form, the walls and moats that surround it,
the guards at its gates, all this serves to reinforce the idea of
malefactors confined and punished: the ease of admission could not
fail to attract a great number of visitors . . . What a most striking
spectacle for the most numerous class of spectators! What a theme
for conversations, allusions, domestic lessons, useful stories! . . .
And yet the real penalty is less great than the apparent one . . .
The punishments being visible, the imagination exaggerates them."
(Bentham, quoted in Pasquino 1980: 21-2)
Certainty. If people think that they can escape the punishment, some
will yield to the temptation to commit crime. Liberal penal theorists
therefore emphasized certainty of conviction and punishment as the
best means of achieving deterrence. If punishment was to operate as an
efficient deterrent it was essential to impress upon individuals that
every crime would be punished. This ideal of certainty of conviction
and punishment led to a number of specific penal policies. It led, for
instance, to support for the establishment of an efficient, rationally
organised police force (Foucault 1977b: 96; Reiner 1985: 11). For the
purpose of this study, however, the ideal of certainty has had two
important sets of consequences for penal policy.
First it has led to, what might be termed, a 'positivist' approach
to criminal law. Liberal penal theorists favour a definite, publicly
declared, set of criminal laws; i.e. a penal code which is known to
all (cf. Foucault 1977b: 95-6). A crime then consists simply of an
infraction defined by law (cf. Pasquino 1980: 19). Conduct which does
not infringe a specified law does not constitute a crime, no matter
how unjust or reprehensible it is judged to be, and regardless of
whether it transgresses traditional or customary rules. Liberalism is
therefore against the notion of 'natural crime'. For the purpose of
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deterrence the advantage of this stance is that it enables people to
clearly distinguish between criminal actions and lawful actions (cf.
Foucault 1977b: 95-6). The link between crime and punishment therefore
becomes more 'obvious'; punishment can be seen as the inevitable
response to a transgression.
Secondly, the need for certainty has led to a dislike of discretion
in the system of penal control. In order to deter crime it is
necessary to impress upon citizens that if they commit a crime they
will automatically suffer the prescribed punishment for their offence
(ibid). In order to do this it is necessary to ensure that those who
are convicted of offences do, in fact, have the prescribed punishment
imposed upon them. For this to be possible a number of conditions have
to apply. For instance, as Foucault points out, there can be no right
to pardon (ibid). What is most important for this study, however, is
that there has to be a system of determinate sentencing. If penal
officials, or anybody else, are allowed to waive or even substantially
adjust the penalty, the possibility of escaping the prescribed
punishment for an offence might again enter the minds of those tempted
to commit crime. The prescribed penalty for an offence should be
stated in advance, and then applied with as little variation as
possible.
Proportionality. In order to deter crime the punishment has to be
sufficiently severe to offset any advantage or 'pleasure' which the
offender might derive from his crime. In the words of Bentham,
punishment should be "not less in any case than is sufficient to
outweigh . . . the profit of the offence" (quoted in Kittrie 1971).
However, any punishment in excess of that necessary to offset the
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profit of the offence would be - for liberalism - an unnecessary
infliction of harm. Punishment should therefore be proportionate to
the offence committed. The amount of harm inflicted upon the offender
should be roughly equal (or rather slightly greater than) the amount
of harm caused by the offence.6
Methods of social control: (b) reformation
A second 'technique' of social control, which some liberal theorists
advocated, was the reformation of offenders. In the case of
reformation, punishment is used as a device, or as an opportunity, for
improving the offender's character and habits, thereby making it less
likely that he will offend again in the future.
It is necessary to distinguish two different concepts of reformative
punishment. In the first it is suggested that punishment itself can be
used to bring about a change in the offender's 'character', and may
even strengthen the resolve of others not to commit crime. In the
second, it is suggested that punishment should be accompanied by the
use of reformative techniques; punishment being used as a means of
compelling the offender to submit to these techniques (see Bean 1981:
46). The first of these concepts of reformative punishment has been
explained by Hart, who also, conveniently, distinguishes this idea of
reformation from that of deterrence:
It is possible that the actual experience of the pains of punishment
may lead to what is usually meant by 'reform', viz. a change of
heart and effective resolution to conform to law not because of fear
of repeated punishment but out of moral conviction. . . . Others have
argued that the application of punishment to an actual offender, by
marking the law's condemnation of a crime, may not merely deter
potential offenders through fear but may strengthen their moral
inhibition against the conduct thus condemned, and this too, may be
considered a species of reform. (Hart 1968: 240)
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What is distinctive about this idea of reformation is that it does
not require the use of any special reformative techniques. Punishment
itself is the means of bringing about a change in the offender's moral
disposition. However, in the second concept of reformative punishment,
it is suggested that reformative 'techniques' should be employed in
addition to punishment in order to bring about an improvement in the
offenders character and habits. So, if we are to explain the nature
and consequences of the changes which have taken place in the
rationale and methods of social control since the second half of the
nineteenth century, we need to ask what were the preferred methods of
reforming offenders. Without going into too much detail, we might
identify the favoured reformative techniques as being discipline,
education and moral exhortation. These techniques, we might note, had
one thing in common, they were all best developed in prisons (see
Salmond 1920: 76). In the second half of the nineteeth century
incarceration was a favoured form of punishment partly because of its
usefulness for reformative purposes. I will now look, very briefly, at
each of these 'techniques'.
Discipline: In the second half of the nineteenth century, prisoners
were subjected to a regime of uniform discipline, which included
features such as a strict timetable, regulation diet, hard labour and
punishment (such as reduction of diet, increased work periods and
corporal punishment) for deviation from the rules (Garland 1985: 12-
13; cf. Foucault 1977b). One of the functions of discipline was to
train the offender in regular and productive habits, thereby
contributing to his reform (cf. Foucault 1977b).
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Education: Some prisoners in the second half of the nineteenth
century received a small amount of elementary education (Garland 1985:
13). As with elementary education in general, part of the purpose of
this was to enable the recipient's moral improvement.7
Koral exhortation: As well as receiving elementary education,
prisoners might also be subject a small amount of more direct moral
exhortation, by the chaplain or a philanthropic visitor (cf. ibid).
This second concept of of reformative punishment was not acceptable
to all liberal penal theorists. As we have seen the idea of making
people behave well, through the use of compulsion and constraint, was
somewhat at odds with the liberal ideology of 'negative freedom'.
Reformative punishment, which attempted to improve the offender's
moral disposition and habits under conditions of compulsion, could
easily be regarded as a breach of the person's right to one's own
morality, a right which extended even to criminals, who could not be
forced to conform to the law, but could only be punished for their
transgressions. Hence for Beccaria:
Reformation is not to be thrust even on the criminal; and while, for
the very fact of its being enforced, it loses its usefulness and
efficiency, such enforcement is contrary to the rights of the
criminal, who can never be compelled to anything save suffering the
legal punishment. (Beccaria, quoted in Garland 1985: 34)
However, other liberal penal theorists were less hostile to the
concept of reformative punishment and Bentham actually promoted the
idea (Garland 1985: 16-17; Rodman 1968). In Britain, as Garland points
out, official penal policy was closer to Bentham than to Beccaria;
reformation was regarded as a subsidiary objective of punishment
(Garland: ibid). It needs to be stressed, however, that in the second
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half of the nineteenth century reformation was only a subsidiary
objective of British penal policy. The idea of reformation had most
impact upon the working of quasi-penal institutions, such as
reformatory and industrial schools for young offenders (ibid: 8). In
the prisons, which lay at the centre of the penal system, the
objective of reformation was regarded as subordinate to other
objectives, such as deterrence, less-eligibility and uniformity
(ibid).
THE THERAPEUTIC APPROACH TO SOCIAL CQflTKQL
Having briefly described some of the central distinctive features of
the juridical approach to social control, I will now move on to
construct an ideal type of 'the therapeutic approach to social
control', the approach to social control which, according to the
medicalization thesis, is replacing the juridical approach in modern
societies such as Britain.0
Ideological basis
While the juridical approach to social control is based within the
ideology of liberalism, the therapeutic approach to social control is
based within an ideology of welfare. Hence Kittrie (1971), examines
the shift towards a therapeutic approach to social control within the
context of a broader transition towards a welfare/therapeutic state.
As with the liberal state, the objective of the welfare state is to
promote the freedom of individuals. However, in the ideology of
welfare, freedom is conceived in a positive sense. Freedom is no
longer regarded as the absence of constraint and compulsion, rather it
is seen as requiring that the individual's basic needs are met. Where
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these needs cannot be met by the individual's efforts in the open
market, it becomes the duty of the state to meet them. In the ideology
of welfare, freedom therefore requires positive intervention by the
state. Accordingly, the welfare state is a paternalist,
interventionist state; one of its major functions is to ensure that
its people are provided for and cared for.
Within the ideology of welfare, social control is not as problematic
as it is within the ideology of liberalism. Constraint and compulsion
are not necessarily the negation of freedom, since freedom is
something more than - and other than - the entitlement to do what one
wants. There is not the same concern, within welfarism, to restrict
social control. Indeed such restriction may be regarded as harmful
where social control is considered necessary in order to promote the
welfare of the individual.
This brings us to a crucial feature of welfarism. Within the
ideology of welfarism social control is often justified, not simply as
a necessary evil - i.e. necessary in order to prevent destructive
clashes of interest - but as a useful instrument in promoting the
welfare of individuals. By constraining and compelling individuals,
the state can act for the ultimate benefit of those individuals.
Social control is regarded as being, in many cases, freedom-enhancing
rather than freedom-restricting.
The farm and objectives of therapeutic social control
This transformation from liberalism to welfarism entails an
accompanying shift in the form and objectives of social control. In
welfarism, the objective of social control is not simply to ensure
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that persons remain within the law, rather it is to enhance the
welfare of the individual. This leads to a shift away from breaches of
the criminal law as the sole justification for the initiation of
social control. If the purpose of social control is to produce 'well'
individuals, then any conduct which interferes with the well-being of
individuals should be restrained through social control measures. The
ambit of social control is therefore greatly expanded. Social control
under welfarism is concerned not only with those who break the law,
but with others whose habits and characteristics are detrimental to
their well-being.
Methods of social control: treatioent
From what has been said, it might be seen that the ideology of
welfarism encourages a great deal more of social control than does
liberalism. This has implications for the study of social control,
since studies must now take into account a far wider and more
diversified range of activities.® The social control which takes place
within the criminal justice system is only one part, albeit a very
important part, of the welfare State's official social control
apparatus. For the purposes of this thesis, however, I will
concentrate upon social control within, and at the boundaries of, the
criminal justice system. I will use the term penal control to
distinguish this aspect of social control from social control in
general.
The question then is what is welfarism's preferred mode of inducing
compliance with the law. Proponents of the medicalization thesis
suggest that with the shift towards welfarism there is a double shift
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in the preferred mode of penal control. First, reform replaces
deterrence as the primary method of penal control (see Allen 1973).
Secondly, there is a change in reformative techniques, away from moral
persuasion and towards medical-scientific techniques of reform (ibid).
It is this last claim that gives the medicalization thesis its
distinctive flavour - and it is this claim which I will be
particularly concerned to challenge in this study.
From deterrence to reform
First, I will look at the suggestion that reform is replacing
deterrence as the primary method of penal control. This, in itself,
would have a number of important implications for penal control. In
particular, it would lead to an erosion of the principle of
determinate sentencing (see Bean 1981: 64). If reform is the primary
objective of penal control then there is little point in releasing an
offender from the ambit of penal control until he has been reformed.
In a purely reformative system the offender would be subject to penal
control until his character and habits had been improved to the extent
that he was unlikely to commit further offences or other
delinquencies. Similarly, there would be little point in subjecting a
reformed offender to further penal control. Once the offender's
character and habits had been improved, and he was no longer a
nuisance or a danger, to others or himself, then - from the paint of
view of reform - there is nothing further to be achieved by subjecting
him to further penal control.
Since it is difficult to tell in advance how long an offender would
have to be subject to penal control techniques in order to be
reformed, it is necessary to modify, if not to abandon altogether, the
principle of determinate sentencing. 'Sentences' cannot be strictly
determined in advance, rather the length of 'reformative treatment'
required must be left open to some extent. This has the further
implication that the length of 'treatment' is to be decided, not
solely in advance by a judge or jury, but on a more or less day to day
basis by those responsible for administering reformative treatment.
Decisions about penal control pass, to some extent, from the law to
penal officials, the administrators of penal treatment.
The shift in language here - from the punitive term 'sentencing' to
the medical-sounding term 'treatment' - is important. With the shift
towards reform, the criteria used to determine the length of penal
control become more like those used in medical treatment. Take, for
example, the way decisions are made governing the length of stay in a
hospital. The expected length of stay may be determined in advance,
although in difficult cases it might be 'left open'. Even where the
decision is made in advance, however, the length of stay may be
modified depending upon the outcome of treatment. If the treatment is
particularly successful, the patient may be released early; if there
are any complications, the patient may be detained longer. In any
case, the patient shouldn't be released until he is well enough to
return home. The ultimate decision will be made by those responsible
for the patient's treatment, and it will be made 'after the event'.
The medicalization thesis suggests that with the shift towards a
primarily reformative approach to penal control, this medical logic is
applied to decisions about the length of time an offender needs to be
subjected to penal control (see Bean 1981: 64).
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If a shift towards reformation implies an erosion of the principle
of determinate sentencing, then the principle of proportionality must
also be modified, if not abandoned. The length of period an offender
is subject to penal control would have to be governed, not by the
seriousness or profitability of the offence, but by the offender's
character and habits. The measure of the length of treatment is the
offender's character, rather than his offence.
From moral persuasion to treatment
I will now move on to outline the claim that traditional techniques
of reformation are being replaced by medical-scientific techniques.
According to this claim, attempts to reform the offender through
punishment and moral persuasion have given way to the medical-
scientific control of human behaviour. This transformation itself
depends upon a shift in the way human action in general, and criminal
action in particular, is understood. Criminal acts are no longer
regarded as freely chosen, rationally calculated actions, but are seen
as the determined outcome of antecedent causes. As Allen (1973) put
it:
It is assumed, first, that human behaviour is the product of
antecedent causes. These causes can be identified as part of the
physical universe, and it is the obligation of the scientist to
discover and to describe them with all possible exactitude.
Knowledge of the antecedents of human behaviour makes passible an
approach to the scientific control of human behaviour.
(Allen 1973: 173)
The therapeutic approach to crime is based, then, upon a medical-
scientific model of criminality (see e.g. Balch 1975; Box 1980; Koran
1980). This views crime not as a voluntary, calculated act, but as an
'illness', as the determined product of underlying physical or
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psychological attributes.10 It is this medical-determinist mode of
explanation which makes the project of medical-scientific penal
control possible. If criminal conduct has definite causes, and if
those causes can be identified and the process by. which they lead to
criminal behaviour can be understood, then it is possible to prevent
further offences. Crime can be prevented by removing the cause, or by
diverting the process by which it leads to criminal conduct. It is
also passible to prevent crime more generally, by identifying those
likely to commit criminal acts in the future before they have actually
comitted an offence. This can be done by examining people in order see
whether they display the symptoms of 'criminality' or else possess the
physical or psychological attributes which lead to crime. The
therapeutic approach to crime involves, then, not only the treatment
of offenders, but also a wider social programme geared towards the
identification of future offenders and treating them in order to
prevent them from actually becoming offenders (see Clarke 1975: 36;
Kittrie 1971: 30-31).
What then are the techniques used to control the behaviour of
offenders and of others with a propensity to crime, and in what sense
are they different from traditional reformative techniques?
Some proponents of the medicalization thesis have tended to focus
upon the emergence of somatic treatments. Conrad (1981), for instance,
presents a list of examples of medical solutions which have been
developed for behavioural problems and social deviance. All of the
treatments that he mentions involve physical treatment of some sort.
Hence, he points to the development of drug treatment for
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exhibitionists and hyperactive children, psychosurgery for young men
prone to violent outbursts, medication given to to alleviate 'mood
disorders' of prisoners, by-pass operations for obesity and heroin-
blocking agents for drug addicts. In a similar vein, Moran (1980) - in
a paper dealing specifically with the 'medical control of criminality'
- points to the use, in the United States, of psychosurgery on those
involved in urban riots. This literature pays little attention to the
specific objectives or operational principles of these treatments, but
it is generally presumed that their objective is to prevent
delinquency by subduing the delinquent (Conrad 1975; Box 1980). Most
importantly, however,is the assumption that these treatments actually-
work. The use of physical treatment is regarded as successful in
preventing individuals from behaving in a criminal or delinquent
manner (Box 1980). For instance, in a paper on the drug treatment of
'hyperkinesis', a behavioural disorder in children, Conrad (1975: 17)
states that drug therapies have actually been successful in their
objective of making children less disruptive and in enabling them to
learn.
More generally, though, proponents of the medicalization thesis also
include, within the ambit of medicalization, the emergence of
'psychological' techniques of social control. Hence, Greenwood and
Young (1980: 150), in discussing the "increasing use of scientific
techniques in the deployment of reaction to deviance", include under
this heading "the whole gamut of therapeutic approaches to the 'cure'
of deviancy, ranging from drug therapy, through psychotherapy, to the
use of therapeutic communities". Box (1980), discusses the use of
brain surgery (which is very rarely used), drug therapies (which are
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most popular) and also individual psychotherapy, behavioural therapy
and methods of 'altering environmental contingencies'. Moran (1900)
discusses psychological techniques of 'behavioural modification'.
Once again, though, proponents of the medicalization thesis do not
tend to explain the specific objectives or operational principles of
these various psychological techniques. It is assumed, however, that
the abjective is to produce conformity to law and other norms through
the use of a variety of psychological techniques designed to alter the
attitudes and habits of offenders and other delinquents. Once again,
it seems to be assumed that these techniques are actually successful
in producing conformity. It is presumed that the control of human
behaviour through psychological techniques has actually been realised.
What distinguished these techniques, whether physical or
psychological, from traditional reformative techniques is their
effectiveness and intrusiveness. Vith traditional reformative
techniques, such as moral persuasion, there was no guarantee of
success; the offender could, if he so wished, resist all moral
exhortation. Modern methods of treatment on the other hand, whether
physical or psychological, are presumed to be capable of modifying the
conduct and character of offenders, whether or not the offender wishes
to change. They are capable of altering the conduct of "unwilling and
unco-operative clients" (cf. Kittrie 1971: 10).
THE CRITIQUE OF THE THERAPEUTIC APPROACH
I will now move on to consider some of the main criticisms which
sociologists and legal theorists have made of the therapeutic approach
to social control. In doing this I will also try to show that these
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criticisms are, in fact, aimed at the image of the therapeutic
approach which I have just outlined (and usually entail a preference
for the juridical approach which I have also described).
The benevolent image of social control and the erosion
of procedural safeguards
As we have seen, the transformation from liberalism to welfarism
entails a change in the way social control is viewed. From being
perceived as a freedom-restricting punishment, social control comes to
be regarded as freedom-enhancing treatment. One consequence of this is
that welfarism places less emphasis than does liberalism upon the need
for checks upon the exercise of social control. Where social control
is justified as treatment, the need for procedural safeguards becomes
less apparent. To quote Box (1980): "benevolent medical motivation
dispenses of the need for due process". Or, as Balch (1975) put it:
the medical/benevolence model legitimises a departure form due
Jf
process, leaving ofenders subject to the discretion of medical
experts.
This aspect of the therapeutic approach to social control has been
criticised by legal theorists such as Allen (1973) and Kittrie (1971).
They argue that the transformation to a therapeutic approach to social
control has been accompanied by an erosion of civil liberties. Arguing
from well within liberal ideology, they claim that even where social
control is justified as being for the benefit of its recipient, it is
still social control and therefore freedom restricting. Therapeutic
social control therfore needs to be subjected to the same safeguards
as more obviously punitive forms of social control. To quote Allen:
Measures which subject individuals to the substantial and
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involuntary deprivation of their liberty are essentially punitive in
character, and this reality is not altered by the facts that the
motivations that prompt incarceration are to provide therapy or
otherwise contribute to the person's well-being or reform. As such,
these measures must be clearly scrutinised to ensure that power is
being applied consistently with those values of the community that
justify interferences with liberty for only the most clear and
compelling reasons. (Allen 1973: 181)
The expansion of social control and the threat to pluralism
As we have seen, the medicalization thesis argues that welfarism
encourages more social control. Social control is no longer concerned
solely, as it is in liberalism, with the prohibition of deviant
conduct which is harmful to others, it is also concerned with conduct
considered harmful to the deviant himself. Any habits or
characteristics which are regarded as detrimental to the person's
welfare are seen as a target for social control. Hence it has been
suggested that the move towards a therapeutic approach to social
control constitutes a threat to pluralism. Or, in the words of Kittrie
(1971), it constitutes a threat to 'the right to be different'. This
aspect of the therapeutic approach to social control has been
criticized by the sociologist Zola (1972), who argues that the real
danger from medical social control lies not in its being an overt
evil, but in its benevolence. In its bid to create a perfect human
society, the therapeutic approach to social control threatens civil
liberties and the diversity which contributes to the quality of life.
Criticisms of the indeterminate sentence
The idea of indeterminate sentencing has been criticised on the
grounds that it leads to a situation in which those who have no desire
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to change their behaviour are subjected to long periods of
incarceration, which is not justified by any offence they have
committed (see Bean 1976: ch. 1; Allen 1973). Many offenders, for a
variety of reasons, do not want to be reformed. This is particularly
true of those whose offences are politically motivated, or of those
who have a 'principled' commitment to non-conformist behaviour. Under
the indeterminate sentence system, these will be incarcerated for long
periods, and subjected to reformative techniques. Even where these
reformative techniques are unsuccessful, the offender will be
subjected to "prolonged and degrading torment" (Rodman 1968: 210)."
The critique of medical-scientific techniques of social control
As we have just seen, attempts to reform offenders, even when they
are unsuccesful, are considered to be problematic. The move towards
effective, medical-scientific techniques of reformation, however, is
regarded as constituting an even greater threat to the offender. As
Rodman (1968: 210) puts it: to the extent that reformative techniques
are based upon an adequate understanding of human psychology, and are
therefore successful, they will "result in the coercion and
manipulation of the individual to a degree not even imaginable under
older, rougher methods".
The objection to medical-scientific techniques of social control
forms the hub to the critique of the therapeutic approach to social
control. The problem with such medical-scientific techniques is that
they present the greatest threat of all to 'the right to be
different'. Through the use of such techniques, offenders are not only
punished for non-conformity, they are also transformed, against their
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will, into conforming citizens. The whole process smacks of thought
control, 'brainwashing' and totalitarianism- of 1984, Clockwork
Orange and Brave New World (see Cohen 1979).
The 'neutralization' of political dissent
This brings us to an important point. It might be noticed by now
that the critics of the therapeutic aproach to crime are concerned not
just with the the penal consequences of the therapeutic approach to
crime - i,.e. with its consequences for offenders - but also (and
perhaps mainly) with its political consequences. In order to explain
this it is necessary to point out that much of the critique of the
therapeutic approach to crime presupposes that crime (or at least a
significant amount of crime) can be viewed as a form of political
dissent. The commission of crime may be a principled breach of the
law.12 Alternatively, crime may be committed during a political
protest. However, as we shall see in a moment, crime itself may be
seen as an inherently political act. First though, I will consider a
statement by Clarke (1975), who draws the link between crime and
politics in relatively restricted manner. Clarke was concerned with
those who "break the law on principle". Vith regard to such offenders,
he writes:
The dangers of treatment as indoctrination . . . become apparent. It
is one thing to induce conformity by external sanctions, for this
leaves it open to the individual whether to conform from expediency
or to offend and incur sanctions. Treatment, however, is directed
precisely at getting him to change his views about conformity rather
than allowing him to keep the law despite his beliefs and campaign
to change it. In starting out by helping offenders who may be
constrained to recidivate, the treatment view may catch those
recidivists whose transgressions are acts of protest at what they
regard as evil laws. In eliminating the propensity to offend,
treatment may also eliminate the capacity to participate as a
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citizen In the political process of law-making . . .
(Clarke 1975: 35-6, emphasis added)
Clarke's concern is with the conscientious political offender. His
objections to treatment do not appear to extend to the treatment of
ordinary offenders. Others, however, have adopted a more radical
attitude. Box (1980), for instance, suggests that most (if not all)
delinquency is a form of political protest, even where it is not
directly political.13 Box's arguments were made in the context of the
treatment of 'maladjusted' children, but they are clearly intended as
being relevant to the understanding of all forms of delinquency,
including crime; the medicalization of naughty schoolchildren "is
merely an illustration of a much wider process of medicalizing social,
moral and legal problems" (ibid).
Box argues that 'naughty behaviour' of schoolchildren is often an
inarticulate protest, a "gesture of moral outrage" at the injustice in
society and in schools (injustice which is ultimately the product of
capitalism, which educates youths for Jobs which don't exist). Haughty
behaviour, therefore, if it was interpreted properly and listened to,
could become a focal point for political change. Instead, however,
this protest is silenced by the medical profession who define naughty
children as 'hyperactive' or 'maladjusted' and then 'treat' them with
drugs. This treatment has the effect of turning naughty children into
obedient, orderly children who are prepared to submit to the schools
authority. As Lasch (1980) put it, the new mechanisms of therapeutic
control pacify "a formerly rebellious population". Treatment quietens
the population, making it more manageable" (Greenwood and Young 1980:
159) Social harmony, civil tranquillity and school discipline are
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produced, but in a 'criminogenic society' social harmony is
undesirable - what is required is revolt.. So, for Box, the role of
treatment is to ensure that revolt doesn't take place; treatment is
therefore regarded as a means of protecting the existing, unjust,
social order:
A generation of urban poor, many of them on prescribed drugs since
their infancy, are hardly going to transcend their medication and
revolt. Instead they are likely to have internalised the medical
view that they are indeed sick cases and merely seek medical or
quasi-medical treatment. <Box 1980)
The de-politicizatian of deviant behaviour
From this last quotation from Box, it can be seen that the
neutralization of political protest is regarded, by critics of the
therapeutic approach to social control, as an ideological, as well as
a practical, accomplishment. As well as silencing political dissent in
concrete terms, through the use of medication (the so-called 'liquid
cosh'), it is argued that the therapeutic approach to social control
'depoliticizes' political protest by defining delinquents as ill (Zola
1972: Conrad 1975/6). As Box put it:
Medical experts propose definitional shifts in moral, ethical and
political problems into medical conditions, so that the conflicts,
disputes and disagreements implicit in the former can be avoided by
systematically labelling some of the antagonists. . . as diseased.
In this way structural or cultural changes which might otherwise
became the focal point for solving social problems are replaced with
a terse medical injunction: get them and cure them" (Box 1980)
The basic problem here is that by defining conforming behaviour as
healthy, and non-conforming behaviour as ill, the therapeutic approach
'naturalises' the dominant morality. It presents the dominant morality
- what is in fact the product of ethical and political choices - as
naturally right (see Balch 1975). Hence delinquent conduct, which may,
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in some cases, be the product of a rational and "intentional
repudiation of existing political arrangements" <Conrad and Schneider
1980: ch.9), is represented as irrational and determined, as the
product of an underlying disorder. Political protesters are
represented as "flawed individuals" (Box 1980). This process is often
compared to the abuse of psychiatry once prevalent in the U. S. S. R. ,
where political dissidents are defined as insane (see Conrad 1975). As
well as justifying the detention of dissidents, this medical
definition of the problem also de-politicizes deviance in an
ideological sense. It disseminates the view that any way of behaving
which is not in accordance with the dominant morality is simply
irrational and sick. For the critics of the therapeutic aproach to
crime, the dissemination of such a view is perhaps, in the long run, a
greater political threat than the more concrete aspects of therapeutic
control (Box 1980).
The individualization of social problems
The final criticism which I will outline is somewhat contradictary
when read alongside the others. It is often argued that the
therapeutic approach to social control individualizes social.problems
in the sense that it,ignores the social structural factors which cause
crime, and regards crime as the product of 'internal' malfunctioning,
whether psychological or organic (Conrad 1981: 118; Greenwood and
Young 1980; Zola 1972; Balch 1975; Conrad and Schneider 1980: ch.9).
It is important to distinguish this argument from the previous one
(even though the critics of the therapeutic approach often fail to
make this distinction). In the case of 'depoliticization', it is
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argued that crime is a protest against the injustices of the social
order - crime is seen as rational and innocuous (or even useful). In
the case of individualization, however, it is argued that crime is
caused by the injustices of the social order - in which case crime is
regarded as a genuine social problem. In this second argument, it is
agreed (with the proponents of treatment) that crime is a problem
which has identifiable causes; what is disputed is where these causes
are to be located. Critics argue that the advocates of treatment
locate the causes of crime within the individual, whereas they should
be located in the social order.
If prostitutes make a living by selling their bodies, then we must
find the roots in the sexist nature of society; if women have
abortions because they cannot afford to have another child, then we
must look to the economic problems which capitalism engenders . . .
we must look to the irrationality of the social order, not the
inadequacy of the individual. (Greenwood and Young 1980: 158)1A
The critique which I have outlined paints a grim picture of the
therapeutic approach to social control. This, of course, is precisely
its intention. The objective of the critique is to show that a
development which is conventionally regarded as a progressive and
humanitarian reform, does in fact have a more sinister side to it. The
critique tries to show that far from having the beneficial
consequences generally claimed for it, the ^transformation from a
juridical to a therapeutic approach to social control has had a number
of deleterious penal and political consequences. This critique has not
been without effect. It has contributed to the partial decline in the
popularity of the treatment philosophy in penal policy, which has
occurred over the last decade or so. Treatment, where it is not
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rejected altogether as proper goal of penal policy, is now regarded
far more circumspectly than it was in the 1960s and early 1970s.
In the course of this thesis I will ask whether the image of the
therapeutic approach to social control relied upon - and constructed
by - the critique, is an accurate one. I will suggest that the
reality of the therapeutic approach to crime is substantially
different from the image presented by its critics.
CHAPTER 2
THE INEBRIATES PROBLEM
in "the second, half of the nineteenth century
iKTgQDOCTIQS
One of the ways by which the rationale and methods of penal control
were partially transformed in the second half of the nineteenth
century was through reformist and State interventions into the problem
of habitual drunkards. These interventions can be traced back to the
late 1850s when reformers, among whom medical professionals were
particularly prominent, started to campaign for the establishment of a
network of inebriate reformatories and retreats for the confinement
and 'treatment' of habitual drunkards. This campaign led to the
passing of the Inebriate Acts of 1879 - 1898' and to the establishment
of a number of inebriate reformatories and inebriate retreats. By 1908
there were eleven inebriate reformatories at work, along with
approximately twenty inebriate retreats and a number of other special
legal provisions for those registered as habitual drunkards (Official
Publications 1908; Kelynack 1904-5).
In this and the following chapter I will try to discover the
rationale behind the establishment of inebriate reformatories and I
will describe and examine the methods which were advocated for the
'treatment' of inebriates. I Will start, -in this chapter, by examining
the category of 'inebriety'-in detail, looking at how inebriates were
distinguished, in practice, from others, and at why inebriates were
deemed to require new forms of penal control. Before proceeding,
however, I will try to show how the account of the inebriates problem
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offered in this chapter fits into my more general concern with changes
in the rationale and methods of penal control.
I will start by looking briefly at how the inebriate reformatory
experiment has been described and explained by MacLeod (1967) and
Radzinowicz and Hood (1986: ch. 9), which are the two most detailed,
modern accounts of the inebriate reformatory experiment to have been
published. These accounts are constructed around a few basic themes.
First, the inebriate reformatory experiment is regarded as part of a
more general transformation in the direction of social policy which
took place towards the end of the nineteenth century. This theme is
most prominent in the account of Macleod (1967), who, incidentally, is
sympathetic towards the objectives of the inebriety reformers. MacLeod
regards the inebriate reformatory experiment as forming part of a more
general "gradual transformation taking place in national attitudes
towards the prevention and cure of social illness during the last
quarter of the nineteenth century" (ibid: 215). The direction in which
social policy was moving, according to Macleod, was towards welfarism.
This transformation was guided by well-intentioned progressives, who
promoted the concept of "government provision for chronic alcoholics"
(ibid) and who wanted to put the prevention and cure of alcoholism on
a public basis (ibid: 217). In order to achieve this they had to
overcome not just "public apathy" and "parliamentary ignorance", but
also the more positive resistance offered by "self-appointed advocates
of individual liberty", who opposed any inteference with the freedom
of the individual which was not justified in juridical terms (ibid:
215).2 MacLeod concludes his article by stating that because of this
- 41
resistance, and because of certain weaknesses in the reformers' own
ideas, the inebriate reformatory experiment failed (ibid: 245). For
such experiments to succeed a "fundamental reappraisal of the nature
of man and the character of society" was required; "such reappraisals
remained a challenge for the social planners of the Welfare State"
(ibid).
A second theme is that the inebriate reformatory experiment was the
product of a change in the way habitual drunkards were perceived. In
the accounts of both MacLeod (1967) and Radzinowicz and Hood (1986),
it is suggested that there was a move, in the second half of the
nineteenth century, towards a medical-determinist perception of
habitual drunkards. New medical theories appreared, claiming that
inebriates got drunk, not willfully, but rather because of an innate
or acquired, physically-based addiction to alcohol. These theories had
implications for social policy since they suggested that traditional
.methods of dealing with habitual drunkards were inappropriate, being
based upon a misconception of the nature of the problem.
Traditionally, if habitual drunkards broke the laws against public
drunkenness, they were punished by a small fine or a short period of
imprisonment. If they remained within the law they would not be
interfered with; they could get as drunk as they pleased, as often as
they pleased. Temperance reformers might, on occasion, try to persuade
them to change their habits, but they could not use any form of
coercion; the habitual drunkard was free to reject the advice and
exhortations of temperance reformers. This 'approach' to habitual
drunkards was based upon a moralist-voluntarist perception of the
habitual drunkard. The habitual drunkard was regarded as a free agent,
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with the ability to decide whether or not to drink. With the shift
away from a moralist-voluntarist and towards a medical-determinist
perception of habitual drunkards, the need for different methods of
dealing with habitual drunkards became apparent. It became clear that
what inebriates required was neither punishment, nor moral
exhortation, but medical treatment. Hence inebriate reformatories,
where such treatment would be available, were recommended.
MacLeod, for instance, describes how, during the second half of the
ninetenth century, the traditional moralistic view typified by the
Temperance Movement, began to give way to an emerging scientific
appreciation of alcoholism.
Mot until the last half of the 19th century did the scientific
appreciation of alcoholism become general. Only then, under the
guidance of a few doctors and reformers, was the image of the
drunkard as a disorderly, ill-disposed social unit gradually
transformed into one of a neglected patient suffering from a mental
disease with well-marked clinical features. Reformers who sought to
remove the moral stigma from alcoholism, and to treat the alcoholic
by medical means, led the advance guard of a movement to promote
prevention and cure on a public basis. (MacLeod 1967: 217)
Macleod argues that the new medical theories of alcoholism as a
"nervous disease" (ibid: 224) led to the idea of inebriate retreats
and reformatories, since these theories implied that "a prolonged stay
in a rest home or retreat, particularly in the early stages of
addiction, was an essential ingredient in the cure of an alcoholic"
(ibid: 219). For Macleod, the rationale behind the inebriate
reformatory experiment was to enable "the enforced detention of
voluntary patients and convicted criminals for a period long enough to
give hope of a cure" (ibid: 220-1).
Similarly, Radzinawicz and Hood - although they are far more
sceptical about the veracity of the new medical theories - suggest
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that the inebriate reformatory experiment was a direct result of the
new disease theory of alcoholism which emerged in the second half of
the nineteenth century.
In the middle of the nineteenth century the view gained acceptance
among certain medical authorities that habitual drunkenness was a
disease. . . An excessive and uncontrollable desire for intoxicating
drinks was 'symptomatic of some abnormal cerebral condition which
gives it the character of a form of insanity.' The condition was not
the result of drinking, rather it was to be seen as the result of
the mental states which created the desire for drink. Dipsomania was
a 'physical proof of mental disorganisation'. . .
(Radzinowicz and Hood 1986: 289)
The disease theory, they suggest, led to the perceived need to keep
the inebriate away from drink until a transformation in the bodily
tissue took place - a transformation which would free the inebriate of
his, or her, craving for alcohol.
This concept of drunkenness led to the conclusion that the patient
should be detained until he was cured. And cure could be achieved
only when 'the time arrives at which all the tissues of the body
have been changed, and a new tissue laid down in its place.'"
(Radzinowicz and Hood 1986: 292)
Bath of these accounts also agree that the operative theory of
inebriety was a physicalist one. It is assumed - or, in the account of
MacLeod, argued - that most of the reformers saw inebriety, or
alcoholism, as a physically-based mental disease. This assumption is
implicit in Radzinowicz and Hood's account of the rationale of
reformatory treatment, which I have just discussed. It is argued for
explicitly by MacLeod, who claims that the physicalist approach of the
reformers contributed to the eventual failure of the inebriate
reformatory experiment.
MacLeod argues that among the reformers there were in fact two
theories of inebriety. The first theory, which the majority of
reformers subscribed to, was a physicalist theory which "held that
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alcoholism was a nervous condition and was essentially inherited or at
least that a predisposition to alcoholism was passed on from father to
son" (MacLeod 1967: 244). This view, according to MacLeod, led to
therapeutic pessimism: "If alcoholism were only an inherited
condition, then retreats were effective only in isolating alcoholics
and insulating society" (ibid: 244-5). MacLeod argues that this
physicalist conception of alcoholism led many inebriety reformers to
virtually identify themselves with the eugenics movement;3 this was to
their disadvantage since it cut them off from the main current of
public health policy. MacLeod prefers the second theory, the
environmentalist theory, which, he argues, was subscribed to by a
small minority of reformers. The environmentalists "espoused 'nurture'
over nature" and argued that "alcoholism was acquired and that its
cause was to be found in ignorance and the social environment" (ibid:
244). This concept of alcoholism as a "social disease" - as deriving
"from the slums and anxieties of modern life" - could have led to more
positive forms of intervention - an environmental approach - but,
according to MacLeod:
Because the medical profession and the 'hereditarians' dominated
the reforming organisations, and because there was no sufficient
psychiatric or psychological information upon which to base an
environmental approach, the issue missed the main current of public
health policy, and was divorced from the body of favourable public
opinion. The concept of alcoholism as a 'social disease' was thus
prevented from taking root. (MacLeod 1967: 245)
Finally, both accounts assume that the inebriate reformatory
experiment involved a transformation in the way the problem of
habitual drunkards was dealt with; a shift away from punishment and/or
moral persuasion, towards medical treatment. This assumption will be
considered in detail in the next chapter. I have mentioned it here,
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however, in order to consider an important related argument made by
Radzinowicz and Hood (1986). They argue that the original objective of
the inebriate reformatory experiment was to provide medical treatment.
This original objective was frustrated, however, because those
habitual drunkards who were sent to the reformatories - and
particularly to the State reformatories designed for criminal habitual
drunkards - were the worst cases and therefore those most resistant to
cure (ibid: 306f). Radzinowicz and Hood argue that as the
reformatories were established, they began to be used for "the 'idle
and the dissolute,' prostitutes, and the mentally defective" (ibid:
308). As a consequence of this "the purpose of the reformatories
shifted from cure and reformation to discipline and incapacitation"
(ibid). Radzinowicz and Hood therefore suggest that there was a gap
between the medical intentions of the reformers and the actual
regimes, which were more penal and disciplinary than medical. This gap
is explained as a result of a distortion of the reformatory's original
purpose, a distortion due to fact that the reformatories were lumbered
with the most refractory and unmanageable cases (ibid: 309): "The
reformatory nature of the State institution was thus distorted and it
became no more than a deterrent 'punishment block'" (ibid: 310).
To summarize, in these accounts it is suggested that the inebriate
reformatory experiment occurred because of a change in the way
inebriates were perceived. From being perceived as willfully
dissolute, the inebriate came to be regarded as a sick person, who got
drunk because of a physically-based, often hereditary, addiction to
alcohol, and who required medical treatment - regardless of whether he
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broke the law - in order to cure his addiction and hence protect his
own welfare.
It is to such 1 medicalized' perceptions of delinquents that critics
of the the therapeutic approach to crime object. Although the critics
of medicalization have not dealt specifically with the inebriate
reformatory experiment, it is clear that their general arguments are
intended to apply to such developments. Hence it is passible to
construct a 'critical' interpretation of the inebriate reformatory
experiment, using the general arguments of the critics. This procedure
is defensible, since the critique of medicalization is meant to be a
general critique, which applies to all instances where the
medicalization of social control occurs.
In such a critique it might be argued that the disease concept of
alcoholism 'individualized' the problem of habitual drunkenness. It
might be argued, in agreement with MacLeod (1967), that habitual
drunkenness was a response to the dreadful social conditions
engendered by industrialization, urbanization and capitalism; that
"alcoholism derived form the slums and anxieties of modern life"
(ibid: 245). It might be asserted that it was these social conditions
rather than the drunkard himself, which required to be reformed, and
that the medical conception of the problem concealed this fact.
With more novelty it might be argued that the disease concept
'depoliticized' the problem of habitual drunkards. Social historians
have analysed in detail the various ways in which drinking and
drunkenness were political problems in the nineteenth century (see,
especially, Harrison 1971). To mention just one example: with the
emergence of capitalism and industrialization - and particularly
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factories - a more disciplined working class was required. The
traditional drinking patterns of the working class - especially when
they interfered with the efficiency of the worker - therefore became a
problem. Hence the campaign against habitual drunkards might be
examined in the context of a more general attempt to construct a
disciplined and efficient workforce capable of manning the new
factories. Hence, it might be argued that habitual drunkenness was not
so much a problem for the drinker himself, but for those who benefited
from the labour of factory workers. Applying the arguments qf the
critique of medicalization, it might be argued that this political
aspect of the habitual drunkards problem was concealed by labelling
drinkers as 1 inebriates', thereby representing their drinking, not as
an integral part of working class culture - and therefore as something
with a perfectly rational basis - but simply as the product of an
illness, which is clearly, and without question, irrational and
undesirable.
Other elements from the critique of medicalization could also be
applied to the inebriate reformatory experiment. The point, however,
is that these criticisms assume that the operative image of the
inebriate was in fact as described by Macleod (1967) and Radzinowicz
and Hood (1986). In what follows, I will try to show that the
perception of the inebriate which animated the inebriate reformatory
experiment was, in fact, far more complex, and in many ways quite
different, than that suggested in these accounts.
First, I will argue that it was as a public nuisance requiring
social control, rather than as an alcoholic requiring medical
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treatment, that the inbriate came to be regarded as a specific
category of person requiring a new form of intervention. However it
was not simply the inebriates inability to work efficiently, but his
inability to undertake a whole range of duties required of the
citizen, that made him a public nuisance. Secondly, and
correspondingly, although medical theories of inebriety were developed
at this time - and although these theories were, to an extent,
physicalist and determinist - these theories had little practical
importance in determining who was to be sent to inebriate
reformatories. The criteria used to distinguish inebriates from others
were social and behavioural, rather than strictly medical. Inebriates
were distinguished from others in terms of their outward conduct,
rather than in terms of their 'internal' condition (either physical or
psychological). Also, although medically qualified doctors were to
play a part in the ascertainment of inebriates, this was because of
their 'position in the community' - which made them reliable 'judges'
of the person's conduct - rather than because of any specifically
medical skills which they might have possessed. This shifts our
attention away from questions about the character of medical theories
of alcoholism and towards asking how those inebriates who were sent to
reformatories were perceived. I will try to answer this question over
this and the following chapter.
THE DISTiyCTIOI BETVEEH ORDINARY DBinnfAKDS ABP DIPSOMANIACS
The category of 'habitual drunkards', or 'inebriates', did not
include every person who frequently got drunk. Rather, from the start
of the inebriate reformatory campaign, a distinction was made between
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the 'ordinary drunkard' on the one hand, and 'the inebriate' or
'dipsomaniac' on the other. Only the inebriate - or as he was
sometimes known, the 'dipsomaniac' - was seen as a candidate for
confinement and treatment at a reformatory. The ordinary drunkard was
to be left free to do as he pleased unless he broke the laws against
'public drunkenness' or 'drunk and disorderly conduct', in which case
he was to be dealt with through ordinary penal sanctions, i.e. small
fines or short sentences of imprisonment.
Ve can begin to understand the purpose of the inebriate reformatory
by asking what criteria were used, in practice, to distinguish the
inebriate from the ordinary drunkard. If the inebriate reformatory
experiment was indeed premissed upon some new medical theory of
alcoholism, we would expect the inebriate to be distinguished from the
ordinary drunkard in medical terms. There was in fact some attempt to
do this. The rationale for the distinction was said to be medically
based; the ordinary drunkard got drunk out of willful dissoluteness,
while the inebriate's drinking was said to be the determined outcome
of an underlying nervous disorder. This however was simply a
justification offered for a distinction which was, in practice, made
on non-medical grounds. Those who were sent to reformatories were
never subjected to any sort of medical examination to determine
whether their drunkenness was voluntary or the product of an
addiction. If we wish to understand the real basis of the distinction
it is necesssary to look at how the inebriate and the ordinary
drunkard were to be distinguished in practice, rather than at the way
this distinction was represented in medical discourse.
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An early attempt to elaborate the distinction between the ordinary
drunkard and the dipsomaniac can be found in the work of Alexander
Peddie. Peddie, addressing the National Association for the Promotion
of Social Science (NAPSS), was advocating the establishment of
. . . special legalised arrangements to facilitate the exercise of
control over dipsomaniacs, or insane drinkers, with a view towards
their cure as well as protection. (Peddie 1860: 538)
One of the obstacles in the way of such a policy was, he pointed out,
a misunderstanding about who the proposed arrangements were intended
for. He therefore stressed that "it is not, as some seem to suppose,
every drunkard, or every habitual or inveterate tippler, for whom we
wish legal restraint" (ibid: 358). (In order to be understood, this
statement needs to be placed in its historical context. Peddie was
trying to distinguish the concerns of the inebriate reformatory
campaign - which was concerned with a relatively small group of
habitual drunkards - from the far wider concerns of the Temperance
Movement. At this time the Temperance Movement was advocating radical
interventions into the drink problem. Its campaign for prohibition of
the sale of alcohol threatened everybody's 'right' to drink - not just
that of those who habitually drunk to excess - and was strongly
opposed by powerful groups in society.A Peddie was now trying to
stress that unlike the Temperance Movement, his concern was not with
the ordinary drinker, nor even with the ordinary drunkard, but rather
with a certain class of drunkard, the dipsomaniac).
One obvious reason for this restriction was that of practical
feasibility: "to raise asylums for all such would be indeed a
formidable undertaking" (ibid). Just as important though, the ordinary
drunkard was to be excluded from the policy on principle. For Peddie
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there was a clear distinction of type between the ordinary drunkard
and the dipsomaniac:
. . . between the ordinary drunkard, in whom drinking is an acquired
vice, and the insane constitutional drunkard in whom drinking is a
disease, it is easy to draw a line of distinction.
(Peddie 1860: 538)
How did Peddie draw this distinction? One line of reasoning he
develops is that with the ordinary drunkard, drinking is a voluntarily
chosen vice, whereas the dipsomaniac has no control over his drinking:
he is "destitute of any command over his own will - of all ability to
resist the craving" (ibid. 539). The crucial test is the loss of self-
Here, then, we are brought to view the test by which we are to
distinguish the insane drinker from all other drunkards, and thus to
remove all difficulty as to what should be the legal understanding
in regard to dipsomania. The test is the loss of self-control. The
dipsomaniac is in the condition characteristic of a large proportion
of other insanities. He has lost . . . 'the distinguishing attribute
of sanity, the mastery of himself'. He cannot overcome the desire
for spirituous liquors which burns within him . . .
(Peddie 1860: 540-1)
So far then, the argument seems to fit well with the conventional
accounts of the inebriate reformatory programme. If we interrogate
Peddie's concept of dipsomania further though, we find it simply
shifts his problem to another level. It is still necessary for him to
state how those with no control over their drinking are to be
distinguished from those who do have control. Peddie's description of
the nature of dipsomania avoids the question which he set out, and
which it is essential for him to address; that of how, in practical




Peddle offered no medical criteria for distinguishing the ordinary
drunkard from the dipsomaniac. He offers some brief accounts of the
drinking habits of dipsomaniacs, but since the object of the exercise
is to distinguish between those in whom such habits are a vice and
those in whom they result from a medical condition, then such accounts
are hardly the appropriate evidence. This is particularly problematic
in the case of his category of 'acquired dipsomania', "a condition in
which the mere vice is transformed into a disease, and the mere
vicious habit into an insane impulsive propensity, and then the
drunkard becomes a dipsomaniac" (ibid. 539). Peddie fails to refer to
any objective criteria, let alone a mode of medical examination, which
could distinguish between those in whom drunkenness remains a vice and
those in whom it has been transformed into a disease.
Peddie's disease concept offers no practical guidance then as.to who
is to be considered a dipsomaniac and who is to be considered an
ordinary drunkard. This does not mean, however, that the distinction
is purely arbitrary. Peddie does in fact offer criteria for making the
distinction, but these are social and behavioural rather than medical.
He states that there are an infinite variety of ordinary drunkards, of
which he mentions just a few types, including "the social, jolly
after-dinner drinker", the "'go-on-the-spree' or paroxysmal drinker",
and "the habitually imbibing but never thoroughly intoxicated
drunkard" (ibid. 538). Underlying this diversity is one common factor
which distinguishes them from the dipsomaniac:
. . . they are on the whole able to perform their usual duties
tolerably well; some, though drunk at night can face the world
pretty respectably next morning, and not only eat a good breakfast,
but do duty or give good advice in the shop, counting-room, or
chambers. Many hard drinkers can exercise wonderful control over
themselves, choosing the time to drink and the time to keep sober;
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and while sober, can discharge all their family, professional,
social, or even religious duties - so far, at least, as outward
observances go. (Peddie 1860: 538, emphasis added)
The ordinary drunkard is characterised then by his control over his
habit, but since this in itself gives us no guide to his recognition
we have a list of the social duties and standards which the drinker
must conform to if he is not to be classified as a dipsomaniac.
Provided the drinker can go to work, do his job properly, look after
his family, and be seen to observe his religious duties, then he "may
be left untouched by legislative restraint". Such drunkards,
. . . may be left to the teachings of morality and religion,- to the
precepts and example of the wise and good. Should they carry their
transgressions so far as to disturb the peace and order of society,
then they properly come under the cognizance of the police and
courts of law. But within this limit, as voluntary and responsible
drinkers, they are beyond legislative control." (Peddie 1860: 539)
The dipsomaniac then is one who has no control, not only over his
drinking, but over his conduct in general. But, out of all the
drunkards that exist, how are we to recognise such characters? Peddie
gives us a physical description of the dipsomaniac; he is "truly
lamentable to behold, with his general broken-down aspect, feeble
tremulous limbs, pale or leaden-coloured visage, and watery,
lustreless eye" (ibid. 539). The characterisation of the dipsomaniac,
as a sickly, feeble weakling might be seen as revealing a concern with
efficiency. Industrialisation required robust, healthy workers, not
these lamentable dipsomaniacs. Ve might also note that there is a
possible role for the medical doctor here. The role of the doctor
would not, however, be to determine whether the person had any
underlying physical condition which could explain his addiction to
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drink, rather it would be to carry out a physical examination of the
person in order to see whether he displayed these signs of weakness.
Peddie never suggests, however, that such an examination should take
place. There was in fact a more simple way of distinguishing the
dipsomaniac from the ordinary drunkard. One simply has to look at the
affect which drinking has upon the person's capacity to perform his
"social and civil duties'.
He cannot now control his conduct, or manage his affairs; he is
useless or dangerous to himself or others; disqualified for social
and civil duties, a wreck of humanity, and a burden on society.
(Peddie 1860: 539)
It is here then, at the level of social capacities, that the crucial
test lies. The concern is not with every drunkard but those in whom
drunkenness is associated with general social inadequacy. Drunkenness
was important only insofar as it was the cause of, and a sign of, this
inadequacy. Drunkenness which didn't impair one's ability to function,
and which didn't leave one a burden upon society, was certainly not to
be approved of, but it was not, in itself, sufficient grounds for
legislative restraint. This shows us what the concerns of the
inebriate reformers were. The main concern was not with drunkenness as
such, but with inefficiency, of which drunkenness was considered to be
a major cause. Hence, people could get drunk as often as they pleased,
without risking legislative interference, provided their drunkenness
didn't interfere with their efficiency or make them a nuisance in
other ways. So long as the drunkard didn't commit a crime, didn't
neglect his social obligations (e.g. to provide for his family), and
didn't make himself a burden on society in any other way (e.g. by
requiring public assistance) - he would be free to live as he liked
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(cf. Sose 1985: 89). What mattered was not drunkenness or immorality
as such, but the ability to contain the costs of one's drunkenness and
immorality. Those who failed to contain the costs of their drinking
habits - and only those - were to be subject to intervention.
THE SELECT COMMITTEE OH HABITUAL DRUHKAKDS. 1872
From the very start of the inebriate reformatory campaign then, the
concern was with social inefficiency and public nuisance, rather than
with drunkenness as such. Throughout the history of the campaign the
concern remained constant. This raises doubts about the claim of
Radzinowicz and Hood which I discussed earlier, the claim that
reformatory policy became distorted later on when reformatories were
'lumbered' with the 'idle and dissolute'. I would argue that the
concern was, from the very beginning, precisely with the idle and
dissolute. The inebriate reformatories were not so much lumbered with
these cases, rather they were constructed for them. This can be
established further by going on to consider the arguments of the
Select Committee which was established in 1872 - as a result of the
reformers' efforts - in order "to consider the best plan for the
control and management of habitual drunkards" (Official Publications
1872).5
The Committee drew attention to two major problems with existing
penal methods of dealing with the problem of habitual drunkards. In
the first place the existing penal methods - small fines and short
periods of imprisonment - were ineffective, since they failed to
reform or deter the habitual drunkard (ibid: para. 3; q. 533). Proof
of this was the very fact that habitual drunkards were repeatedly
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convicted for drunkenness offences. If ordinary penal treatment were
sufficiently reformative or deterrent, then, it was argued, there
would be no such thing as multiple convictions for drunkenness (ibid:
para. 3). The solution to this problem was: in the first place, legal
recognition of the category of habitual drunkards, so that those who
repeatedly committed drunkenness offences could be subjected to
different treatment than the first-time, or occasional offender (ibid:
paras. 15-18); and secondly, the establishment of state-funded
inebriate reformatories where habitual drunkards could be incarcerated
for a period long enough to ensure their reformation. The threat of
long periods of incarceration was also deemed to be useful from the
paint of view of deterrence and as a means of promoting the comfort
and well-being of society (ibid: Akroyd's draft report, para. 15; qq.
81, 77-85, 1194-6).
The second problem with existing penal methods was that they could
only be used against a small proportion of those considered to be
habitual drunkards, those who were found guilty of drunkenness
offences. The committee argued that there were many habitual drunkards
who, for one reason or another, never came into contact with the law.
It pointed to;
... a very large amount of drunkenness . . . which never becomes
public . . . but which is probably even a more fertile source of
misery, poverty, and degradation than that which comes before the
police courts; for this no legal remedy exists, and without further
legislation it must go unchecked.
(Official Publications 1872:_para.9)
Or as one witness put it;
The habitual drunkard whom we wish to treat. . . very rarely comes
before the justices; he is cunning enough to keep out of the way; it
is the ordinary drunkard who comes before the justices.
(Official Publications 1872: Dr. Bree, q. 889).
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The solution offered to this problem was the establishment and
licensing of a separate class of privately-funded inebriate retreats
for the confinement and treatment of non-criminal habitual drunkards
(see Peddie 1872: paras. 2-5). Confinement in a retreat was to be
governed by two procedures. First, a person could voluntarily declare
himself an habitual drunkard and enter a retreat. Having done this
however, he would then be liable to detention, as if he had been
committed through the second procedure (rec'n. 2-3; there was a
precedent for this proposal in the procedures of the Contagious
Diseases Commission, see q.729). Second, a person could be committed
to a retreat, in a procedure analogous to that of the committal of
lunatics to asylums. The person could be committed,
. . .on the application of their friends or relatives, under proper
legal restrictions, or by the decision of a local Court of Inquiry,
established under proper safeguards, before which, on the
application of a near relative or guardian, or a parish or other
local authority, or other authorized persons, proof shall be given
that the party cited is unable to control himself, and incapable
of managing his affairs, or that his habits are such as to render
him dangerous to himself or others; that this arises from the abuse
of alcoholic drinks or sedatives; and he is therefore deemed to be
an habitual drunkard. (Official Publications 1872: rec'n. 3)
It was proposed that such persons be confined for a period not
exceeding twelve months and that control of their property should be
placed with a trustee or guardian (rec'n. 4).
It appears then that a major objective of the committee was to
construct a new approach to the control of habitual drunkards. This
was not to replace the juridical approach, rather it was to operate
alongside it, dealing with those cases which could not be adequately
dealt with through juridical principles. In the process, juridical
principles would be modified, but not totally displaced.
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This new approach to the problem of habitual drunkards can be
distinguished first, in terms of its form; instead of small fines and
short periods of imprisonment we have long periods of "punitive
treatment" in reformatories.G Secondly, it can be distinguished in
terms of its scope, its target population was not those who committed
drunkenness offences, but rather those who, through a variety of
procedures, were declared to be habitual drunkards. In the following
chapter I will examine the form which intervention took; here I am
concerned with the second aspect of this new form of intervention, its
difference in scope.
As we saw in chapter one, in the juridical approach to social
control, only those who break the law are liable to interference with
their liberty. In the case of drunkenness, only those who transgressed
the laws against 'public drunkenness' and 'drunk and disorderly
conduct' could be subjected to penal control. The target population
for the new, reformatory approach to the problem of habitual drunkards
differed in two respects. First, it did not include all drunkenness
ofenders, but only 'recidivist drunken offenders'. Secondly, it
included 'non-criminal inebriates', persons who were regarded as
inebriates even though they had not been convicted of a drunkenness
offence. I will now look at these two categories in more detail in
order to see what they tell us about the rationale behind the
inebriate reformatory experiment
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(a) The distinction between the recidivist and the occasional
drunken offender
First, not all drunken offenders were to be included within the
category of habitual drunkards. The first time or occasional offender
was to be excluded, only the recidivist drunken offender was to be
deemed an habitual drunkard. The committee recommended that those
convicted of three drunkenness offences within a period of twelve
months should be required to find "sureties for sobriety and good
conduct for a fixed period"; if such sureties could not be found, or
if the conditions were subsequently breached, then,
... he should be deemed and registered as an 'Habitual Drunkard'
and as such may be sent to an industrial inebriate reformatory by a
magistrate's order for a term of not less than three nor more than
twelve months, the time to be governed by the frequency of the
offence" (Official Publications 1872: paras. 15-18)
Ve can note then that the recidivist drunken offender is not to be
subjected to any medical or psychiatric examination to determine
whether his drunkenness is the result of an underlying disorder,
physical or mental. Rather he is to be declared an habitual drunkard
solely on the basis of his recidivism. Ho knowledge of the person as
an individual is necessary, all that one needs to do is count his
convictions: "I would lay it down that if the man was brought before
the magistrates more than a certain number of times he would be deemed
an habitual drunkard" (ibid: q. 1905).
This concern with recidivist drunken offenders owes little, if
anything, to developments in medical theory. In order to explain this
concern it would therefore be necessary to turn our attention away
from the development of a disease concept of inebriety and to look at
a quite different development which was taking place in the second
- 60 -
half of the nineteenth century - the developing concern with
recidivism - or with habitual criminals.7 The connection between the
habitual drunkards problem and the more general problem of recidivism
was made explicit by the the committee member, Akroyd.
. . . your attention has been called to the question of dealing in
this country with habitual criminals in a different way from that in
which you deal with ordinary criminals; in your judgement, would the
same sort of dealing be desirable with habitual drunkards as well as
with the habitual criminals?" (Official Publications 1872: q. 1421)
To subject recidivists to special forms of penal control was to go
against juridical principles, which - as we saw in chapter one -
declared that a person should receive a punishment proportionate to
his offence and that the punishment shouldn't be varied to take
account of who the offender was or the likelihood of his re-offending.
Nevertheless, from the second half of the nineteenth century, through
to the early years of the twentieth century, special legal provision
was made for the incarceration and supervision of recidivists
(Radzinowicz and Hood: 1986: ch.8). This change in the direction of
penal policy was partly the result of increasing political concern
with the problem of the class known, variously as ' the residuum', or
the criminal class.
In the second half of the nineteenth century the working class was
increasingly seen as being divided into a number of distinct sub¬
classes.0. While the better-off sections of the working class had, to
a considerable extent, adapted their lifestyle and personal conduct to
the demands of urban, industrial society - and had 'internalised'
values such as lawfulness, sobriety, self-help, respectability,
domesticity, thrift and 'rational' forms of recreation - the
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'residuum' had not. The residuum - or as Booth was to call them "the
lowest class of occasional labourers, loafers and semi-criminals"
- remained unattached to these social values. They were therefore seen
as representing a threat to the social order. One of the major
concerns of social policy in the second half of the nineteenth century
was with how to contain this threat.
One method of controlling the residuum was to use the deterrent
effect of punishment. This method was increasingly regarded as
insufficient, however, for a number of reasons. First, as we saw in
chapter one, deterrence worked, at least partly, through the disgrace
of punishment; to be sent to prison was an afront to one's self-
respect. The residuum, however, were regarded as having no self-
respect in the first place; indeed, this was one of their defining
features. Having no self-respect they could not be deterred through
the threat of ordinary punishment (Official Publications 1872: q.
1599).9 A second problem was that the types of crimes which the
residuum tended to commit were petty crimes (see Radzinowicz and Hood
1986: 241-3), petty larceny and nuisance crimes, such as 'being drunk
and disorderly. On the principle of proportionality such offences
could be punished, at most, by short sentences of imprisonment. These
sentences were regarded as being too short for deterrent purposes.
An alternative method of dealing with the residuum would be to try
to 'reform' or 'discipline' them, to install within them the values of
sobriety, domesticity, self-help, and so on. As we shall see in the
fallowing chapter, this is the strategy which was suggested by the
inebriety reformers. The existing juridcial approach to the problem
was deemed to be useless for the purposes of reform. First, because
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the short sentences of imprisonment which the habitual drunkard would
receive, at the most, were too short for the purposes of reform, and
secondly, because the regime of prisons was unsuitable for refomative
purposes. What was therefore required was longer periods of
confinement in new 'reformative' institutions. Such confinement would
also act as a more effective deterrent and would also incapacitate
many recidivists, thereby containing the threat which they posed to
the social order. It is in this context - rather than in the context
of new medical theories of alcoholism - that the inebriate reformatory
experiment can be best understood.
The concern with habitual drunkards can be seen then as an aspect,
and a central one, of this more general concern with the residuum. Not
only, as I will argue in the next chapter, was 'treatment' conceived
of in terms of installing, within the inebriate, central social
values; also, the category of habitual drunkards was defined in the
same terms as the residuum. The habitual drunkard was defined not so
much in terms of his drunkenness, but rather in terms of his general
lack of attachment to social values and the social order The
inebriate's lack of sobriety was just one aspect, albeit an important
one, of his more general lack of 'socialization'. So throughout the
enquiry of the 1872 Committee the habitual drunkard was described in
the following terms: Habitual drunkards often "go about hawking"
(q.6); they "are generally weak and of weak intellect" (q.27); they
are not the stable population, but passers through, - they are tramps
(q.62-4); drunkenness is associated with petty larceny, disorder, etc.
(q. 134); "Sixty-nine per cent of the persons convicted of drunkenness
could neither read nor write; and ninety-one per cent...never went to
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any place of worship" (q.134); "The habitual drunkard is an idle man"
(q.1294); he has no self-respect (q. 1599).
(b) The nan-offender inebriate
The other group whom the committee wanted to subject to special
forms of control as habitual drunkards were those who, without
committing any offence, were nevertheless deemed to require detention
because their habitual drunkenness had left them unable to perform
their social duties or to manage their affairs. This proposal was far
more controversial than the proposal to confine habitual drunken
offenders. While the proposal to confine recidivist drunkards departed
considerably from juridical principles, it could at least be argued
that these offenders had previously infringed definite laws. The
proposal to confine non-offender habitual drunkards could not be
justified in this way; the proposal conflicted radically with the
basic liberal tenet, that a citizen could only be deprived of his
liberty on grounds that he had committed a definite illegal act.
There was, however, one widely recognised exception to this rule:
the power to confine the insane. While not wholly uncontroversial,
this power has generally been acceptable to all but the most staunch
defenders of the liberal principles. A major reason for this is that
special rules for the insane can be justified without stepping outside
the boundaries of liberal ideology. As we saw in chapter one, the
liberal/juridical approach to social control presupposed that
individuals were self-governing, rational individuals. The insane,
however, clearly lacked either free will and/or rationality. The
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principles which guided the control of normal persons could therefore
be deemed inapplicable to the insane.
One way of arguing for legal provisions for habitual drunkards,
without confronting liberalism head-on, was to argue for some sort of
affinity between inebriety and insanity. I would argue then, that it
was this special legal status of the insane, as much as any medical
consideration, which led the reformers to their persistent comparisons
of the insane person and the habitual drunkard. It should be made
quite clear though that the conventional view was not that the
habitual drunkard was insane; to the contrary it was persistently
pointed out by the witnesses at the inquiry that - apart from short
periods when the habitual drunkard was suffering from delerium tremens
- the habitual drunkard was not insane (Official Publications 1872:
para. 12, qq. 480, 672, 1081). In fact, the practice of confining
habitual drunkards in lunatic asylums, which sometimes occured, was
criticised by the reformers as inappropriate (ibid: para. 12, qq. 455,
460, 1187-9). Also a distinction was often drawn between the small
minority of inebriates who were "clearly mad" and hence could be sent
to an asylum, and those who were not, and hence required different
treatment (ibid: q, 240). The actual argument used, was that habitual
drunkenness was a condition analogous to insanity; inebriety was a
sign of impaired mental function, but not of insanity (ibid: q. 3208).
It was argued that because of this affinity between inebriety and
insanity, habitual drunkards should be dealt with through procedures
similar to those used for confining the insane.
The question of the relationship between the insane and the habitual
drunkard was addressed by Peddie during a discussion of whether or not
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the proposed inebriate reformatories should be under the control of
the Board of Lunacy. Earlier in his testimony, Peddie was asked
whether treatment or punishment was most suitable for the habitual
drunkard; he replied that since;
. . . habitual drunkenness ... is a form of insanity, or at least
something closely allied to insanity, then the habitual drunkard is
more properly a subject for care, as it were, in a hospital, than a
person for punishment in a gaol; yet at the same time there must be
a certain amount of reformatory treatment entering into every
case. . . (Official Publications 1872: q. 954, emphasis added)
Peddie went on to argue that the proposed institutions should be under
the control of the Board of Lunacy, but qualified his argument as
follows.
I come somewhat unwillingly to this conclusion, and I think it
would be very desirable to keep up a clear distinction between such
institutions and asylums for the insane. Ve treat the insane as
people labouring under disease; . . . there is nothing disgraceful in
their condition ... we avoid as far as we can all signs of
incarceration, and shun the very words which indicate the existence
of what we are constantly trying to reduce to a minimum. But I think
we should be obliged to deal with the drunkard somewhat differently.
He is detained against his will, and if supported by the country is
forced to work, in spite of the fact that he is still legally sane,
and has possession of his civil rights and responsibilities', there
is something therefore disgraceful about his position, and something
penal in his treatment. . .
(Official Publications 1872: q. 1213, emphasis added)
The important question to ask, with regard to this second category
of inebriates, is how they were distinguished - in the absence of any
firm criteria such as the commission of frequent drink-related
offences - from others. We should recall that habitual drunkenness was
not in itself considered sufficient grounds for intervention, since
ordinary drunkards were to be distinguished from inebriates.
As we saw earlier, apart from those cases where the person
voluntarily declared himself to be an habitual drunkard, the decision
was to be made by a Court of Inquiry. In making its decision the Court
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was to consider whether there was evidence that the person was "unable
to control himself", "incapable of managing his affairs", or
"dangerous to himself or others", and that this was due to "the abuse
of alcoholic drinks and sedatives" (Official publications 1872: rec'n.
3).
So, despite the claims of some witnesses - that the ordinary
drunkard and the dipsomaniac could be distinguished on the basis of a
medical diagnosis (ibid: qq. 560, 954, 1059, 1341) - the criteria to
be used in practice, for ascertaining inebriates, were in fact social
and behavioural. Nevertheless, it seems to have been generally
presumed that the opinion of medical professionals on these questions
would be, in some sense, authoritative. Hence it was claimed that
'medical men' would have no difficulty distinguishing between habitual
drunkenness which results from a vice and that which results from a
disease (ibid).
This view was disputed, hoewever, by a number of medical witnesses,
such as Dr. White, "an ordinary doctor", who claimed that it was, in
fact, "impossible for medical men to tell the difference between
habitual drunkenness caused by disease and that caused by bad habits"
(ibid: q. 374). Similarly, Dr. Anstie argued in favour of a more
simple test, based upon the same logic as the distinction between the
occasional and the habitual drunken offender: "I think you must have
as your test the frequency with which a man has broken down, you must
make some rules independent of abstruse medical rules" (ibid: q. 567).
In the light of this difference of opinion it is useful to look at
what, according to its advocates, medical diagnosis consisted of.
Answering this question is difficult because, despite their faith in
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the ability of medical men to 'diagnose' inebriety, none of its
advocates of medical diagnosis tell us bow diagnosis was to take
place. What we are told, however, is that it is the practical
experience of the medical man which makes him particularly qualified
for the task of distinguishing the inebriate from the ordinary
drunkard. The greater competence of the physician as against any other
educated person, was explained then solely as a result of the
phyician's greater practical experience; no reference is made to any
distinctive medical skills which may be necessary. Hence to the
proposition that "the boundary between vice and disease... is one
which might be left to the educated mind", Dr. Vinslaw replied,
No; I think that a medical man who has had practically to deal with
these cases has very little difficulty in coming to the right
conclusion as to whether the boundary line has been overstepped, in
other words, whether the condition is that of normal or abnormal
drunkenness. . . . Experience gives him an additional sense, and
enables the physician to come to the right conclusion; he ought
rarely to commit a mistake in his diagnosis.
(Official Publications 1872: q. 1351)
Elsewhere, we get a clue as to the type of practical experience
which is so essential to the task of diagnosing inebriety. It is not
so much the clinical experience of the physician which is of value;
rather it is his intimate knowledge of the social situation of the
drunkard. Hence Dr. Bree argued that physicians can easily detect the
habitual drunkard, even among the poorer classes;
. . . the parish surgeon knows every person in the parish, and all
the circumstances, and sees the misery of the wife and children, and
knows the cause of it, and his attention is very early drawn to it."
(Official Publications 1872; q. 859)
This quotation gives us a clue then as to the criteria which the
doctor had in mind when deciding whether a person was an inebriate or
an ordinary drunkard. The decision is not to be made upon the basis of
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physical or mental tests, rather the doctor must take into account
"all the circumstances". But what are these circumstances? It seems
fairly clear that the basic test was one of efficiency and ability to
perform one's obligations. Hence the non-criminal habitual drunkard
was defined in terms of the affect which his drinking had upon his
capacity to function efficiently, without becoming a nuisance and a
burden upon his family, employers and society. Hence, in deciding
whether to classify a drinker as an inebriate, the doctor would have
in mind a distinction between the "regular drunkard, i.e. one who gets
drunk but can carry on his business should not be interfered with"
(q.594) and habitual drunkards, who are "...the cause of ruin to their
families, of grevious injury as well to their relatives as to their
creditors" (q.1900). The habitual drunkard "squanders his property,
mismanages his property, places his family in trouble or distress, or
transacts his business prejudicially to the interests of his family or
his creditors, or...he uses intoxicating liquors to such an extent as
to increase the danger of ruining his health, and shortening his life"
(ibid).
Ve might state then that along with the concern with the residuum,
the reformers were concerned with those members of the skilled working
class and of their own middle-class, who, through habitual drunkenness
had became nuisances to their families and potential public nuisances.
These twin concerns - with the residuum and with the inebriates among
the skilled labourers and the middle-class - can be seen as dual
aspects of the one problem. The residuum were defined in terms of
their lack of attachment to central social values, such as sobriety,
respectability, self-help and thrift. The non-criminal inebriates were
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seen, not so much, as unattached from the social order, but as in
danger of becoming unattached through their habitual drunkenness.
Since the central social values were seen as closely connected (see
Nye 1984: ch.5) the person who had lost the value of sobriety might be
seen as in danger of losing his attachment to other social values,
thrift, self-help etc. The distance between the drunkard, the
squanderer, and the idle pauper was a short one, and the habitual
drunkard was well on the way to adopting the moral standards of the
idler.
The residuum then, needed to be attached to the social order. The
better-off habitual drunkards required that their ties to the social
order be strengthened. The problems which the recidivist drunkard and
the better off habitual drunkard were similar then, but differed in
the crucial aspect that the recidivist required integration into a
culture which he had never been a part of, while the better off
habitual drunkard required a strengthening of his ties to the culture,
ties which already existed. The recidivist, in short, needed to be
completely socialized, while the better-off drunkard needed some
milder form of socialization. This difference, as I will point out
shortly, was clearly reflected in the proposed solution to the
problem.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF THE PROPOSALS
A Bill was subsequently introduced to carry out the the committee's
recommendations, but it failed to get beyond a second reading
(Official Publications 1893/4: appendix 6). In 1877, amid fresh
concern with the problem of intemperance, a new Habitual Drunkards
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Bill was introduced. This eventually became law in 1879, but the
original Bill's proposals were radically diluted through amendments
(ibid). The Habitual Drunkards Act, 1879 only made provision for the
licensing of retreats, established as 'private speculations', to which
•habitual drunkards' could be admitted on their own application
(ibid). The original Bill had also proposed the establishment of
reformatories, funded by local rates with contributions from the
Treasury, to which criminal and non-criminal habitual drunkards could
be committed. These compulsory procedures were dropped, as were the
Bill's proposals regarding procedures for the recapture of escaped
patients. 10 It was widely agreed that without the power to "recover
patients who have escaped" the potential of inebriate retreats to
"cure" habitual drunkards was severly undermined (Official
Publications 1893/4: para. 9).
By and large then the reformers failed, at this stage, to achieve
their main objective, i.e. a substantial extension of the power to
confine and control inebriates. Apart from libertarian objections, the
political unwillingness to compel local authorities to undertake the
financial commitment involved in the establishment of inebriate
reformatories was a major contributing factor to the failure of the
reformist proposals.11 Along with the refusal to allow compulsory
committal, the fact that retreats were to be privately funded, meant
that the admission fees were often high, so that only those with
considerable means could enter inebriate retreats for 'treatment'. Far
from the control of the residuum which the reformers had sought, the
Habitual Drunkards Act 1879 led only to the establishment of - in the
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words of Radzinowicz and Hood (1986) - "temporary refuges for
gentlemen alcoholics".
Many of the reformers' demands were, however, eventually legislated
for in the Inebriate Act, 1898.12 In confirmation of what I argued
earlier, the new concern with habitual drunkards in the 1890s farmed
part of a more general concern with habitual criminals and hence with
the 'criminal class' or 'the residuum'.13 The problem of inebriates
was so closely identified with the problem of habitual criminals that
it was possible to address these different aspects of the one problem
through the same official enquiries. The nature of the problem is well
revealed by the title of the 1895 Scottish Departmental Committee
which inquired into the problem of "Habitual Offenders, Vagrants,
Beggars, Inebriates, and Juvenile Delinquents" (Official Publications
1895).And in 1896 inebriety reformers were arguing that recidivists
and habitual drunkards could be considered together (Renton and
Yellowlees 1896). Support for this contention came from the Prisons
Committee, which in 1894 defined the habitual criminal in the
following terms:
. . . there is a large class of habitual criminals not of the
desperate order, who live by robbery and theiving and petty larceny,
who run the risk of comparitively short sentences with comparitive
indifference. They make money rapidly by crime, they enjoy life
after their fashion, and then on detection and conviction they serve
their time quietly with the full determination to revert to crime
when they come out. Ve are inclined to believe that the bulk of
habitual criminals are composed of men of this class...further
corrective measures are desirable for these persons. .. they are a
nuisance to the community, (Official Publications 1894, quoted in
Renton and Yellowlees 1896: 92)
After suggesting that such cases required special treatment, the
committee went on to argue that,
Under this head should be included most prisoners sentenced
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primarily for drunkenness. They are not criminals in the ordinary
sense and should stand by themselves in a special category.
(ibid: 93)
The 1898 Act allowed for the compulsory committal to inebriate
reformatories of two classes of inebriate. The first class were
multiple drunkenness offenders, the second class consisted of
offenders (convicted of any offence) who were proved to be inebriates.
Offenders in both classes could be committed to an inebriate
reformatory for a term not exceeding three years; for those in the
second class this 'reformatory treatment' could be imposed either in
addition to, or instead of, being sentenced for their actual offence
(this was known as a 'dual-track' system and is also found in
legislation concerning 'persistent offenders' from the same period -
Radzinowicz and Hood 1986: p.305 & ch. 8; Official Publications 1908:
ch. 3). Along with this, the Provision of Meals Acts 1903 and the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1904, provided for the detention
in inebriate reformatories of those found guilty of child neglect or
cruelty to children, where such neglect or cruelty was considered to
be due to inebriety.13
This legislation affected the position of habitual drunkards who had
been found guilty of a criminal offence. Ho provision was made,
however, for the compulsory detention of those who might be considered
to be inebriates, but who had not committed any offence. Provided the
drinker could remain within the law, their liberty could not be
interfered with - unless they voluntarily signed away their freedom -
no matter how much of a nuisance or a burden they were. ,G There was
still considerable dissatisfaction among the inebriety reformers then,
who continued to demand a means of controlling non-offender
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inebriates. The following from the Departmental Committee on the
Inebriates Act, 1908, echoes the demands of the previous generation of
inebriety reformers.
There is, however, a class of inebriates who are numerous, whose
inebriety is the cause of great distress, misery, poverty, and
degradation, to themselves and their families, and who are excluded
from the operation of both these Acts. Any person who drinks to
excess, without committing a public offence or crime, can continue
his drunken habits indefinitely, notwithstanding that he may
produce, over many years, untold misery to his family and ultimate
expense to the community. Such persons often, at length, commit
offences, and then may be dealt with under the Act of 1898; but, in
very many cases, they pursue their disastrous habit until they die
of disease engendered by it. There is no reason to doubt that if
there existed means by which could be placed compulsorily under
control at an early period in their career, a large proportion of
them could be restored to decency and usefulness, and an
incalculable amount of misery and poverty could be prevented. At
present the only possibility of control for such persons is the
somewhat remote chance that he may be persuaded or coerced into
making a 'voluntary' application for admission to a Retreat"
(Official Publications 1908: para. 18, emphasis added)
COMMITTALS TO IffEBRIATE REFORMATORIES
The gender imbalance
The most striking feature of the population actually committed to
inebriate reformatories is that the vast majority were women. In the
inebriate reformatories established under the 1898 act there was
accomodation for 165 males, and 1,021 females (Official Publications
1908: q. 92). In the Marlborough St. Court, for the nine years to
April 1908, 140 persons were sent to homes as habitual drunkards; of
these 17 were men and 123 women. In the Tower Bridge Court, for the
same period the figures were 15 men and 123 women (ibid: q. 304). An
understanding of the causes of this ratio will bring us closer to
understanding the purpose of the inebriate reformatory, and will
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confirm my contention that the concern was not with drunkenness in
itself, but rather with the drunkard as a public nuisance.
There is no single explanation for the gender imbalance between male
and female commitals to inebriate reformatories.17 It does not appear
to have been the result of a deliberate decision; the inebriate
reformatory campaigners had not given the impression that
reformatories were intended for women rather than for men. If
anything, the inebriety reformers who gave evidence to the 1872
Habitual Drunkards Committee appeared to have male, rather than
female, inebriates in mind. There were very few references to female
inebriates specifically and there was only one witness who declared a
specific interest in female inebriates. This was Dr. Druitt who,
unlike most of the other witnesses was concerned primarily with
habitual drinking among the upper classes. He argued that there was a
great deal of "secret drinking" among upper class women (Official
Publications 1872: q. 3028 f). Unlike the social imbibing of upper-
class men, this secret-drinking was (by definition) anti-social, and
was therefore likely to be the sign of inebriety. This argument
doesn't explain the subsequent gender difference in reformatory
committals. In the first place it was not upper-class women, but those
from the poorest sections of the labouring class who were sent to
reformatories. Secondly, they were sent there after receiving a number
of convictions for public drunkenness offences (i.e. they were not
secret drinkers of the type encountered by Dr. Druitt).
It should also be pointed out here that the inebriate reformatories
were not constructed according to any systematic plan. The inebriates
legislation permitted, rather than ordered, the establishment of
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inebriate reformatories, with the result that reformatories were
constructed through local initiatives and philanthropic endeavour. So,
the facts: (i) that the bulk of reformatory provision was for female
inebriates and (ii) that females constituted the vast majority of
committals, were in a sense accidental, rather than the result of an
explicit policy. But while there is no single explanation of the
imbalance, I will argue that the various factors which contributed to
the imbalance were related, and that this relationship can be
understood once we realise that the purpose of the reformatories was
to contain and discipline those who were deemed to be a public
nuisance. The following then is an account of the factors which, taken
together, contributed to the gender difference; I will try to show how
each was related to the general concern with inefficiency and public
nuisances.
Inebriety, child neglect, and neglect of domestic duties
The following are two fairly typical descriptions of women who were
sent to inebriate reformatories:
Age 36; started to drink to excess 14 years ago, continued 7 years,
then for 3£ years was steady, afterwards relapsed, and for 3te years
had been drunken. She frequently accosted men in the street in order
to obtain drink. There were six children involved, the oldest 13
years, the youngest one month (this child was blind with gonorrheal
opthalmia).
The husband was a respectable, hard working man. Average earnings 28
shillings weekly. The woman had pawned the clothing and household
goods as far as possible; the other furniture and windows broken.
Rooms dirty; bedding black with dirt
The children were fairly nourished, but they were very dirty, as was
their clothing. That there condition was not more deplorable was due
to the efforts of the mother's sisters.
Committed for 3 years detention on 18 October 1907, the previous
convictions were:-
October 1904 - Voman reprimanded by magistrates and given a chance
to reform.
November 1904 - Husband got a separation; remained apart for a few
months.
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February 1906 - Six months for neglect.
1906-1907 - Several fines for being drunk and disorderly."
(Official Publications 1908: evidence of E. J. Parr, Director of the
HSPCC, which was responsible for the committal; described as a
typically bad case).
Aged 36; drunken for 14 years. Husband steady and industrious,
earning 38 shillings weekly, - an elder boy also gave 10 shillings
weekly for his lodgings.
Three children effected, 15 years to 4.
The children were clean, well nourished, and fairly clothed, but
this was owing to the father's attention. He had also kept the house
clean and fairly tidy. The women entirely neglected her home and all
its duties; would do no cooking.
She stopped away daily for hours, and frequently for one or
more nights.
She had pawned clothing and many other things, and borrowed money
all round, and nearly lost her husband his job through his being
pestered at the works for repayment
One month's imprisonment; three years detention on 4th July 1906.
Previous convictions:-
In 1902 prosecuted and convicted.
In 1903 prosecuted and reprimanded only.
In 1904 3 months imprisonment."
(ibid, described as a less serious case).
The gender imbalance can be partly explained by the activities of
the NSPCC who claimed responsibility for 316 committals. The HSPCC's
campaign was directed at mothers whose habitual drunkenness left them
unable to perform their domestic duties. Inebriety in mothers was
considered particularly problematic as the mother was the shaper of
the child's and the husband's domestic environment. If the mother
didn't perform her domestic duties well, the environment would be
disorderly, dirty, and unhealthy. And since, as I will argue in the
next chapter, a squalid and disorderly environment was seen as a chief
cause of inebriety and other unhealthy habits, habitual drunkenness in




Another way in which a concern with female inebriates was explicitly
expressed was in the provisions of the Licensing Act of 1902 which
enabled a magistrate to send an inebriate wife to to a retreat in lieu
of a separation order (Official Publications 1908: q. 278). There was
no reciprocal power with regard to inebriate husbands (ibid: q. 288).
This power was seldom used because it was still necessary to obtain
the wife's consent (the admission would be 'voluntary', ibid: q. 278).
This provision was not in itself responsible for the gender imbalance;
it does however give us a clue to the extraordinary concern with
female inebriates. The Inspector of Inebriate Reformatories, Dr. R. V.
Branthwaite, had this to say:
Of course the power is really a very humane and a very useful one,
if it could be only more generally applied, because an inebriate
wife if separated from her husband usually becomes immoral and sinks
to the lowest depths. (Official Publications 1908: q. 278)
The 'lowest depths' refers, as we might guess, to prostitution, and
in particular to street prostitution. As I have suggested earlier, and
as Nye points out in his book 'Crime, Madness and Politics in Modern
France' (1984), late nineteenth century medical men and
philanthropists hardly distinguished between the various 'social
pathologies', tending to see them as aspects of the one social
problem. The link between one problem, such as inebriety, and others
such as prostitution, crime, pauperism, etc. was easily made; just as
the bourgeois values of sobriety, thrift, domesticity and self-help
were seen as inextricably linked. This statement from the Departmental
Committee on the Inebriates' Acts, 1908 is typical.
Many inebriates exhibit lack of self-control, not only in
indulgence in drink, but also in abhorrence of steady employment, in
excessive sexual indulgence, in violence of temper, and in other
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ways. (Official Publications 1908: page. 6)
In this statement we find the problem of inebriety being closely
linked to the problem of prostitution and to other immoralities. In
fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that the women confined in
inebriate reformatories tended to be confined for prostitution just as
much, or even more so, than for their drinking habits. This concern
far prostitution goes a long way then towards explaining the gender
imbalance in reformatory committals.
In the HSPCC committals cited above we can detect a hint of concern
with street prostitution: "she frequently accosted men in the street
in order to obtain drink". Others who testified before the 1908
committee revealed a similar concern. The following is from the
metropolitan magistrate, Mr. E. Baggallay:
... we should keep the streets and other public places free from
habitual drunkards, and particularly women, who are a very great
trouble; and there is no doubt with regard to women that they
influence others. As I understand it at the time the 1898 Act was
passed it was very largely supported on the ground that it would
assist the magistrates and the police in keeping the streets
clear. (Official Publications 1908: q. 302)
Dr. V.C. Sullivan, the Deputy Medical Officer at H.M. Prison,
Holloway, argued that a large number of female prisoners who had
suffered from delirium tremens (a condition closely associated with
inebriety) were prostitutes (ibid: q. 834). For another witness the
slide from inebriety to prostitution was practically Inevitable;
inebriate women "pawn their childrens' or husband's clothes, and
eventually the man gets a separation, and then that woman, what
happens to her - the street" (ibid: q. 1476). Another witness,
described the type of case which was dealt with in the women's
inebriate reformatory at Langho, in Lancashire, in the fallowing
- 79 -
terms: "The great majority of them are of the lowest class of street
harlots, and of the lowest slum population of the large towns" (ibid:
q. 1996).
The connection between inebriety and prostitution was most explicit
though in the evidence of Thomas Holmes, a Police Court Missionary and
Secretary of the influential penal reform body, the Howard
Association. Incidentally, Holmes' argument also shows that advocation
of inebriate reformatory treatment was-by no means dependent upon a
deterministic outlook.- He claimed;-
The police court inebriates who come under that Act are first
immoral. I have watched the lives of hundreds of them. They come on
the streets absolutely of their own accord, of purpose aforethought;
no other life will suit them; they are not there because of social
and industrial circumstances. The women who come within this Act and
who so frequently appear at the police courts are simply absolute
prostitutes and nothing else - that is eighty per cent of them. . .
the whole bulk of young women that are charged in police courts are
activated first by lust." (Official Publications 1908: q. 1488)
Holmes spent most of his testimony moralising about prostitution.
The first impression one gets from reading his testimony is that he
has turned up at the wrong committee; indeed his interrogators found
it necessary to inform him that the concern of the committee was with
inebriates and not with prostitution (ibid: q. 1511). To this Holmes
replied that with most arrests of women for drunkenness offences, and
subsequently with most of the committals of women to inebriate
reformatories, drink was only the formal reason for arrest and
committal. The real reason was prostitution.
"... they get drunk enough to get into contact with the police and
get locked up. For the drink, as drink, very few of them have any
particular passion; it serves their purpose by getting them into
contact with men" (Official Publications 1908: q. 1511)
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Elsewhere though, Holmes describes the relationship between inebriety
and prostitution in different terms. Drink is not simply used for
business purposes, rather the lust for drink and the lust for sex are
connected at a deeper level: "... drink brings them into contact with
the police. The connection of the two passions makes them very
objectionable and makes them interfere with men" (ibid: q. 1489). And
finally, when asked whether confinement in inebriate reformatories
would cure them, Holmes reply was "I do not know about that, but the
streets would be cleaner" (ibid: q. 1518).
The concern with street prostitution intersects clearly with the
concern with the residuum. Street prostitutes were the most visible
sign of the existence of this class; they were seen as drunk, morally
loose, idle (prostitution was not considered to be work) and
undoraesticated. The connection betweeen the problems of prostitution
and that of the residuum comes out clearly in the statement above
linking 'the lowest class of street harlot' with the 'lowest slum
population of the large towns' . Nor was the problem too far removed,
in the eyes of the reformers, from the problem of neglect of children
and domestic duties. As we have seen, the women who neglected her
children and husband, was in danger of being thrown out by the
husband. From there, the next stage was almost inevitably that of
street prostitution. The women who failed to keep a good home, the
street prostitute and the inebriate were hardly distinguished at all
in the minds of the reformers; the problems generally went together
and had to be tackled together. What was required was not cure of the
inebriate, but the total reformation of the inebriate women.
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The correspondence between female Inebriety and reformatory treatment
The gender Imbalance In reformatory commitals might also be partly
explained by looking at how a particular conception of female
inebriety connected with a particular conception of the nature of
reformatory treatment. I will briefly outline this argument here,
although it will become clearer after the next chapter, when I will
have described the favoured methods of reformatory treatment.
With regard to the nature of female inebriates, it was presumed that
inebriety in a female was more the determined outcome of
circumstances, environmental and otherwise, than was inebriety in men.
The argument that habitual drunkenness was, in part, not willful but
the product of one's environment, was not applied evenly to men and
women. Like their conduct in general, the drinking behaviour of men
was likely to be seen as more voluntary than determined, even in the
case of men labelled as dipsomaniacs. The drinking behaviour of women
though, was likely to be seen as more determined than voluntary (cf.
Allen 1987). This was related to a more general conception of female
nature, or at least of the nature of female deviants: "I think the
environment of a woman is very important because she seems to take on
the colour of her environment more than men do" (Official Publications
1908: q. 700).
The reason for this leading to a greater likelihood of women being
subjected to reformatory treatment had nothing to do, however, with
arguments to the effect that since their drinking was determined, they
were therefore ill and should not be punished. Rather it was thought
that since women were more easily shaped by the environment, and by
moral suasion (ibid: q. 704) than were men, they could be more easily
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managed through the relaxed discipline of the reformatory, than
through the harsh discipline of the prison. The particular conception
of female inebriety had to intersect then with a particular conception
of the nature of reformatory treatment before it could be translated
into a gender difference in actual committals (cf. Allen 1987). As we
shall see in the next chapter, reformatories were distinguished from
prisons in terms of the type and degree of discipline which they
imposed. Prisons were characterisaed in terms of their harsh
disciplinary regimes, which were more suitable to the wilful conduct
of the male inebriate, whereas the milder discipline of the
reformatory, relying upon environmental manipulation and moral
suasion, was seen as more suitable for the punishment and reformation
of the less wilful female inebriate.
The confinement of the residuum
To move on and look at the population of the inebriate reformatories
in more general terms, it is clear that the reformatories were used as
a tactic in the attempt to contain and discipline the residuum. The
reformatories were used to incarcerate people from the poorest
sections of the working class: the unemployed, paupers, vagrants,
tramps; all those who obtained no benefit from the existing social
order and who correspondingly had no attachment to values which helped
uphold that order. These were 'the dangerous classes'; the
reformatories were a form of 'social defence' against this danger, a
means of clearing the streets of undesirables. To quote V. Byrne, who
was Under-Secretary of State, at the Home Office;
I may say now that the scum of the gutters and of the streets has
been sent to these reformatories; in many instances with the
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excellent object of removing the scandal and danger and expense
which their life of freedom entailed.
(Official Publications 1908: q. 21)
Others described the population of inebriate reformatories in terms
which went far beyond any specific concern with drunkenness. The
following is from Branthwaite, the inspector of inebriate
reformatories;
. . . irreformable inebriates are persistently drunken when not in
prison, commit wilful damage, attack policemen, or are publicly
disorderly or indecent. They gain no benefit from repeated prison
punishment; but, on the other hand, exhibit progressive physical
deterioration, steady decline of mental power, and finally become
hopeless mental and moral degenerates. During periods of liberty
between imprisonment such persons create disturbances without number
by fighting, disorderly conduct and obscene language, behaving
indecently, and causing obstruction. They are responsible for
assaults, wounding . . . and wilful damage. They are also the cause
of considerable expense to public funds without adequate return. . .
They bring into the world ill-fed, uncared-for and mentally useless
children, who provide the mass from which the future criminal,
drunken and lunatic army is recruited, and finally they themselves
become in later years chargeable to the rates as paupers or
lunatics. (Official Publications 1908: q. 209)
Just as Peddie in 1860, along with other witnesses who gave evidence
to the 1872 committee, had asserted that those who could function
efficiently without becoming a public nuisance were not to be
considered as inebriates whatever their drinking habits, the reformers
of 1908 made it clear that the criteria for inteference was social
worth, as the folowing exchange makes clear.
You would really rather take as your standard the usefulness of the
man? - I would.
If he drinks periodically, and is a useful wage earner for his
family meantimes, you would not interfere with him? - Not unless he
gets into trouble. (Official Publications 1908: qq. 977-8)
Overall then, it seems clear that the inebriate reformatory
experiment owed little, if anything, to changes in the way of thinking
about the causes of drunkenness. The concerns of the inebriate
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reformatory campaigners, as manifested first in their practical
proposals, and later in the way they actually selected the population
for reformatories, went far beyond any concern with drunkenness. The
main concern was to contain and discipline a class of persons who had





In the previous chapter I suggested that the chief functions of the
inebriate reformatory were to be the containment and socialization of
the inebriate and I also suggested that socialization involved
installing within the inebriate the habits and values - such as
sobriety, industriousness, prudence, restraint, self-help, family
responsibility, thrift and accumulation - which the person had to
adopt if he were to adapt to the environment created by urbanization,
industrialization and capitalist production.1 In this chapter I will
try to support this argument by looking at how the reformers used the
concept of treatment. I will argue that the reformers used the word
'treatment' to refer to an activity which <a) had the objective of
installing these habits and values within the inebriate, thereby
helping to attach the inebriety to society; and (b) employed many of
the techniques of 'moral management' - moral management being a method
of reforming characters which was developed, in particular, in
nineteenth century lunatic asylums.2 I will also try to show that
these techniques were quite different from the activities which we
conventionally think of as medical treatment.
Understanding Institutional practices
Before proceeding, I will briefly describe how this analysis differs
in its methodological approach, from that used in both conventional
and some sociological discussions of institutional practices. These
methodological arguments are important since they help us to
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understand why commentators have misunderstood how terms such as
treatment are used when employed in the context of quasi-penal
institutions such as inebriate reformatories.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the conventional analyses of the
inebriate reformatory presume that the reformatories were intended as
places of medical treatment. In both of the accounts discussed it is
suggested that this original aim was eventually frustated in practice.
For Radzinowicz and Hood <1986: 306-10) the original medical objective
was frustrated as inebriate reformatories became lumbered with
incurable cases and hence became used for discipline and
incapacitation. While for MacLeod <1967: 244-5), the physicalist-
hereditarian perception of inebriety - which he claims was favoured by
most reformers - led to inebriate reformatories being used solely for
the purpose of "isolating alcoholics and insulating society". These
eventual outcomes are regarded, however, as unintentional
consequences; for both accounts the original objective of the
reformers was to establish institutions for the medical treatment of
inebriates.
That this was the original objective is presumed, rather than
explicitly argued for. To be fair, Radzinowicz and Hood support this
presumption with a quotation from Dr. Horman Kerr, who claimed that in
cases of inebriety there was a degeneration of brain tissue, and that
the confinement of inebriates in a place where they could not get any
drink was therefore necessary for the purpose of facilitating the
growth of "a new and ample supply of healthy brain and nerve
substance" <Radzinowicz and Hood 1986: 292). However, neither
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Radzinowicz and Hood, nor MacLeod, pose the question of what the
reformers actualy meant by the term 'treatment'.
This reflects a more general problem with these accounts: i.e. they
do not address the question of what was actually meant to happen
within the inebriate reformatories. While they contain a wealth of
detail about the political struggles which went on over the
establishment of reformatories and over the power to confine
inebriates in them, neither account tells us much about what was
supposed to happen to the inebriate once they entered the reformatory.
These accounts stop at the gates of the reformatory. Perhaps this
reflects a more general problem in conventional scholarly discussions
of institutions - and certainly of penal and welfare institutions -
which often show little concern with the details of institutional
practices, focussing instead, almost exclusively, upon the lofty,
philosophical and political debates which take place with regard to
these institutions. This in itself would not be so objectionable but
for the fact that such accounts do tend to make presumptions about
institutional practices and, incidentally, often make recommendations
about how these practices should be altered. Hence, as we have seen,
Radzinowicz and Hood (1986) and MacLeod (1967) presume that the
inebriate reformatories were intended as places of medical treatment
and they also presume that they eventually ended up as institutions
which merely isolated and punished the inebriate.
There is, however, a long sociological tradition which does provide
an alternative to purely 'external' accounts of welfare and penal
institutions, the 'micro-sociological' accounts of social interaction
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within institutions, as represented by Goffman*s classic work Asylums
(1961). Goffman's study is particularly pertinent here, because his
analysis of institutional life is based primarily upon a participant
observation study of an institution - a large mental hospital (over
7,000 inmates) in the USA - in which psychiatric discourse is a key
functioning constituent, but also in which one of the primary concerns
of the staff is with the control and management of the inmates. As I
will argue later, the inebriate reformatory can be characterised in
similar terms. Nevertheless, there are some major weaknesses in
Goffman's approach which make it unsuitable for analysing the
inebriate reformatory. I will briefly point out some of the specific
features of Goffman's analysis, before identifying its weaknesses from
my point of view.
First, to use the words of Hirst and Voolley (1982: 183), "Goffman
deliberately chose to consider the institution not in terms of
psychiatric rationality, its formal objectives and official organizing
knowledges and practices, but instead as a specific context of social
interaction". Secondly, he identified the primary concern of the staff
as being not with treatment, but rather with the management and
control of the inmates. Third, he argued that the behaviour of the
inmates was interpreted in psychiatric terms; bad behaviour was seen
as a sign of continuing illness, co-operative behaviour was seen as a
sign of progress, and so on. Fourth, he argued that the techniques
used to manage and control the inmates were also legitimated in
psychiatric terms. The basic technique used was a system of rewards
and punishments (early release for good - i.e. co-operative -
behaviour, suspended release for bad - i.e. unco-operative -
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behaviour, transfer to a more or less secure wards etc.); these were
legitimated in psychiatric terms: early release was justified on
grounds of the patient's recovery, suspended release on grounds that
he was still ill, and so on.
Overall Goffman implies a clear gap between actual practice and its
representation. The implication is that we cannot understand the
mental institution on the basis of its official, or conventional,
representation - i.e. as a domain of psychiatric rationality -, rather
it is necessary to undertake a (sociological) observation of the
social interaction which actually takes place within the institution.
Vhile there is a some correspondence between Goffman's argument and
that which I will make here with regard to the inebriate reformatory,
there are also some important differences. In order to elaborate these
differences I will point out some of the problems which I find in
Goffman's work.3
First, Goffman's concern to study social interaction within the
institution, rather than presuming that what happens can be surmised
from psychiatric theory or from the public representations of
psychiatric practice, is to be welcomed. There are however problems
with the way in which he contrasts psychiatric rationality with asylum
practice. In his eagerness "to look at the hospital with sociology in
mind, not junior psychiatry" (Goffman 1961: xi), Goffman fails to
realise how asylum practice does relate to psychiatric discourse.
Because Goffman never undertakes any detailed study of psychiatric
discourse, (his pre-suppositions make such analysis superfluous), he
equates psychiatry with an ideal image of medical rationality. Since
much of what happens within the mental institution cannot be properly
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accounted for in terms of this ideal type of medical rationality,
Goffman presumes that psychiatric discourse merely legitimates
judgements and actions which take place for other reasons (management
and control). The possibility that psychiatric discourse differs
significantly from the ideal of medical rationality is not recognised
by Goffman.
Secondly, and following from this, Goffman's contrast between
psychiatric treatment and the control and management of inmates is
also problematic. Goffman's argument is that the primary function of
the staff is not to treat, but rather to control and manage the
inmates, primarily through a system of rewards and punishments. What
Goffman fails to recognise is that control and management through
reward and punishment is tied to a specific theory of psychiatric
treatment. Related to this, Goffman misunderstands the full
implications of the control and management of inmates. The concerns
with control and management do not, as Goffman suggests, derive simply
from the need for order in the institution (although this is
undoubtably an important consideration), rather they derive from a
particular conception about what the objectives of psychiatric
treatment are; a conception which is elaborated in practical
psychiatric discourse and which is tied to a specific perception of
mental illness. Once again the problem is that Goffman contrasts
actual practice with an Ideal image of psychiatric treatment,
conceived as a form of medicine, rather than looking at how asylum
practice relates to concepts of treatment which are outlined in
practical psychiatric discourse.
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Thirdly, and also related, Goffman implies that the procedure of
interpreting the inmates' behaviour in psychiatric terms is
illegitimate. He points out that disruptive and unco-operative
behaviour is often construed by the staff as a sign of continuing
mental illness. For Goffman the real problem, from the staff's point
of view, is that such behaviour interferes with the smooth running of
the institution. Disruptive behaviour is problematic from a moral or
control point of view. The attachment of psychiatric labels to such
behaviour then appears, to Goffman, to be arbitrary and extraneous
(see Hirst and Voolley 1982: 187). The problem, as Hirst and Voolley
point out, is that in psychiatric terms it is quite legitimate to
consider disruptive and unco-operative behaviour as a sign of mental
illness (ibid). Once again, the problem is that Goffman works with an
ideal image of illness; his conception of illness is drawn from a
crude physicalist model which, as Sedgwick points out, is hardly
characteristic of the way illness is conceptualised in physical
medicine, let alone in psychiatry (Sedgwick 1982: chs. 1-2).
An example of this problem, which is of particular interest to the
case of inebriate reformatories, comes from Goffman's discussion of
work in the mental institution. Goffman considers work solely in terms
of how its meaning is affected by the context of the total
institution. On the outside work is meaningful because of the
financial rewards it produces (Goffman 1961: 10). In the total
institution, cut off from the outside economy, there is no real
incentive to work; so "the individual who was work-oriented on the
outside tends to become demoralized by the work system of the total
institution. An example of such demoralization is the practice of
- 92 -
bumming' or 'working someone for' a nickel or dime to spend in the
canteen" (ibid: 11). Goffman argues that,
Staff members, interpreting this begging pattern in terms of their
own civilian orientation to earning, tend to see it as a symptom of
mental illness and one further bit of evidence that inmates really
are unwell. (Goffman 1961: 11)
The problem is that it is quite reasonable, within the terms of
psychiatric discourse, to interpret begging - and more generally
idleness - as a symptom of continuing mental illness.
Ve have already seen, in the case of the criteria for diagnosing
inebriety, that idleness was central to the diagnosis of this form of
'mental abnormality'. I will argue shortly that the insistence that
the inmates of reformatories work, or at least take part in 'rational
recreations', was tied to a specific conception of the nature and
causes of inebriety and to a specific therapetic theory. Without an
investigation of psychiatric discourse it is impossible to understand
the significance of work within institutions in which psychiatric
discourse functions and it is impossible to fully understand the
reasons why begging might be seen as a sign of continuing mental
abnormality.*
More generally, the problem with Goffman's analysis lies in the way
he conceptualises the 'gap' between the official representation of the
asylum (i.e. as a domain of medical rationality) and its actual
practice. Goffman's basic methodological presumption is that in order
to understand asylum practice it is not sufficient to look at official
accounts of what is supposed to happen, rather it is necessary to
directly observe the social interaction which actually takes place
- 93 -
within the institution; it is necessary to focus upon 'where the
action is' .
As I have suggested it is indeed necessary to examine actual
institutional practices, rather than accepting official
representations as accurate, if one is to understand the practice of
penal/welfare/psychiatric institutions. It cannot be presumed that
institutions which are represented in medical terms, in fact function
according to the logic of medical rationality. The problem with
Goffman is his jump to the presumption that social interaction can
therefore be understood without any reference to the wider framework
of assumptions, logics and objectives, within which it takes place.5
In the context of the study of institutions, the problem is the
presumption that institutional practices can be understood without any
reference to the discourses which constitute them. Following Rothman
(1971: xv) we might argue that where conventional accounts often fail
to look behind the language of the reformers, alternative accounts,
such as Goffman's, tend to ignore this language completely. I should
stress that this is not an argument against 'micro-sociology' as such.
The argument is not that 'wider events' are more worthy of study than
'local events'; to the contrary I have criticised conventional
analyses of the inebriate reformatory experiment because they focus
exclusively upon the political struggles which went on around the
construction of inebriate reformatories. My argument is that we cannot
understand the meaning and significance of small scale social
interaction itself, without some knowledge of the wider framework
within which it takes place. The problen then is the sharpness of the
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distinction which Goffman draws between events inside the institution
and concerns outside of it.e
In the following account of the inebriate reformatory I have tried to
oppose two tendencies. The first is that of the conventional analyses,
which presume - without looking in detail at how the concept of
treatment is actually employed in the reformers' discourse - that the
reformatories were intended as places of medical treatment. The second
tendency which I will oppose is that which - following Goffman - would
focus solely upon the control and punishment exercised by the
reformatory staff, and ignore the role played by psychiatric discourse
in constituting the reformatory regime. Instead of simply stating that
reformatories were involved in the business of social control, I will
argue that they exercised a specific form of control, and that in
order to understand specific features of this style of social control
(and in order to evaluate it) it is necessary to analyse reformatory
practice within the context of the practical discourses which
constituted it.
Overall, I will argue against the simple division between
psychiatric treatment and social control, which informs both the
conventional and the alternative sociological accounts of 'punitive
treatment'. For the inebriety reformers there was no simple
distinction between treatment and control (and nor, for that matter,
between treatment and punishment). Both the conventional accounts and
the alternative's such as that of Goffman, work with a 'medical model'
of psychiatry, in which psychiatric intervention is totally opposed to
management and discipline. I will try to show that both management and
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discipline within the inebriate reformatories depended upon a specific
conception of psychiatric intervention.
THE GEBEALQGY OF THE INEBRIATE REFORMATORY
One implication of my methodological arguments is that in order to
understand what was meant to happen within inebriate reformatories, it
may be useful to start by looking at 'external' developments which
made the idea of the inebriate reformatory conceivable. It may be
useful, in other words, to look at the developments in the realm of
ideas and institutional practices, which pathed the way towards the
idea of inebriate reformatories, making the inebriate reformatory
experiment almost the obvious path to follow. As I suggested in the
previous chapter, the most appropriate developments to look at are not
those realm of medical theories of alcoholism. Rather, I will place
the inebriate reformatory experiment in the context of developments in
institutional responses to those who were considered to be nuisances.
The 'Sober House'
The idea of the inebriate reformatory had already been in existence
for at least half a century before the inebriate reformatory
experiment began in Britain. In 1810 the renowned American physician
and reformer, Benjamin Rush, outlined his 'Plan for an Asylum for
DRUNKARDS to be called the SOBER HOUSE' (Rush 1948; emphasis in
original). Rush stated:
... it has occurred to several citizens that a house appropriated
exclusively for persons addicted to the excessive use of ardent and
fermented liquors, in which they might be reformed or accomodated
where they could no longer injure themselves nor others, would be
attended with the most beneficial consequences. Hitherto the
hospital and the Jail have been their only receptacles, but as
proofs of insanity or crimes from strong drink are required for
their admission into them, and as incalculable evils are often
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produced by drunkenness short of insanity and crimes, the proposed
asylum would be the means of restraining and preventing them.
(Rush 1948: 354-5)
In the proposed 'sober house', drunkards were to be confined in
separate apartments and subjected to a definite regime,
. . . such diet, drink and employments and means of moral and
religious instruction, should be contrived for them as are
calculated to promote their reformation and comfort."
(Rush 1948: 355)
The problem addressed by Rush was that the existing receptacles far
drunkards - the jail and the hospital - did not cater for those
drunkards who, although requiring confinement, were neither insane nor
criminal. It was not, however, simply that the drunkard, whom Rush had
in mind, could not be sent to the jail or the hospital; the problem
was also that the regime of the jail or hospital was not suitable for
these drunkards. What was required was not simply another receptacle,
but a 'more fitting receptacle' .7 The regime of the proposed sober
house was to differ form that of the prison and from that of the
(mental) hospital. The proposed sober house was to be neither prison,
nor hospital, but something different.
Reforma tories
Ve can further our understanding of the inebriate reformatory
experiment by examining it in the context of a long history of penal-
reformatory confinement of delinquents. In Discipline and Punish,
Foucault (1977b) describes the regimes and operational principles of a
number of penal-reformatory institutions. He describes the Rasphuis of
Amsterdam, opened in 1596, which was originally intended for beggars
or young malefactors.® The 'Rasphuis approach' was similar, in many
respects, to that suggested by the inebriety reformers. In the
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Rasphuis: (i) "the duration of penalties could, at least within
certain limits, be determined by the administration itself, according
to the prisoners conduct" (ibid: 121); (ii) "work was obligitary. . .
and, for the work done, the prisoners received wages" (ibid); and
(iii) "a strict timetable, a system of prohibitions and obligations,
continual supervision, exhortations, religious readings, a whole
complex of methods 'to draw towards good' and 'to turn away from evil'
held the prisoners in its grip from day to day" (ibid).
Foucault argues that these basic principles also appeared in
different ways in the blueprints of a number of other penal-
reformatory institutions. He uses the examples of the maisaii de force
at Ghent, the 'English model', and the Philadelphia model. The maison
de force, presuming idleness to be the general cause of most crimes,
organized penal labour around economic imperatives. Its aim was to
"revive for the lazy individual a liking for labour, force him back
into a system of interests in which labour would be more advantageous
than laziness, form around him a small, miniature, simplified,
coercive society, in which the maxim 'he who wants to live must work'
would be clearly revealed" (ibid: 122). And as would be the case in
the inebriate reformatory, the duration of the sentence was a subject
of the utmost importance: "this reconstruction of homo oeconomlcus
excluded the use of penalties which were too short - this would
prevent the acquisition of habits and skill of work - or too long -
which would make any apprenticeship useless" (ibid).
The 'English model' - a term which Foucault uses to discuss the
principles outlined in the works of penal reformers such as Hanway,
Howard and Blackstone - added to the principle of work that of
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isolation; the idea that the prisoner should work and live in
solitude, or at least in silence. Originally justified in negative
terms, as a way of preventing promiscuity, blackmail and escape,
isolation soon became legitimated in more positive terms. It became a
technique for producing moral conversion; it would provide "a
'terrible shock' which, while protecting the prisoner from bad
influences, enables him to go into himself and rediscover in the
depths of his conscience the voice of good" (ibid). One proponent of
this "apparatus for modifying individuals" referred to it as 'a
reformatory' (ibid: 123). Solitary or silent regimes did not form part
of the inebriety reformers' plans, but as I will point out, the
principle of isolation appeared in a modified form, as did the idea of
moral conversion.
The other model discussed by Foucault is the Philadelphia model, by
which he means the Walnut Street Prison, remodelled in 1790 in
accordance with these new principles.9 While this corresponded in many
respects to the maison de force and to the English model, it also
included some specific features. The prisoner's transformation was not
entrusted solely to solitude, self-examination and purely religious
exhortations, rather the prison administration was to continuously
address itself to the task of reforming the prisoner. Connected with
this, reformation was to be accompanied by "a development of knowledge
of individuals" (ibid: 125). Reformation involved the use of
biographical details of the offender and throughout his detention the
prisoner would be observed: "a whole corpus of individualizing
knowledge was being organized that took as its field of reference not
so much the crime committed (at least not in isolation), but the
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potentiality of danger that lies hidden in an individual and which is
manifested in his observed everyday conduct" (ibid:126).
Foucault's focus in Discipline and Punish is on 'the birth of the
prison' . Since one of the major stated concerns of the inebriety
reformers was to establish an institution which would differ
significantly from prisons, it is necessary to justify my placing of
the inebriety reformatory experiment within the context of the history
of prisons. In the first place, we should be sceptical about the
claims made by many inebriety reformers, i.e. that their proposed
institutions would differ radically from prisons. It would be more
accurate to describe the blueprints of the inebriate reformatories as
a modified prison regime. The proposed reformatories were to
incorporate many of the features of ordinary prisons, but their
regimes were to be more 'relaxed'.
There are a number of reasons why new institutions, with a more
relaxed system of discipline and control, were deemed necessary for
inebriates. First, the incarceration of inebriates along with 'real
criminals' , far from leading to their reformation, was considered to
be more likely to lead to their 'moral contagion': "drunkards meet
other criminals in prison and are therefore sucked into the criminal
class" (Official Publications 1872: q. 150). Secondly, inebriates were
difficult to manage within ordinary prisons. In his evidence to the
1872 inquiry into the problem of habitual drunkards, the prison
governor H. Webster supported the inebriate reformatory experiment by
arguing that "drunkards make unprofitable and disorderly prisoners.
They are not fit to work the tread-wheel" (ibid: q. 139; cf. Gunn et
al 1978: ch. 1). Thirdly, a more relaxed regime was considered
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necessary for the incarceration of inebriates who had not committed a
criminal offence (or - in the case of recidivists - who were to be
committed for a longer period than would be justified by their actual
offence). To send non-criminal inebriates to institutions with prison¬
like regimes was considered to be unjust. A milder form of discipline
was the concessionary price to be paid for the extension of formal
penal control to non-offenders.
My placement of the inebriate reformatary within the history of the
prison appears to confirm the 'sceptical' view about the relationship
between the representation and actual practice of penal institutions.
It might appear that the psychiatric discourse, through which the
practice of the inebriate reformatory was represented, functioned
merely to throw a cloak of medical respectability over what was
essentially a penal operation. It is wrong though to see the
psychiatric representation of reformatory practice 'solely as an
exercise in legitimation'.10 In many ways it was quite legitimate to
represent reformatory practice in psychiatric terms. The type of
regime which was proposed, and which was put into practice in some
reformatories, did in fact correspond in many respects to the ideals
and practice of psychiatric treatment of the mentally deranged. The
inebriate reformatory can be located within the history of the prison,
but it can also be located within the history of mental institutions
(even though there were important differences between asylums and
inebriate reformatories). In order to appreciate this it is necessary
to reject the conventional wisdom which places mental institutions and
penal institutions in direct opposition to each other; the former
- 101 -
characterised as a domain of benign medical treatment, the latter as
one of harsh discipline. While there were important differences
between nineteenth century mental institutions and penal institutions,
these differences are neither as great as, nor of the same nature as,
conventional wisdom presumes them to be. There were in fact important
similarities between the regimes of mental and penal institutions, and
also between psychiatric treatment and penal techniques <cf. Rothman
1971).
I should stress however that this link between the asylum and the
prison is not being made in the same terms as it is made by Goffman
and by popular anti-psychiatry in general. Goffman also drew links
between the asylum and the prison, but in his case the link is that
both are total institutions, social organisations which differ
radically from life on 'the outside' (using these criteria Goffman
also places monasteries and concentration camps in the same category).
Just a short step from Goffman is the more cruder and often popular,
anti-psychiatry argument which links the mental hospital to the prison
by arguing that mental hospitals are, in effect, prisons.11 In what
follows, nineteenth century penal and mental institutions are linked
in a quite different way. The link is historically specific: they
shared similar regimes, with a similar, and related, set of
objectives, discourses, management practices and reformatory
techniques; in their blueprints, if not always in their practice (cf.
Rothraan 1971: particularly pp. 133 & 151). This link might best be
expressed by saying that the early nineteenth century asylum, the
early nineteenth century prison, and also the late nineteenth century
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inebriate reformatory, were all institutions in which the discourse of
moral treatment had gained a foothold.
Moral treatment was a complex system of intervention into the
problem of mental disorder advocated and practised by early nineteenth
century asylum managers. It differed radically, in its mode of
intervention and in its underlying rationale, both from physical
medicine and from physicalist forms of mental medicine. Its
application was by no means limited to medical sites or to medical
problems: the principles of moral treatment were applied in various
forms in prisons, workhouses, reform schools etc. as a means of
correcting crime, idleness and delinquency (Hirst and Woolley 1982:
181). Moral treatment could be better described - as indeed it often
was - as moral management, since it involved the manipulation of the
patient's environment, rather than technical interventions aimed
directly at the patient's body or psyche. Indeed, moral treatment was
more often likened to education, and to child-rearing, than to
conventional medical treatment (Donnelly 1983: 44). In discourses of
moral treatment the relationship between the medical-superintendent
and a patient was often compared wth a parent-child relationship,
rather than with a doctor-patient relationship. Moral treatment was
about character formation rather than about healing. Based upon a
conception of insanity as a defect of the will, moral treatment sought
to teach the 'patient' how to obtain mastery over himself and to train
him in habits of self-control. It aimed to transform the patient into
a self-governing individual, by subjecting him to a moral and domestic
environment, which the patient was to internalise. This intervention
was premissed upon a number of related presumptions about human nature
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and about the nature and causes of mental derangement. The following
is a somewhat simplified summmary.
First it was presumed that all human beings had a common nature.
Individual differences were presumed to derive therefore, not from
nature, but from the effect of the environment - both physical and
social - upon the person. It was presumed, in other words, that the
person was shaped by his environment. A healthy environment would
produce a healthy person, both physically and mentally; while an
unhealthy environment created physical infirmity, deformity and
disease, and also mental infirmity and derangement. By altering the
environment one could prevent disease and infirmity, whether physical
or mental. At the level of physical health this conception of the
relationship between the person and his environment found expression
in the public health movement. I will concentrate here upon the
implications of this conception for interventions into the area of
mental health, although it should be stressed that the distinction
between mental and physical health was not made as sharply as it is is
in much modern medical thought.
It was presumed that mental health was shaped by the environment: a
moral environment would promote a healthy mind, while an immoral
environment could cause mental infirmity and derangement. The term
'moral', in this context, referred, on the one hand, to the register
of ethics; a moral environment was one which was virtuous in terms of
'religious' values: piety, honesty, etc. But also, and more
importantly, it referred to a register of social values: a moral
environment was one which was orderly, domestic, sober, industrious,
clean, etc. Conversely, an immoral environment existed not only where
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there was a lack of religious observance, dishonesty, etc. (the clear
signs of immorality); it also existed where there was a lack of proper
domesticity; where there was disorder, drunkenness, idleness and
filth. If mental derangement was a product of an immoral environment,
it followed that it could be countered through altering the person's
environment, making it moral. This logic could lead to two forms of
intervention. On the one hand there were those interventions which, in
close association with the public health movement, aimed to alter the
moral environment. Another form of intervention was to remove the
person from his pathological surroundings and place him in a moral
environment where he would stay until that environment had been
internalised as conscience. This second mode of intervention was known
as moral treatment.
Confinement was, therefore, essential to moral treatment. Confine¬
ment in an asylum was a way of containing the mentally deranged
person, thereby ridding society of a danger or a nuisance. But it was
also justifiable in therapeutic terms. The advocates of moral
treatment saw the environment - and more specifically the family
environment - as being unamenable to imposed planning or reordering,
i.e. as 'unprogrammable' (see Rose 1985: 26). In order to cure the
mentally dranged person it was necessary then to remove him from the
family and place him in the enclosed, programmable, moral environment
which was the asylum. Asylums were to be situated, ideally, in the
country. Along with the fact that sites were cheaper there, rural
locations meant that land was available for outdoor work. Also the
tranquillity and clean air of the country would serve to counter the
effects of the disorder and squalor of the city (cf. Donnelly 1983:
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31-2). The asylum itself was conceived as an enclosed domain of pure
morality. The patient was to be subjected to moral exhortation and
taught the virtues of religious observance. But more importantly, he
was to be subjected to a domesticated, industrious, and disciplined
regime. Work, and in particular outdoor and domestic work, was one of
the most important features of moral treatment. The regularity of
labour, it was presumed, would install discipline (Donnelly 1983: 37).
Discipline was also enforced through a system of rewards and
punishments; the objective being not simply to maintain order within
the asylum, but also to inculcate the patient with the power of self-
discipline. More generally, every aspect of the asylum regime, was
designed to promote order, regularity and domesticity. Patients were
to work, eat, sleep, and relax, according to a set timetable; the
architecture of the asylum was designed to impress a sense of
regularity and neatness upon the patient (see Rothman 1971:
particularly pp. 152-3; Donnelly 1983: 54-5). The esence of moral
treament is captured well in the following quotation from Castel.
Moral treatment is the manipulative technique that deduces this
institution as the necessary and sufficient condition of its
implementation. Its "principles' are clearly legible in the
architecture of the buildings and the arrangement of the furniture
in the rooms, in the organization of groups for work and leisure, in
the rigid accounting for time and the strict separation of
activities, in the abjective and subjective relations of
subordination of patients to the medical personnel. Everything is
organized there in order that reason, as complete conditioning by
rules, shall annul the disorder of the spirit and morals that is
madness. (Castel 1983: 258-9)
THE IMEBRIATE REFORMATORY REGIME
Here I will describe how the inebriate reformatory was to operate
according to those who campaigned for its establishment. I will argue
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that - contrary to conventional wisdom - the inebriate reformatory was
never intended primarily as a place of medical treatment. In place of
this conventional thesis I will argue that the inebriate reformatories
were conceived, from the beginning, as a places of moral treatment and
reformatory discipline. I will support this argument with material
drawn mainly from a number of official inquiries into the problem of
habitual drunkards. These inquiries were set up as a result of the
reformers' campaign. The reformers used these inquiries as an
opportunity to present their ideas about the inebriates problem and
reformatory treatment, as well as using them to present their reform
proposals to the government and to other bodies with influence or
control over penal policy.
I will start by asking what objectives the inebriate reformatory was
intended to further. One thing is clear: the inebriate reformatory was
meant to do far more than cure the inebriate of his craving for
alcohol. When the reformers talked of curing the inebriate they had in
mind a much more ambitious goal: the transformation of a ne'er'-do-
well into a self-governing, productive and decent citizen (see also
Branthwaite 1907-8). Also, this task of reformation was accompanied by
other, familiar objectives: deterrence, containment, and retribution.
The inebriety reformers saw no contradiction in pursuing these goals
simultaneously; and a single aspect of the reformatory programme, such
as the proposals pertaining to the work of inmates, was often seen as
a means of promoting a number of objecives concurrently. Another
concern of the reformers, which was expressed so frequently that it
can be considered as an objective in its own right, was that of making
inebriate reformatories self-financing. I will consider these
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objectives separately, although I should stress that the reformers
seldom drew sharp distinctions between their various objectives.
Deterrence
The reformers criticised the existing penal approach to the problem
for its failure to deter the habitual drunkard (Official Publications
1872: q. 81). A number of problems were identified. First, certainty
of conviction and punishment - which, as we saw in chapter one, was
considered essential to a proper system of deterrent punishment - was
not being achieved. A number of factors undermined 'the rule of
perfect certainty'. Most important, however, was the fact that there
were considerable problems in enforcing the payment of fines (by far
the most common sanction) especially with regard to vagrant
inebriates, so that in practice many fines went unpaid (ibid: q.1469).
A second problem was that the sanctions themselves - small fines and
short sentences of imprisonment - were considered inadequate for
deterrent purposes. As proof that the existing system was
insufficiently deterrent, the 1872 committee offered the very
existence of the problem of habitual drunken offenders. The fact that
"the same individual is convicted over and over again, to even more
than a hundred times", proved that the existing system of sancions was
neither deterring, nor reforming, the habitual drunkard (ibid:
para.3).
The reformers' concern with deterrence was such that, at the very
beginning of the 1872 report we find, not a reference to reformation
or treatment, but a recommendation that "the laws should be made more
simple, uniform, and stringent" (ibid: para.l). The reformers wanted
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tougher penalties; heavier fines which would increase progressively
with the number of convictions (ibid: para. 14) and, of course, longer
sentences of confinement in inebriate reformatories (ibid). It was
presumed that a long confinement in an inebriate reformatory, with its
regime of discipline and work, would be abhorrent to the idle and
undisciplined inebriate, no matter haw beneficial it would actually be
to the inebriate in the long term. For the inebriate from the better-
off classes, mere confinement would be distasteful enough, and hence
it was argued that inebriate retreats for ' gentlemen alcoholics' could
operate with a more pleasant, comfortable regime (which was just as
well since one would have to pay a considerable fee for 'treatment' at
an inebriate retreat). The reformers also advocated the setting up of
a Drunkard's Register (ibid: paras. 14-17) which would have a number
of uses, but would be particularly useful in helping to keep track of
a drunkard's movements, thereby easing the recovery of fines and
making sanctions more certain (ibid: para. 17).
The issue of deterrence also entered the question of what size the
institutions should be. Some favoured a small number of large
institutions because of economies of scale. Others, such as Akroyd,
preferred a large number of smaller institutions, with a maximum of
fifty inmates, because of their symbolic value. The sight of the
institution, as the proper place for inebriates, would be deterrent
both in the direct sense, and also indirectly, due to its 'educative'
value.'2 Hence Akroyd - following the American pioneer of inebriety
reformatories, Dr. Parrish - argued:
the advantage of inebriate asylums Is much wider and greater than
in the mere restoration of individuals. ... My own impression is,
that if they were very numerous and not very large, scattered all
through the country, the deterrent influence upon inebriates who are
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outside would be very strong. I think that institutions of this
class, properly conducted, with suitable men at the head of them,
would be centres of a great deal of information and light. That
would go very much to formation of a proper public sentiment, and
modify the estimate which people have of drunkards themselves.
(Official Publications 1872: Akroyd's draft report, para. 16)
Containment
The inebriate reformatory was also advocated as a means of ridding
society of a public nuisance (ibid: q. 79). As we saw in the previous
chapter it was not every inebriate, but rather those who constituted a
public nuisance, who were seen as requiring legal control. Aside from
its reformatory and deterrent effects, detention in an inebriate
reformatory would serve to remove the inebriate from 'the streets' for
a considerable period. Also, the proposed drunkard's register would
mark out the inebriate, thereby making his surveillance and control
easier. By the time of the 1908 Departmental Committee inquiry into
'the Operation of the Law Relating to Inebriates and to their
Detention in Reformatores and Retreats', containment had emerged as a
major justification for the reformatories:
... we consider it just and right that he [the inebriate] should be
detained, not merely for his reformation, but to protect the
community against his ill-doing. We are unanimouosly of the opinion
that the detention of the inebriate is justifiable, and necessary,
apart form all question of reformation.
(Official Publications 1908: p. 18)
Reforming the inebriate
Detention in an inebriate reformatory was justified primaily as a
means of reforming the inebriate. By reform was meant, not simply
changing the inebriate's drinking habits, but rather a much furthei—
reaching transformation of the inebriate into a domesticated and
industrious citizen; the objective being to socialize, to civilise and
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to domesticate the inebriate character. The techniques for achieving
this were not those of physical medicine, nor were they physicalist
forms of mental medicine; rather they were those of moral treatment
and of the disciplinary techniques prefigured in the early reformatory
models, which were outlined earlier in this chapter. Hence, in 1872 it
was explicitly stated that "reformatories would exercise moral
treatment" and "reformatory discipline" (Official Publications 1872:
qq. 515-6; Akroyd para. 28). Similarly, in 1908, the objectives of the
retreats and reformatories was seen as being to turn inebriates into
"useful members of the community" (Official Publications 1908: p.
167). This was to be achieved through "moral suasion" (ibid: p. 168),
"educational treatment" (ibid: p. 169) and discipline (ibid: p. 15, q.
736). I will now go on to describe how the reformers employed the
concept of treatment, looking first at what they saw as the objectives
of 'treatment'.
Self-control
One of the most frequently stated objectives was the cultivation of
the inebriate's will. Throughout the proceedings of the 1872 inquiry
this objective is frequently referred to: the aim of reformatory
treatment would be to "strengthen and invigorate the will of the
patient" (Official Publications 1872: Akroyd: para. 15); "treatment
throughout, when it moves beyond mere detention, seems to take the
form of restoring the moral will ... it must restore or install a
moral will so that desire can be overcome" (ibid: q. 1090); "the most
perfect cure... is the acquirement of self-control (ibid: 3157); & men
must be given the opportunity of "getting possession of themselves"
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(ibid). Similarly, the 1908 report refers to the "instillment and
cultivation of self-control" as a major objective of reformatory
treatment (Official Publications 1908: pp. 5-6). These statements were
based upon the presumption which we have already noted in chapter two,
i.e. the presumption that the inebriate's habitual drunkenness was the
product of his lack of self-control. Habitual drunkenness was just one
(albeit an extremely important) manifestation of loss of mastery over
oneself; inebriety was a deformation of the will.13
It is important to point out that what was occurring here was more
complex than a straightforward shift away from a voluntarist and
towards a determinist perception of habitual drunkards. We can recall
from chapter one that the juridical approach to social control - and
liberalism in general - presupposed that individuals posessed the
capacities of free will and rationality. The reformers were now
arguing that inebriates did not possess these capacities. The
inebriate had little control over his own conduct; he was a slave to
his desire for drink. Nor did the inebriate act rationally; he failed
to calculate the consequences of his conduct with the result that this
behaviour was not only a nuisance to to others, it was also self-
defeating. It appears that the voluntarist-rationalist concept of
human action was - at least in the case of habitual drunkards - being
abandoned. However, it might be more correct to say that the
voluntarist-rationalist perception of human action was being put to a
different use, rather than being abandoned. Instead of presuppossing
that individuals did possess free will and rationality, the reformers
were using the ideal of the self-governing, rationally calculating
individual as the standard by which the inebriate could be judged and
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found lacking. Moreover, the same voluntarist-rationalist standard was
used in order to define the objectives of 'treatment'. The objective
of treatment was defined as the transformation of the inebriate from a
'determined' being into a self-governing individual. Treatment aimed
to install a capacity for self-control within the inebriate. Its
purpose was precisely to invest the individual with the capacities -
and hence the responsibilities - of the normal self-governing,
rational person. The purpose of treatment might be defined therefore
as being to construct free-standing, competent individuals; the type
of individual which liberalism presupposed, but did not itself account
for (cf. Donnelly 1983: xi-xii).
This concern for self-control derives directly from the discourse of
moral treatment and from other, associated discourses of 'management'
(see Donnelly 1983: preface). For these discourses controls from
within were always preferable to outward conformity to rules. Ideally,
control would be achieved through the internalisation of norms, rather
than through mechanical constraints or fear. This would ensure a more
economic form of control in at least two respects. First it did not
require constant supervision by the controlling agent. Secondly, it
was a more positive form of 'control': instead of functioning simply,
to prohibit certain acts, it would function positively, to make the
person function in a certain way. Normalisation would not only prevent
breaches of the rule, but could create in the individual the capacity
and the desire to act in certain ways (cf. Foucault 1977; 1979;
Donzelot 1980). This was one of the main reasons why the inebriety
reformers objected to the policy which the Temperance Movement
advocated at the time, i.e. prohibition of the sale of alcohol. The
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inebriety reformers argued that "the acquirement of the power of self-
control ... is far better than any prohibitory laws" (Official
Publications 1872: q. 3157). It had long been recognised that
prohibition was inneffective, since it was easily overcome by
smuggling and illegal distillation (see Official Publications 1834);
it was often argued that the only effective means of promoting
genuine, long-term sobriety was through 'moral means' - i.e. through
education and environmental improvement - which would bring about a
capability and desire for sobriety in the person. But also, as we
shall see, sobriety was not the only aim of intervention. The
inebriety reformers were never content to simply stop the inebriate
from drinking, they also had the more positive goal of imbuing him
with certain capacities and desires which were only indirectly
connected with sobriety.
Industriousness
One of the methods advocated for cultivating the inebriate's
capacity for self-control was making him undertake regular work: "The
instillment and cultivation of self-control is necessarily an affair
of time. It can only be effected by the imposition of steady work . .
." (Official Publications 1908: p. 6). The imposition of work was,
however, also considered valuable as a means of promoting another
objective of 'reformatory treatment', i.e. the objective of
transforming the inebriate from an idler into an industrious person.
As we saw in the previous chapter one of the defining character¬
istics of the inebriate, according to the reformers, was his idleness.
Reformatory treatment corresponded to this conception of inebriety.
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One of its central features was that the inebriate be made to work, in
order to overcome "the habit of idleness" (Peddie 1872). The 1872
report recommended that reformatories be established on "the
industrial system" (Official Publications 1872: rec'n 8). The inmate
was to be made to work, preferably at useful and remunerative labour
(ibid: q. 722; letter of Mr. Smith to the chairman of the committee);
and the proceeds of the inmates labour "should be applied to the
payment of the entire cost of maintenance while in the reformatory; if
any excess remain, it should be applied to the maintenance of wife and
family..." (ibid: rec'n 9).
By making the inmate work a number of objectives could be achieved
simultaneously. In the first place, given the inebriate's dislike of
work, forced labour would act as a deterrent. This was not, however,
the main reason for the insistence that the inebriate work. Pointless
and demeaning labour would probably be the most effective deterrent.
Yet, the reformers insisted that work should be remunerative and
useful. One of the reformers' main objections to the imprisonment of
inebriates was that in prison they were given "useless hard labour",
rather than being taught "trades and skills" (ibid: Smith's letter).
This concern with remunerative labour can be explained partly in
terms of another objective: that the institutions be self-financing.
It was constantly asserted that inebriate institutions could
eventually become self-supporting. Inebriate retreats for rich
dipsomaniacs would, of course, be supported by the fees of their
clients. Inebriate reformatories on the other hand, were to be
financed from the proceeds of the inmates labour. Despite some opinion
to the contrary from those who doubted that "profitable work can be
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obtained by force" (ibid: qq. 1206-7), it was confidently and
constantly asserted that a enough profit could be made from the
inmates labour to make the institution financially independent (ibid:
rec'n 9; Akroyd's draft report, para. 17 & rec'n 6; qq. 722, 954,
2946; Peddie para. 3>. Idealistic as this hope was, many nevertheless
went even further in their arguments, claiming that not only could the
inmate make enough to support his stay in the reformatory, but that
there would be excess profit on their labour. This was to be put to
two uses: First, it would go towards the support of the inmate's wife
and children (ibid: rec'n 9; qq. 1524-9); and secondly, it would be
saved up and given to him on his release (ibid: q. 2948-53). Thus two
evils of the prison system would be thwarted. First, the inmates
family would not be thrown upon the poor rates (ibid: qq. 1524-9); and
secondly, the inmate would not leave the institution pennyless and
hence end up in the same condition as when he entered (ibid: Smith's
letter). To summarise this point in Peddie's words:
. . . inmates might have an opportunity of earning wages, out of
which a deduction should, in the first instance, be made for their
own maintenance, then for the support of their families, if such
there be, and the remainder go to secure additional comforts while
in the institution, and to form a reserve fund for their own use
after a trial of liberty is made. (Peddie 1872: para. 3)1"*
These 'purely economic' reasons, important as they were, were not
the only, nor the most important reasons, for the insistence that
inmates of inebriate reformatories engage in profitable labour. The
most important function of labour was to turn the idle, unemployable,
inebriate into a productive and industrious person. This was to be
achieved in a number of ways. Most directly, the inmate would receive
training in specific skills and trades, which would be useful to them
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after their release (ibid: Smith's letter). It was essential then that
the work undertaken in the reformatory be useful to him upon his
departure; that it would enable him to earn a living.
As well as training in specific skills, there were other, less
direct, reasons for the insistence that inmates of reformatories
undertake profitable labour. Forced labour would perform the functions
of teaching the inebriate how to work and teaching him the value of
work. Its more general function was to turn idlers into "useful,
industrial people" and to "teach them how to earn a living when they
leave" (ibid: Akroyd para. 17.) So even those who accepted the fact
that prolonged detention of inebriates would entail great expense,
nevertheless supported the inebriate reformatory programme because of
its "long term gains by making habitual drunkards productive,
therefore saving on poor-law rates" (ibid: q. 1230).
More generally still, work was to be a means of promoting other
objectives of reformatory treatment. As Foucault points out in his
discussion of moral treatment, work was deemed crucial for its
symbolic and disciplinary effects, as well as for its productive
value.
Work comes first in 'moral treatment' ... In itself, work
possesses a constraining power superior to all forms of physical
coercion, in that the regularity of the hours, the requirements of
attention, the obligation to produce a result detach the sufferer
from a liberty of mind that would be fatal and engage him in a
system of reponsibilities . . . Through work, man returns to the
order of God's commandments; he submits his liberty to laws that
are those of morality and reality . . . Foucault (1971: 247-8)1S
Hence Peddie argued that apart from its financial value, "work
itself rehabilitates" (Official Publications 1872: q. 954). Another
member of the 1872 committee argued that "even profitless work would
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be useful because of Its therapeutic value". Even for the fee-paying
patients at inebriate retreats - who could not be forced to work and
didn't need to be taught skills or trades - work of some kind was
deemed to be an essential: the "upper classes require occupation
rather than work" <ibid: 954). Hence the provision of 'rational
recreations' - and "such mechanical employment as taste and
inclination may dictate and opportunity afford" - was recommended for
inebriate retreats (ibid: q. 2973; see also q. 2198). One of the
benefits of work was that it would facilitate the inculcation of
"moral and regular habits" (ibid: q. 473). When work was mentioned it
was often coupled with a concern for discipline; for one witness the
essential features of the reformatory regime were "detention and
forced abstinence" coupled with "rigid discipline and hard work"
(ibid). But even for these purposes, profitable and useful work was to
be preferred. In the first place, as at the maison de force at Ghent,
this was because the objective was not simply to install a capacity
for work, but also to install a desire for it. The inebriate had to be
shown that work was in his interest. This was another reason for
saving a portion of the inmate's income for his release. This would
not only profit him directly, it would also display to him, in the
most concrete of ways, the benefits of both working and saving.
Self-respect
Another reason for the concern that labour be useful was that it was
also intended as a means of promoting self-respect. Once again the
promotion of self-esteem was one of the main principles of moral
treatment (see Foucault 1971: 248ff). With self-respect would come
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self-control; the person with self-respect would restrain themselves
from disgraceful behaviour because they would not wish to lose their
respectability. It was argued then that "a man must have his self-
respect sustained and cultivated" (Official Publications 1872: Akroyd,
para. 15). One witness argued that people drink because they have lost
all morality and self-respect and therefore "treatment must be long
enough to restore a man's sense of worth" (ibid: q. 1990). Apart from
sobriety itself, one of the main means by which self-respect was to be
promoted was through work. Hence the need for useful and profitable
labour; self-respect would be obtained when the inmate felt that he
was a contributor to, rather than a burden on, society - when he felt
that he was worth something. Hence Peddie argued the need for "useful
and remunerative labour of various kinds" in the following terms.
No better counteractive to the tendency to intemperance can be
employed, none better fitted to generate feelings of self-esteem,
and gradually strengthen the power of self-control, than occupation
and the steady cultivation of industrial habits, especially with the
stimulus of obtaining some immediate as well as ultimate advantages
from the same. (Peddie 1872: para. IV)
Domestication
As I have already mentioned, female inebriates were to be taught
domestic skills. It was suggested that women be educated under the
industrial school system "so that they will make good wives" and
trained to "make working class homes comfortable and habitable"
(Official Publications 1872: q. 831). This training in domestic skills
also included 'instruction' in "the rules of hygiene" (ibid: q. 2967).
On this issue, the inebriety reform movement intersected with a much
broader movement which had as its objective the domestication of the
residuum. Beyond the concern with individual inebriates, the inebriate
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reformatory was seen here as a means of spreading the norm of
domesticity, through the training of women from the bottom sections of
the working-class women in domestic habits.16
The objectives of promoting domestication and self-respect were also
linked: "sanitary and hygienic measures" were a means of promoting
"self-respect and self-control" (ibid: q. 2974). The domesticated
woman would take pride in her home and so acquire self-respect. This
interlinking of the themes of domestication and self-respect comes
across in the following quotation form Lady Somerset, who ran an
inebriate reformatory at Duxhurst.
I have taken great pains in the cottages at Duxhurst to see that
they have only such surroundings and such things as they would have
in their own homes if they were living as self-respecting citizens
under conditions such as they ought to have. I think it is a help to
them when they go out to have lived in homes conducted in this way
and to realise that that is what their own homes must be.
(Official Publications 1908: q. 1092)
Managing the inebriate
I will now go on to look at the 'techniques' which were to be used
for bringing about these objectives. Some of these have already been
covered in my discussion of the role of work within the inebriate
reformatory regime. I will concentrate, therefore, upon the other
methods of 'mangaging the inebriate' which were advocated. By and
large, these corresponded to the methods of moral treatment which had
been elaborated by lunacy reformers in the first half of the
nineteenth century. The inebriate reformatory regime was also
prefigured by the reformatory models described by Foucault in
'Discipline and Punish'.
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Altering the inebriate's environment
The reformers regarded confinement as an essential ingredient of
reformative treatment. Confinement was regarded as necessary, in the
first place, as a means of removing the inebriate from the
associations and surroundings which contributed to his inebriate life¬
style. Through confinement the inebriate "is withdrawn from the
associations that he has been accustomed to, from the temptation with
which he has been surrounded in society, and in that respect is able
to come to himself" (Official Publications 1872: q. 2607). This
justification for confinement clearly depends upon an analysis of
inebriety as a problem which is caused, to a considerable extent, by a
bad 'environment'. In this context, the term 'environment' would
include both the physical environment and the 'social milieu', e.g.
the company which the inebriate kept. It appears to have been presumed
that the inebriate was, to a considerable degree, the 'product of his
environment'. Hence in order to change the inebriate's character, it
was necessary to alter his environment. The environment, however,
appears to have been regarded as fixed and unalterable (at least in
the short term). Altering the inebriate's environment therefore meant
removing the inebriate from his environment. It involved:
"... breaking up former habits and associations, drawing from the
mind those old companions of an intemperate life, forming new
thoughts, new ideas, and new and better habits, necessitating a new
life in every respect; a radical change.
(Official Publications 1872: q. 2974)
Hence treatment would work better with younger inebriates, who might
not yet have been fully integrated into a bad environment and were
therefore easier to remove from it: "I think the younger you can get
hold of these people the less likelihood you will find of their going
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back again" (Official Publications 1908: q. 569). Also, in order to be
successful, reformatory treatment should preferably be followed by the
placement of the inebriate in a different environment from that which
he, or she, had come from.
I do not know whether any assistance is given to them to start life
afresh in some other neighbourhood and give them an opportunity of
that kind, I think it would be very useful, but at present, if they
have no means, they must go back to the district in which they
formerly lived, ... if they come back to their old neighbourhood I
think their fate is sealed. (Official Publications 1908: qq. 1148-9)
In addition, if the aim was to remove the inebriate from her
environment, one had to be careful not to 'import' that environment
into the reformatory by sending inebriates from the same area to a
single institution.
I think one of the worst features of the present character of
reformatories is that the women of the same locality go mainly to
the same reformatory . . . when you get a woman sober and anxious to
lead a better life an old companion who had known her perhaps in
the same doss-house in London, and knew all about her former life,
came down, and this woman would laugh at the idea of her companion's
reformation, and would undo in a few days what we had been trying to
build up for many weeks ... I would send the women as far from
their own locality as possible, and I would keep as few women as
possible from the same districts together.
(Official Publications 1908: qq. 1090-1)
This analysis of inebriety was somewhat different then to the
physicalist theories of inebriety and dipsomania which were being
debated at the time. And importantly, this environmentalist analysis
of inebriety had different implications for 'treatment' than did
physicalist analyses. Whereas physicalist analyses would imply that
physicalist treatment was the most appropriate response to the
problem, the environmentalist analysis implied a 'social' model of
treatment. What was required was not so much an alteration of the
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offenders physical make-up, but an alteration of the offenders
environment.
However, the purpose of confinement was not simply to remove the
inebriate from an bad environment, rather it was to place the
inebriate in a better - or a more 'moral' - environment. In such an
environment the inebriate could learn how to conduct himself and would
internalise a set of attitudes about correct living. The inebriety
reformers therefore discussed the details of the architecture and the
regime of refomatories in detail. It is necessary to pay attention to
these discussions since questions about reformatory architecture and
regime were not incidental or 'purely administrative matters', rather
they were of the utmost importance because the regime was, in a sense,
the essence of reformatory treatment. In analysing reformatory
treatment it is wrong to separate questions of 'correct architecture'
and 'good administration' from questions of therapy, because therapy
consisted precisely of placing the offender in a properly designed,
properly run, institution. This point may become clearer as I discuss
the various aspects of the reformatory regime.
Architecture
Reformatory treatment was to operate by altering "the whole
atmosphere surrounding the patient" (Official Publications 1908: q.
741). To this end, the reformers paid a lot of attention to the issue
of the 'mood' which buildings could evoke. Hence the architect of a
women's reformatory in Lancashire was directed to "prepare a scheme in
which light, air, and pleasant surroundings should be considered as
necessary concomitants to the reformatory" (ibid: q. 1565). The
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reformers took great pride in those reformatories which were
"extremely well built, light and airy and clean, and built in a manner
which will reduce the cost of repairs and maintenance considerable"
(ibid: q. 1677). Such reformatories would be a direct contrast to the
homes of inebriates which, as we saw in the previous chapter, were
criticised by the reformers as unpleasant, ill-kept and squalid.17
Regularity and order
Regularity and order were to be key key features of reformatory
discipline. They were regarded as the antidote to the irregularity and
indiscipline of a drunken and idle life. Moral and regular habits
would result from living according to a strict set of rules and a
strict timetable: "prompt attendance at meals and upon religious
exercises; retirement at ten o'clock in the evening and lights to be
extinguished at half-past-ten; no spiritious or fermented liquors to
be used, and indulgence in tobacco disapproved" (ibid: Akroyd, para.
20). The set timetable played an important role in reformatory
treatment. This can be seen by the frequency with which the reformers
described the routine of reformatories. One reformer, for example, in
describing an inebriate reformatory under the mangement of the
Lancashire Inebriate (Act) Board, told the Select Committee of 1908
that;
The daily routine, which illustrates the policy of the house, may be
of some interest:
Rise at 6.30 a.m.; morning prayers 7.15; breakfast 7.30 to 8 a.m.;
work 8 - 12.30 p.m.; dinner 12.30 - 1.30 p.m.; work 1.30 to 5 p.m.;
tea 5 to 5.30; exercise and recreation 5.30 - 8.30; supper 8.35;
prayers 8.50; retire 9 p.m.; all lights out 9.30.
(Official Publications 1908: p. 170)
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It needs to be stressed that this timetable was advocated not just as
a means of maintaining discipline within the reformatory, thereby
making the reformatory easy to manage, rather it was also seen as a
technique of reformatory treatment. Treatment involved 'training' the
inebriate to live his, or her, life according to an established and
orderly routine. The inebriate was to be 'taught' "unswerving
discipline" (ibid).
Rewards and punishments
Another key element in reformartory discipline was the imposition of
a system of rewards and punishments. Good behaviour was to be rewarded
with privileges. The system in American inebriate retreats, whereby
patients who obeyed the rules for eight weeks were allowed to visit
the nearby city twice a week, was recommended. Apart from encouraging
conformity, this could also be used to test the extent of the
patient's recovery; if he returned sober after limited exposure to the
temptations of freedom, then he could be considered on the road to
recovery (ibid: Akroyd, para. 20). The use of a system of privileges
would help prevent breaches of the rules and be used to test the
patient's self-control. But even more importantly, it would encourage
inmates to strive to improve themselves; it would act positively, to
promote norms, as well as negatively, to ensure conformity. Hence
Peddie advocated a system of "rewards and benefits immediately
derivable from industry and good behaviour" (Peddie 1872: para. IV).
And, the superintendent of an American inebriate retreat, which was
seen as a model for reformatories in Britain, stated:
When a patient has been with us three or four months, has been
obedient to all the rules, and is what we call an excellent model
patient, I grant him other priveleges, and da not restrict him to
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going out twice a week. (Official Publications 1872: q. 2975)
Breaches of the rules were to be punished by withdrawal of
privileges (ibid: Akroyd, para. 20). Other methods of punishment
included the imposition of fines (another reason for remunerative
labour) and "limiting particular creature comforts, and withholding
certain pleasures".(Peddie 1872: para. IV). The effects of such a
system of rewards and punishments is well described by Foucault. It
allows an intensification of control, whereby every aspect of
behaviour is judged and sanctioned, and therefore subject to
manipulation: it creates a positive, rather than a purely negative,
form of intervention.
. . . instead of the simple division of prohibition, as practiced in
penal justice, we have a distribution between a positive pole and a
negative pole; all behaviour falls in the field between good and bad
marks. (Foucault 1977b: 180, see also pp. 180-83).
The semi-determinate sentence and 'licenced freedom'
The possibility of an effective system of rewards and punishments
would, of course, be greatly enhanced if the reformatory
administration had control over the length of the inmates sentence. As
we saw in chapter one, the juridical approach to social control
favours a determinate sentence. One of the central aims of the
refomatory movement on the other hand, as Foucault shows, has been to
give the administration the power to adjust the sentence, according to
the inmate's conduct. The inebriate reformatory campaigners were no
exception: they argued that "no definite period can be given of how
long a cure will take" (ibid: q. 709) and therefore the
"superintendent should exercise his own judgement as to the release of
the dipsomaniac" (ibid: q. 481). One witness stated that,
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the proposition which is lying at the back of this committee <is)
the establishement of institutions in which a person can be... kept
and treated for such a length of time as in the Judgement of those
in charge of him will be sufficient to effect his cure.
(Official Publications 1872: q.473, emphasis added)
As these statements show, the need for such a power was often
represented through a medical analogy: just as the length of a
hospital stay is decided according to the treatment needs of the
patient, so the inebriate should not be released until he is cured.
However, elsewhere in the proceedings of the 1872 inquiry, it is
possible to find administrative control of the sentence being
justified in somewhat different terms. First, as we have just seen,
this flexibility could be used as a means of controlling the inmate's
behaviour. Secondly, it could be used as a means of strengthening and
testing the inmate's self-control.
In order to explain this second argument it is necessary to look at
the actual proposals regarding the length of the inebriate's
detention. The reformers did not ask for a totally indeterminate
sentence. This was partly due to a tactical compromise. Proposals for
an indeterminate sentence would almost certainly have attracted the
opposition of liberals, who regarded the indeterminate sentence as an
unacceptable affront to liberal-juridical principles.ie The policy
which the reformers pursued - i.e. semi-determinate sentencing - was
not altogether uncontroversial, but was likely to meet with less
opposition. But along with being wise from a tactical point of view,
the semi-determinate sentence was also, in many respects, preferable
to the indeterminate sentence. In order to explain this I will outline
the reformers' proposals in more detail.
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The committee asked for was a sentence of not less than three nor
more than twelve months (ibid: rec'n. 4).19 After serving the minimum
period, the inebriate would then be eligible for release on licence;
depending, of course, upon his conduct. This placed considerable
discretion in the hands of the reformatory administration. This
discretion was represented though, as being exercisable only in the
direction of leniency. The administration would only have the power to
reduce, but not to increase, the (judicially determined) sentence:
"The period of detention should be fixed by the court of inquiry, or
by the magistrates, but may be curtailed upon sufficient proof being
given that a cure of the patient has taken place (ibid: rec'n. 6).
This was not simply a ploy to get longer sentences; the reformers
fully intended this power of early release to be used. Apart from its
disciplinary uses, its benefit was that it opened up the possibility
of a new mode of intervention. In between the options of detention or
total freedom, this 'parole period* created a third possibility: a
licenced and supervised freedom. The inebriate's self-control could
then be tested by seeing how he coped with this supervised freedom. If
he relapsed he could be returned to the reformatory: if he remained
sober for a considerable period then it his treatment could be deemed
successful. Hot until the patient has "regained the power of self-
control under temptation, and that self-control has been fairly
tested, should the patient be considered cured" (ibid: Akroyd: para.
11; see also Peddle 1872: para. IX). But the parole period could also
be used as a means of strengthening the inebriate's self-control; i.e.
it would be part of the 'treatment'. During his parole period the
inebriate would have full freedom of movement, but at the same time he
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would be aware that he was being observed. This gave him the chance to
gradually adapt to the temptations of freedom, thereby gradually
increasing his powers of self-control. Hence, the parole period was
justified by one witness as being for the purpose of enabling the
inmate to resist temptation and acquire self-control: "he should go
where the temptation is" (ibid: q.2761).
Inebriate retreats
So far, I have been concerned mainly with inebriate reformatories.
The reformers were also concerned with the establishment of inebriate
retreats for fee-paying clients who entered voluntarily. In these
retreats, for obvious reasons, the 'harsher' techniques of reformatory
discipline could not be employed. Whereas reformatories would ideally
be separate institutions but could be attached to prisons or
workhouses (q. 649, 669), inebriate retreats were to be established in
rural districts and were to employ some of the milder methods of moral
treatment:
. . . sanitary and hygienic measures: restraint from business and the
busy scenes of everyday life; quiet, reading, writing, pure air,
well-ventilated rooms, good-nourishing diet, regular hours for
meals, rising and retiring, proper physical exercise.
(Official Publications 1872: 2973)
What should be recognized though is that the same concept of treatment
informed the blueprints for the inebriate retreat and the inebriate
reformatory. The reformers seldom saw it necessary to state whether
they were referring to retreats or reformatories, except when they
were talking about admission, financing, work of inmates etc.
Treatment in both the reformatory and the retreat depended upon the
same concept of management; which received a different emphasis
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depending upon the population which was to be subject to it. Rich,
fee-paying dipsomaniacs would be dealt with through the milder
techniques; poor, 'criminal' inebriates were to be subjected to some
of the harsher techniques of reformatory discipline. The conception of
the problem in both cases was similar, the objectives of intervention
were also the same.
Medical treatment
Finally, a word about the place which medical treatment was to have
in the inebriate reformatory. The reformers drew a distinction between
medical treatment on the one hand <by which they generally meant
physical treatments), and, on the other, the moral treatment or
reformatory discipline which was to be the main form of 'treatment'
used. Medical treatment was to play a rather limited role in
'rehabilitating' the inebriate. There was certainly no 'cure' for
inebriety in the strictly medical sense, no technical intervention or
drug which could cure the habitual drunkard of his condition. Only the
steady inculcation of moral and regular habits was of any value. Not
everyone agreed with the reformers on this. There was those who
claimed to be "in possession of a specific remedy for the cure of
drunkenness"; but these were dismissed by the reformers as "quacks"
(ibid: q. 2974).20 This is not to say that there was to be no medical
treatment (in the strict sense) at the inebriate reformatory; but such
treatment was to play a minor role, facilitating 'treatment', rather
than being the treatment itself. Medical treatment was to be used, for
the most part, during the first few days of confinement. Its role was
to mitigate the physical effects of alcohol consumption and sudden
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withdrawal, in order to get the inebriate into a physical condition in
which he could undergo moral treatment.
Uearly all patients on their admission require medical treatment;
stimulant, sedative and narcotic remedies are usually administered
at the outset, followed by alternative medicines to improve and
correct the secretions, after which tonics, both vegetable and
mineral, are given, calculated to add tone and strength to the
system. When we have organic diseases, appropriate remedies adapted
to each particular case are administered to relieve and assist
nature in removing the same. Outside of these functional and organic
difficulties very little medical treatment is demanded or
required..." (Official Publications 1872: q. 2973)
THE PERCEPTION OF IBEBKIETY
Finally, in this last section I will examine the perception of
inebriety which informed the inebriety reformers. I will argue (a)
that the reformers' perception of inebriety cannot be properly
characterised as determinist; and (b) nor can it be characterised as
specifically medical.
Eesponsibility
I will look first at whether inebriety was seen as a determined
condition. At first, it seems that inebriety was regarded as a
determined state. Consider, for instance, the fallowing description of
the inebriate, which is from the 1908 Departmental Committee.
His drunkenness, and the condition of mind consequent on oft-
repeated drunkenness, cannot be considered to nearly the same extent
the result of his own voluntary action. In his case the desire for
drink is so overmastering, self-control is so inadequate, and in
many cases the ill affects of drink are so imperfectly appreciated,
that it cannot be proper to hold the inebriate offender fully
responsible. (Official Publications 1908: p. 15)
Many similar quotations can be found. It seems, therefore, that
there was a straightforward shift towards a determinist view of
habitual drunkenness in this period. If we look closer at the
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inebriate reformatory experiment, however - and if we look in
particular at the concept of treatment which it employed - it becomes
clear that the situation was, in fact, more complex.
First, if we return to the arguments about the inebriates lack of
control over his habit, we often find that they are addressed to a
specific issue, the issue of the inebriate's legal responsibility. The
reformers were concerned to argue that inebriates should not be
categorised along with ordinary offenders, as fully responsible for
their actions, and as therefore subject to intervention only if they
had transgressed the law. The reformers wished to exclude inebriates
from the full protection of liberal-juridical guarantees against
unwarranted interference with personal liberty. They therefore argued
that inebriates, unlike ordinary delinquents, were not fully
responsible for their actions.
In other circumstances, however, the inebriate was clearly
considered to be responsible bath for his condition and for its
'cure'. Inebriety was characterised as a disorder of the will, as a
failure to exercise self-control. The inebriate's will was weak and
therefore he could not resist bad habits, whether these involved
drunkenness or other indulgences (abhorrence of steady employment,
excessive sexual indulgence, violent temper, etc. - see ibid: p. 6).
But the inebriate's will was weakened in the first place, by the
habitual indulgence in these vices. Moreover, the will could be
restored or strenghthened by voluntary effort, by abstaining from
vice - adopting more moral habits, by undertaking steady employment
etc.
But there are cogent reasons why the term disease should not be used
to characterise the inebriate habit. By disease is popularly
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understood a state of things for which the diseased person is not
responsible, which he cannot alter except by the use of remedies
from without, whose action is obscure, and cannot be influenced by
exertions of his own. But if, as is unquestionably true, inebriety
can be induced by cultivation; if the desire for drink can be
increased by indulgence, and self-control diminished by lack of
exercise; it is manifest that the reverse effects can be produced by
voluntary effort; and that desire for drink may be diminished by
abstinence, and self-control, like any other faculty can be
strengthened by exercise. It is erroneous and disasterous to
inculcate the doctrine that inebriety, once established, is to be
accepted with fatalistic resignation, and that the inebriate is not
to be encouraged to make any effort to mend his ways. It is more so,
since inebriety is in many cases recovered from, in many diminised,
and since the cases which recover or amend are those in which the
inebriate himself desires and strives for recovery.
(Official Publications 1908: pp. 5-6)
Heredity and environment
If inebriates were indeed regarded as responsible for their
condition then it might be thought that the heredity versus
environment debate was redundant. This debate seems to presume that
inebriety is determined, the question being, by what. But, to the
contrary, proponents of heredity and environmentalist theories managed
to harmonize their ideas about the inebriate's responsibility for his
condition with theories about the causality of inebriety (cf. Nye
1984: ch. 4). The way in which this harmonization was achieved will be
examined later in the thesis, when I look at the category of 'moral
insanity'. My concern here is to argue (a) that the treatment of
inebriate's presupposed an environmentalist theory of inebriety, and
(b) that this was not necessarily at odds with an heredity theory of
inebriety.
First, although the reformers often asserted that inebriety was an
inherited condition (the actual argument was more often that a
suscepibility to inebriety could be inherited) they never developed
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any techniques for dealing with inebriety as an inherited, physical
condition. As Macleod <1967) points out, in the absence of such
techniques, the heredity theory of inebriety could only lead to
therapeutic pessimism. All that could be achieved was the isolation of
the inebriate, both in order to prevent his being a public nuisance
and in order to prevent him, or her, from producing offspring who
would also be inebriates. Macleod is wrong, however, when he states
that the inebriety reformers were in fact pessimistic about the
treatability of inebriety. As I have argued, the inebriety reformers
clearly regarded inebriety as a treatable condition. Treatment was
directed, however, at the environmental causes of inebriety. The whole
emphasis of reformatory treatment was upon altering the inebriate's
environment - removing him from a bad environment and placing him in a
moral environment which would then be internalised as conscience. The
question of heredity versus environment, whatever its philosophical
interest, was therefore of little practical importance. In practice,
the physical causes of inebriety could not be treated, while the
environmental causes were treatable.
CHAPTER 4
REHABILITATING THE VAGRANT ALCOHOLIC
The 'Treatment' of Habitual Drunkards in the 1960s & 1970s
My analysis of the inebriate reformatory experiment suggests that
the increasing use of medical terminology in penal discourses does not
necessarily mean that there was a shift from a juridical to a medical
approach to social control. I have argued that in the case of the
inebriate reformatory experiment the use of a medical vocabulary was
associated with a more complex and subtle transformation in the way a
social problem was perceived and managed. It could be the case,
however, that a shift towards a medical approach to social control
occurred much later. Hence, in the 1960s there was a fresh attempt to
replace the penal approach to the problem of habitual drunkards with a
treatment approach.1 Once again, it has been presumed that what was
occurring was a shift towards a medical approach to the problem. Such
presumptions are not without foundation, since the new treatment
programme was often represented through medical language and metaphor.
It was argued for instance, that the treatment policy represented the
imminent triumph of medical rationality over conservatism, as science
and humanitarianism rescued the alcoholic from the domain of moral
condemnation and punishment.
Informed opinion is today prepared to accept that intoxication and
alcoholism are not to be regarded as crimes to be punished, so much
as diseases to be cured if possible. In the field of alcoholism we
are witnessing the same transition as we saw, not so long ago, in
the field of mental illness; the alcoholic is moving away from the
position of social outcast to the position of ordinary patient who
can and should receive treatment. Even our criminal law, so often
the last refuge of conservatism, has at last taken a timid step
along the road to progress. But with our prisons still containing a
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substantial portion of men and women whose predominant problem is
alcoholism, it is clear that we have not travelled nearly far
enough. (Silkin 1969)
In this chapter I will argue that this use of medical terminology
was, once again, associated with a transformation which was more
complex and subtle than a simple shift towards a medical approach to
social control. I will suggest that the shift which occurred was
towards a social-psychological approach to the control of habitual
drunkards. I will also suggest that while there were substantial
differences in detail, this social-psychological approach to social
control embodied a similar set of assumptions, logics and objectives
to those which informed the inebriate reformatory experiment.
VAQSMCT, ALCOHOLISM ASP SOCIAL CQffTRQL
The arguments of this chapter can be clarified by comparing them
with the account of the treatment programme presented by Peter Archard
in his book Vagrancy, Alcoholism and Social Control (1979). I will
suggest that, despite its many merits, Archard's account fails to
grasp the meaning of the treatment programme.
Archard identifies four strategies which have been "devised to
control the derelict alcoholic": moral, penal, medical and social (see
figure 1). He argues that the penal and moral forms of control were
dominant from Victorian times to present, but that they are now
tending to be replaced by a socio-medical approach: "a socio-medical
approach to the problem is tending to replace concepts of moral reform
and legal control (ibid: ch. 1). Or as he puts it later: "Medicine and
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Figure 1, Skid Row Social Control Matrix (from Archard 1973; 14)
theoretically and. in the formulation of policy, over moral and penal
approaches" (ibid). This thesis does not, however, fit well with
Archard's descriptions of the network of agencies through which the
habitual drunkard is controlled; it is therefore modified in a number
of ways. It is argued, for instance, that we are in a period of
transition in which the penal and moral approaches have not been
totally displaced, therefore - "at present the institutional structure
on skid row offers simultaneously moral, legal, medical, and social
approaches" (ibid: emphasis in original). Elsewhere in the book,
Archard argues that administrative and political concerns have led to
medicine and social work being "grafted onto" rather than replacing
penal/moral institutions.
A major problem with Archard's analysis is the way in which he
opposes traditional penal and moral approaches with the modern
therapeutic approach. I will attempt to demonstrate throughout this
chapter that, while the treatment programme did differ from
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traditional moral/penal approaches, the differences were neither as
sharp as, nor of the same nature as, Archard presumes them to be. The
treatment programme - whether considered from the perspective of its
'dominant view of the skid row alcoholic', its 'strategy of recovery',
or its 'institutional base' - was, in many respects, continuous with
traditional moral/penal approaches to the problem of habitual
drunkards. What is at issue here is the adequacy of Archard's
conceptual framework - and especially of the opposition he constructs
between moral/penal and social/medical approaches - for understanding
changes in the social control of habitual drunkards.
As I have suggested, Archard does in fact struggle with this
conceptual framework; his observations often contradict it. He finds
that the simple ideal types he constructed - moral, penal, medical and
social approaches - are in fact totally confused in practice. We have
just seen some of the ways in which Archard attempts to modify his
thesis. Later in the book, Archard is even more uncertain, as when he
argues that - "At best, a treatment rationale has only been theoret¬
ically introduced into the penal system as justification for the
continuing legal processing of alcoholics" (ibid: ch.5). Similarly, he
states that "the shift from penal to socio-medical control of homeless
alcoholics", has been achieved, not in practice, but only "at an
ideological level" (ibid: ch. 7). This presents Archard with a
conundrum: "why is it that in spite of this ideological shift, the
vast majority of alcoholics continue in practice to be handled by the
law" (ibid). This problem becomes particularly acute when Archard
describes the implementation of the 'socio-medical model'. He notes
that all the approaches he identifies, not only exist together, but
are in fact mingled: agencies based upon Christian charity are defined
as part of the treatment system; the human sciences are used to
fortify moral standpoints; and Christian based agencies employ social
workers, doctors and psychiatrists. Rather than revising his thesis in
the light of this evidence, Archard dismissively explains all this as
the product of conceptual and practical confusion: the complexity of
the "punishment and treatment matrix is the product of conceptual and
practical confusion about whether the habitual drunken offender should
be defined as spiritually weak, criminally deviant, mentally sick, or
socially inadequate" (ibid: ch. 1).
A second problem with Archard's conceptual framework concerns the
way he views the relationship between medicine and social work. As we
have seen, Archard identifies these as seperate approaches, each with
its own conception of the problem, strategy of recovery, and instit¬
utional base. He then has to account for their collaboration to form a
hybrid 1socio-medical approach". Archard does this by arguing that
each selects different aspects of the skid row man for consideration
and modification (ibid). The skid row man presents two problems: his
vagrancy and his drinking - he is a vagrant alcoholic. Medical
experts, he argues, address the problem of the skid row man's
alcoholism, conceived as a chemical dependence upon alcohol; their
task is therefore to provide treatment for alcoholism. Social workers,
he argues, address the problem of the habitual drunkard's social
isolation and social inadequacy; their task is that of social
rehabilitation. This thesis has the merit of recognising that social
rehabilitation is a major ojective of modern interventions into the
problem of habitual drunken offenders and also of recognising that
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social rehabilitation is not necesarily a medical objective. The
problem with the thesis is the role it ascribes to medicine in the
overall strategy of intervention into the problem of habitual
drunkards and, most importantly, the presumption that 'treatment' is a
purely medical concern which is directed solely at the habitual
drunkard's alcoholism, and not at his social inadequacy. In Archard's
book, 'treatment' refers to medical treatment which, for him, is
something quite distinct from social work's strategy of social
rehabilitation.
The source of the problem is revealed when Archard writes about the
"collaboration of medicine (psychiatry) and social work" (ibid: ch.
1). The problem here is the unargued 'jump' from medicine to
psychiatry. Throughout the book Archard uses the terms 'medicine' and
'psychiatry' as if they were interchangeable.2 In doing so, he
implicitly accepts the conventional description of modern psychiatry,
as a branch of medicine which specializes in mental illness. According
to this description, psychiatry approaches mental illness through the
medical model; it looks for the underlying disorder of the brain or
psyche which causes mental illness and tries to eliminate this
underlying disorder either through physical treatments, or through
non-physical therapies which are based upon principles similar to
those of physical treatment. According to the medical model, such
treatment typically takes place in a mental hospital.
The contemporary psychiatric system
As a number of writers have pointed out, such descriptions fail to
grasp the nature of the contemporary psychiatric system. Most notable
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here, is the recent work of Miller and Rose (Miller and Rose 1986;
Miller 1986; Rose 1986). Vhile not denying that some psychiatry does
conform, more or less, to this conventional description, they argue
that the most important developments in the psychiatric system -
during the twentieth century - have taken place beyond the confines of
the medical model and medical institutions. The twentieth century,
they argue, has witnessed the birth of a social psychiatry which
differs radically - in the problems which it addresses, in its mode of
intervention, and in its institutional bases - from 'medical
psychiatry'. The birth and development of social psychiatry has
altered, fundamentally, the nature and the contours of the psychiatric
system.
The psychiatric system no longer confines itself to intervention
into the problem of mental illness, in the restricted sense of the
term (i.e. the gross mental disorders which used to be called
madness). Psychiatry now intervenes into a whole range of "less severe
forms of behavioural disturbances and personal distress" (Miller 1986:
14). It is now concerned with minor and remediable behavioural and
emotional disturbances which cause social inefficiency and personal
unhappiness. Psychiatric interventions are not confined to physicalist
methods of treatment, such as the use of drugs, electro-convulsive
therapy, or psycho-surgery. Nor is the balance made up of conventional
psychoanalytic therapies - despite the undoubtably significant role
psychoanalysis has played in the re-shaping of twentieth century
psychiatry. The most significant interventions offered by the
contemporary psychiatric system owe little to organicist medicine and
are only indirectly related to psychoanalysis. They consist of social
- 141 -
therapies, behaviour therapies, and other 'therapies of normality3
Implicit in the use of such therapies is the presumption that social
factors are the predominant cause of these disorders. The existence of
organically caused mental defects is not, however, denied; to the
contrary one of the roles of psychiatric diagnosis in contemporary
psychiatric treatment programmes is to divert those whose disorder is
organically caused away from the programme (see Hose 1986: 79-80).
Correspondingly, the modern psychiatric system is not confined to
the mental hospital; it extends far beyond the world of institutional
confinement. Psychiatry operates wherever mental distress, behavioural
problems or social inefficiency become interpreted and constituted as
psychiatric problems: e.g. the family, school, community, the judicial
system and industry (Miller 1986: 39). It operates through other
institutions, such as the prison (see Carlen 1986). Psychiatrists are
employed by institutions such as these, not simply to carry out
psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, but also to advise administrators
on how to run the institution in a way which will minimize mental
disorder and behavioural problems and which will promote mental
health. Hence psychiatry operates by shaping other institutions and
practices according to psychiatric criteria. It operates therefore,
not just through the psychiatrists, but through other agents: penal
administators, social workers, parents, teachers etc.
To say that psychiatry has become involved in the problem of
habitual drunkards is by no means tantamount, then, to saying that the
problem has become medicalized. I will argue that it is from the
direction of social psychiatry that psychiatric interventions into the
problem of habitual drunken offenders have come. If this is correct,
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then it is misleading to characterise those interventions as medical
in the way Archard does. This has some important consequences for his
thesis. First, the collaboration between psychiatry and social work is
a far more complex affair than it appears in Archard's account. For
Archard, psychiatry handles the medical aspect of the problem, while
social work deals with the social aspect. As we have just seen though,
psychiatry is as much involved in the social terrain as is social
work. Ve have also seen that psychiatry operates, partly, through
social work. Psychiatry and social work are already heavily involved
in a complex relationhip; they should not be thought of as entirely
different processes that occasionally work together. *■ A second
consequence is that once the 'medical' is left out of the picture -
and I will argue that it must be - then there can be no simple-
opposition between traditional moral/penal approaches and contemporary
treatment. - If treatment is understood not as medical treatment but as
social rehabilitation, then it can no longer be conceived as directly
opposed to traditional moral/penal approaches. Traditional moral/penal
agencies and techniques might form part of the rehabilitation system.
THE 'REDISCOVERY' OF THE HABITUAL DRPHKARDS PROBLEM
Proponents of the treatment policy often suggested that the campaign
to replace the penal processing of habitual drunkards with a treatment
approach was founded upon the realisation that 'alcoholism' was an
illness, similar to mental illness: since the majority of habitual
drunken offenders were clearly alcoholics, it followed that they
should be treated rather than punished as if they were criminals. In
opposition to such reasoning, critics - such as T. Szasz (1972) -
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argue that 'alcoholism' is not an illness, that habitual drunkenness
is simply a bad habit. This criticism is directed at 'the disease
concept of alcoholism'.s Vhen it comes to understanding the treatment
programme, however, such attacks on the disease concept of alcoholism
are of little value. The suggestion that there was a simple transfer
of the problem of habitual drunkards from a moral-penal register to a
medical register is misleading. The emergence of the treatment
programme followed a much more complex path.
In his book Vagrant Alcoholics, Tim Cook (1975) traces the origins
of the Alcoholics Recovery Project, a voluntary organization which
played a large role in promoting awareness of the habitual drunkards
problem and in establishing the treatment programme. In doing so he
makes it clear that the habitual drunkard owed his rediscovery to the
fact that he was a public nuisance. Cook traces the origins of the
project to concern among the residents of the south London borough of
Southwark, about the problems caused by vagrant alcoholics
congregating and sleeping rough in the area. The initial concern was
about the problem caused to the local residents (i.e. the 'settled'
residents) by the existence of vagrant alcoholics: "A local newspaper
(Mercury, 1 October 1965) described Southwark as 'one of the worst hit
boroughs by 'down-and-out' crude spirit drinkers'" (Cook 1975: 7).
A similar account is given by the Home Office Working Party report
on 'Habitual Drunken Offenders' . A chapter of the report was devoted
to the "effect on the public" (Official Publications 1971: ch. 6).
There, it was acknowledged that while "the 'need' with which we are
concerned in this report is that of the offender himself... the
community as a whole also has much to gain" from the reduction of
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social harm which would result from more effective interventions into
the problem (ibid: para 6.1). The habitual drunken offender's life¬
style, of which his drinking was an aspect, had two sets of harmful
effects, according to the working party. First there were the problems
which arose from "the malfunctioning of the individual": i.e.
financial cost in benefits, resources spent on socio-medical
facilities, damage to property etc. Secondly, there was the harm
"brought about by the actual conduct of the habitual drunken offender
in public" (ibid: para. 6.2).
The working party went into the second problem in detail. It stated
that, except in two areas of London, the public tended to be
indifferent to the existence of the habitual drunkard, although there
were some complaints from residents of coastal towns (i.e. holiday
resorts) that habitual drunkards, by their appearance alone, detract
from the town (ibid: para. 6.5).s The two areas of London referred to
were the boroughs of Southwark and Tower Hamlets. Residents of these
boroughs saw habitual drunkards as a "gross nuisance". The Health
committee of Southwark Borough Council is cited: "These people...
urinate, defecate, and vomit wherever they may be, and their clothing
is filthy. Public places, subways and highways are worse for their
presence" (ibid: para. 6.7). Voluntary care organisations were seen,
by local residents, as exacerbating the problem by attracting habitual
drunkards to the area. For local groups, compulsory detention and
treatment were the only solution (ibid: paras. 6.8-.12).
These habitual drunkards would eventually be defined, among other
things, as 'vagrant alcoholics' and they would be the targets of the
treatment programme. There was no attempt to distinguish, in medical
- 145 -
terms, those habitual drunkards who were alcoholics from those who
were not. This is clear form Cook's discussion of the way the target
group was defined.
... at no stage in the proceedings did anyone seem to wish to state
who was in fact a 'crude spirit drinker' and what criteria were
being used to define him. Local newspapers talked of 'methies',
'jake drinkers' and 'surgical spirit drinkers'; the London prisons
reported on 'recurrent drunks'; research workers wrote about 'skid
row alcoholics'. Yet all were agreed that a hostel for 'crude spirit
drinkers' was needed. One document neatly illustrates the confusion:
'the task of this hostel would be strictly defined as that of
helping the chronic drunkenness offender - in other words, the
vagrant surgical spirit drinker' (Cook 1975: 11)
Cook goes on to state:
After some months the term 'vagrant alcoholic' gradually came to be
accepted and by the time the hostel opened in May 1966 there seemed
little dispute that, whatever the social manifestations, the down-
and-out drunk was in the majority of cases an alcoholic too.
(Cook 1975: 12)
COffCEPTmiSATIQy OF THE PROBLEM
Once it had been rediscovered, the habitual drunkards problem could
have been dealt with in a number of ways. In order to explain why
'treatment' was seen as the solution it is necessary to examine how
the problem was conceptualised. In conceptualising the problem, the
advocates of the treatment programme made certain political
presumptions. I will start then with a much simplified account of the
political ideology which influenced the proponents of the treatment
programme.7
In the post World War II era full employment, rising standards of
living and the establishment of the welfare state (often referred to
collectively as 'the postwar settlement') led some social thinkers to
revise classical social democratic theory (Clarke et al 1980: 179).
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These revisionists presumed that the problems of material inequalities
had been largely resolved (ibid). For them, what was now required was
(a) supervision of the economy; and (b) improvement of the quality of
social life, particularly by improving the capacity of 'residual'
social groups to benefit from the postwar settlement (ibid). Social
problems were construed as remediable through technical solutions, by
improving the functioning of 'the system' (ibid).
For these revisionists, remaining social problems could be explained
in terms of (i) the incompetence of certain 'residual' social groups,
and (ii) "bureaucratic inefficiency and disjunctions between different
welfare agencies" (ibid: 180). It was within such a paradigm that the
v*
rediscovered habitual drunkards problem was interpreted. Other newly
rediscovered and closely related problems, such as homelessness (DHSS
1972) and poverty (see Clarke et al 1980), were being interpreted and
conceptualised in a similar manner. These problems were seen as the
result of "bureaucratic problems in the delivery of services, the lack
of economic resources to make these services technically efficient,
and the stubborn personal incompetence of certain groups of the
population" (ibid: 180).
The proposals which emerged concerning the co-ordination and
improvement of welfare services for the habitual drunkard will be
returned to later in the chapter. Here I wish to examine further this
perception of the habitual drunkard as an 'incompetent'. First it
needs to be stressed that the habitual drunkard's incompetence was not
seen as being due to mental illness. To the contrary, it was often
stated explicitly that alcoholism was something other than mental
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illness. While in some cases, low intelligence and mental illness were
deemed to have contributed to habitual drunkenness and in others a
lifetime of habitual drunkenness was seen to cause mental impairment,
a diagnosis of alcoholism did not of itself imply mental illness. Thus
it was possible to ask how much mental illness there was among
alcoholics (Official Publications 1971: app. H). Also, for the Home
Office working party, one of the roles of the psychiatrist in
treatment programmes would be to divert those suffering from overt
mental disorder.
... no hostel ought to be established without . . . some procedure
being devised whereby men whose principal and immediate need is
treatment for mental disorder can be diverted to a more appropriate
agency. (Official Publications 1971: para. 11.41)
Alcoholism was seen, not as mental illness, but as a behavioural and
emotional problem. The typical habitual drunkard was shown to have had
a life-long history of behavioural problems and social ineffiency.e In
this respect he (or she) had - "a background similar to other types of
social casualty, and very much the same as that which is so often
found with the chronic petty recidivist and the homeless single man"
(Official Publications 1971: para. 5.15). These problems could
generally be traced back to the drunkard's early childhood
experiences. The habitual drunkard was of 'low social class' (Official
Publications 1971: para. 5.13, app. H; Hamilton 1978: ch.2). He often
had a drunken - and sometimes violently drunk - father (Official
Publications 1971: app. k). His early life was characterised by
disorder and disturbance - the parents were often separated, or else
there were frequent parental rows - and this all took place against a
background of abject poverty: typically, there was - "a history of
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disturbed parent-child relationships, of broken homes, and of poor
home backgrounds" (Glatt 1964; see also Official Publications 1971:
para. 5.14 & app. k). In short, the habitual drunkard suffered
"damaging experiences during the early formative years" (Cook 1969).
The next stage of the path towards habitual drunkenness was a poor
education. There was a double problem here: first, the situation of
the parents generally led to the child receiving minimum schooling
(Official Publications 1971: paras. 5.13, 18.2, & app. H); some "may
never have had any education" (Glatt 1964: 282); secondly, the child's
early experiences were likely to cause behavioural problems which
interfered with his education:
He . . . missed much schooling because of illness and frequent
truancy. He could barely read or write when he left school at the
age of 14.
Her scholastic performance was poor, she truanted frequently and
was unable to conform to school discipline. She says she was unable
to write until her last year at school.
(Official Publications 1971: app. k - 'Five Case Histories' )
This truancy was the first step in a career of juvenile delinquency:
promiscuity (and possibly prostitution) in young women; house and
shop-breaking, petty larceny and other misdeanours among young men
(ibid). Heavy drinking usually started at this stage, i.e. 16-18
years (ibid). Vith men, delinquency was often stopped by brief careers
in the navy, army or R.A.F.; often though, most of the money earned
would be spent on drink (ibid).
The life of the adult habitual drunkard was marked by two closely
related features: unemployment (or lack of regular employment)9 and an
inability to settle. The habitual drunkard was, in other words, a
vagrant: a person without a settled home or regular work. One reason
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for the habitual drunkard's Inability to obtain regular employment was
their lack of employment skills (ibid: para. 5.13):
Few of them have any special skill and many have a poor work
record. It is therefore not surprising that the opportunities of
employment are limited; jobs in he catering trade or casual work in
the markets may be the only possibilities.
(Official Publications 1971: para. 7.38)
A second reason, however, was the habitual drunkard's inability to
hold a steady job (ibid: para. 5,13). This inability was explained, of
course, by their tendency to go on drinking bouts; but it was also
seen as a consequence of the drunkard's general lack of
responsibility, negative attitudes towards authority and a whole host
of other negative attitudes; at least these are the assumptions which
lie beneath the surface of remarks such as - "She last worked 6 weeks
before her admission as a casual domestic in an institution, but left
after 3 weeks following a row with her supervisor" (Official
Publications 1971: app. K, case E).
The habitual drunkard's 'drifting' was explained in a similar
manner. In a survey of men appearing in a magistrates' court on
charges of drunkenness (which would have included many not considered
as habitual drunkards) it was found that only 42 per cent had their
own accomodation, 42 per cent had stayed in a reception centre and 51
per cent had slept rough (Gath 1969; see also Official Publications
1971: para. 16.5 & app. H, para. 9). Along with this there was a
tendency to wander around (Cook 1975). This was seen partly as the
result of circumstances; habitual drunkards had obvious difficulties
in finding and paying for accomodation. But it was also attributed to
an Inability- or unwillingness - to settle (Official Publications
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1971: para. 16.12); the habitual drunkard is a wanderlust (Cook 1975:
2).
Another common characteristic of habitual drunkard's was that they
were generally either single or separated; any marriages which were
entered into were generally unsettled and short-lived (Hamilton et al
1978: ch. 11). This reflected a more general problem: their failure at
interpersonal relationships (ibid: ch.2). Once again drinking put an
obvious strain on personal relationships, but the habitual drunkard's
incompetence in this respect was also considered to have deeper
causes. The habitual drunkard, it was said, deliberately tried to
avoid contact with others. Hence, very few had any contact with their
family (Gath 1969).
What all these problems had in common was that they contributed to,
and were manifestations of, the habitual drunkard's rootlessness. It
was the drunkard's social Isolation, rather than his addiction to
alcohol, which was his main defining feature. The habitual drunkard
had little, if any, social affiliations; along with his lack of
attachment to family, -
Forty per cent had not attended a cinema, dance, church, or other
social function during the proceeding five years. Less than ten per
cent belonged to a club, union, or formal organisation. (Gath 1969)
With many habitual drunkards, this rootlessness was practically
literal, as a large proportion (in England) were Irish and Scottish
immigrants.
Closely connected with these behavioural and social problems, were a
number of 'emotional' problems. The habitual drunkard was described as
immature, self-indulgent, self-punitive, dependent, paranoid,
apathetic, irresponsible, as having negative attitudes towards
authority and feelings of guilt, anxiety, inadequacy and rejection
(Glatt 1964: 276; Hamilton et al 1978: ch.7; Official Publications
1971: para. 16.7, app. K, case E & app. If; d'Orban 1969). While not as
debilitating or as irremediable as mental illness or insanity, these
emotional problems were considered to be serious enough to cause
social inefficiency and personal unhappiness.
These emotional problems were seen as related, in a complex way, to
the habitual drunkard's social and behavioural problems. In the first
place the social problems of the habitual drunkard were seen as the
cause, to a considerable extent, of the habitual drunkard's emotional
problems. For instance, many of the habitual drunkard's emotional
problems resulted from "the lack of satisfactory adult models and the
occurrence of damaging experiences during the early formative years"
(Cook 1969). On the other hand, - as we have seen - the drunkard's
emotional problems were often deemed to be the cause of his social
problems; his negative attitudes towards authority and his
irresponsibility led to behavioural problems such as truancy or an
inability to hold down a steady job; and these in turn created social
problems - lack of education, a paucity of employment skills and
unemployment. These social problems then re-enforced the habitual
drunkard's emotional problems, and so on. In short, the habitual
drunkard's social, behavioural and emotional problems were seen to
form a vicious circle.
This has some important implications. First, it is difficult to
classify this conception of the problem as either belonging to a moral
approach or as being antithetical to moral approaches. On the one
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hand, It is argued that social conditions determine what the habitual
drunkard is; on the other hand, the habitual drunkard's habits and
attitudes are seen as the active cause of his social condition. If the
habitual drunkard could be persuaded to adopt better habits and
attitudes, despite the social forces which prevent him from doing so,
his problems could be solved. The habitual drunkard's social problems
are therefore both recognised as social problems and translated into
problems of individual morality. Habitual drunkenness is simultan¬
eously 'socialized' and 'moralized' . Social conditions are held to
account, but at the same time the habitual drunkards's attitudes and
conduct are scrutinised (cf. Collison 1980: 155-6). This conception of
the problem provided the grounds for a blurring of the distinction
between, on the one hand moral/penal intervention, and on the other,
social assistance, an issue to which I will return later in the
chapter.
A second implication is that the problem of alcoholism was seen as
inseparable from the habitual drunkard's other problems. The habitual
drunkard's alcoholism was seen as just "one facet of a constellation
of problems which includes homelessness, unemployment, ill health and
social inadequacy" (Moody 1979: 28). As Cook put it: "we are dealing
with a complex disorder of which alcohol is a conspicuous but at times
minor component" (Cook 1969). This led to two conclusions. First, and
most obviously, the problem of drunkenness could not be dealt with
separately from the drunkard's other problems. Contrary to what
Archard suggests, there was never any question of working on one
without working on the other. The habitual drunkard's social rehabil¬
itation could not be left to social workers, while his dependency on
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alcohol was dealt with by medical doctors. Unless one dealt with the
habitual drunkard's social and emotional problems there could be
little hope of curing his alcoholism. Secondly, and less obviously,
this conception of the problem led to an inversion of the relationship
between the habitual drunkard's alcoholism and his other problems. The
social, behavioural and emotional problems which were uncovered in
order to explain habitual drunkenness, were now seen as more important
than the drunkenness itself. Correspondingly, habitual drunkenness
became important, not in itself, but as a sign of deeper trouble.
Alcoholism ceases to be the illness, and becomes the symptom:
The pioneers have fought so hard to persuade the public that
alcoholism is a disease that we may be in danger of confusing the
disease with the symptom. Is not alcohol only too often the
substitute-support, the substitute-security, the substitute-love
which those deprived of the genuine article resort as the most
easily available alternative? If so, is not our problem the common
problem of mental illness - not merely to find a less degrading,
less pernicious substitute support, but beyond that to attack, if we
can, the root of the malady? (Silkin 1969)
'Skid Raw'
This conception of the habitual drunkard might be clarified by
examining how the reformers used the term 'skid row'. The habitual
drunken offender was often referred to as a skid row alcoholic. The
immediate reference is obvious: "Skid row was originally an American
term which described a distinct geographical area with its flop¬
houses, pawnshops, cheap restuarants, taverns and missions" (Cook
1975: 32).10 The term 'skid row alcoholic' referred to the drunkards
who lived in these areas. In this context it was easy to see the skid
row alcoholic as isolated from the rest of society, as living in a
place with its own rules and norms, with its own subculture.
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In Britain, there were no distinct geographical areas which would
qualify for the label 'skid row'. Nevertheless, researchers started
writing about 'London's skid row' (Edwards et al 1966) and the 'skid
row alcoholic' (Cook 1975). This enabled them to refer to an asocial
group of persons, living geographically within - but culturally
outwith - society. Although they were not geographically isolated this
group was considered to be socially isolated. They belonged to a
subculture in which the fundamental habits of sociality - order,
industry, providence, etc. - had no place. Hence Glatt (1964) argues
that "some of these people have in fact never been socialised". The
Home Office stated: "these men are not an integral part of society...
they are not therefore susceptible to the normal conforming and
stabilising pressures of society" (Official Publications 1971: para.
5.19). Cook (1969) described the skid row subculture as pre-social, as
being characterised by "unusually regressive and primitive relations":
"some of these men have in fact never been 'socialised' and need much
more than the 'resocialisation' necessary for the majority of criminal
alcoholics".
Skid row alcoholism was a problem therefore of ma1adaptation. The
habitual drunkard had internalised, not society's norms, but those of
the skid row subculture. The problem could not be solved then simply
by removing the person from the skid row; in Britain the place did not
exist as a geographical entity, skid row was more of a mental than a
geographic space. Hence social intervention must be accompanied by
psychological (or psychiatric) intervention.
In so far as it is appropriate to talk of a skid row in England, it
is possibly true to say that the phrase represents an attitude of
mind, an outlook on life, a resignation to the worst society can do,
a lack of belief in self and a feeling of rootlessness. It is not
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getting the man off skid row that is the problem, but getting skid
raw out of the man. Skid row is 'as much a state of mind as it is a
place' (Ross, 1970, p. 113). There is a need, in other words, to
distinguish a moral from an ecological entity. This implies
considering skid row as perhaps some kind of continuous
psychological territory or as an institution without walls.
(Cook 1975: 32)
CRITICISMS OF 'THE PEffAI. REVOI.VTgG DOOR'
In order to understand the treatment policy it is necessary to
understand the criticisms which were made of the penal approach by the
advocates of treatment. Two types of argument should be distinguished:
first, an argument against the punishment of habitual drunkards,
launched from within the terms of legal and philosophical discourse;
this argument had relatively little impact upon the formulation of the
treatment policy. Secondly there was an argument against using the
'penal approach' in general, and imprisonment in particular, as a
solution to the habitual drunkards problem; this 'practical' critique
was an essential component of the treatment programme. It needs to be
stressed that neither argument was directed at punishment or
imprisonment as such. Rather they argued that punishment or
imprisonment were inappropriate for the habitual drunkard. That
punishment and imprisonment were necessary for most other criminals
was never questioned. Rather it was argued that to punish, or to
imprison, the habitual drunkard was a category mistake, since the
habitual drunkard, for a number of reasons, could not be considered to
be 'real criminal'.
The legal/philosophical critique was more prominent in the USA than
in Britain. In 1956 the American Medical Association defined
'alcoholism' as a disease. This led to a questioning of the state's
- 156 -
right to punish the habitual drunkard, on the grounds that it was
wrong to punish ill persons for displaying a symptom of their disease
(Goff 1969). This argument was put forward in actual trials, with
varying degrees of success. In one case - that of J. Driver - an
appeal court ruled that imprisonment of an habitual drunkard violated
the constitutional ban on 'cruel and unusual punishment' (ibid). In
another - Easter vs. District of Columbia - the appeal court ruled
that an alcoholic does not have mens rea or criminal intent to become
publicly intoxicated (ibid). These arguments can be located within the
logic of the juridical approach to social control in which punishment
is justified by reference to the notion of free will. If alcoholism is
an addiction then the alcoholic's drunkenness is not a product of free
will. Punishment of the alcoholic for drunkenness is therefore neither
right nor purposeful.11
The campaigners for treatment in Britain seldom employed this
legal/philosophical argument. Their criticism of the penal approach to
the problem of habitual drunkards rested on rather different grounds.
Their concern was not with the moral soundness or legal rectitude of
punishment, but with the adequacy of 'the penal approach' as a means
of rehabilitation. Their 'practical' critique was launched then, from
within an entirely different framework of logics and assumptions. The
practical critique presumes that the only legitimate objectives of
interventon are rehabilitation and - to a lesser extent - deterrence.
Interventions - such as the imprisonment or fining of habitual
drunkards - are regarded almost solely from the point of view of their
ability to bring about these objectives. That is to say, the penal
approach is regarded as a technique, to be judged solely according to
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its efficacy (cf. Garland and Young 1983: 4-5). The debate between
'the penal approach' and 'treatment' then becomes, not a
philosophical/legal - nor a political - debate, but a purely technical
issue.
For the proponents of treatment the problem with the penal approach
was that it achieved nothing: "no one is deterred; no one is reformed"
(Official Publications 1971: para. 7.8). This view was shared by those
involved in prison administration. As I have suggested in appendix 1,
prison administrators from the nineteenth century on had been eager to
rid themselves of the habitual drunken offender. Although it was now
often argued that prison could do some good for the habitual drunkard
(see in particular Arnold 1969), the emerging problem of overcrowding
was leading to fresh attempts to rid prisons of the habitual drunken
offender. There had been recent attempts to transfer habitual
drunkards to open prisons (Official Publications 1971: paras 7.14-18).
Apart form a few exceptions there was a general consensus that
imprisonment of the habitual drunkard was futile. The following from
Lord Stonham expresses the general feeling at the time:
The work of drying out and cleaning up these men, well knowing that
they will soon be back [in prison], is a stupid waste of our badly-
strained prison resources, particularly at prisons like Pentonville,
where drunks account for one in six of all admissions. Heither the
excellent clinic there nor the fresh air we provide at Spring Hill
open prison is a substitute for the continuous support these people
need if they are to be, at least partially, restored to useful
citizenship. Prison is not the place."
(Lord Stonham: cited in Official Publications 1971: ch.3)
The metaphor of 'a revolving door' was used to put across the
futility of the penal approach (Pittman and Gordon 1958). The skid row
alcoholic, it was said, was arrested and subsequently charged for a
drunkenness offence. He then either paid a fine or served a short
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prison sentence. In either event he was back on skid row within a very
short time. He was returned to exactly the same social situation, with
the same social, behavioural and emotional problems as he had when he
entered the 'penal revolving door'. It was therefore not long before
the next arrest re-started the cycle (Official Publications 1971:
para. 7.8; Archard 1979: 86).
Like the nineteenth century inebriety reformers, the sponsors of the
treatment programme identified two basic problems with the penal
approach: (i) the prison sentence was too short for rehabilitative
purposes; & (ii) imprisonment was, in any event, unsuitable as a
device for rehabilitation. Vith regard to the first criticism, it was
argued that the habitual drunkard required long-term psychiatric and
social intervention if he was to be re-integrated into society. The
short prison sentence was therefore totally inappropriate:
The shortness of their sentences generally makes it impracticable
for the prison service to undertake psychiatric treatment or even to
attempt to inspire a wish to have treatment on release, or to make
after-care arrangements to counteract the lack of social support
they will, in the ordinary course, experience on discharge.
(Official Publications 1971: 7.13)
Even if longer sentences were imposed, imprisonment would still have
been considered inappropriate for the rehabilition of the habitual
drunkard. One of the main reasons for this was to do with the author¬
itarian structure of the prison regime. Such a structure might be
suitable for the punishment of 'real' criminals, but for the rehabil¬
itation of the habitual drunkard it was wholly inappropriate; it would
more than likely re-enforce the habitual drunkard's incompetence,
rather than lead to his rehabilitation (d'Orban 1969). Since one of
the main problems with habitual drunkards was their refusal to take on
- 159 -
responsibility and to make decisions, what they required was a regime
which would encourage and facilitate the taking on of responsibil¬
ities. So, what was required was a democratic and permissive regime,
rather than the authoritarian regime found in mast prisons.12 An
authoritarian regime perpetuated the problem by making every decision
for the habitual drunkard, a situation the habitual drunkard was more
than willing to accept. Since the habitual drunkard's basic problem
was a refusal, or an inability, to take control of his own life, a
situation in which he was controlled by others was quite agreeable to
him. 13
Closely related to this is an argument made by d'Orban about
habitual drunkards in Holloway prison. D'Orban argued that habitual
drunkards were quite happy to go to prison, since in prison life they
"found a form of social adjustment which fulfils the needs of their
damaged personalities" (d'Orban 1969). It was often suggested that
many vagrant alcoholics saw a prison sentence, especially during
winter, as a means of securing a few weeks shelter and sustenance
(Archard 1979). D'Orban argued that prison also met the emotional
needs of the habitual drunkard; prison was an emotional, as well as a
physical, shelter.
. . . they have became quite dependent on the institution. They gain
a sense of security and emotional support in the firmly structured
and familiar community at Holloway. . . . Prison life is able to meet
their physical and emotional needs better than any available
alternative. (d'Orban 1969)
As such, imprisonment was deemed better than no intervention at all.
The problem with prison was that by fulfiling these needs for the
habitual drunkard, it prevented the habitual drunkard trying to fulfil
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them for himself, in a normal way, through developing normal
relationships and through living a normal life in the community.
Somewhat related to this is a criticism of imprisonment as offering
an extreme and minimalist form of control: the habitual drunkard was
either in prison and therefore subject to an authoritarian regime in
which every decision was made for him, or he was at large, and hence
subject to no control at all.
. . . the dangers of relapse are greatly increased by the sudden
transition from closed prison conditions to the freedom and
temptation of life in the community.
(Official Publications 1971: para. 7.11)
What was required instead was a gradual "progression towards a more
liberal and normal regime" (ibid). The gap between total control and
total permissiveness needed to be filled in, so that the habitual
drunkard could be subject to intervention, yet still be in a situation
where he could make decisions and take on responsibilities.
THE TREATMENT PROGRAMME: A- The Rehabilitation Hostel
A 'comprehensive and integrated treatment programme' was proposed as
a 'constructive and positive alternative' to the penal revolving door
(Cook 1969; 1971). In what follows I will discuss two aspects of this
treatment programme. First I will examine the proposals concerning the
regime of rehabilitation hostels for recovering habitual drunkards.
These hostels were to play a central role in the proposed treatment
complex. They were to provide a therapeutic alternative to the prison;
being more long-term, constructive and psychologically rewarding, as
well as less expensive. The 'therapy' which would be available in such
hostels was quite distinct from medical treatment however; it was to
be a social therapy. Secondly, I will consider the institutional base
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of the proposed treatment complex. I will argue that - in this respect
as in others - the treatment programme was consistent with 1 social
psychiatry' rather than with hospital (or asylum) based 'medical
psychiatry'.
Proposals for the establishment of rehabilitation hostels for
habitual drunkards formed the core of the treatment programme. At one
level, the reasons for this emphasis are obvious. Since habitual
drunkards were - practically by definition - homeless vagrants,
providing a home was a pre-condition of treatment:
It is worth asking at this stage why a hostel was established as
opposed to some other form of 'treatment'. Other methods of
treatment were in fact not debated by the working party. The crucial
element of homelessness led to the position that, unless a decent
roof was provided, talk of recovery or sobriety held little or no
meaning for the habitual drunken offender. (Cook 1975: 14-15)
This is no doubt correct, but it is a partial explanation. The
provision of settled accomodation was more than simply a pre-condition
of treatment; it was one of the main objectives of treatment. Since
vagrancy was a large part of the problem, leading the drunkard towards
a more settled way of life was a large part of the solution. Although
the hostel was was only a temporary place of residence (although, as
we shall see in a moment, some saw hostels as a long-terms solution)
it could help in settling the drunkard by providing him with a fixed
dwelling place while he was put in touch with housing authorities and
social services.
Even so, it is still necessary to explain why the hostel, as opposed
to another means of settling the habitual drunkard, was favoured. That
something deeper was at stake is clear from the fact that, at the
time, it was "fashionable to talk about hostels whenever a situation
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of care Is under discussion, whether in the context of delinquents,
ex-prisoners, epileptics, ex-psychiatric patients, unmarried mothers,
or alcoholics" (Ingram-Smith 1969). The importance attached to the
hostel can be explained in terms of its ideological significance. The
hostel was to occupy a position half-way between the 'freedom and
temptations of the community' and the total control of the penal
institution. An alternative term for the rehabilitation hostel was, in
fact, 'the halfway house' (Rubington 1967). The hostel resident,
unlike the prison inmate, would be in the community; but unlike others
he would be 'sheltered' from the full pressures of independence. The
hope was that from this sheltered independence the habitual drunkard
would gradually take on more and more responsibilities and
correspondingly improve his self-confidence, until he achieved a level
of competence at which he could function normally without social
support (Official Publications 1971: ch. 10).
Treatment then became synonymous with social rehabilitation. Helping
the habitual drunkard to achieve sobriety was just one, and not
necessarily the most important, objective of treatment in the
rehabilitation hostel. As Cook (1969) stressed, "something more than
sobriety is needed"; the aim of the hostel would be to "alter a man's
self-image" and to enable them to "sustain a fully independent life in
the community". More specifically, Ingram-Smith (1969) stated that one
of the main aims of the hostel would be "to achieve social rehabilit¬
ation, including steady employment, reintegration into the community,
and, if appropriate, reconciliation with the family." Using the words
of Nikolas Rose (1986: 73), we might define the objective of the
rehabilitation hostel as being "to manage the individual from a
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pathology conceived of as social maladjustment to a normality
construed in terms of functional efficiency". It was recognised
however that this goal was impossible to achieve with many habitual
drunkards; "some may require life-long support" (Cook 1969). For
these, living in the rehabilitation hostel could be an end in itself
(Cook 1971: 236). In so far as living in a rehabilitation hostel was
the closest some would ever get to normal, domestic living, then it
was desirable that they should stay in the hostel as long-term
residents, rather than return to the wilderness of skid row.
Given that these were the objectives, it is not surprising to find
that physicalist methods of treatment were not to play a major role.
Drugs for the treatment of alcoholism were available, but these by
themselves could not help to achieve the wider aim of social
rehabilitation. In fact, they often failed to acheive even the limited
aim for which they were designed, that of keeping the alcoholic sober:
"Most residents had used Antibuse and Abstem in the past, without
success, the majority of them had little confidence that these drugs
could keep them sober, and had often drunk whilst taking them" (Pollak
1969). On the other hand, antidepressants and tranquillizers were
considered useful, but the function of these was to facilitate therapy
by combating initial restlessness; they were not intended as long-term
solutions (ibid).
More important than the question of physical treatment is that of
conventional psychiatric treatment. It was generally agreed that
conventional methods of psychiatric treatment were of little value in
the task of rehabilitating the habitual drunkard. One of the reasons
why hostels were needed was because conventional inpatient treatment,
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at a mental hospital, was inadequate to the task. Institutional
treatment - whether in a prison or psychiatric hospital - was
inappropriate because the problem had to be tackled "in the community"
(Cook 1969).
Nor is it likely that conventional hospital treatment on a larger
scale would be effective. At the end of the period of in-patient
treatment, the man has to return to a society in which manifestly he
lacks the social skills to survive, having lost or never possessed
such skills. (Gath 1969)
JTor were conventional psychiatric therapies (such as one-to-one
psychotherapy or psychoanalytic group psychotherapy) considered
appropriate for use in the hostel (Cook 1975: 20). Vhile the
psychiatrist was to play an important role in the hostel, he would not
be directly involved in 'treatment'. The psychiatrist was to perform
three functions. First, as we saw earlier, he was to assess potential
residents before they were admitted to the hostel. One of the main
functions of this assessment would be to rule out the existence of
mental disorder (Pollak 1969; Cook 1971). Secondly, he was to act as
an expert adviser to the staff of the hostel, "helping them to
understand both individual behavioural problems and the group dynamics
of the house" (Cook 1971: 232; Official Publications 1971: para.
11.39).Thirdly, he was to participate in group meetings in the
hostel (Pollak 1969; Cook 1971). The psychiatrist was not to run these
group meetings though (Cook 1971: 233); it seems as if his task was to
interpret the behaviour and talk of residents, rather than to 'treat'
them (see Cook 1975: 20-21; cf. Rose 1986: 71).
As opposed to conventional medical or psychiatric treatment, the
rehabilitation hostels were to adopt a "therapeutic community
approach" (Cook 1975: 26). The therapeutic community movement was
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based upon the idea that "social environment was a critical factor in
the cultivation of recovery" (Unsworth 1987: 263). Hence, the Home
Office working party argued that the "social structure probably holds
the key to the success or failure of a hostel" and it talked about
"the use of environment as an aid to therapy" (Official Publications
1971: paras. 10.27-9).
One of the key themes here was participation and democratization. In
contrast to the hierarchical, disciplinarian regime of the prison, and
the paternal, staff-directed regimes of other lodging houses, the
rehabilitation hostel would be run by the residents, in co-operation
with the staff. Residents would be responsible for the day-to-day
running of the hostel and for deciding the overall policy of the
house. The responsibilities of the residents included: "weekly
parcelling and organizing of the laundry, the provision of front door
keys, the paying of some of the bills, the cleaning of the house,
cooking at weekends, the general management of the house... and, above
all, the selection of potential residents" Cook 1975: 23).
"Ve felt it was important to involve the residents more and more in
policy decisions, both to relieve the strain on the staff and,
above all, to make the man's stay at Rathcoole more positive and
demanding." (Cook 1971: 230)1S
This did not imply total permissiveness however. Permissive regimes,
which had no rules at all and which made no demands upon the habitual
drunkard, were viewed with disfavour. Hence 'permissive shelters' run
by voluntary organisations, in which drinking was allowed, were
accused of colluding "with the men's idea of themselves as 'hopeless
drunks'" (Official Publications 1971: Ch.12). By refusing to set
expectations for the habitual drunkard, one was confirming their self
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image of 'I'm just an alcoholic dosser so don't ask anything of me*
(Cook 1975: 19). Vhat was required instead was "a vigourous directive
approach designed to foster an attitude of self-help rather than
passive dependency" (Cook 1971: 229; & 1975: 21). The rehabilitation
hostel was to be run as a participatory democracy (subject to obvious
limitations such as the power of the authorities to set limits, veto
decisions etc.) (Cook 1971: 230).,e
The position of the hostel, between, on the one hand, the freedom of
ordinary social living, and on the other, the external constraint of
institutional confinement, was to be achieved by getting the right mix
between staff and resident direction. Too much staff direction created
the risk of paternalism, thus "removing from the man an opportunity to
examine himself and require some resposibility" (Official Publications
1971: ch. 8). Too little staff direction, on the other hand, meant
that no therapy at all took place .
It is evident that neither an under- nor an over- supportive or
directive approach can be wholly satisfactory . . . and that the
group approach is more likely to foster the self-confidence that a
man needs if he is to function independently.
(Official Publications 1971: para. 11.26).
This idea was reflected in the distinction which was made between
the rules and 'the ethic of the house' (ibid: para.27). Formal rules
were avoided as far as possible. The only hard and fast rule in
established hostels was the strict 'no-drinking' rule. This rule -
along with its sanction, expulsion from the house - was decided upon
by the residents themselves. 17 Otherwise formal rules were objected to
because they demanded nothing of the resident, other than passive
obedience: "staff direction which is expressed in terms of a list of
rules does not... seem to be as efficacious as an approach which
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demands more from the residents" (ibid: emphasis added). The hostel
regimes required self-motivation and willed commitment, not just
avoidance of sanctions (again, simulating normal social life and its
looser controls). Moreover, the imposition of formal regulations by
staff "produces in some residents resentment against rules which in a
freer setting would be accepted in a more positive fashion" (ibid:
ch.8). A more informal 'cade of conduct* which required positive
contribution, rather than passive obedience, was preferred. Only a
code which was established by the residents could be effective.
Since there was quite a high turnover in the residents of hostels -
partly due to the no-drinking rule - it was considered important to
establish 'culture carriers'. These were residents who were settled
for a considerable period; their task was to inform new residents of
the code and, more generally, to ensure continuity of the culture.
These culture carriers were important; first, because the hostel was
seen as a site of a continuous battle between the new positive culture
and the old skid row culture (see Cook 1971: 230). Every new member
would take in some of the skid row culture with him; it was important
that he be integrated into the new culture, rather than the whole
house drift back into the skid row culture. Secondly, these culture
carriers were symbols of success; they were "visible proof that
recovery is possible" (Cook 1975: 102)
Most important though, was the fact that the culture carrier was not
an external figure of authority, but a fellow alcoholic. The code was
more likely to be taken seriously when it was clear that it was
created by the residents, for themselves, and not imposed upon them.
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This was particularly important when a new resident was being
admitted:
. . . the policies of the house on drinking were explained by the
residents to the new man so that there was greater chance of their
policies being believed, the culture was thus carried from resident
to resident reducing the 'them and us' division. (Cook 1975: 24)
Or, in other words, since the code was not imposed upon the residents
by 'authority', the resident was less likely to resist it in his usual
anti-authoritarian manner; the reality basis of his anti-authoritarian
attitudes had been removed (cf. Rose 1986: 73).
Too often men can reject what staff say about the House but they
are much less easily able to do this with fellow alcoholics. There
can be no equivocation when the residents inform the potential
newcomer that if he drinks he will have to leave. From the beginning
the man is faced with the seriousness of his sobriety.
(Cook 1971: 231)
Another key theme in the therapeutic community approach was
communalism (Rose 1986: 74). In the rehabilitation hostel, communalism
was achieved through weekly group meetings and by the establishment of
an Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) group in the house (Cook 1971). The AA
was a forum whereby residents could achieve greater insight into their
problems and attitudes; but it also performed a more basic function of
promoting a sense of solidarity. Most importantly, this solidarity was
based upon the new rehabilitative culture and not upon the old skid
row culture:
"Early in 1968 the Rathcoole AA group began meeting on Monday
evenings. Its effect on the House was remarkable. Talk about
drinking became positive instead of humorous nostalgia about bomb-
site adventures. The AA philosophy of "a day at a time' and 'first
things first' and so on, tended to make men less anxious. But above
all it increased beyond measure the group spirit and wish to be
involved in the House," (Cook 1971: 230)
As can be seen, one of the functions of communalism is to ensure
participation from the habitual drunkard. Communalism was also
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considered useful as a means of countering the skid row alcoholic's
"life-long difficulties in making stable personal relationships"
(Pollak 1969; cf. Official Publications 1971: paras. 8.22-40; Cook
1975: 20-22).
A third component of the therapeutic community approach was reality
confrontation (Rose 1986: 74). In the rehabilitation hostel the first
stage in reality confrontation was admitting that one was an
alcoholic. Unless one realised and fully accepted what one was, then
no change was possible. Group meetings were used as a means of
promoting insight into the problem; positive and serious talk about
the nature of alcoholism and the nature of recovery (is it sobriety or
a change of lifestyle?) were used as means of promoting self-awareness
of one's condition and hence the possibility of altering that
condition (see Cook 1975: 23 & passim).
A fourth theme was that of gainful employment. If the habitual
drunkard was to be fully restored to personhood and citizenship then
it was essential that he find steady, gainful employment. As well as
keeping the habitual drunkard occupied, gainful employment would make
the person independent and no longer a burden on society. Vith this
independence and usefulness would come self-confidence and self-
respect .
An important aspect of social rehabilitation is performance at
work.... Once he is gainfully employed a man is able to pay his way,
spend or save money of his own, and thus be another step towards
becoming a useful member of society and being able to command
degree of respect. (Official Publications 1971: para. 8.21)
Since many habitual drunkards were unable to hold ordinary employment,
it was suggested that 'sheltered employment' be provided - at least
initially - under the Disabled Persons (Employment) Acts 1944 and 1958
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(Official Publications 1971: para. 10.23). It was also considered
necessary for the hostel to have the services of a sympathetic general
practitioner, who would be willing to place the alcoholic on the sick-
list for a short time, during periods of acute anxiety about work
(Cook 1971: 233). The need for employment also meant that hostels had
to be situated in urban areas, where the jobs were.
Finally, a frequently stated concern was that the hostels be
provided with material comfort. Apart from the humanitarian grounds
for such a demand, it was also felt that a pleasant and comfortable
environment could be an aid to therapy. It would demonstrate the
advantages of domestication over sleeping rough and would be "an
indication to residents that there are expectations of them" (Official
Publications 1971: para. 10.29) It was considered particularly
valuable if the residents were involved in the furnishing and
decorating of the hostel (ibid).
Moral treatment, the inebriate reformatory and the
rehabilitation hostel
From this account of the objectives, methods and underlying
assumptions of the rehabilitation hostel it should be clear that what
was involved was a sociological and psychological, rather than a
specifically medical, conception of treatment. This conception of
treatment cannot be understood in terms of the medical model. It can
be better 'placed' by examining its continuities with the conception
of moral treatment which was utilised by nineteenth century inebriety
reformers. Despite their substantial differences, the inebriate
reformatory programme and the plans for rehabilitation hostels rested
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upon a similar framework of assumptions, logics and objectives. In
what follows I will briefly examine some of these points of
congruence, as well as some of the important differences between the
inebriate reformatory programme and the modern proposals. I will not
attempt an exhaustive comparison, rather I will point to some of the
more general continuities in order to establish the pertinence of this
line of investigation.
The fundamental objective of both the inebriate reformatory and the
rehabilitation hostel was social rehabilitation. Both institutions
were confronted with an asocial population, "deficient in the
fundamental habits of sociality'. Their task: to assimilate this
population to society by methods of improvement; to restore the
incapacitated subject to the qualities of the citizen.18 The same
image of the adult, able-bodied citizen underlies both programmes. The
ideal citizen is independent, i.e. capable of both sustaining himself
and of fulfilling his obligations to society and to family without
inordinate public assistance and without becoming a public nuisance.
This implies a whole range of other attributes: industriousness,
domestication, providence, a sense of responsibility, regularity, and
sobriety. Failure to conform to this image provides the grounds for
intervention; the objective of intervention is to imbue the individual
with these qualities.
In both cases it was assumed that these objectives could be achieved
by manipulating the individual's surroundings and by training him in
the habits of sociality. It was presumed that the disorders dealt with
were the product of a pathological environment and upbringing.18
Treatment involved countering the effects of this, by placing the
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individual in better surroundings and by re-training him. Treatment
was analogous to child-rearing, with the exception that not only was
it necessary to socialise the individual, it was also necessary to
counter the effects of a socialization to an inappropriate or
'pathological' culture'.
For the inebriety reformers confinement was a necessary condition of
resocialization. It was necessary to remove the individual from his
pathological surroundings and to place him in an institution in which
the environment could be regulated. In the modern approach confinement
was not deemed to be as necessary; in some ways it was seen as
positively harmful. Beneath this difference however, lies a shared
assumption. In the modern case it was also deemed necessary to remove
the habitual drunkard from his pathological surroundings, i.e. from
skid row. But by this time, the environment is not conceived as a
geographichal entity, but as the set of social relationships. Removing
the habitual drunkard from skid row now implied a social and
psychological, rather than a physical process.
In these general ways, and also in many of their specific features -
the emphases upon controls from within as opposed to external
controls, gainful employment, the development of self-respect, and
domesticity - there was a deep similarity between the inebriate
reformatory programme and the rehabilitation hostel programme. Both
can be understood by reference to the principles of moral treatment.
THE TREATMENT PROGRAMME; B, The Rehabilitation Complex
As I have just mentioned, confinement was no longer considered to be
a condition of treatment and was seen in some respects as an obstacle
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to rehabilitation. So instead of being concentrated within an
institution the modern treatment programme was dispersed throughout
society. The boundaries of the modern programme were therefore
different from those of the inebriate reformatory programme.20 It
follows that we cannot fully understand the modern treatment programme
by concentrating solely upon its operation within an institution. We
have to examine a wider set of proposals concerning the establishment
of "a co-ordinated treatment service" for habitual drunkards. A
detailed account of these proposals would be well beyond the scope of
this chapter. Instead I will try to identify their underlying logic
and some important effects of this more dispersed form of
intervention.
Along with rehabilitation hostels the treatment system was to
consist of other "facilities" for habitual drunkards. These included
detoxification units where the habitual drunken offender could be
taken when arrested, instead of being put through the penal revolving
door (Official Publications 1971: ch.15; Cook 1975: ch.6; Hamilton et
al 1978). These detoxification would preferably be established in
psychiatric hospitals. It is interesting to note, however, that one
experimental detoxification unit was established in a Regional
Poisoning Treatment Centre which was staffed by ordinary medical
personnel. This soon proved unworkable mainly, it seems, because of
the attitudes of the medical personnel, who refused to see habitual
drunkards as genuine medical cases (Hamilton et al 1978).21 The
detoxification unit would undertake functions currently performed by
the police and prison service - 'drying out' the habitual drunkard
under medical supervision, cleaning him up, and so on - without
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resorting to criminal procedures. It would also attempt to educate the
habitual drunkard about alcoholism, help him find accomodation for
when he leaves, and try to motivate him to enter the treatment system
<ibid). The basic difference between this and the penal approach was
that while the latter had no official interest in the habitual
drunkard once he had paid a fine or his prison sentence had been
served, the detoxification unit would attempt to keep the habitual
drunkard within the treatment system. While the penal approach
returned the habitual drunkard to skid row, the detoxification centre
would attempt to put him on the path to rehabilitation.
It was also envisaged that detoxification centres would 'catch' the
habitual drunkard who had lost his place in a rehabilitation hostel
for breaking the rules against drinking (Hamilton et al 1978). Such
units could therefore help ensure that once the alcoholic had entered
the treatment complex he would only leave it through the door to
normal society. In contrast to the penal revolving door, the path
through the treatment complex would start at skid row and end up at
normal society. Although it was a slippery path, those who slipped
back would be caught and prevented from ending up exactly where they
started.
It was also proposed that facilities such as 'shop-fronts' be
established (Cook 1975: ch. 4). These would be established in areas
where skid row alcoholics tended to congregate. Staffed by social
workers and recovered alcoholics, their function would be to provide a
place where the habitual drunkard could drop-in for a couple of hours
warmth and companionship. This would help establish initial contacts
with the skid row alcoholic, without frightening him off with pressure
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to change his life-style. Once the habitual drunkard had become used
to these surroundings, efforts could be made to motivate him to
undergo treatment. Those who appeared to be goad treatment prospects
could then be referred to the appropriate agency.
Along with the establishment of new facilities the treatment
programme proposed that existing agencies and facilities, which came
into contact with habitual drunkards, be integrated into the treatment
network. These existing agencies and facilities included (a) official
agencies: such as the probation and after-care service, the prison
service, the courts, the police, psychiatric clinics, hospitals, and
the Supplementary Benefits Commission: and (b) facilities run by
voluntary, charitable organisations, such as crypts, shelters, and
lodging houses (Official Publications 1971: chs 7-9 & 12-13). If these
facilities were to play a more positive, rehabilitative role they
would often have to be changed in certain aspects of their operations.
This reshaping would be achieved through the giving of professional,
expert advice. Such advice was considered particularly pertinent where
voluntary, charitable agencies were concerned.
If all these agencies were to operate effectively it was essential
that they be co-ordinated (Official Publications 1971: ch.14: Cook
1975: passim). Co-ordination would ensure that the habitual drunkard's
social and psychological needs (as intepreted by social workers and
psychiatrists) were met as fully and as efficiently as possible. It
would prevent duplication of services, and therefore inefficiency. Co¬
ordination would also mean that each agency understood the work of the
others. A particular agency would therefore know where appropriate
help for a particular habitual drunkard was available and would be
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less likely to make inappropriate referrals (such as referring an
alcoholic in need of detoxification to a rehabilitation hostel). Co¬
ordination would also facilitate the compiling of biographical details
of habitual drunkards, information gathered by one agency could be
added to a central file, and therefore be available to all others.
This knowledge of the habitual drunkard would also help to achieve the
most important abjective of co-ordination: preventing the habitual
drunkard from slipping through the treatment net. In a co-ordinated
network of treatment facilities the habitual drunkard would not leave
one agency or facility without being referred to another. Sometimes
this would represent an advance along the rehabilitative path, e.g. a
move from a detoxification unit, to a rehabilitation hostel. In others
it would prevent the habitual drunkard from slipping too far back
along the path: the shop-front, for instance, would enable a relapser
to stay in contact.
The treatment network would also include agencies such as alcohol
information centres which would disseminate information and advice
about alcoholism. One of the functions of such centres would be to
educate and advise those who had drinking problems, but who were not
(yet) alcoholics. Treatment would therefore perform a prophylactic
function. It would prevent the potential alcoholic from drifting into
skid row by ensuring intervention at an earlier stage than would
otherwise be the case.
In general then, this co-ordinated range of treatment facilities was
intended to bridge the gap between skid row and the normal community;
facilitating the movement from the former to the latter. It would also
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mean that those without the competence to live a normal life-style
were not condemned to skid row. Those who were not capable of
independent social functioning could live in a rehabilitation hostel,
on a long-term basis. Although receiving continuous support they would
be able to take on some degree of responsibility and independence.
The treatment complex would also fill in the gap which existed
between punitive intervention and non-intervention. These relatively
simple choices offered by the juridical approach were to be
supplemented with a wide range of non-punitive and non-institutional
interventions into social problems. This could have two sets of
implications. In the first place, some persons who - under a juridical
approach to social control - would be considered beyond the scope of
control (i.e. those who did not break the law) could now be brought
within the 'social control net'. It is important to stress however,
that these persons would be subject to a less punitive and more
'assistantial' form of social control than that which is considered
appropriate for offenders. The other implication is that some of those
who were convicted of offences and were usually dealt with through the
conventional punitive techniques of prison and fine could be dealt
with through less punitive, more assistantial forms of social control.
This conception of treatment could also lead to a filling in of the
gap between between penal intervention and assistance. The relatively
simple choice of penal intervention or assistance would be
supplemented by a whole range of partly punitive, partly assistantial
options. This, in turn, would make questions about the 'worth' of
offenders less central. It would no longer be always necessary to make
an either/or choice between whether the person was willfully dissolute
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and therefore deserving of punishment or a victim of circumstances and
therefore in need of assistance (although the possibility of placing a
person in either of these categories would still exist). Such choices
could be increasingly avoided as a range of 'facilities' were
established between the penal and the assistantial.
CHAPTER 5
MORAL IRSARITY, MORAL IMBECILITY ART) PERAL POLICY IR
THE RIRETEERTH CERTURY
IJTRODUCTIOW
The term 'moral insanity' - which was coined by J. C. Prichard in
the first half of the nineteenth century (Prichard 1837) - appears
frequently in penal and social discourses of the nineteenth century
(cf. Donnelly 1983). In the second half of the nineteenth century a
closely related but distinct term, 'moral imbecility', began to appear
in penal and social discourses. Both of these terms began to fall into
disuse from the beginning of the twentieth century, as they were
replaced by a new term, 'psychopathy*. In this study I will examine
how these terms have been used in the discourses of penal policy,1 but
before proceeding with this task I will look very briefly at
conventional accounts of the formation and develpment of these
concepts. I will then look, once again very briefly, at some of the
main objections which have been lodged against these concepts by
sociological sceptics. The purpose of this is to show that both
conventional and sceptical accounts presume that these terms have been
used in a specifically medical-scientific sense. In the rest of the
study I will try to show that, to the contrary, medically-founded
knowledges have contributed relatively little to the formation and
development of these categories, rather they have been constructed,
for the most part, upon the basis of social-psychological theories and
knowledges. I will also try to show that the formation and development
of these concepts cannot be understood by looking in abstract at
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developments in medical or psychiatric ideas. Rather the meaning of
these concepts can be best understood by placing their formation and
development in the context of specific social and institutional
problems for which psychiatry and criminal justice have endeavoured to
provide solutions.
Conventional accounts of the development of these categories
In conventional accounts of this development it is suggested that
the use of each of these concepts in penal discourses represents
various stages in a transformation from a 'moralistic' to a scientific
perception of affectionless, anti-social offenders (Butler 1975; cf.
Prins 1980: Henderson 1939). These accounts point out that before
Prichard coined the concept of moral insanity only those who were
severely deranged intellectually - i.e. those who had little or no
capacity for reason - were regarded as insane (Prins 1980: 140). Those
who were not intellectually disordered, but who nevertheless
persistently acted in an anti-social and self-defeating manner and
showed no feelings or concern for the fate of others or themselves,
were simply regarded as grossly depraved characters. For these
accounts, this failure to ' recognize' such characters as mentally
disordered is explained by "the rudimentary state of psychological
knowledge" (Prins 1980: 140).
In the first half of the nineteenth century some 'medical
psychologists' began to argue that insanity was not confined to
intellectual derangement, and that there were 'affective' or
' emotional' disorders which which were also types of insanity
(Henderson 1939; Prins 1980: ch.5). In Britain, Prichard coined the
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term 'moral insanity' to refer to this form of 'character disorder'
and the category included those emotionless, anti-social characters
who were once seen as simply depraved. This concept had important
consequences for penal policy since it implied that it was wrong to
deal with those morally insane persons who broke the law - and given
the nature of the condition such transgressions were frequent - as
criminal justice cases. Rather they should be dealt with in the same
way as insane persons were dealt with, i.e. they should be confined
and treated in an asylum (or similar institution) until their
condition had been cured.
D. K. Henderson, an influential writer on psychopathy, suggests that
while the concept of 'moral insanity' represented a considerable
advance in psychological theory, it was not a scientific concept since
it was based upon the purely 'hypothetical' notion that there existed
a 'moral sense', independent of the reasoning faculty. Henderson
argues that the existence of the 'moral sense' was never established
scientifically, rather it had been simply 'posited' by late eighteenth
century 'empiricist' philosophers.2 The category 'moral insanity' was
therefore constructed at a time when psychology was still at "the
philosophy of mind stage" (Henderson 1939: Prins 1980: ch.5). In the
late nineteenth century, so the story goes, there was a transformation
in the nature of psychological knowledge. There was a shift away from
psychology based upon 'philosophical speculation' to psychology based
upon positive, scientific knowledge.3 This transformation led
psychologists and pscyhiatrists to reject the notion of an independent
moral sense (Henderson 1939). With this rejection it became clear that
the term 'moral insanity' was a misnomer (ibid: 11). Hence the term
- 182 -
psychopathy was adopted by psychiatrists such as Kraepelin, who was
among the first to undertake scientific 'research' into the condition.
Research into psychopathic personalities has continued ever since. The
condition has, however, proved to be extremely difficult to explain
and even more difficult to modify by treatment.
The controversy over 'moral insanity', 'moral imbecility',
and 'psychopathy'
With the possible exception of 'maladjustment' no other diagnosis
has had such difficulty in establishing its status as a genuine
clinical label; and there are signs that both are proving too vague
and unsatisfactory for professional use. Other disorders have
symptoms which only occasionally bring the sufferer into conflict
with the codes of behaviour of his society, but the symptoms
of psychopathy almost invariably do so.
(Walker and McCabe 1973: 205)
This statement from Walker and McCabe, which identifies
'psychopathy' as one of the most controversial psychiatric categories,
could also be applied to the categories of 'moral insanity' and 'moral
imbecility' which preceded psychopathy. The formation and development
of these categories has been accompanied by controversy and dispute.
Among those who have tried to understand and treat these 'disorders'
there have been the usual disputes about the nature of the condition,
its aetiology, and the best methods of treatment (Prins 1980: ch.5).
Such disputes are quite common; they occur with regard to most other
psychiatric categories. There are also, however, more fundamental
disputes within the discipline of psychiatry about whether conditions
such as psychopathy do in fact exist. Some psychiatrists have asked
whether psychopathy is "a concept or a chimera" (ibid). It has been
suggested that if psychopathy is difficult to understand and almost
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Impossible to treat, perhaps it is because psychopaths are, after all,
simply wicked, recalcitrant delinquents (ibid).
This questioning has been taken further by those who have looked at
the concept of psychopathy from outside of the discipline of
psychiatry. It has been painted out that so-called 'psychopaths' are
diagnosed as such, not because of the presence of any objectively
verifiable form of mental disorder, but because they are extremely
impulsive, hedonistic and irresponsible in their conduct and
attitudes. Such deviancy, it is argued, cannot necessarily be equated
with mental disorder since many persons are deviant without being
victims of mental disorder (Critchley 1951: 39-40; Vootton 1959: part
II). To equate deviancy with mental disorder is therefore circular and
hence logically defective. The psychopath is;
par excellence, and without shame or qualification, the model of the
circular process by which mental abnormality is inferred from anti¬
social behaviour while anti-social behaviour is explained by mental
abnormality. (A. Lewis, cited in Wootton 1959: 250)
For Vootton, Lewis, and many other critics of the concept of
psychopathy, the development and use of these concepts (i.e. moral
insanity, moral imbecility, psychopathy) is the result of confusion
(Vootton 1959; Lewis 1974). Psychiatrists have simply failed to
realise the ambiguities and contradictions inherent in the concept of
psychopathy: "The volume of literature on the subject of psychopathy
is rivalled only by the depth of the confusion in which this
literature is steeped" (Vootton 1959: 250).
Over the past few decades, however, sociological critics have put
forward a somewhat different interpretation. They have argued that
such concepts have been used, despite their circularity and
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incoherence, because they perform the useful functions of legitimizing
the social control of a group of troublesome persons and promoting the
interests of certain groups within the psychiatric profession. This
argument has been made most forcefuly by Shulamit Ramon (1986) who
argues that despite the criticisms which have been lodged against the
category of psychopathy, and despite the therapeutic failures,
psychiatrists still use the term - and the State still supports
psychiatric interventions into psychopathy - because of the functions
which the concept performs. Ramon argues, for example, that during the
Second World War, psychiatrists used psychiatric categories such as
psychopathy to explain high levels of aggression and cruelty. Such
explanations were useful, Ramon argues, because by explaining such
behaviour in individualistic, psychological terms, psychiatry shifted
attention away from the social factors which cause aggressive and
cruel behaviour and therefore enabled a shifting of guilt for such
behaviour "as far as possible from the arena of collective
responsibility" (ibid: 220). Ramon also argues that the category of
psychopathy was supported by the therapeutic community movement
because it gave it a foothold in society (ibid: 239). Most
importantly, however, Ramon argues that the category of psychopathy
was adopted by the Home Office because it places a * smokescreen' of
medical expertise around a questionable practice of social control
(ibid: 240). So, despite all its logical contradictions, the category
of psychopathy;
. . . has a function nonetheless. It enables the state to accomplish
the social management of a troublesome group of individuals, and it
enables psychiatry to maintain and sustain its mandate over those
whose conduct is socially undesirable yet who do not fall within the
ambit of our system of criminal justice. (Ramon: 1986: 240)
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Conventional accounts assume that psychopathy is a real condition,
which is knowable through psychiatric concepts and treatable through
psychiatric techniques (although the precise concepts which will
reveal the true nature of psychopathy are yet to be developed and
effective treatments have still to be discovered). The critics of the
concept, on the other hand, have argued that there is no such
condition as psychopathy and that 'psychopathy' is therefore nothing
more than a medical label attached to those who display no symptoms of
mental disorder but simply act in an anti-social manner without
showing any remorse. What both accounts share in common is the view
that the formation and development of the concept of psychopathy is
the product of a transformation from a moral to a medical conception
of anti-social conduct. While conventional accounts celebrate this
transformation as a sign of progress in our way of thinking about and
responding to those with 'character disorders', critics argue against
such medicalization on the grounds that it distorts the moral and
political issues raised by anti-social behaviour and its control. The
critique of the concept of psychopathy is based upon the presumption
that the term 'psychopathy' is in fact used in a specifically medical
sense (what is challenged is the assumption that 'psychopathy' is a
genuine medical or psychiatric condition). In this study I will try to
show that the reality is in fact more complex and somewhat different.
I will try to show that the categories of moral insanity, moral
imbecility and psychapathy have been used in a variety of ways and
that in penal discourse they have been used primarily as social-
psychological and administrative categories.
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THE CATEGORY OF ' MORAL IBSAHITY'
In this chapter I will start by presenting a brief exposition of the
concept of moral insanity. I will then look at how the concept was
utilised in penal discourses. This task is a complex one since the
concept of moral insanity was utilised, not in a single debate, but in
a number of distinct, but intersecting, debates over legal, penal,
social and psychiatric policy. The picture is further complicated by
the fact that the concept of moral insanity was not utilised in a
consistent manner; 'moral insanity' was neither a univocal category,
nor a uniform condition. In order to examine the use of the concept in
the discourses of penal policy it is necessary to appreciate this
complexity. The impact of 'moral insanity' cannot be traced along a
single axis, rather its variety of uses and its corresponding variety
of implications - which were often contradictory - need to be traced.
In order to do this it is necessary to reject the image of a single
battle between law and psychiatry, an image which permeates both
conventional and sceptical accounts of the formation and development
of the concept. It is necessary instead to trace a number of distinct
conflicts, and a number of distinct uses of the concept, while also
showing how they intersect. The result will be a more complex map of
the various ways in which the category 'moral insanity' was employed
in penal discourses than that suggested by the nation of a gradual
medicalisation of deviance. The result should also be a more adequate
and more accurate account of how the concept of moral insanity has
influenced and shaped penal policy.
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Although the concept of 'moral insanity' was anticipated by a number
of early nineteenth century 'medical psychologists', such as Arnold,
Pinel and Esquirol, the term was first formally proposed by J. C.
Prichard in his work A Treatise on Insanity (1837)."* Prichard
criticised the then dominant conception of madness which he considered
to be too intellectualistic, in that it restricted the concept of
insanity to defects of reason: "It is generally supposed that the
intellect or the reasoning faculty is principally disordered in
persons labouring under mental derangement . . . this is by far too
limited an account of madness". There were other types of insanity, he
argued, such as moral insanity, in which the persons capacity to
reason was unaffected, his intellectual powers remained intact, but
the moral sense was impaired:
the intellectual faculties appear to have sustained but little
injury, while the feelings and affections, the moral and active
principles of the mind, are strangely perverted and depraved; the
power of self-government is lost or greatly impaired; and the
individual is found to be incapable, not of talking and reasoning
upon any subject proposed to him . . . but of conducting himself with
decency and propriety in the business of life . . (Prichard 1837)
This concept was expounded in Prichard's psychiatric writings, where
it was often given a strict, diagnostic meaning. Persons who suddenly,
and for no explicable reason, underwent a substantial change of
character were diagnosed as morally insane. Moral insanity was
diagnosed where a person started conducting himself in a manner which
departed radically from his normal pattern of behaviour. The crucial
point is that although moral insanity was diagnosed upon the basis of
departures from norms, the norms departed from were established by the
person himself in his own past conduct. For example, a moderate
drinker who suddenly, for no apparent reason, started getting drunk
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every night, might be diagnosed as morally insane, whereas a person
who had a long history of drunkenness would not - in the strict,
diagnostic application of the concept - be diagnosed as such. As
Donnelly puts it, a diagnosis of moral insanity:
. . . was strictly applicable only to individual case histories
which evidenced sudden or inexplicable changes in a person's 'moral
sensibility', demeanour, and disposition. The norms from which it
represented a gross deviation were themselves 'individual', given in
the person's past 'normal' self, which the madness had perverted.
Thus the case-histories of the morally insane commonly described
their perversion of affections by contrast to, and as a sudden and
immoderate departure from, their previous normal and sane conduct
and feelings. (Donnelly 1983: 138)s
Moral insanity as a 'social' category
However, as Donnelly also points out, the concept of moral insanity
was often interpreted more loosely, and employed in accounts - not
just of individual patients - but of the cultural traits, ways of
living, and mental characteristics of social groups, especially the
labouring classes and the poor (ibid). It was used, in particular, to
account for criminal behaviour and other anti-social and immoral
conduct, such as habitual drunkenness (ibid: 137-8; see Symonds 1869).
In such accounts the concept was used to describe general deviations
from social norms, rather than an individual's departure from his own
moral sense. By the same token, the practical relevance of the concept
was not restricted to its impact upon the treatment of those
individual patients who were diagnosed as morally insane; the concept
also had an impact upon social policy in general. More specifically,
it was deemed pertinent to those social practices which were concerned
with moral improvement, i.e. with improving the morals and habits of
the population, and especially those of the poorer classes. So while
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the concept had an immediate impact upon the fate of a relatively
small number of persons who were diagnosed as morally insane - either
to justify their confinement in an asylum or to help them to avoid the
legal punishment for an offence - it also had a more general impact
upon those social groups who were the target of policies designed to
promote moral improvement.
This broader interpretation and usage should not be understood as a
distortion of Prichard's concept, or as a deviation from the concept's
true meaning. The relationship between the restricted, technical use
of the concept and its more general usage was much more complex than
the notion of distortion suggests. The two uses were already present
in Prichard's writings. Although Prichard proposed the concept of
'moral insanity' in his psychiatric writings, the category also
occupied an important position in his more general - and much more
voluminous - writings on 'the history of mankind'.6 As we shall now
see, in those writings Prichard constructed a concept of moral
insanity which owed more to 'anthropology' and 'social theory' than to
psychogical medicine.
One of Prichard's concerns in his more general works was to defend
religious doctrines concerning the unity of mankind. This led him to
challenge the idea that "there exists in mankind several distinct
species" (cited in Leigh 1961: 195). Prichard contended, to the
contrary, that all human beings were endowed with a common nature. In
order to support this contention it was necessary for him to explain
the causes of variations - both physical and psychological - between
different people, and especially between different races. The answer
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was, in a sense, contained within the question: if the variations
could not be explained in terms of nature, then they had to be due to
culture. More specifically, physical variations were attributed to the
effect of the environment upon physical structure. Prichard subscribed
to an environmentalist theory of heredity in which the environment -
i.e. "climate and modes of life, domestication, etc." - directly
influenced physical characteristics, which were then transmitted to
offspring, via the ovum (see Leigh 1961).
Prichard explained variations in mental structure between the
different races in similar terms. All men, he contended, were endowed
with a common intellectual and moral nature (ibid). Variations in
mental characteristics between different races were due to the degree
to which the intellectual and moral nature had been cultivated. The
most barbarous races were those in whom the intellectual and moral
nature had been least cultivated, the civilised races were those in
whom it had been most cultivated. But why were some races were more
cultivated than others? For Prichard the differences were, once again,
due to the effect of environment. A wild environment would produce
savage sentiments; a more moderate, domesticated environment would
produce a more civilised, moral sensibility. These sentiments were
then transmitted through heredity.
Prichard did, however, implicitly posit an important difference
between physical and mental structure: the latter was apparently more
fluid, and hence more modifiable, than the former. This difference is
one of degree: according to Prichard's thesis, physical structure was
modifiable, but modification would take place slowly over a number of
generations. Prichard often implied, however, that the mental
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structure of a person could be modified within that person's lifetime.
Prichard's claim was that, if subjected to a moral environment, the
savage was biologically capable of becoming an 'Englishman' (ibid),
i.e. capable of adapting the ideas and sentiments of ' the civilised
races'. The moral and intellectual nature of the savage could be
cultivated; the savage could be morally improved."7
Intersection of the 'individual' and 'social' meanings of
'moral insanity'
Prichard often assimilated the insane with primitive and savage
people in respect of their basic psychology (Donnelly 1983: 167-8).
The explanation of variations in mental structure between races, was
thereby converted into a explanation of mental variations between
Individuals. The insane stood in the same relation to their more
rational (or more moral) fellows, as savage races stood in relation to
civilized races. The insane differed from others in terms of the
backwardness of their moral and intellectual nature. The insane
person's moral and intellectual senses had been weakened - sometimes
through physical injury or heredity, but often through living in an
immoral environment - leaving them in a state of mind somewhat akin to
that of the savage. And crucially, as Prichard made clear in his
psychiatric writings, the moral sense could be damaged while the
intellectual sense seemed to be unimpaired. One could therefore be
morally insane, without exhibiting any defects of reason. Here,
Prichard anticipated later psychiatrists such as Maudsley and
Tredgold, who argued that the moral sense is the highest of the
senses, the latest to have been acquired and hence the easiest lost,
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or the most commonly absent.® A generation later, Maudsley (1879)
would argue that the moral sense was "the last acquisition in the
progress of humanization, and its decay is the first sign of the
commencement of degeneracy".
Analysis of the concept
From what has been said it should be clear that Prichard subscribed
to an environmentalist theory of evolution. As Nye (1984: ch.4) has
argued, such environmentalist or Lamarckian versions of 'evolution'
would prove to be far more popular than strict Darwinism, among
nineteenth century psychiatrists and scientists.9 A number of paints
need to made about such environmentalist theories, and about
Prichard's theory in particular. First, although such theories can be
described as environmentalist, they were not opposed to
hereditarianist theories (cf. Rose 1985: ch.3; Hirst & Vooolley 1982:
43-58). It is therefore wrong to try to classify such theories as
either environmentalist or hereditarian. The opposition between
environmentalism and hereditarianism - an opposition which has
structured so much of the debate over the category of psychopathy (see
Prins 1980) - is an inadequate one for analysing these theories since
it fails to grasp their complexity. In Prichard's account, mental
characteristics were both acquired (through interaction between the
person and the environment) and inherited; acquired characteristics
were passed on through heredity.
Also, such theories cannot be easily classified as being either
voluntarist or determinist. They appear, on the one hand, to be
determinist in that they argue that conduct is the product of 'moral
sense', which is in turn the product both of heredity and the
environment. There are at least two - closely related - reasons, on
the other hand, for not classifying such theories as determinist.
First, we should consider the way in which the environment was
conceived. As Prichard used the term, the environment included not
only relatively 'fixed' items such as climate, but also items which
were presumed to be within the individual's control, such as 'modes of
life' and 'domestication'. Individual cases of moral insanity might be
brought on, for instance, by a person's adopting an immoral or
undomesticated mode of life. Intemperance, promiscuity, idleness, and
other forms of immoderate behaviour, along with disorderliness,
uncleanliness, and lack of domestication in general, were all habits
which could create the conditions in which moral insanity might occur.
Secondly, the relation between the environment and the person was
conceived as one of 'influence', rather than one of straightforward
determination. In environmentalist theories of the time, the
environment was seen as exerting an influence upon the physiological,
nervous and psychological traits of the person (cf. Aron 1965: 40-41).
A particular environment would be favourable to the appearance of
certain traits, but would not directly cause them (ibid). In other
words a certain environment would make moral insanity likely, but not
inevitable. Similarly while heredity could predispose one towards
moral insanity, moral insanity could not be directly transmitted
through heredity.
These two ideas - the concept of environment as being partially the
individual's creation and the idea that the environment influenced but
did not absolutely determine mental characteristics - opened up a
- 194 -
space between free will and determinism, and therefore between
responsibility and non-responsibility, and between ethics and science.
They made it possible to show how a person's conduct was not simply
the product of free choice, that it was influenced by the environment
and by heredity; but at the same time, they left open the possibility
the the person could, by an exercise of will, overcome the effects of
environmental and heredity influence. The person could improve his
environment, to some degree, by the adaption of moral - i.e. moderate
and domesticated - habits. Also, the person could, through exercising
his will, overcome the influence of an immoral environment. The
person's will was a weapon against environmental influence. Where that
will was weakened - through immoral and undomesticated habits, then
the person would become a slave to environmental influence. Eventually
he would more than likely become morally insane. Correspondingly, it
was not a contradiction to ascribe moral insanity to a person (or to a
social group) and at the same time to criticise that person's, or that
group's, conduct as unethical, as was in fact done (Donnelly 1983;
Smith 1981: 114).10 Through the theory of moral insanity, the person
was attributed with a residuum of responsibility for his condition and
for his conduct. While the theory made conduct an object for
scientific knowledge and intervention, it did not facilitate any
removal of conduct from the domain of choice and therefore of ethics.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW
In comparison with the ideas of some later psychiatrists, Prichard's
view of the implications of 'moral insanity' for penal practice was
rather restricted. For Prichard the concept was to be used to extend
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the scape of the insanity defence, so that the morally insane - as
well as those with defective reason - could be excused punishment (see
Prichard 1837: 271-3). An immediate impact of the concept, then, was
to open a long controversy within law, and between law and psychiatry,
as to how insanity should be defined for legal purposes. This was
related to a more general issue as to how far the law should amend its
practices in response to knowledges - psychological knowledge in
particular, but also that of other human sciences - which appeared to
contradict legal theories of responsibility.
It is important to remember what was at stake in this conflict. At
the time - and indeed up until the abolition of capital punishment in
1957 - a successful plea of insanity would save an offender's life.
Instead of being hung, the offender would be confined indefinitely as
a criminal lunatic. This is important since the legal recognition of
moral insanity, as a condition which diminishes moral responsibility,
and therefore should excuse from full legal responsibility, would
quite clearly have a humanizing influence upon penal practice. The
concept of moral insanity therefore acquired an amount of goodwill, at
least in reformist circles. But this goodwill could also help to
promote other uses of the concept, in contexts where its implications
were not quite so obviously humanitarian.
Traditionally, the law had restricted the insanity defence to those
who were obviously and grossly mad, using crude tests such as the wild
beast test and the right-wrong test.11 In the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries the law refined its practice somewhat,
giving these tests more precise definitions (Donnelly 1983: 71-3).
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However it still restricted the insanity defence to those those who
were quite clearly suffering from defects of reason (ibid). Prichard,
and other psychiatrists were now arguing for a further refinement in
light of their 'discovery' of new 'partial insanities', of which
moral insanity was one of the most important. However, within a decade
of the publication of Prichard's treatise on insanity, the
intellectualist conception of insanity had been reaffirmed as the one
which should guide criminal law. The key event here was the
establishment of the M'Naghten principles.
In 1843 Daniel M'Naghten was put on trial after he "shot and killed
Sir Robert Peel's private secretary while believing himself to be
persecuted by the police, supposedly on instructions from the Tories"
(Smith 1981: 14). M'Naghten's defence counsel - in what would
undoubtably be seen by some as an attempt to 'depoliticise' political
actions by having their perpetrators designated insane - argued for
M'Naghten's acquittal on grounds of 'partial insanity'. The trial then
became the site for a battle between those who wanted to restrict the
legal definition of insanity to disorders of the understanding and
those who wanted a much wider range of partial insanities (including
moral insanity) to be recognised as grounds for acquittal. In the
event M'Naghten was acquitted. In an unprecedented move, however, the
issue of the correct ambit of the insanity defence was referred to the
judges of the House of Lords. They proposed the famous 'M'Naghten
Rules' which reaffirmed the traditional, intellectualist 'right-wrong'
test.
... to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing;
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or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong. . (cited in Smith 1981: 15)
The M'Naghten principles have been derided by commentators - from
within both the legal and the psychiatric professions - ever since
(see Clyne 1973). The attraction of such conceptions of insanity to
the law has been explained, however, by Vootton (1959: especially
pp.228-31). The M'Naghten Rules are attractive to law because of their
narrowness and simplicity, and because they avoid circularity (ibid).
Vhere insanity is equated with intellectual deficiency it can be
inferred from criteria external to the actual offence. This makes it
easier - particularly for those who are not medical experts - to
distinguish beteen the sane and the insane offender. Defects of
reason, it is presumed, can generally be relied upon to reveal
themselves, or at least they can be detected with the use of objective
tests. The M'Naghten principles therefore avoid the circular argument
that the offender 'must have been mad to do such a thing' (ibid). They
therefore make it possible to draw a line "between those whose
offences are explained by illness, and those who cannot legitimately
plead ill-health as mitigation of, or excuse for, their conduct"
(ibid). The problem with extending the scope of the insanity defence -
and of moving beyond strict intellectualist conceptions of insanity -
is that it then becomes difficult (or impossible) to find a test of
insanity which is Independent of anti-social conduct. If anti-social
conduct becomes, in itself, evidence of insanity, then crime and
insanity become indistinguishable.
In short the advantage of the M'Naghten principles is that they
'exteriorize' the relation of crime to madness (cf. Castel 1975).
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Crime may be an incidental feature of madness but it is not defined as
its essence; other independent evidence must exist for the condition
to be diagnosed. Conversely, the concept of moral insanity is
unacceptable to the juridical forms of thought because it appears to
conflate crime and insanity; it implies that certain types of
delinquency are, in themselves, evidence of madness. If we return to
Prichard's argument, however, it seems quite clear that it also
'exteriorizes' the relation of crime to madness. In his 1847 essay 'On
the Different Forms of Insanity in Delation to Jurisprudence' ,
Prichard acknowledged the fact that;
... it is often very difficult to pronounce, with certainty as to
the presence or absence of moral insanity, or to determine whether
the appearances which are supposed to indicate its existence do not
proceed from natural peculiarity or eccentricity of character."
(J. C. Prichard, cited in Skultans 1975)
For Prichard, however, this was a practical, rather than a
conceptual, problem. He therefore argued for a greater role for
medical experts in criminal trials, since only the physician with wide
experience of dealing with the insane could recognise moral insanity
(see Skultans 1975: 6-7). Nor was Prichard alone in thinking this.
During the 1850s and 1860s the Journal of Mental Science carried a
number of articles by psychiatrists on how 'homicidal mania, without
disorder of intellect' - a condition close to moral insanity - could
be detected by "those who know haw to look for it" (Robertson 1860),
and on how to distinguish the genuinely insane from those who feign it
too escape punishment (Davey 1859).
It seems clear from this that Prichard was using the concept of
moral insanity here in the restricted sense mentioned earlier, i.e. as
a deviation from individual norms. Presumably the medical expert would
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examine the offender in order to determine whether there had been some
sudden or inexplicable change in the his moral sensibilities. In the
article by Robertson, mentioned above, it was argued that "In every
case of homicidal insanity without intellectual disorder, some
previous aberration from the standard of mental health will be found"
(Robertson 1860). Although moral insanity was thereby diagnosed on the
basis of anti-social behaviour, the anti-social behaviour was not, in
itself, treated as evidence of insanity. Anti-social behaviour would
only lead to a diagnosis of moral insanity if it constituted a
departure from the pattern of behaviour which the individual had
established for himself. So although Prichard argued for a conception
of insanity wider than that relied upon by the law, his argument still
left crime and insanity external to each other.
A SHIFT IIT FOCUS; From the Insanity Defence to Penal Policy
Defence lawyers continued to seek acquittals on grounds of moral
insanity right up until the 1940s.12 In recent decades they have tried
to have murder charges against 'psychopaths' reduced to verdicts of
manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility (see Walker and
McCabe 1973: 215 - 218). By the second half of the nineteenth century,
however, the concept of moral insanity was already being utilised by
those with a much more ambitious project in mind: a radical alteration
of the social control system.13 The sponsors of this new project
showed little concern for the traditional question of how insanity was
to be defined by the law. Instead they entered a much larger conflict,
a conflict between classical penal thought and psychiatry over the
social regulation of 'the criminal class'. Correspondingly, there was
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a shift in the way the concept of moral insanity was used. The concept
was applied now, not so much to individual cases, but rather to a
whale category of persons: habitual criminals. The broader, social
interpretation of the concept now became dominant.
This shift can be seen in the pages of the Journal of Mental
Science. In the 1850s and early 1860s the journal carried a number of
articles specifically concerned with the scope of insanity defence.
From the mid-1860s on, these articles get fewer, while a new concern
emerged and began to dominate: a concern with the psychology of the
criminal class. For a brief period these concerns were intertwined
(e.g. Symonds 1869; Haynes 1864/5). Within a few years though,
articles on the new subject - the psychology of criminals - made
little or no reference to issue of the insanity defence (e.g. Thomson
1870 & 1871). Within the space of a few years the insanity defence had
become a peripheral issue for 'medico-legal science'; the central
concern was now with the new problem of the criminal class.1'4
Thomas Laycock might be considered a pivotal figure in this shift of
psychiatric attention. In a lecture bluntly titled ' The Antagonism of
Law and Medicine in Insanity, and its Consequences' , Laycock raised
the familiar issue of the difference between legal and medical
conceptions of insanity: "Medicine says a man may be insane and
irresponsible, and yet know right and wrong; law says a knowledge of
both right and wrong is the test of both soundness of mind and
responsibility to the law" (Laycock 1862). So long as law refused to
listen to medicine, many insane offenders would be, unjustly, put to
death:
Thus law, as recently expounded in the English courts and the
English legislature, is entirely antagonistic to medicine on all
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those questions of mental science which involve the freedom and
well-being of the imbecile and the insane, and which often determine
whether they die an ignimonious death or not. (Laycock 1862)
In the same article, however, Laycack hints that medical interven¬
tion can achieve something else, besides wresting the morally insane
from the hands of the executioner: "Medicine says restrain and cure
the insane and imbecile offender against the law; law says hang,
imprison, whip, hunger him, and treats medical art with contempt"
(ibid). Previously psychiatry had merely asked the law to excuse
certain offenders from the normal punishment for their offence. Mow it
was making a rather different demand: restrain and cure the insane and
imbecile offender, rather than simply punish him. It is important to
notice though, that already Laycock appears to be using the term
insane and imbecile offender much more broadly than before.
Some years later Laycock's concern with the insanity defence had
faded into the background. In an article titled 'Medico-mental Science
and the Prevention of Crime', he confidentally asserted: "That medico-
mental science is often at variance with the doctrines of and
decisions of the courts of law is a fact too well known and too
generally admitted to need formal proof" (Laycock 1868). His attention
had by then shifted to a rather different - and in terms of numbers
involved, infinitely larger - problem:
. . . there is a large number of criminals termed in France the
'classes dangereuses' and in English phrase 'known to the police'
and another still more numerous body, not exactly of this class, but
incorrigible vagabonds, drunkards, mendicants. All these, numbering
tens of thousands, are really so constituted corporeally that they
possess no self-control beyond that of an ordinary brute animal. . .
They are, for the most part, immoral imbeciles, so that however
frequently they may have been subjected to prison or other
discipline, the moment they are set free, they resume their vicious
and criminal course. (Laycock (1868: 342)
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MORAL IMBECILES. THE BORM CRIMIMAL. AMD THE COHFLTCT BETVEEEM
CLASSICAL FEffAL THEORY AID CRIMIITAL MTHEQPQLQGY
The 'criminal class' was not an obvious category. To the contrary,
such a class was unintelligible to the prevalent penal rationality.
For classical penal theory criminals had nothing in common except for
the fact that they had chosen to commit crimes. It was presumed that
criminals were like non-criminals in their essential characteristics,
1.e. free will and rationality; they differed from others "only in the
contingent and non-essential fact of their law-breaking" (Garland
1985: 14) If there were other differences between the criminal and the
non-criminal, such differences had no status within classical penal
theory and hence there could be no special allowances made for them in
pena1 practice.
For the criminal class to become conceivable the prevalent penal
rationality had to be confronted. What was later to become an
established fact - the existence of the criminal class - still had to
be asserted explicitly at this stage. One of the main purposes of an
article by Thomson, in 1870, was to assert: "1. That there is a
criminal class distinct from other civilised and criminal men; (and)
2. That this criminal class is marked by peculiar physical and mental
characteristics" (Thomson 1870: emphasis in original). The category of
moral insanity, and the closely related category of moral imbecility,
played a crucial role in establishing this argument. It was largely in
terms of the category of moral imbecility that the criminal class was
conceived and represented. The essential distinguishing feature of the
criminal class was said to be their moral imbecility. The argument
that "violent and habitual criminals are, as a class, moral imbeciles"
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(Thomson 1871) was to form the basis of a sustained attack upon
classical penal rationality throughout the remainder of the nineteenth
century.
Henry Maudsley was one of the chief exponents of this idea. Like
Prichard, Maudsley often used the concept of moral insanity as an
individual diagnosis; he claimed that moral insanity was diagnosable
on the basis of deviation from individual norms: "In extreme cases it
is observed that the modest man becomes presumptious and exacting, the
chaste man lewd and obscene, the honest man a thief, and the truthful
man an unblushing liar" (Maudsley 1870). Maudsley was, in fact, well
aware of the problems involved in generalising the link between crime
and madness. He acknowledged that moral insanity was "a form of mental
alienation which has so much the look of vice or crime that many
persons regard it as an unfounded medical invention" (Maudsley
1874).1S He argued, however, that although the 'symptoms' of moral
insanity and vice were the same (i.e. anti-social conduct), moral
insanity was nevertheless an authentic condition which could be (and
should be) evidenced by factors other than simple delinquency:
. . . the evidence of disease will be found in the entire history of
the case. What we shall often observe is this - that after some
great moral shock, or some severe physical disturbance, in a person
who has a distinct hereditary predisposition to insanity, there has
been a marked change in character. . ." (Maudsley 1874).
However, Maudsley also argued for the existence of 'moral imbecil¬
ity' , a condition closely related to moral insanity (see Burt 1925:
34-6). It is necessary to examine this concept in a some detail since,
although closely related, there is a crucial difference between moral
insanity and moral imbecility.
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In the domain of intellectual defects, the insane had already been
distinguished from mental defectives: while the insane had lost their
ability to reason, mental defectives had never developed it. Loss of
mind was distinguished from lack of mind (ibid; cf. Jones 1972: ch.8).
In the first half of the nineteenth century there was a move towards
extending the category of mental defectives to include imbeciles,
imbecility being defined as a mental defect which was not quite so
severe as the long-recognised condition of idiocy (Jones: ibid).
In a similar manner Maudsley drew a distinction between the morally
insane - those whose moral sense had been damaged by severe 1 moral
shock' or 'physical disturbance' - and moral defectives: the moral
defective was a person who had never developed a moral sense in the
first place (ibid). This condition was said to correspond to
imbecility, hence the term 'moral imbeciles'. It was this category
which was applied to the criminal class: ". . .if there be a class of
persons who are without the moral sense, who are the true moral
imbeciles, it is the class of habitual criminals. . . " (Maudsley
1870).
Moral imbecility did not, however, relate to moral insanity in
exactly the same way as 'intellectual imbecility' related to 'intell¬
ectual insanity'. The crucial difference between 'intellectual
insanity' and 'intellectual imbecility' was that while insanity was
generally attributed to disease in later years (although heredity
could predispose a person to insanity), and was considered potentially
curable, imbecility was considered to be an hereditary, or inborn, and
permanent condition (Burt 1925: 34-6).1G The 'symptoms' of insanity
and imbecility were more or less the same (i.e. gross deviation from a
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given standard of reasoning ability); the conditions differed in terms
of their cause and curability. Likewise, moral imbecility was
distinguished from moral insanity on the grounds that it (moral
imbecility) was an inborn and hereditary condition and that it was
incurable. However the 'symptoms' of moral imbecility were also
different from those of moral insanity. Whereas moral insanity was
diagnosed on the basis of deviation from norms of conduct established
by the individual, moral imbecility was inferred from the
transgression of social norms. The moral imbecile had, by definition,
always acted in an anti-social manner. Unlike the concept of moral
insanity then, the concept of moral imbecility did appear to lead to a
generalisation of the link between mental abnormality and crime. The
concept of moral imbecility implied that those who persistently acted
in an anti-social manner 'from birth or from an early age' were
suffering from a form of mental defect. Through the concept of moral
imbecility, Maudsley 'interiorized' the relation between delinquency
and mental disorder.
This difference between the category of moral insanity and moral
imbecility was never acknowledged by Maudsley, nor by others who
promoted the concept of moral imbecility. In fact, during the second
half of the ninteenth century the two terms were often used inter¬
changeably (see Watson 1988). Also, the same method was used to
illustrate cases of moral imbecility as was used to demonstrate cases
of moral insanity. This method was the biographical case-history.17
The relevance of the biography to diagnoses (and illustrations) of
moral insanity was obvious: it could be used to determine whether
there had been a sudden change in character, a sudden departure from
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the norms of conduct established by the individual for himself. ie The
biography could not be used to establish moral imbecility in the same
way, since in moral imbecility the person had always acted in an anti¬
social manner. The biography of a moral imbecile could only establish
that a person had a life-long history of delinquency. What happened in
fact was that the language used to describe the instances of
delinquency read 'moral imbecility' into the conduct, while professing
to infer moral imbecility from the conduct. Nevertheless, writers such
as Haynes (1864/5) switched from biographies of moral insanity to
biographies of moral imbecility as if they were one and the same
thing.
Biographical case studies of moral imbeciles did not establish what
was claimed for them, i.e. the existence of moral imbecility as a
medical condition distinct from ordinary delinquency. These studies
did however, draw a distinction between the moral imbecile and the
'ordinary delinquent', but this distinction was at the level of
description of the conduct, not at the level of its cause. The main
use of the biographical case study was, in fact, to present a detailed
portrayal of the type of character the moral imbecile was. This aspect
of the writings on moral imbecility has generally been overlooked by
critics of the concept. I would argue, however, that the
representations of the moral imbecile contained in biographical case
studies has had an important and lasting impact upon penal policy (and
more generally upon cultural conceptions of delinquency); an impact
which is at least equal to that of arguments about biological
determinism, which are generally the focus of attention. It is
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necessary then to consider these biographical illustrations in a
little detail.
The biographies of moral imbeciles all told a similar story, only
the specific details differed. 131 First, there was the family
background: in nearly all cases of moral imbecility there was some
family history of insanity (which was generally considered to be proof
of the hereditary nature of moral imbecility). In the early years the
child was often either spoiled or treated very harshly. School years
generally saw the start of serious delinquency, but also of other
problem behaviour such as throwing tantrums. By adolescence, moral
imbecility was clearly recognisable. The adolescent moral imbecile
indulged, in various degrees, in masturbation, promiscuity, lying,
stealing, fraud, and other forms of delinquency. Much of this
delinquency was without purpose; objects stolen, for instance, were
often of little use to the moral imbecile. Moral imbeciles were not
only bad though, they also tended to be sad. They were unable to
relate normally to others and appeared to be unhappy with themselves:
they were quarrelsome, they tended to be loners, they were easily
excitable and prone to sudden and impulsive outbursts of violence;
they were sometimes suicidal; and they often lived in a fantasy world.
Heedless to say, the moral imbeciles conduct often brought him into
conflict with authority. The moral imbecile was always in trouble,
first with his parents, then at school, and later on with employers
and the police.
All these features add up to an extremely troublesome person. There
were one set of factors, however, which distinguished the moral
imbecile from other troublesome persons. Moral imbeciles displayed a
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striking detachment from their deeds. They seldom showed any regret or
remorse for what they had done and seemed not to appreciate the affect
of their conduct had upon others. Characteristically, they often
described their deeds, even ghastly killings, in matter-of-fact,
neutral terms.20 Moral imbeciles displayed a "deplorable want of
feeling as to what is right and wrong" (Haynes 1864/5: case 15,
emphasis added - see app. B). This could not be explained, however, by
intellectual defect. Moral imbeciles were not insane or imbecilic in
the usual sense. To the contrary they were often of more than average
intellect. They were perfectly capable of understanding the difference
between right and wrong, in the sense that they were cognisant of the
difference (ibid). They seemed, however, to be unable to appreciate or
be affected by the difference between right and wrong. They were aware
of the distinction, but the distinction itself made no impression upon
them. They were totally destitute, not of intellectual sense, but of
moral sense (ibid).
It can be seen that although the emergence of the concept of moral
imbecility occurred as part of a change in the way of certain types of
delinquent were perceived, this change was not towards a medical
perception of delinquency. Rather, there was a more complex change in
the way the delinquent was perceived. In the first place a distinction
was drawn between those in whom a delinquent act was an isolated
ocurrence and those in whom the act was simply one more offence in a
life-long history of delinquency. The latter were referred to as
'moral imbeciles'. As we saw in the chapters on inebriety such
distinctions owed little, if anything, to medically-founded knowledge,
rather they were made by looking at the 'moral history' of the
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delinquent. Secondly these 'moral imbeciles' were represented as
having different ' characters' from the one-time offender and from non¬
offenders. As we shall see, although this difference in character was
generally explained by reference to the physical make-up of the
person, it was also often presumed that environmental factors played
an important role in shaping the character of moral imbeciles. In any
case, what is important is not simply how the basis of the difference
was understood, but the fact that 'moral imbeciles' were seen as
different. What was novel about the concept of moral imbecility was
that it referred to a class of persons who, for whatever reason, were
impervious to society's norms. These characters therefore represented
a threat to the social order.
CRIKIML ANTHROPOLOGY
The term 'moral imbecility' was often used to refer to all 'habitual
criminals' (i.e. all recidivists). Recidivism was often deemed to be,
in itself, sufficient proof of moral imbecility. But many
psychiatrists - and especially those with a direct influence upon
penal policy and practice - soon rejected such broad usage and began
to use the term in the more restricted and specific sense, rejecting
the argument that all habitual criminals were moral imbeciles (cf.
Garland: 1988). Others, however, continued to generalise the link
between moral imbecility and recidivism. This tendency was, in fact,
taken further in the study of criminal anthropology.
Lombroso, conventionally designated the founding father of criminal
anthropology, explained criminality in terms of atavism, 'a hereditary
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regression to the behaviour and appearance of a primitive human
ancestral type' (see Nye 1984: 99). Lombroso argued that about forty
per cent of offenders were 'born criminals', persons who had inherited
a large number of primitive characteristics. Their behaviour was
therefore that of the savage. While savage behaviour might have been
appropiate in savage times, it was now intolerable and hence branded
criminal (see Gould 1978). Lombroso's argument was in many ways
similar to that of Prichard, a generation earlier. While Prichard had
drawn comparisons between the behaviour of savages and that of madmen,
Lombroso compared the behaviour of lower animals to that of the
criminal. Lombroso argued that 'the usual behaviour of lower animals
is criminal by our standards' (ibid: 224). He then examined the
anatomy of criminals to show that criminals were throwbacks to our
evolutionary past (ibid). The criminal, he claimed, had many features,
not only of lower primates, but also of lower mammals and even of
flatfishes (ibid: 225). These physical stigmata were accompanied by
mental and social signs of atavism. Noting similarities between
criminal slang and the speech of savage tribes, Lombroso concluded:
"They speak differently because they feel differently; they speak like
savages, because they are true savages in the midst of our brilliant
European civilisation" (cited in Gould 1978: 225). Once again it can
be seen that Lombroso's views were more complex than the argument for
which he is often credited with - i.e. that criminals are biologically
inferior (cf. West 1988). In order to assess Lombroso's contribution
to criminology it would be necessary to pay more attention to the use
he makes of the concept of 'atavism'.
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Havelock Ellis (1910 - first published in 1890) was chiefly
responsible for disseminating criminal anthropology in Britain.21
Ellis argued that the criminal, as well as being an evolutionary
throwback, was also a moral imbecile. As was the case with Prichard,
Ellis linked psychiatric with anthropological designations of
delinquency. Ellis expressly welcomed Prichard*s attack upon "the
conception of insanity then ruling among English lawyers, by whom it
was regarded as a purely intellectual matter". However, he also
criticised Prichard's use of the concept of moral insanity as being
too restrictive, arguing that the cases which Prichard used to
demonstrate moral insanity were "clearly insane in far more than
'moral' respects" (Ellis 1910: 33). According to Ellis all those who
constituted the criminal class - i.e. persistent delinquents as
opposed to the 'political criminal' or the 'criminal by passion'
(ibid: ch.l) - could be seen as moral imbeciles (ibid: 33 & 285-6).
For Ellis the 'born criminal' and the 'moral imbecile' were one and
the same thing (ibid: 292). As against Prichard's concept of moral
insanity, Ellis in fact preferred that of the German 'alienist'
Grohmann, who expressly realised that "there are no clear lines of
demarcation between the insane and the criminal" (ibid: 288 ff).
Where both Maudsley and the criminal anthropologists diverged from
Prichard was in their insistence that moral imbecility was an inborn,
permanent condition. As we saw earlier, while Prichard argued that
mental and moral characteristics were passed on through heredity, he
also presumed that these characteristics - unlike physical character¬
istics - could be substantially altered during the term of a person's
life. Maudsley and the criminal anthropologists argued to the
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contrary; once a defective moral sense had been inherited, it could
not be altered, or at least not for the better. One's moral nature was
biologically determined, just as physical characteristics were; it was
a part of one's constitution <and of course, for the criminal
anthropologists, there was a strong relationship between physical and
moral defects). As Ellis put it:
. . . the average criminal, whatever injustice he may have suffered
at the hand of society, is at the same time often a more or less
congenitally abnormal person, endowed with an ill-adjusted organism
which fails to respond to the same social stimuli as the organisms
by which it is surrounded . . . (Ellis 1910: xiv)
And, to run ahead a little, we might note that this argument was often
used to support claims that the moral imbecile was irreformable:
A true reformation would be a re-forming of the individual nature;
and how can that which has been farming through generations be
reformed within the term of a single life? Can the Ethiopian change
his skin, or the leopard his spots? (Maudsley 1870)
Implications for penal policy
As was the case with moral insanity, the concept of moral imbecility
was utilised in attacks upon juridical theories of criminal
responsibility. However, whereas in previous attacks the focus was
upon the occasional, serious offender who was diagnosed as morally
insane, now it was upon a large proportion of offenders - recidivists
- who were categorised as moral imbeciles. And the purpose of the
attack was not to suspend the legal punishment for an offence in a few
cases, rather it was to remove juridical restrictions upon the
exercise of social control, at least where the object of control was a
member of the criminal class. What was at stake was not an
individual's life, but the partial replacement of one style of social
control with another.
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As we have seen, juridical forms of thought placed definite limits
upon the exercise of social control: the liberty of a person could not
be infringed unless that person committed a punishable offence, and
punishment had to be proportionate to the offence committed. These
restrictions were tied, however, to the juridical conception of the
person as a self-governing, rational individual (see ch.l). Hence it
was often accepted that where this presumption was rebutted, as in the
case of the lunatics or mental defectives, these restrictions could be
set aside to some degree.22 It was generally agreed, by all but the
most extreme liberals, that lunatics - provided they were properly
certified as such - could be confined without being found guilty of a
definite legal offence. Such confinement was generally justified as
necessary to protect both the lunatic and society against the
lunatic's dangerous propensities and lack of competence (ibid).23
The argument that a large proportion of offenders were moral
imbeciles can be seen as an attempt to extend this logic: if those
suffering from mental defects of an intellectual nature could be
confined for reasons of social defence, then those suffering from
mental defects of a moral nature should also be subject to such
confinement. Moral imbeciles, it was argued, should be subject to the
same form of social regulation as were lunatics and other mental
defectives. It was argued in fact, that the need to control moral
imbeciles was even greater, since their high level of intelligence,
combined with a lack of moral sense, made them an even greater threat
to society than the ordinary mental defective (Ellis 1910: ix). The
argument then, was that the moral imbecile should be subject to the
same sort of social regulation as the lunatic, and not given the
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protections to which the normal person was entitled. To deal with the
moral imbecile in the same way as one dealt with ordinary offenders
was to make a category mistake. The moral imbecile, or the born
criminal, was not an ordinary offender; although he was not insane or
mentally defective, the moral imbecile was not normal either (ibid:
xxiii).
What can be noted about this argument is that it does not pose a
direct challenge to the logic of juridical punishment. Juridical
punishment already excluded the insane from its jurisdiction; it was
now being argued that moral imbeciles should be considered on a par
with the insane, rather than with normal persons. So, despite
rhetorical attacks upon "the antiquated traditions concerning
'responsibility' which rule in our courts of law", and upon attempts
to deal with the criminal through "the antiquated blunderbuss of
punishment" (ibid: xxiv-xxv), it is clear that the objective was not
to abolish legal restrictions upon social regulation altogether,
rather it was to abolish restrictions upon the control of a certain
class of persons, the 'criminal class*. By arguing that members of the
criminal class were not mentally normal, special controls could be
justified for them, while the social regulation of the ordinary person
was still guided by the principles of juridical punishment. Criminal
anthropology re-enforced the appeal of this argument; as Radzinowicz
and Hood put it:
The definition of a criminal class as a separate and foreign social
species implied that decent citizens had nothing to fear from a
jurisprudence tailored for, and applicable only to, this element.
(Radzinowicz and Hood 1986: 231)
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The concept of moral imbecility therefore lent scientific legitimacy
to the developing concerns of social policy. The criminal class, a
social category,24 was represented as a race apart; its members were
represented as psychologically and physically, as well as morally,
inferior to the normal citizen. Special forms of control - designed
for them, but not for the ordinary citizen - could therefore be
represented as both necessary and justifiable. The category of moral
imbecility was therefore put to an ideological use. It is important to
realise though that this did not involve a misuse of the category.
Psychiatrists did not overstep their position by applying the category
of moral imbecility to the criminal class. This is precisely because
'moral imbecility' was not a neutral, scientific concept, rather the
category of 'moral imbecility' was constructed, as we have seen, by
direct reference to social norms. The category was properly applicable
to criminals since it was partly the product of a new analysis of
criminality. And I might add that this new analysis of the nature and
causes of criminality employed social knowledges and moral theories,
as well as medical and psychiatric ideas.
The concept of moral imbecility was used, not simply to argue for
more social control over the criminal class, but to argue for a
specific form of control. Ellis, for instance, relied on the concept
in order to support three sets of penal policy proposals: (i) eugenic
proposals for the sterilization of habitual criminals; (ii) the
introduction of indeterminate sentences for habitual criminals; &
(iii) proposals for prison reform.
(i) sterilization of habitual criminals: In keeping with his view that
moral imbecility was an hereditary condition, Ellis supported eugenic
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proposals for the sterilization of habitual criminals and other
methods - e.g. permanent segregation - of preventing moral imbeciles
breeding offspring whose moral sense would be even more defective than
their own, and thereby "lowering the level of civilisation in the
community" (Ellis 1910: xiii; 1939: 10).2S
(ii) the Indeterminate sentence: Whereas others had used the concept
of moral insanity to attack the right to punish, Ellis employed it in
order to point to the inadequacies of punishment "as a practical tool
for dealing with criminals in a civilised state" (ibid). Punishment,
Ellis pointed out, was based on the presumption that the criminal was,
like other persons, a responsible being. According to Ellis, however,
it had now been established that the criminal was not in fact a
responsible person, that he was a moral imbecile. This being the case
it was useless to approach the criminal "with the antiquated
blunderbuss of punishment" (ibid). The criminal could not be
controlled in the same way as the ordinary person, for whom the threat
of punishment was generally sufficient to prevent delinquency. Rather
the control of the criminal should be put on the same basis as the
control of other dangerous lunatics. In particular, it was necessary
to reject the classical principle of proportionality between crime and
punishment when dealing with the moral imbecile. Criminals could not
be dealt with by "simply meting out to them 'punishments' in the form
of a term of imprisonment roughly equivalent to what social opinion
and the judge considered to be the size of the offence, a method which
is merely a transformation of the old lex tal ionis?' (ibid: preface to
4th edn). Instead of punishment being determined by the crime the
" treatment of offenders must be so far as possible individualized and
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directed not so much towards the crime as towards the criminal" (ibid,
emphasis added). The criminal, in other words, must be confined for as
long as he remained a threat to society: "... the indeterminate
sentence. . . is really as cardinal a principle in the treatment of
prison inmates as of hospital inmates, while from the point of view of
social protection it is even more necessary" (ibid).
(iii) prison reform:- Ellis proposed the establishment of a 'moral
hospital' , an institution which would be the equivalent in the domain
of moral disorder, to the lunatic asylum in the world of intellectual
disorder: "We used to chain our lunatics. Our lunatic asylums during
the past century have become mental hospitals. Our prisons must now
really become what it was long ago said they ought to be, moral
hospitals" (ibid: preface to 3rd edn.)26 In arguing this, Ellis was
not necessarily arguing that prisons should be replaced by hospitals.
Ve might just as easily interpret Ellis as engaging in the familiar
business of imagining the ideal prison; an institution which instead
of being a place of moral contagion would be capable of reforming the
character and morals of criminals. Hence Ellis supported the Borstal
institution as a good example of a prison run on modern and
intelligent lines (ibid: preface to 4th edn.). For Ellis, the ideal
prison would incorporate certain features of the hospital (most
notably the principle that the person should not be released until he
was 'better') but it would also incorporate elements from other
institutions such as the technical school: "It is now becoming
recognised that the prison must have in it elements borrowed from the
hospital, the lunatic asylum, and the technical school, while yet
remaining distinct and apart from all these" (ibid).
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What is notable here is that eugenic proposals - which are clearly
based upon a conception of moral imbecility as an hereditary condition
- are combined with proposals concerned with the reform of the
criminal. The presumption that the criminal might be reformed is
obvious in the proposals for prison reform. The proposal for
indeterminate sentences also reveal such a presumption. Indeterminate
sentences would only make sense if the there was some hope of the
criminal's reformation; if the criminal were truly irreformable,
permanent exclusion rather than an indeterminate sentence would be the
logical policy. The idea of moral imbecility as a natural, hereditary
condition did not lead automatically then to the contention that the
moral imbecile was irreformable. As we saw earlier, it was often
argued that whereas mental defectives could not be cured, they might
be improved. From reading Ellis's policy proposals we might say that
he made a similar presumption, that moral imbeciles cannot be cured,
but some moral improvement was possible. Wheras one's moral nature was
virtually as unalterable as one's physical constitution, this did not
automatically mean that the moral imbecile was beyond moral
improvement, despite rhetorical statements to that effect. For Ellis,
the moral imbecile should be prevented from breeding, but should also
be subjected to reformatory techniques.
CQUCLUSIOAS
The concepts of moral insanity and moral imbecility cannot be said
then to have had a single impact upon penal policy in this period. The
concepts were not used in a consistent manner, but took on different
meanings in different contexts, with a corresponding range of
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Implications; implications which were often contradictory. Notions
such as the 'medicalisation of deviance' - which suggest a singular
path from an explicitly moral conception of deviance, towards a
scientific medical conception - are inadequate for understanding the
develoment of these concepts and their impact upon penal policy. The
notion of medicalisation is also clearly inaccurate, most obvioulsly
because a wide range of knowledges - not specifically medical, nor
even psychiatric - contributed to the meaning and the development of
the concept.
More importantly though, even the specific psychiatric theories of
moral insanity and moral imbecility cannot be simply classified as
medical, or at least not without considerable qualification of the
term 'medical'. If medically qualified professionals became important
figures in the domain of penal theory in the nineteenth century it was
not through applying conventional medical concepts to previously moral
problems, but by developing a new type of knowledge; a knowledge which
can be placed between morals and medicine, and between ethics and
science. More specifically, while the notion of medicalization tends
to emphasise the emergence of a biological-determinist view of
delinquency over voluntarist and environmentalist theories, I have
tried to show here that the categories of moral insanity and moral
imbecility cannot be classified as biological-determinist; the
concepts were also clearly based upon valuntarist and environmentalist
assumptions.
The point, however, is not simply that the concepts of moral
insanity and moral imbecility cannot be classified as biological-
determinist; rather I have tried to show the inadequacy of basing
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analysis of the concepts solely upon the conventional questions of
voluntarism vs. determinism, environmentalism vs. organicism, and so
on. An exclusive focus upon these questions prevents us from
understanding the broader impact which the categories of moral
insanity and moral imbecility have had upon penal debate and penal
policy, and upon conceptions of delinquency. To mention just two
important points: First, the concepts helped to disseminate the idea
of the criminal as an undercivilised character. This was to become a
constant theme (although cast in very different terms) in twentieth
century accounts of psychopathic personality. Secondly, in different
ways the concepts of moral insanity and moral imbecility contributed
to the establishment of the biographical case study as an important
aspect of criminological knowledge. Such studies were to play an
important role in twentieth century penal theory, providing an
alternative to the psychological technique of mental testing as a way
of assessing character.
CHAPTER 6
THE IRTRQDUCTIOH OF •PSYCHOPATHY* IRTO PERAL DISCOURSE
In this chapter I will describe how the category of psychopathy was
introduced into penological discourse. I will argue that the origins
of penological discourse on psychopathy cannot be properly understood
by concentrating solely upon developments in medical and psychiatric
knowledge and by asking how these were brought to bear upon penal
policy. Instead, it is necessary to examine developments in penal and
social policy which led to the formation of the penological category
of psychopathy. The concept of psychopathy which was employed by
penologists was not a medical concept which penologists had
reluctantly recognised. Eather penologists played a major role in
forming and developing a category of psychopathy which owed little to
medically-founded knowledge. This argument disturbs both conventional
and sceptical presumptions about the origin and development of the
concept of the psychopathic offender.
Conventionally 'psychopathy' is regarded as a specifically medical
concept (see ch.5). This is based upon a further presumption, that
'psychopathic disorder' is a pathological condition which was
recognised by medical experts as a result of clinical observation and
scientific reasoning. If we then ask how this medical concept came to
occupy such an important place in penal discourses, something like the
following explanation emerges: One of the symptoms of psychopathy is a
propensity towards delinquency; psychopathy is typically defined as a
condition which "results" in severely anti-social conduct (See
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Official Publications 1957: para. 166). In other words, psychopaths,
because of their condition, often transgress social norms and hence
become offenders. Vhereas the symptoms of other psychiatric disorders
only sometimes bring the sufferer into conflict with the criminal law
and other social norms, the symptoms of psychopathy almost invariably
do (Walker & McCabe 1973: ch.9). So, those who are suffering from
psychopathic disorder, and hence are the subject of medical concern,
often end up in the penal system. Medical and penal interests
therefore coincide over the issue of 'the psychopathic offender'.
Medicine recognised psychopaths as patients to be dealt with according
to the principles of treatment, but criminal justice mistakenly
regarded them as ordinary offenders to be dealt with according to the
principles of punishment. It was therefore necessary for medical
experts, and other enlightened penal reformers, to persuade penal
policy makers that the medical perception of psychopathy was the
correct one and that law and penal practice should be reformed so that
psychopaths could be dealt with as medical patients rather than as
ordinary offenders. Hence, it was necessary for medical experts to
discuss psychopathy in a penal context. The introduction of the
category of psychopathy into penological discourse is presumed, then,
to be contingent upon the fact that psychopaths happen to break the
law often. If it weren't for the psychopaths propensity to break the
law, medicine could have got on with the task of investigating
psychopathy and treating psychopaths without ever having got involved
in the debate about what to da with the psychopathic offender.
Here I will challenge the basic presumption that psychopathy is a
specifically medical concept. I will argue that the concept of
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psychopathy which was employed in penal debates was formed and
developed within a penal, rather than a specifically medical context.
If this argument is accepted, then it is no longer necessary to ask
how a medical concept found its way into penal discourse. We can
regard the concept of psychopathy as indigenous to penal discourse.
Underlying the idea that psychopathy is a specifically medical
concept is the presumption that psychopathic disorder is a mental
condition, which has always existed, but which only became known to us
when medicine recognised its existence. A major problem with this
presumption is that nobody has ever actually pin-pointed the moment
when psychopathy was first recognised. The term psychopathy was first
used in the late nineteenth century, but the actual recognition of
psychopathic disorder - as a distinct mental disorder or group of
disorders - is generally regarded as having occurred much earlier.
It is probable that philosophers and physicians had recognised the
group of so-called 'psychopathic disorders' as early as the
seventeenth century. Certainly 150 years ago French and German
psychiatrists had done so.
(Official Publications 1975: para. 5.4, emphasis added)
This quotation is from the Report of the Committee on Mentally
Abnormal Offenders (also known as the Butler Committee), which
contains a major review of the problem of psychopathic offenders. The
Butler Committee do not provide evidence for the claim that
psychopathy had been recognised since the seventeenth century, but
refer us to another leading work on the history of psychopathy, that
of Valker and McCabe (1973: ch.9). But when we turn to Walker and
McCabe's text we find that they simply cite, as a precursor of the
modern concept of psychopathy, Burton's aphorism - put forward in his
Anatomy of Melancholy (1621) - that the difference between ordinary
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persons and madmen was one of degree rather than an essential one. To
interpret this as evidence that Burton recognised the existence of
psychopathy is speculative, to say the least.
The Butler Committee are on sounder ground when they designate the
French and German psychiatrists Pinel and Grohmann as the early
recognisers of psychopathy. At least these psychiatrists' definitions
of "moral diseases of the mind" such as ' aanie sans del ire' ,
'congenital brutality' and 'moral dullness' bear a striking
resemblance to many modern definitions of psychopathy. However there
is no evidence that these psychiatrists recognised or discovered
'moral diseases'. All we know is that they asserted the existence of
such diseases.1 Like Prichard (see ch.6), Pinel and Grohmann did not
present any independent proof of the existence of moral disease; they
simply inferred moral disease from a person's pattern of conduct.
If writers on psychopathy are hazy about the precise moment when
psychopathy was first recognised it is because they are equally hazy
about what psychopathy actually is. One would expect accounts of the
recognition of psychopathic disorder to define psychopathy; that is to
say, one would expect them to tell us what it was that psychiatrists
recognised. However, psychopathy is seldom precisely defined.2 Nor is
this failure to define psychopathy a simple oversight; writers on
psychopathy have often admitted that they are unable to define
psychopathy.3 The closest which many writers come to a precise
definition is to suggest that psychopathy is a mental disorder which
results in extremely anti-social conduct. This, however, can mean a
number of things. It might mean, for instance, that psychopathy is a
physically-based mental abnormality which causes anti-social conduct.
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This is clearly the perception of psychopathy held by those who
initiate research projects with the objective of finding biological or
cerebral abnormalities which can explain psychopathic conduct (e.g.
Fabisch 1966). However if this is what psychopathy is, then the
pathology involved has never been recognised, nor has its existence
ever been proved. Pinel and Grohmann never undertook any research into
the physical causes of moral disease. Even more recent medical
research into psychopathy has failed - as those who have undertaken it
admit - in its attempt to prove the existence of biological or
cerebral abnormalities which can explain (or are even consistently
associated with) 'psychopathic' conduct (ibid).
Often though, it is implied that psychopathy is something less
tangible, or more abstract, than a physically-based condition.
Psychopathy is often perceived, not as a mental condition with a
physical basis, but as a purely mental disorder - a disorder of the
mind with no physical basis. Such a conception of psychopathy is
clearly based upon a perception of the mind as an abstract entity with
no corporeal existence and no specific relationship to the body. If
this is the case then psychopathy must be regarded more as an abstract
concept, rather than as a name attached to a tangible entity. But if
psychopathy is an abstract concept, and not a physical condition, then
it is meaningless to talk about the recognition of psychopathy as if
it were a definite event. It would be more correct to talk about the
formation of the concept.
Writers of conventional accounts of psychopathy do, of course, often
realise that they are writing about the development of a concept, and
not simply about a series of scientific observations. However, they
- 226 -
tend to write about this conceptual development as if it were
dependent upon a process of scientific discovery. The origin and
development of the concept of psychopathy is still regarded - even by
those who eschew any reference to a physical basis of psychopathy - as
the product of a gradual increase in our knowledge and understanding
of the mind and of the types of mental state - such as psychopathic
states - which exist. This 'advance' in our understanding of the mind
is particularly associated with the adoption of pasitivist method in
the study of mind: it is implied that, whereas in previous eras
reflections on the mind were merely speculative, modern psychological
theories are based upon positive knowledge.A In such accounts we might
interpret the term 'the recognition of psychopathy' as referring to a
gradual process whereby scientific reasoning and research helps us to
understand the truth about the mind and helps us to realise that there
is a mental state which can be described as psychopathy.
This version of 'the discovery of psychopathy' still faces the
problem of locating a moment when psychopathy was correctly described,
or stating when speculation gave way to positive knowledge. For
instance, we might expect such accounts to tell us about the discovery
of some psychological attribute which could fully explain psychopathic
conduct. However, psychological research has been no more successful
than physicalist research in establishing the existence of
psychological attributes which can explain, or are consistently
associated with, psychopathy (see e.g. Black 1966). Psychologists have
even failed - once again as they themselves admit - in their attempts
to construct psychological tests which are capable of distinguishing
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the psychopath from the non-psychopath, or of confirming whether or
not a particular individual is a psychopath.s
However, even if tests were devised which were accepted as reliable
instruments for discriminating between the psychopath and the non-
psychopath, these would still not prove the existence of a definite
mental state called psychopathy. Ve have to ask ourselves what such
tests could actually tell us. Those tests which have been used were
intended as 'ethical tests' or 'temperament tests' (Watson 1988).
Their purpose was to discriminate between those with normal social
sentiments and those with abnormally anti-social sentiments. All that
such tests could prove is that those who fail them have anti-social
attitudes. Even if successful temperament tests were devised, the most
they could do would be to 'detect' those with an anti-social
disposition. There are no good reasons for presuming, however, that
those whose attitudes are judged to be anti-social share any special
physical, genetic or psychological attributes. Attitudes are not
inherently social or anti-social, rather 'anti-social' is an
evaluation which we attach to attitudes (and to conduct). Similarly
the concept of psychopathy is not simply a descriptive concept, it is
also a judgemental concept.e As such, psychopathy is not something
which can simply be discovered.
It is misleading to refer to the "discovery" of psychopathy, as if
'psychopathy' is a tangible object which has always existed but was
not known to us until it was revealed by medical or psychological
science. Instead, we need to think of this phenomenon simply as a
change in the way of interpreting the behaviour and attitudes of those
who persistently, and without remorse, act in an anti-social manner.
- 228 -
Such people might always have existed, but to name them psychopaths is
to change their meaning for us. This change in the way of perceiving
such characters needs to be explained. Ve need to know why it occured
and, most importantly, we need to ask what were the distinctive
features of this new perception of anti-social characters?
Conventional accounts of this development fail to provide adequate
answers to these questions. In a sense they avoid these questions by
presuming that psychopathy is a constitutional condition which was
simply 'discovered' in medical or psychological laboratories. I will
argue, to the contrary, that 'psychopaths' were not simply
'discovered', rather they were re-named, re-described, and ascribed
with a new significance. This process of re-naming, re-describing and
re-interpreting 'psychopathy' was not inevitable. Ve need to
understand why this approach to psychopathy emerged, rather than some
other approach. And we need to know what was distinctive about this
new way of naming, describing and understanding the psychopath. The
answers to these questions cannot be found by looking at developments
in psychiatric ideas and knowledges in abstract. Rather it is
necessary to look at the penal and social discourses within which this
process of naming, describing and interpreting the psychopath took
place.
The arguments of sociological sceptics are also not very helpful
when it comes to understanding the formation and development of the
concept of psychopathy. One of the major contributions of sociological
sceptics to this debate is to argue that medical designations of
deviance - such as 'psychopathy' - were the product of political
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battles between medicine and law over 'social-control turf' (e.g.
Conrad and Schneider 1980). This argument, like conventional accounts
of the formation of the concept, makes the mistake of presuming that
the formation of the category of psychopathy can be understood simply
as the product of a shift towards a medical interpretation of a anti¬
social conduct. However, while conventional accounts regard the
medical perception of 'psychopathy' as 'true', this argument regards
the medical interpretation as having no scientific basis. Conrad and
Schneider (1980: ch.10), for instance, regard the shift from legal to
medical designations of deviance as a political, rather than a
scientific achievement. In other words, it was the political power and
social prestige of the medical profession, rather than the veracity of
medical theories, which allowed medical designations of deviance to
gain social and political acceptance. But why should the medical
profession want to medicalize deviance? Conrad and Schneider's answer
is that medicalization of deviance facilitated medical expansion - at
the expense of law - into the field of social control. This, they
argue, was profitable to the medical profession since it allowed them
to colonize the field of social control, thereby reaping the profits
to be made from working in this area. But medicalization of deviance
was also useful for governments - who therefore supported the medical
profession in this battle over social control turf - since it helped
to legitimize the social control of delinquents, such as psychopaths,
who could not be adequately controlled through the mechanisms of law
and because medical techniques appeared to be more successful than
punitive techniques in achieving social control."7
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In the account which follows I will accept that the legal
recognition of the category of psychopathy was at least partly the
product of a political struggle. It could hardly have been otherwise
since even if the category of psychopathy did have a firm foundation
in scientific knowledge, this would not have guaranteed its political
acceptance. However, I will argue that it is wrong to characterize
this struggle as being between medicine and law. Although
psychiatrists did play a major role in the debates over the concept of
psychopathy, their relationship to legal and penal agents was far more
complex than the adversary one suggested by the medicalization thesis.
APMIPISTBATIVE CATEGORIES MP PSYCHIATRIC CONCEPTS
The term psychopathic personality was not used in practical penal
discourses in Britain until the 1920s. The term 'psychopathic
inferiority' had, however, been used in psychiatric discourse in the
late nineteenth century, most notably in the work of the German
psychiatrist Kraepelin (Official Publications 1975: para. 5.6).
Kraepelin's concept of psychopathic personality is described, by the
Butler Committee, as being influenced by the idea of hereditary
degeneration and by Lombroso's concept of 'the born delinquent' (ibid:
paras. 5.5-5.6). Ve should not presume, however, that the penological
concept of psychopathic personality - by which I mean the concept
which was employed in penal discourses in Britain from the 1920s - was
derived from Kraepelin's concept. For should we presume that it was
derived from the degeneration theories of French psychiatrists such as
Morel, or from the criminal anthropology of Lombroso, even though the
ideas of Morel and Lombroso had been disseminated in Britain through
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the writing of Maudsley and Ellis (see ch.6). I will argue, contrary
to such presumptions, that the term psychopathic personality was
adopted in penal discourse in Britain, not so much out of theoretical
commitment to the ideas of moral degeneration and the born criminal,
but mainly because it was a convenient way of designating a category
of offenders which had already been partially defined, by prison
administrators, since the 1870s.
This is not to say that the penological category of psychopathy was
purely an administrative category, formed without reference to
developments in psychiatric theory. To the contrary, prison doctors,
who were often quite cognizant of developments in mental medicine,
played a major role in prison administration from the 1870s on.® These
prison doctors undoubtably brought psychiatric ideas to bear upon
administrative problems. It is therefore not possible to draw a sharp
distinction between the administrative categories of the prison and
psychiatric categories, during this period. Even more importantly,
however, this relationship worked both ways. The concerns of prison
administration (along with the concerns of the managers of other
social institutions, such as schools) - had a profound influence the
development of psychiatric categories. The administrative concerns of
penal and other social institutions not only provided the context
within which many psychiatric categories were formed and developed,
these practical concerns also influenced the definition of psychiatric
categories. It is therefore necessary, in order to understand these




In order to understand the formation of the penological category of
psychopathy it is necessary to examine the formation of a two closely
related categories: 'the feeble-minded' and 'moral imbeciles'. I will
look first at the problem of the feeble-minded. In the late nineteenth
century the term feeble-minded was used to designate those who,
although not mentally deficient enough to be certifiable under
existing lunacy laws, were nevertheless considered to be so weak-
minded as to be beyond socialization and education (Rose 1985: 99).3
At the time there was no special legal or institutional provision for
the feeble-minded, a 'gap' in social provision which social reformers
were eager to fill (see Jones 1972: ch.8). One of the main reasons for
this lack of provision was that, until this time, those who were now
regarded as 'feeble-minded' had been regarded by the law as ordinary
citizens who were no different from others in their essential
characteristics, and for whom special legal and institutional
provision was neither necessary nor justifiable.
Special legal provision did exist for mental defectives - who were
regarded as lacking reason and free will, the essential
characteristics of citizenship - but the 'feeble-minded' were not
included in this category. Vhen doctors and social reformers talked of
the mentally defective, they were usually referring to idiots and
imbeciles, i.e. persons with severe intellectual disorders, often
accompanied - at least in the case of idiots - by physical defects
(Rose 1985: 94-7). Since the 'feeble-minded' were not severely
disordered intellectually, and since they did not display any obvious
physical defect, they were generally not considered as belonging in
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the same category as mental defectives. In fact, until the second half
of the nineteenth century the category of the feeble-minded was
neither self-evident nor theoretically established. It was only in the
late nineteenth century that doctors and social reformers started to
regard the feeble-minded as a special category requiring special legal
provision and special forms of intervention. The category of the
feeble-minded only became conceivable as a result of complex
developments in social institutions and psychological theory.
Here I will concentrate upon the developments in social institutions
which helped make the problem of the feeble-minded conceivable. This
is not because these developments are more important than theoretical
developments in explaining the formation of social or psychiatric
categories. Rather, as I have indicated, it is because the theoretical
developments which led to the formation of the category of the feeble¬
minded did not occur independently, but were intrinsically linked to
developments in social institutions (cf. Rose 1985: ch.4). Psychiatric
theorising about the feeble-minded was not done in abstract, but was
both prompted and shaped by the problems which certain forms of
'undesirable' conduct posed for recently established, or recently
transformed, social institutions. The problem of the feeble-minded
emerged in a number of institutions (ibid: 98). Here I will look very
briefly at the problem is schools, where it emerged most forcefully
(ibid), before considering the problem as it emerged in prisons.
Schooling and the feeble-minded
In the last third of the nineteenth century, schooling in Britain
underwent a major expansion, while at the same time there was a
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transformation in its organisation and its objectives. First,
schooling had been transformed by the establishment of universal, free
and compulsory, elementary education (ibid: 98-111). Secondly, there
was a related development in which the objectives of schooling had
become more 'secularised'; whereas schools had previously been
regarded primarily as agencies of moralisation, their main function
was now being increasingly defined as the transmission of literacy and
numeracy (Jones & Williamson 1979). To be more precise, schools were
still seen as having a moralizing function, but this was to operate
indirectly, by training children in the basic skills of reading,
writing and arithmetic - thereby enabling their future participation
in other social institutions - rather than by direct moral instruction
and moral training (ibid).10
As the universal schooling network became established it soon became
apparent that some children were 'beyond education', or, in other
words, incapable of learning the lessons of the school. Certain
children were obviously beyond ordinary education, such as those with
severe sensory defects - the blind, the deaf and dumb (Eose 1985: 99)
- and those with severe cognitive defects, i.e. idiots and imbeciles.
However it soon became apparent that there were pupils who were not
obviously defective - physically or mentally - but who were
nevertheless beyond ordinary education. As Eose puts it: "... there
were also rapidly found to be children who, while apparently fully
provided with their complement of senses, appeared unable to learn the
lessons of the school" (ibid). These children were referred to, in
official discourse, as 'educational imbeciles' and as 'feeble-minded'
(ibid).
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And we might also note that being 'beyond education" meant not only
being unable to do schoolwork because of intellectual weakness, but
also being incapable of learning because of an inability (or
unwillingness) to obey the disciplinary demands of the school (see
Rose 1985: 102). In modern terms, the category encompassed all those
with learning difficulties, whether these were the product of low
intelligence or of behavioural problems. These educational imbeciles
were deemed to require separate and special schooling, both for their
own benefit and to prevent them from interfering with the smooth
functioning of the ordinary schoolroom (Rose 1985: ch.4).
So, as a specific category, the feeble-minded only came into being
with the emergence of a new (or recently transformed) social
institution, which made new demands upon children. These demands led
to the construction of new social categories consisting of those who
were unable to meet these demands. The category of the feeble-minded
was not a product of abstract psychiatric theorising; rather it was
largely an administrative category which was represented in
psychiatric terms.
Prisons and the feeble-minded
Like the education system, the prison system had undergone a major
expansion by the 1870s. The transportation of convicts had come to an
end, the use of corporal punishments had greatly declined, and
incarceration - particularly in prisons - had become the central mode
of punishment for adult offenders (Garland 1985: 7). At the same time
prisons began to adopt a much modified version of the 'separate
system' of prison discipline.11
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The separate system, which was introduced in Pentanville in the
1840s (Ignatieff 1978), was described by J. B. Thomson - who was the
Resident Surgeon at the General Prison for Scotland - as follows. In
its pure form:
. . . the prisoner was strictly confined to his cell, which was his
workshop and dormitory. He had little or no communication with
officers. The exercise was short, and in isolated cages under
absolute silence. A mask was worn to avoid personal recognition. The
chapel was cellularly divided; or the chaplain stood in the
corridors of a gallery, each prisoner only hearing, not seeing him,
through the cell-door upon the bolt. The food was passed through a
small service door, so that even the warder was not seen.
(Thomson 1867)
This system was often criticised - particularly by advocates of its
rival, the 'silent system' - as having deleterious effects upon the
prisoner (see e.g. Bucknill 1857; cf. Rothman 1971). Instead of
improving offenders, it was argued, the separate system left prisoners
weakened mentally and physically, and often led to insanity and other
nervous disorders (Bucknill 1857: Thomson 1867).
... at the end of his sentence the individual emerges etiolated in
mind and body. The man, perhaps, is weakened for harm, but he is not
strengthened for good. (Bucknill 1857)
Partly in response to such criticism, the separate system was
modified at Pentonville and when it was introduced into other prisons
it appeared in a much modified form. In particular, certain
categories of offender, who were considered unfit to bear the separate
system, were allowed to associate. In the modified separate system:
"After a confinement of nine months male convicts, and after twelve
months female convicts are partially associated. Exercise is had
more freely in open airing-grounds. The chapels are not cellular,
but open seated. Masks are abolished. Varders see and speak to
prisoners at least twelve times daily. Silence is not strictly
enforced; and medical officers have free power to associate all
those who are regarded as unfit to bear the separate system: such as
juveniles, epileptics, weakminded, and suicidals, Highlanders who
cannot speak English, and all the sick"
(Thomson 1867, emphasis added)
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It was in this context that the *weakminded' began to be constructed
as a specific category of offenders. The weakminded were those who
although not obviously insane or mentally defective enough to be
transferred to a lunatic asylum, were nevertheless considered unable,
due to mental deficiency, to bear the rigours of prison discipline.
Once again it was the demands which social institutions made upon
certain groups, and the inability of certain individuals within those
groups to meet those demands, which led to the construction of a new
social-psychiatric category.
There was a complication in the case of the prison however, because
to treat some categories of prisoner differently from others would be
to defeat another penal objective, itself considered essential to good
prison discipline, i.e. the objective of uniformity of treatment (see
Garland 1985: 13-14; Gunn et al 1978: 9). In order to ensure
uniformity, while at the same time maintaining a harsh disiplinary
regime, it became necessary to transfer those who were unfit for penal
discipline to other institutions (Gunn et al 1978: ch.1). Hence prison
officials eagerly advocated and supported proposals to establish
alternative, quasi-penal, institutions such as juvenile reformatories
and inebriate reformatories. As we have seen in the case of inebriate
reformatories, these were considered necessary for the better
reformation and exclusion of special categories of offender; but just
as importantly, they were also seen as necessary to ensure that
ordinary prisons could perform their function of disciplining and
punishing ordinary criminals (ibid). This was clearly stated in 1908
by H. Smalley, the medical inspector of prisons:
. . . the greatest difficulty in the way of the rational treatment of
the criminal is due to the fact that he has to be dealt with by the
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same methods, and in the same class of institutions as the various
quasi-criminal groups with whose characteristics he really has very
little in common. The cleaning out from our prison of the drunkard,
the tramp and the imbecile (would at long last enable) prisons to be
used for the treatment of the criminal.
(cited in Gunn et al 1978: 11; cf. Vatson 1988)
The establishment of special institutions for criminal lunatics, had
already helped prisons to rid themselves of those with gross mental
abnormalities (Gunn et al 1978: ch.1). The establishment of
reformatory and industrial schools in the mid-nineteenth century
prevented juvenile delinquents from being sent to prison (see Rose
1985: 166-68). And as we have seen, the inebriate reformatory
programme - which aimed to divert habitual drunken offenders from
prison - was moving towards realization in the late nineteenth
century. Attention then shifted to adult offenders who were neither
lunatics, nor idiots, but were nevertheless considered to be
weakminded enough to require protection from the rigours of penal
discipline. Eventually the term 'feeble-minded' was used to designate
such offenders (Gunn et al 1978: 7-11).
From what has been said it should be clear that the category of the
feeble-minded was not imposed upon penal discourse from outside. In
the first place many penal officials actively supported the proposals
of those psychiatrists who argued the need for special legal and
institutional provision for the feeble-minded (Gunn et al 1978: ch.l).
The removal of these disruptive elements from ordinary prisons would
allow the prison to function more smoothly, enabling it to get on with
what many regarded as its 'proper' function, the disciplining and
punishment of ordinary criminals (ibid). Secondly, as we have just
seen, the prison was one of the institutional sites where feeble-
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Handedness became constituted as a psychiatric problem; the prison
acted as a practical 'surface of emergence' for the new categories of
mental deficiency - such as feeble-mindedness and moral imbecility -
which were being developed.12
The significance of the feeble-minded
Vith the formation of the category of the feeble-minded, another
social category - the category of 'mental defectives' - was both
expanded and transformed. The category of mental defectives, which had
previously consisted of idiots and imbeciles who had severe cognitive
defects, was expanded to include the feeble-minded, who were not
severely mentally defective but merely mentally deficient. Just as
importantly, with the formation of the category of the feeble-minded
the category of the 'mentally deficient' was no longer associated
solely with cognitive disorders, but encompassed disorders of
character and conduct as well. Vith the higher grades of mental
deficient - such as the feeble-minded - mental deficiency was
inferred less from lack of cognitive ability and more from undesirable
attitudes and conduct.13 The feeble-minded were defined, not so much
by reference to lack of cognition, but by reference to their social
incompetence.
In the category of moral imbecility this tendency, which was already
established, was simply taken a step further. The moral imbecile - as
we saw in the previous chapter - was regarded as having normal, or
even above normal, intellectual powers, but as being 'morally
defective'. In the case of the moral imbecile, mental deficiency was
inferred solely from undesirable conduct and attitudes.
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The category of the feeble-minded was of crucial importance then as
a mediating category between those categories, such as idiocy, which
encompassed purely cognitive defects, and those such as moral
imbecility, which denoted disorders of the affections and conduct
without intellectual defect. The category of the feeble-minded
provided the link between cognitive and moral defects, allowing both
to be presented as different types of mental deficiency. As I will
argue in a moment, the linking of moral defects with cognitive defects
was further facilitated by the fact that the feeble-minded were often
not distinguished from 'moral incapables'. It was only with the
passing of a the Mental Deficiency Act, 1913 that a a sharp
distinction between the two categories became firmly established.
MORAL INCAPABILITY. MORAL IMBECILES AMD THE ROYAL COXXISSION ON THE
QARE AMD CONTROL OF THE FEEBLE JUMPED
The concern with the problem of the feeble-minded eventually led to
the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the problem. The
Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded (also
known as the Radnor Commission) is regarded as important in histories
of the mental health services, on the grounds that it undertook a
major investigation of the problem of the feeble-minded and
recommended major changes in law so that this newly 'discovered' group
of 'mental deficients' - along with closely related groups such as
moral imbeciles - could be provided for adequately (see Jones 1972:
ch.8.). In such accounts it is recognised that the commission's report
was also of some relevance to penal issues, since the feeble-minded,
because of their condition, often became criminals. As The Rational
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Association for the Care of the Feeble-minded - which campaigned for
legislative enactment of the Radnor Commission's recommendations - put
it: because of the neglect to recognize and treat their condition,
"the mentally defective become criminals and are sent to prison; they
become drunkards and fill the reformatories . . (quoted in Jones:
1972: 196).
Here, I will look at the Radnor Commission from a somewhat different
angle. I will argue that its concern with penal matters was not merely
incidental, rather it was central to the commission's investigation.
The main object of investigation for the commission was a penal-social
problem, and its recommendations were directly concerned with the
scope and objectives of the penal system. The Radnor Commission's
proceedings should be understood as penal discourse, and not as
psychiatric discourse which happened to be relevant to penal affairs.
This is important since the Commission's recommendations led to legal
recognition of the category of moral imbecility, and indirectly, to
the formation of the penological category of psychopathy.
One way of establishing what the commission's main concerns were is
to look at the way in which it employed key terms such as feeble¬
mindedness and moral imbecility. Many of the witnesses before the
Royal Commission hardly distinguished between these two terms, using
them - and others such as 'weak-minded' and 'morally incapable' - as
if they were interchangeable. Even in the report of the commission the
two categories were not consistently distinguished. This might be
partly explained by suggesting that the distinctions which were being
made by the leading psychiatric theorists of the day were not full
appreciated or understood throughout the profession.1A More
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importantly though, many of the witnesses and members of the
commission were not medical professionals at all. Educators, penal
officials, reformatory managers, poor law officials, lawyers, and
private philanthropists were among those who contributed to the
proceedings, whether as witnesses or as members of the commission
(Official Publications 1908b: Jones 1972: 191). For these, and for
many psychiatrists, the theoretical distinctions between the two
categories were not of vital importance. The theoretical distinction
between the feeble-minded and moral imbeciles was made in terms of
their psychological differences - moral imbeciles were more
intelligent than the feeble-minded. But in terms of the practical
problems they presented - for government and for the managers of penal
and educational institutions - there was little difference between the
feeble-minded and moral imbeciles. And it was with these practical
problems that the commission, and most of the witnesses, were
primarily concerned.
From reading the Radnor Commissions proceedings it becomes clear
that - despite claims to the contrary - its main concern was with the
moral incapability - i.e. the social misconduct and incompetence - of
the 'mentally defective', rather than with any mental condition which
they shared.1S The commissions's stated concern was with the large
numbers of; -
. . . mentally defective persons whose training is neglected, over
whom no sufficient control is exercised, and whose wayward and
irresponsible lives are productive of crime and misery, of much
injury and mischief to themselves and to others, and of much
continious expenditure wasteful to the community and to individual
families. (Official Publications 1908b: para.9)
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It was the social problem which these persons created, rather than
their mental condition as such, which caused the commission concern.
The person who remained within the law, behaved responsibly, didn't
create mischief or injury, and didn't become an economic burden upon
their families or the State, was of no concern to the commission even
though they might be of exceptionally low intelligence. Conversely,
once one persistently acted in an irresponsible manner, committing
crimes and other mischief, and became a financial burden, they were
regarded as requiring social intervention, even if they were of normal
- or even above normal - intelligence. Persistently delinquent and
irresponsible persons could be designated feeble-minded if their
delinquency was accompanied by low intelligence. But if there was no
sign of low intelligence or cognitive defect they could still be
designated moral imbeciles, and hence as belonging to the wider
category of mental deficients. Although the feeble-minded and moral
imbeciles might differ in their mental attributes, the latter being
more intelligent than the former, the problem they posed was the same:
the conduct of both was widely regarded as undesirable and
unacceptable, but neither was certifiable under existing law. The
following paragraph shows the commission slipping between the morally
incapable and the weak-minded, as well as revealing its main concern
with 'social danger':
There are undoubtably numbers of persons who are not idiots or
lunatics, or at least are not regarded as either - persons of weak
mind who are socially dangerous. In the affluent classes there are
numbers of weak-minded lads. I have known murders perpetrated by
lads of that character, who are not thought to be certifiable, but
allowed to go about uncertified though obviously weak-minded. Among
the poorer classes, there are, no doubt, great numbers of morally
incapables who are not certified, and who are moving about and are
socially dangerous. (Official Publications 1908b: ch.23)
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The Radnor Commission's recommendations
The commission recommended that moral incapables (and the feeble¬
minded) should be subject to the same form of social control as
lunatics and idiots. It was argued that even though moral imcapables
were not, strictly speaking - insane, they were not fully responsible
either. Because they lacked full responsibility, moral incapables
constituted a social danger; just as the insane would if they were not
subject to social control. In this respect - i.e. in respect of the
social threat which they constituted - moral incapables were no
different from outright lunatics. It was therefore logical to extend
the precedent established in the lunacy laws to the control of all
those who, due to weak-mindedness, were a threat to society.
There are cases where weak-minded persons commit crimes, and they
are not certifiably insane. They cannot, strictly speaking, be found
insane under the law as laid down in Macffaghten's case, or under the
law as ordinarily administered, and yet they are from weakness of
mind really not wholly responsible. You cannot say that they are
insane, and yet the state of their minds is such that they ought
not to be set at liberty and allowed to commit further crimes of the
same sort. . . .
We find therefore - and there is evidence in regard to it from all
quarters - that, while there is a large class of mentally defective
persons who are certified as lunatics, and can thus be detained and
receive the protection of the state, there is also another large
class of persons who can often be hardly distinguished from the
'certifiably insane', who are 'morally incapable' 'socially
dangerous', and 'obviously weak-minded' who are 'not thought to be
certifiable' and who 'from weakness of mind are not wholly
responsible'. 'Lunatic' according to the Lunacy Act of 1890, 'means
an idiot, or person of unsound mind' ; and a person found to be in
that condition is legally recognised as irresponsible. Questions
arise accordingly, whether the condition of being irresponsible
should not attach to other mentally defective persons besides
certified lunatics. (Official Publications 1908b: paras. 436 & 437)
There is the rhetorical suggestion here that moral incapables and the
feeble-minded are a little insane. But it should be stressed that this
did not amount to saying that moral incapables and the feeble-minded
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were in fact insane. To the contrary, a distinction was maintained
between the insane, on the one hand, and moral incapables and the
feeble-minded on the other. The argument was that moral incapables and
the feeble-minded shared certain features with the insane - and in
particular their social incompetence and dangerousness - and that they
should therefore be subjected to social control, as were the insane.
It was also pointed out that special forms of control were exercised
over inebriates, and that these also constituted a precedent for
control over moral incapables and the feeble-minded. This was of
crucial importance since - as I have suggested - inebriates, like
moral incapables and the feeble-minded, were subject to special forms
of control because of their conduct, rather than because of any proven
cognitive defect, while at the same time there was a rhetorical
suggestion that inebriates were a little mad - a suggestion which
helped get the inebriates legislation passed.
At present, if we omit.-the procedure adopted in the case of the
insane and in that of the habitual drunkard, there is no form of
procedure available for other classes of mental defect - other
classes of the 1uncertifiable'. The insane, as we have seen, may be
kept under detention as King's Pleasure lunatics or Secrtetary of
State's lunatics; and the habitual drunkard may be sent to
reformatories for any period not greater than three years; but for
the imbecile or feeble-minded or the moral imbecile there is neither
recognised procedure nor available institution.
(Official Publications 1908b: para. 458)
What was ignored here was the fact that, just a few years earlier,
special controls for the inebriate were justified on the grounds that
the inebriate was a special case. The commission also failed to
acknowledge that the inebriate reformatory programme was highly
controversial; its legitimacy was by no means firmly established at
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this stage. Instead the commission presented the control of inebriates
as ordinary and quite legitimate and argued for a further extension of
such control.ie
The inebriate reformatory experiment was seen as a precedent in a
practical, as well as in a legal, sense. The inebriate reformatories
were advocated as models for the proposed mental deficiency institu¬
tions. The architecture of the reformatories, their mode of
administration, and the regimes within inebriate reformatories were
all seen as suitable for institutions for the feeble-minded and moral
imbeciles. 17 So, as was the case in the inebriate reformatory
experiment, the objective of the Royal Commission was not simply to
establish institutions for the detention and- segregation of moral
incapables, these institutions would also be places of 'treatment'.
And when the commission talked about the 'treatment' of the feeble¬
minded and moral imbeciles as 'patients', what they actually had in
mind was reformatory discipline and moral treatment rather than
medical treatment.18 Moral imbeciles and the feeble-minded were to be
taught to lead 'useful lives', which involved them in activities such
as learning trades or being employed in the farm or garden (Official
Publications 1908: see q. 6937).
There was one respect, however, in which the legal status of moral
incapables and the feeble-minded was to remain different from that of
the insane. Moral incapables were to be held legally responsible for
any crimes which they committed. The insanity defence was to remain
available only to those found to be insane according to the
restrictive, intellectualistic definition of insanity contained in the
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M'Naghten Rules. A diagnosis of moral imbecility was not to effect
legal verdicts; it would only become relevant after the legal issue of
the accused person's guilt had been decided by the criminal court,
according to strictly juridical criteria. Only after the verdict was
announced would the question of moral imbeciltity be raised, in order
to determine what was to be done with the moral imbecile-offender.
... in the case of persons who are charged with offences and are
alleged to be mentally defective the principle should be adopted of
keeping the question of the committal of the alleged offence
separate from questions of the alleged mental defect, the relative
responsibility of the offender and his appropriate treatment when
charged with crime or convicted.
It is not . . . necessary or desirable that the precedents under the
Trial of Lunatics Act, 1883 . . . should be pushed further. . . The
question of fact may go to the jury, and when that is settled, the
question of mental defect may be settled by the court in
modification of the sentence.
(Official Publications 1908b: paras. 26 & 460)
There was, of course, a logical contradiction here: on the one hand
it was being argued that moral incapables and the feeble-minded, due
to weak-mindedness, lacked full responsibility, while on the other
hand it was being asserted that they should be held fully responsible
for any crimes which they committed. The commission acknowleded this
contradiction but argued that it would be "inexpedient" for the courts
to recognise a concept of diminished responsibility and that moral
incapables and feeble-minded persons must therefore be held legally
responsible for their crimes (ibid: para.458).
It is of course true . . . that a person must be either responsible
or irresponsible; that in the matter of criminal procedure these two
terms cover the whole ground, and that where the question is 'guilty
or not guilty' it would be impossible for the law to admit the
existence of any doubtful territory between the two.
(Official Publications 1908b: para.458)
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The problem was represented as a practical one: juries were not
competent to determine whether or not a person was a moral imbecile.
Whereas the lunatic and the idiot could be clearly recognised by the
layman, the differences between the moral imbecile and the normal
person could be detected only by medical experts who had observed the
offender over a period of time and who were familiar with the history
of the case (ibid: para.459). We can recall Prichard making a similar
point - with regard to moral insanity - two generations earlier (see
ch.5), But whereas Prichard concluded that this demonstrated the need
for medical experts in the criminal court, the commission were now
arguing the opposite: that the criminal trial would have to remain an
exclusively legal affair, with questions about the offender's mental
capacity being restricted to the traditional ones of whether he was a
total lunatic or an idiot. Prichard's conclusion seems just as logical
- if not more so - as that of the commission. And, in any event, the
question of whether an offender was a moral imbecile would have to be
addressed at some stage - i.e. between the verdict and the sentence -
and the commission saw no problems in answering the question then. I
would argue therefore that the practical problems involved in
distinguishing the moral imbecile from the normal person cannot
explain why the commission proposed to leave the moral imbecile's
legal responsibility intact.
The more likely explanation for the commission's standpoint on this
issue is that it was - perhaps without conscious intention - making a
tactical compromise. The radical attacks upon criminal justice, and in
particular upon the legal concept of responsibility, - mounted by
criminal anthropologists and some psychiatrists in the second half of
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the nineteenth century - had met with little political success and had
in fact encountered much hostility (cf. Nye 1984: ch. 4; Garland
1988), The commission's proposal was more compromising, and likely to
meet less resistance. Its proposals would leave most questions
concerning crime within the judicial domain, while establishing a
limited rale for psychiatry within the penal process. More
specifically, the question of guilt or innocence would retain its
central importance in the penal process, and would be determined
according to strict legalistic criteria, while the degree of
punishment meted out would no longer be restricted by the principle of
proportionality but would be modified on the basis of psychiatric
criteria.
So what was being proposed was not the total replacement of punitive
justice with psychiatric social control. Rather, a more modest
suggestion was being made: that psychiatry work alongside punitive
justice, modifying punitive justice to some extent, but leaving the
basic framework intact. The nineteenth century battle between
psychiatry and 'law' was to be resolved, with psychiatry having gained
some ground, but 'law' remaining the typical response to delinquency.
Perhaps even more importantly, a mutually beneficial working
relationship would emerge, in which psychiatry would relieve the
prisons of troublesome cases, and justify the control of those whose
detention and segregation could not be legitimated in purely punitive
terms, while the penal system provided psychiatry with new objects to
study and treat.
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THE MEJTAL DEFICIENCY ACT. 1913
A Mental Deficiency Act, incorporating the recommendations of the
Radnor Commision, was passed in 1913. The provisons of the act covered
idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, and moral imbeciles. Moral
imbeciles were defined as -
persons who from birth or from an early age display some permanent
mental defect, coupled with strong vicious or criminal propensities,
on which punishment has had little or no deterrent effect.
(Mental Deficiency Act, 1913, section 1 (d)).
The first thing to note about this definition is that moral
imbeciles, like the feeble-minded, were defined by reference to their
failure to meet the demands of particular institutions. Penal
institutions were charged with the task of reforming and deterring
delinquents. Those whom penal institutions could neither reform nor
deter were regarded as beyond penal control and defined as moral
imbeciles (cf. Garland 1985: 224). Accordingly, it was one's 'career'
in correctional institutions - or one's 'moral history' - rather than
any observable or objectively verifiable physical or mental condition,
which was to be the crucial factor in determining whether one was a
moral imbecile.
Interpretations of 'moral imbecility'
The second point about this definition of moral imbecility is its
potential ambiguity. The definition fails to make it clear whether
those without any defect of intelligence were to be considered as
moral imbeciles. As Burt put it in The Young Delinquent:
The words may mean, first of all, one who is primarily defective in
intelligence, but happens, in addition, to possess an incorrigible
propensity to crime, a propensity itself independent of, and
superimposed upon, the essential defect of intelligence. But
secondly, the clause may bear, almost equally well, a totally
different sense: it may denote a person whose incorrigible
criminality is of itself enough to constitute, or is itself the
necessary result of, an inborn mental defect. With the former
meaning, by a curious paradox of legal grammar, a moral imbecile
would be an imbecile whose behaviour is not moral; with the latter
he would be an intelligent person whose morals are imbecile. The
difference is plain. The one is an immoral defective; the other is
defective morally" (Burt 1944: 31)
Or rather the difference was plain to Burt. As I have suggested the
theoretically established difference between feeble-mindedness (which
implied some intellectual defect) and moral imbecility (which implied
no intellectual defect) was not appreciated by all practising
psychiatrists and other social policy makers, who often used the terms
as if they were interchangeable.
As Burt points out, the second interpretation (the moral imbecile as
defective morally) appears most logical (ibid). If the term 'moral
imbecile' was intended to refer to 'an imbecile whose behaviour is not
moral' there would be no practical need for a separate category of
moral imbecility. The so-called 'moral imbecile' would in that case
fall into one of the other categories of mental defect recognised by
the Act, such as 'the feeble-minded'. And indeed, in theoretical
discussions, the tendency was to adopt the second interpretation.
However, as Burt points out, in practice, the former interpretation
was generally adopted (ibid). Burt's point was later corroborated by
the Royal Commission on the Law relating to Mental Illness and Mental
Deficiency, 1954-57:
"Many doctors, probably the majority, never make a diagnosis of
feeble-mindedness or mental defectiveness whether the patient's
personality is predominantly aggressive or inadequate, unless
the patient shows some limitation of intelligence or has a history
of having been regarded as educationally subnormal or backward in
childhood" (Official Publications 1957: para. 177)^°
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The source of the ambiguity lay in the fact that the concept
'mental' was at the time a contested concept, and so therefore was the
concept 'mentally defective'. And, of course, the attempt to include
'moral imbeciles' among the mentally defective was a key struggle
within this wider contest. Two opposing positions can be identified:
(i) the restrictive definition of 'mental':- this identified the term
'mental' solely with the intellect; so to say that somebody was
mentally defective was the exact same as saying they were
intellectually defective.
(ii) the broader definition: this defined the term mental broadly, to
include the moral faculties as well as the intellectual faculties. To
be mentally defective could mean either being defective intellectually
or defective morally (or both) According to this definition: "Mental
defect is a disorder of the mind, but not necesarily a disorder of the
intellect. A defective may be extraordinarily intelligent, even clever
in some ways" (Police Orders 1921).21
Confusion between these two positions appears to have been caused by
adherents to the first position regarding their definition of mental
as 'inevitable', as the only right or rational way to define mental.
For those used to thinking of the mental solely in terms of intellect,
any other conception was difficult to comprehend. So, in order to
avoid ambiguity, those who wanted special provision for moral
imbeciles would have to have argued that those who were defective
morally were to be subject to special powers even if they were not
mentally defective. However, while this would have avoided ambiguity,
it would have meant accepting the restrictive definition of mental; it
would have meant acknowledging that the concept mental referred solely
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to the intellectual faculties. But, as we have seen, there were both
theoretical and tactical reasons for challenging this restrictive
definition. Ambiguity was therefore unavoidable.
The practical result of this was that the designation 'moral
imbecility' was rarely used, and even when it was used, it was applied
was those who were regarded as suffering from some sort of cognitive
defect, in addition to having vicious or criminal propensities (Gunn
et al 1978: 14-15). But logically, these cases could have been dealt
with as feeble-minded persons, or even as imbeciles. In practical
terms, the provision for moral imbeciles was almost redundant.
This would mean that the Mental Deficiency Act had failed, in
practice, to make provision for those who were intellectually normal,
but who were nevertheless regarded as defective morally. That is to
say, even after the Mental Deficiency Act, 1913, there was still no
special legal and institutional provision for the 'moral imbecile',
strictly defined. So, although there was a reform programme which had
the objective of creating special legal and institutional provision
for the administrative control of moral imbeciles, and although this
programme was translated into legislation, the programme was,
nevertheless, not realised in practice at this stage. The opposition
between 'those with understanding' and 'those without understanding"
had been reasserted as the only basis, in practice, for the
classification of delinquents. As Gunn et al have stated:
. . . the Act relieved the prisons of the seriously subnormal
offender. By 1929 the Medical Commissioner estimated that its
provisions had reduced the daily average prison population by about
200. But in respect of one sub-group, the prison authorities were
less fortunate. 'Moral imbeciles' had been brought within the
compass of the 1913 Act in response to evidence given to the Royal
Commission by prison (and other) doctors. The former must have
rejoiced that these particularly difficult offenders were now to be
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channelled into the new asylums. But this first attempt to deal with
one group of psychopaths was ahead of its time and was rarely used.
Doctors came to believe that in order to come within the terms of
the Mental Deficiency Acts, the moral defective had also to display
defective intelligence. The Act was therefore mainly used for those
cases where moral defectiveness was coupled with subnormal
intelligence. (Gunn et al 1978: 14)
THE FORMATIQH OF THE PENOLOGICAL CATEGORY OF PSYCHOPATHY
Those who wanted special legal and institutional provision for moral
imbeciles - i.e. persons of normal or even extraordinary intelligence,
whose conduct was defective - had witnessed the passing of legislation
which appeared to make such provision. Once the legislation started to
be acted upon (in the 1920s, due to the disruption of war) they saw
the term moral imbecile being interpreted in a somewhat perverse,
restricted way, so that the 'true' moral imbecile was excluded. It was
at this stage that the designation 'psychopath' began to appear
frequently in penal discourse. The term was applied to the 'true'
moral imbecile, partly in order to distinguish him from those who had
come to be regarded as moral imbeciles (i.e. those whose defective
conduct was accompanied by intellectual defect). A fresh attempt was
being made to construct a category of delinquents who were to be
considered distinct from ordinary delinquents in terms of their
pathological conduct and attitudes, rather than in terms of their lack
of understanding.
The term 'psychopathy' was adapted by penal practitioners for its
practical covenience - and also, no doubt, for its 'medical sound' -
rather than because of theoretical commitment to the term. In fact the
term was originally regarded as unsuitable and inappropriate, but it
was adopted nonetheless as a convenient term for describing a category
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of offenders who had nothing in common psychologically (other than
their lack of any obvious intellectual defect), but who nevertheless
posed a distinct problem for penal administration.
These claims can be supported by considering the Howard Journal's
discussion of the Report of the Prison Commissioners for 1924-25
(Howard Journal 1926: 38-44).2:2 The major theme of this report was the
prison's failure "in a task which it should never be set to, i.e.
dealing with the mentally unfit" (ibid). Mentally unfit persons were
still being sent to prison, it was argued, despite the Mental
Deficiency Act 1913 and the subsequent establishment of Mental
Deficiency Institutions. The Mental Deficiency Act had eased the
problem, but it had not resolved it.23
Three reasons were given "for the continued presence of the mentally
defective in our prisons" (ibid). First there were difficulties in
finding institutions to take cases; the construction of more
institutions was recommended. Secondly, it was often difficult to
prove that mental defect had existed from birth or from an early age;
it was recommended that the legislation be amended to remove this
requirement. The third problem is the one which concerns us here. It
was argued that there were many prisoners who were abnormal - as
evidenced by their chronic inability to remain within the law - but
who were not regarded as certifiably mentally deficient. This was, in
effect, a restatement of the 'moral imbeciles' problem, with the
crucial differences that the term moral imbecile was no longer used.
For this group of quasi-mental deficients, some new form of non-penal
detention was required; something more than - and other than - the
determinate sentence justified by their offence, but something less
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than the indeterminate detention considered justifiable in the case of
certifiable mental deficients.
There are a great many abnormalities which would not alone justify a
certificate of lunacy or of mental deficiency. It would be, we hold,
most unwise to attempt legislation for the segregation of the
general body of persons suffering from these slighter, or obscurer,
forms of abnormality. But we do think that where their effect is
such that the patient is chronically unable to abstain from breaking
the law, some special form of non-penal detention, for longer, but
not for indefinite periods, should be made a legal alternative to
terms of imprisonment. (Howard Journal 1926)
The term 'psychopaths' was adopted to refer to this group. Some
prison medical oficers - such as the psychoanalytically-oriented
Hamblin Smith - thought the term unsatisfactory and even questioned
whether the so-called psychopaths formed a distinct or unified
psychological type. But even Hamblin Smith agreed that the psychopaths
- whatever one called them - were a recognizable group within the
prison and therefore had to be called something.
There is a large group of cases which have been described under the
unsatisfactory title of 'psychopathic personality' as well as under
equally objectionable titles. But the nomenclature is comparitively
unimportant; for the group is well-recognised, although ill-defined.
It is probable that we shall, ultimately, be able to divide these
cases into several distinct classes. In my view, some of these cases
are simply minor degrees of, what is, in a more advanced form now
treated as certifiable insanity. But whether this view is correct or
not, it is clear that these cases are inadequately handled under the
present system. (Hamblin Smith, in Howard Journal 1926)
What needs to be stressed is that the there was no theoretical
advance whatsoever involved in introduction of the term 'psychopath'
into practical penal discourse. The term was adapted purely as an
administrative category. As Hamblin Smith had stated in an earlier
address to the Howard League, the category of psychopaths consisted of
a heterogenous group of offenders about whom very little
(psychologically) was known.
. . . Then we have that very mixed group at present classed together
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under the head of psychopathic states, cases of inadequate
personality and of sexual perversity of various kinds, a class of
which we have at present very little accurate knowledge, and upon
whom a great deal of work requires to be done. . .
(Hamblin Smith 1924)
In fact the term psychopath was used simply to refer to those who had
previously been known as moral imbeciles, moral defectives, and as
morally insane. Right up until the 1950s these terms were being used
virtually as synonyms (see Critchley 1951: 33-50). In 1957, the Royal
Commission on the Law relating to Mental Illness Mental Deficiency
introduced its discussion of psychopathy by stating that it was going
to discuss the term 'psychopath', "which is now commonly used to
describe patients whom the 1904-8 Commission called 'moral imbeciles'
and 'morally insane'" (Official Pubications 1957: para. 158).
CHAPTER 7
PSYCHOPATHY AJSTD PE3STAL POLICY
IFTRODCTCTIQg
In this chapter I will look at how the term 'psychopathy' has been
used in penal discourses since the 1920s. Since there is a multitude
of references to psychopathy this will clearly not be an exhaustive,
nor even a comprehensive, account; rather I will concentrate upon a
few selected issues and themes. I will start by looking at how the
phenomenon of psychopathy has been defined in penal discourses. I will
suggest that there has been a noticeable change in definitions of
psychopathy since the 1920s. While in the 1920s and the 1930s the term
was often used quite broadly to refer to any psychological
predisposition to crime or delinquency, it gradually came to be used
in a more restricted manner, to refer to 'cold', 'emotionless',
disordered characters. This trend was in many ways the opposite of
that which occurred during the nineteenth century, when the category
of moral insanity gradually took on a broader meaning (see chapter 5).
I will suggest that it is possible to detect here an attempt by
psychiatry to 'withdraw' from its involvement in the management of
'psychopaths'.
An important issue concerning definitions of psychopathy is the
interaction between theoretical definitions of psychopathy and the
practical uses of the category. Definitions and practical uses are
connected in an obvious way; the way psychopathy is defined strongly
influences (but by no means determines) how the label is applied in
practice. If persistent law-breaking is regarded as a defining feature
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of psychopathy, then recidivists are likely to be labelled
psychopaths. However, the practical application of the label is only
partly determined by theory. Non-theoretical, practical concerns of
those involved in penal treatment and administration have also played
a considerable role in determining who is diagnosed or classified as a
psychopath. I will try to show, for instance, that the category has
often been used to exclude difficult cases from treatment programmes
or to justify the placement of these difficult cases in special
institutions. It is important to realise that, while theoretical
definitions influence the practical use of the category, the practical
use of the category, in turn, almost certainly influences theoretical
definitions of psychopathy. Those involved in research into
psychopathy often conduct their research by observing the behaviour,
attitudes and 'moral histories' of those whom penal administrators
have classified (partly for practical, non-theoretical reasons) as
psychopaths. Theoretical definitions of psychopathy are partly based
upon such observations. It seems reasonable to suppose that a
different set of practical problems could lead to a different type of
person being classified as a psychopath and hence to a different
definition of psychopathy.1
DEFINITIONS OF PSYCHOPATHY
The term psychopathy has not been used in a consistent manner since
the 1920s. Rather its use has varied between different users and
different periods. In the 1930s, for instance, the term was often
interpreted very widely. Psychoanalytic-oriented writers, such as R.
D. Gillespie (1930), used the term to include most recidivists, along
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with compulsively delinquent adolescents. In his article The Service
of Psychiatry in the Prevention and Treatment of Crime, Gillespie
estimated that psychopathic personalities constituted about 45 per
cent of the prison population. The size of this estimate raises the
presumption that Gillespie was using the term 'psychopathic
personalities' in a broad sense, in much the same way as the category
of 'moral imbecility' had been used. Gillespie seems to have included
most 'habitual criminals' or recidivists within the category of
psychopathy. However, he also used the term even more widely than
this. In fact, in his article Gillespie expresses relatively little
concern for the plight of adult psychopaths, whom he regarded as
beyond successful treatment (ibid: 26). Gillespie's main concern was
with those who had shown signs of psychopathic traits, but who had not
yet developed into full-blown psychopaths. In such cases, he
suggested, the tendency towards psychopathic conduct and attitudes had
still not become totally engrained into the character and there was
therefore the chance that with treatment it would be posssible to
reform such characters and to prevent them from developing into adult
psychopaths. Accordingly, Gillespie argued for a change in the law so
that those who displayed psychopathic traits could be placed under
supervision, before they started to commit offences, in order that
they might receive treatment.
Too often, . . . they [i.e. psychopathic personalities] cannot
readily be placed under the necessary supervision till they commit a
punishable ofence, when it is already too late for prevention. Yet
the potentialities can readily be recognised beforehand, and
treatment instituted which might well be preventive of further
trouble. (Gillespie 1930: 26)
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This raises the question of how Gillespie, and others who shared his
views, defined those with 'psychopathic traits'. Since this category
included, by definition, many juveniles who had not been convicted of
any criminal offence it was not possible to define this category by
reference to a propensity to commit offences. In Gillespie's article,
no precise criteria are laid down. However, he did present an
impression of the type of person who would be considered as a
psychopath. This characterization of the psychopath appears to have
been based upon Gillespie's observations of psychopaths in prisons
(ibid: 26).
Such persons are essentially unstable, very easily elated and as
readily depressed, vain and selfish, often sentimental and
childish, or resentful, irritable, grudge-bearing and suspicious.
They are easily led, bear responsibility badly, and resort readily
to alcohol and to delinquencies such as forging cheques. Their
capacities cannot be measured with the appearance of qualitative
exactitude that applies to mental deficiency; but the history is
typical and wakes diagnosis not difficult.
(Gillespie 1930: 26, emphasis added)
What Gillespie appears to have done is to have constructed an 'ideal
type' of 'the psychopath' based upon his observations of the habits,
characteristics and attitudes of imprisoned psychopaths. Presumably,
adolescent delinquents who displayed similar traits might be
classified as psychopaths, the degree to which they were regarded as
psychopathic being determined by how closely they matched the image of
the 'ideal' psychopath. We might surmise, then, that any compulsive
delinquent who appeared to be psychologically abnormal, but who didn't
fit any other established psychiatric category, would have been
regarded as a psychopath by Gillespie. However, an important element
in Gillespie's description of 'the psychopath' is his reference to
'history'. In order to tell whether a person is a psychopath, or a
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potential psychopath, it is useful, and perhaps necessary, to look at
their history. The psychopath has a long history of anti-social
attitudes and conduct. This emphasis upon the history of the case as
an essential element in the 'diagnosis' of psychopathy appeared in the
work of a number of psychiatric writers on psychopathy, such as East
(1949) whose ideas I will look at shortly.
Up until the 1960s many writers on psychopathy tended to use the
term in a broad sense, similar to the way in which Gillespie had used
it. For instance, in 1939 Sir David Henderson, the venerated author of
the first British book specifically about psychopathy stated:
. . . the term psychopathic disorder is the name we apply to those
individuals who conform to a certain intellectual standard,
sometimes high, sometimes approaching the realm of defect but yet
not amounting to it, who throughout their lives, or from a
comparatively early age, have exhibited disorders of conduct of an
anti-social nature, usually of a recurrent or episodic type, which,
in many instances, have proved difficult to Influence by methods of
social, penal, and medical care and treatment and for whom we have
no adequate provision of a preventive or curative nature. The
inadequacy or deviation or failure to adjust to ordinary social
life, is not mere wilfillness or badness which can be threatened or
thrashed out of the individual so involved, but constitutes a true
illness for which we have no specific explanation.
(Henderson 1939: 16-17, emphasis added)
I have emphasized an important feature of Henderson's definition of
psychopathy, his reference to the failure of existing methods of
intervention to influence the psychopath or to even provide adequate
provision for the psychopath. On this definition of psychopathy, the
psychopath is a person whom existing agencies, whether psychiatric,
social or penal, can neither 'cure' nor handle. The psychopath is
partly defined by reference to the failure of existing methods of
intervention. 'Psychopathy' is therefore, in part, an administrative
category. What distinguishes the psychopath from others is not only
- 263 -
his conduct and attitudes, but also the fact that existing
institutions have been unable to 'cure' or manage him (or her).
This tendency to define psychopathy partly by reference to the
person's institutional record appears time and again in psychiatric
descriptions of the psychopath. In the 1940s and early 1950s
psychopathic youths were described as
. . . unruly and depraved children, quite immune to all normal
educational and psychological methods. Hence they are generally not
influenced favourably during their detention in an approved school.
(Frey 1948/9: 229)
For Heustatter <1953: 252) a crucial distinctive feature of
psychopaths was that "disciplinary treatment . . . has virtually no
effect upon them". Neustatter practically defined psychopaths in terms
of their institutional needs, regarding psychopaths as those who were
least likely to respond to the proposed 'Hubert-East institutions'
(ibid: 255).2 To move forward to the late 1950s and 1960s, Snell
(1959) described psychopaths as "difficult, aggressive, and
unresponsive prisoners" (emphasis added). Craft (1966a) listed one of
the "clinical features" of psychopathy as "an inability to profit by,
or use experience, which includes a lack of response to punishment".
Taylor (1966) regarded as psychopaths those whom other 'helping'
agencies - such as welfare, hospitals, schools, training schemes,
prisons, and borstals - have failed to help. West (1968) pointed out
that "psychopaths benefit little from the treatment available in
ordinary mental hospitals, and they are very destructive of routine".
Finally, Whitely (1968) described the psychopath as "dependant upon
welfare agencies and accustomed to being taken care of in a hospital
or prison".
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An important exception to this tendency to use the term psychopathy
in a very broad manner is East (1949). It is significant that unlike
Gillespie, who was concerned primarily with interventions outside and
on the boundaries of the formal penal system, and unlike Henderson,
who developed his ideas in a psychiatric context and had little
official contact the penal system, East had occupied central positions
within the penal system - in particular he was the Medical Director on
the Prison Commission in the 1930s - and his views dominated official
penal policy for a lengthy period.3 As Garland (1988) has painted out,
"East was himself a proponent of a psychological approach to crime,
but he viewed its scope as being sharply delimited, and consistently
warned against the dangers and absurdities of exaggerating its
claims." Hence East agreed with the American writers Healy and Branner
who, in an American study of 4,000 juvenile delinquents, 'found* only
2.8 per cent with psychopathic personalities, and who went on to argue
... we firmly stand against the diagnosis of psychopathic
personality made simply on the basis of repeated misconduct without
other signs of psychopathic trends - there are too many other
causations of misconduct, (quoted in East 1949: 127)
East also agreed with his colleague, Dr. Hubert, who argue that "the
delinquent is rarely psychopathic" (East 1949: 127). East took issue,
on the other hand with Kraines, who argued that
. . . the habitual criminal is a socially sick person who may have a
recoverable or incurable illness, the true nature of which can be
determined by proper investigation, (quoted in East: 1949: 127)
Against this, East argued
The habitual criminal ... is often a person who has deliberately
chosen crime as a career, and may show none of the criteria
necessary before a diagnosis of psychopathic personality or other
abnormality can be made" (East 1949: 127)
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East clearly favoured a more restricted interpretation of the term
'psychopathy' than that used by many of his contemporaries. For East,
'psychopathy' was to be used only as a specific diagnostic category,
and not as a general category which encompassed all habitual offenders
regardless of whether they displayed any other more precise signs of
psychopathy. It is important to mention, however, that East did not
suggest that diagnosis be made solely upon the basis of a clinical
examination. For East, an accurate diagnosis of psychopathy could not
be made by relying solely upon clinical examinations; of far more
value was a history of the case.
The Joint Committee on Mental Deficiency . . . reported in 1929 that
the diagnosis of mental deficiency may be established without a full
history from the data observed by the medical examiner, but it can
never be firmly sustained, however much it may be suspected, on the
evidence of history alone. This statement loses much of its accuracy
when applied to psychopathic personalities in whom a detailed,
accurate and complete history may be much more valuable than a
personal examination. Indeed an experienced observer cannot live
long in daily contact with a mentally defective person without
becoming aware of his abnormality, but one may be on close terms
with a psychopathic personality and have no knowledge of his
disability. (East 1949: 126)
Despite East's arguments in favour of a more restrictive concept of
psychopathy, the tendency to use the term broadly, to include most
recidivists and delinquents whose conduct and attitudes suggested
psychic abnormality, continued right up to the 1960s. For instance,
the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental
Deficiency, 1954-'57, whose recommendations led to the inclusion of
provision for psychopathy in the Mental Health Act, 1959, described
psychopaths as persons whose -
. . . daily behaviour shows a want of social responsibility and of
consideration for others, of prudence and foresight and of ability
to act in their own best interests . . . persistent anti-social mode
of conduct may include inefficiency and lack of interest in any form
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of occupation; pathological lying, swindling, and slandering;
alcoholism and drug addiction; sexual offences and violent actions
with little motivation and an entire absence of self-restraint . . .
Punishment or the threat of punishment influences their behaviour
only momentarily and its more lasting effect is to intensify their
vindictiveness and anti-social attitude. . .
(Official Publications 1957: para. 169)
The Commission did not propose a precise definition of psychopathy.
This was partly because they thought it "notoriously difficult to
describe any medical condition in ordinary language" and "even more
difficult to describe or define such conditions in terms suitable to
be incorporated in the law" (ibid: para. 166). The Commission
preferred to make provision for the care and treatment of psychopaths
in general terms, leaving it to doctors to decide who should be
included in the category. The Commission also argued that it was wrong
in principle to write a detailed definition of psychopathy into the
law because advances in medical knowledge might soon make such a
definition outdated and inadequate (ibid: para. 33). It was suggested
that the law should not to impose a straightJacket upon medical
intervention by laying down rigid, legal definitions (which would have
to be amended with every advance in medical knowledge), rather the
role of the law was to make provision for psychopaths in general
terms, and to lay down certain general limits to intervention, leaving
the medical profession to precisely define the condition according to
the state of medical knowledge at any time. Hence the Commission
recommended that new legislation should simply make provision for
"psychopathic personalities", the category to include -
any type of aggressive or inadequate personality which does not
render the patient severely subnormal . . . but which is recognised
medically as a pathological condition, (ibid: para 1.7)
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The government, unhappy about this lack of definition, did write a
more restrictive definition of psychopathy into their proposed Mental
Health Bill. Psychopathy was to be defined as -
a persistent disorder of personality (whether or not including
subnormality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive
or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the patient and
requires or is susceptible to medical treatment.
(quoted in Walker & McCabe 1973: 219)
As Walker and McCabe point out, this definition was quite precise and
restrictive in comparison with that of the Eoyal Commission:
It insisted on the importance of conduct as evidence of a disorder
of personality. Instead of 'aggressive' it said 'abnormally
aggressive'. Instead of the vague term 'inadequacy' it referred to
'serious irresponsibility'. . . it insisted that [the disorder] must
be persistent. It also stipulated that the disorder must 'require
medical treatment' . . . Finally, an important restriction (applying
to all the statutory subdivisons of mental disorder) made it clear
that nobody could be dealt with under these definitions 'by reason
only of promiscuity or other immoral conduct'.
(Walker & McCabe 1973: 219)
Even so, this definition attracted criticism on the grounds that it
was too wide and imprecise. One of the leading critics was Lady
Wootton, who had recently written a sharp critique of the concept of
psychopathy and of the general tendency towards the over-use of
psychiatric concepts in definitions and descriptions of deviance
(Wootton 1959; especially chs. 7 & 8). In the House of Lords, Wootton
proposed a number of amendments to the definition which, if accepted,
would have restricted the legislative definition of psychopathy
considerably (see Walker and Mc Cabe 1973: 219). In the event, only
one of these amendments was accepted, so the Mental Health Act 1959
defined 'psychopathic disorder' as
a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not
including subnormality of intelligence) which results in abnormally
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the
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patient, and requires or is susceptible to medical treatment.
(Section 4 (4))
Following the Mental Health Act many psychiatrists continued to use
the term psychopathy in a broad sense to include all recidivists. For
instance, when H. K. Snell - who had been the director of prison
medical services - was invited to contribute to a book on
'psychopathic disorders' he chose to discuss, not those who had been
officially designated as psychopaths under the Mental Health Act, but
a more general and loosely defined group, 'prisoners with psychopathic
traits' (Snell 1966). Snell didn't specify who he considered to belong
to this group, but he seems to have included any prisoner whom he
regarded as inadequate or aggressive and most recidivists. Snell's
article was in fact mostly about recidivism and about how the
recidivist could be best treated. This appears to confirm a statement
made by Mokes (1976), that during the 1960s habital offenders were
routinely referred to as psychopaths by proponents of psychiatric
approaches to crime. It should be stressed, however, that this
equation of psychopathy and recidivism also took place much earlier,
although it was only some psychiatrists who 'routinely' used the term.
During the 1960s, however, the tendency among many psychiatrists was
towards a narrower interpretation of 'psychopathy'. Walker & McCabe
(1973: ch. 10) show that psychiatrists have tended to interpret the
1959 Mental Health Act definition in a restrictive way. They have
tended to exclude many delinquents who, although their behaviour and
attitudes suggest psychopathy, are considered to be unlikely to
benefit from treatment (see the Mental Health Act's definition of
- 269 -
'psychopathic disorder', quoted above). Since 'untreatability' is a
hallmark of the psychopath (as we saw earlier, for many psychiatrists
being 'beyond treatment' was a defining feature of psychopathy) this
interpretation serves to radically restrict the scope of the category.
It is significant that this restriction of the category should
centre around the question of treatability. One of the major problems
which social, penal and medical agencies have had to deal with when
confronted with 'the psychopath' is what to do with him. Psychopaths
are a group for whom very few want to take responsibility (see Eamon
1986). Psychiatric nurses, for instance, have often resisted being
'burdened' with 'psychopaths' (ibid). What seems to have happened is
that an ambitious psychiatric profession produced the term in the
belief that they could do what others had failed to do, i.e. improve
and perhaps even 'cure' the 'psychopath'. However as they begin to
discover that they can't improve or cure - nor even manage - the
psychopath they have tried to reject them and hence have began to
interpret the term in a restrictive way. In fact, the tendency now is
to reject the term 'psychopathy' altogether in favour of the less
medical-sounding 'personality disorder'. By using this term, which is
less medical in its connotations, psychiatrists appear to be trying to
define the problem in such as way that penal and social agencies,
rather than medical agencies, are seen as the appropriate bodies to
handle the problem; the term 'sociopathy (which has been used by some
writers in the USA since the 1930s) has been advocated for much the
same reason. This suggestion might be supported by the following
quotation from Allen (1987), where she distinguishes the two terms.
In practice the two classifications Ci.e. 'psychopathy' and
'personality disorder'] relate to much the same territory of
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personal abnormality at the margins of the psychiatric domain. The
classification of psychopathy was developed in an attempt to annexe
these abnormalities to psychiatry, and thence to the clinical domain
of medical disease. The alternative classification of personality
disorder was intended to sever that medical connection, by asserting
the continuity of these abnormalities with the broader realm of
personal variations" (Allen 1987: 76)
The term personality disorder has not entirely displaced
'psychopathy'. However the tendency now is to use the term psychopathy
in a much narrower sense than it was used by many psychiatists between
the 1920s and 1960s. The term now tends to be used to refer to
emotionless, 'cold' disordered personalities. The 'modern' psychopath
is a callous, hedonistic anti-social person who commits crimes - often
brutal and horrendous - without feeling any guilt (cf. Jenson 1979).
In the modern use of the term it is -
more precise to speak of amorality than immorality when defining
psychopathy, since the term immorality implies a knowledge and an
acceptance of morality which is outside the range and understanding
of the person exhibiting psychopathy ... we do face a man called
the psychopath who is a lonely wolf, highly impulsive, a victim of
his own immediate desires, unable to form lasting bonds of affection
with other human beings. (Jensen 1979: 84)
In conclusion, I would suggest that over the last few decades
psychiatry has attempted to retreat from its involvement in the
management and control of psychopaths, leaving the problem to the
penal system. In making this point it should be made clear, however,
that throughout the twentieth century the category has sometimes been
used not in order to include psychopaths within treatment programmes,
but in order to exclude them from such programmes. As Prins (1986:
158) points out, the 'label' has often been used "pejoritively and as
a defence against involvement". Nevertheless the decision to use the
term 'psychopathy' might be interpreted as a sign of a willingness on
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the part of some psychiatrists to adopt the problem and to assume
responsibility for the management of psychopaths. From the 1920s to
the 1960s many psychiatrists appeared to be willing to at least try to
'cure' and manage psychopathic offenders.
By their own admittance, psychiatrists have been unsuccessful in
this venture. Psychiatrists have openly admitted that they have no
'cure' for most cases of psychopathy (ibid: 159). They have also made
it clear that they have great difficulties in even managing
psychopaths, particulary aggressive psychopaths (ibid). In the face of
these problems it seems that psychiatrists have been increasingly
reluctant to take responsibility for the problem (ibid: 158-9).
Psychiatrists, it seems, are now so concerned to pass the problem of
psychopathy back to the penal system that that they are undoing the
psychiatric label, and redefining the phenomenon in non-psychiatric
terms. In this instance at least, it might be more appropriate to
think not about the medicalization of deviance, but about its virtual
opposite, the de-medicalization (or rather the de-psychiatrization) of
crime and social control.
CONCLUSIOIT
Throughout this thesis I have tried to describe the way medical
concepts have been used in penal discourse since (approximately) the mid-
nineteenth century. In doing so I have tried to show that this medical
terminology has often been misunderstood, particularly by many of those
who have criticised what they see as an increasing tendency towards the
medicalization of deviance and social control. As I result of this
misunderstanding, I would suggest that the changes which have taken place
in the methods and rationale of social control and in analyses of
delinquency, in Britain since the nineteenth century, have also been
misunderstood. Much of my argument has been that medical concepts have
been used in penal discourses in complex and varying ways and that this
complexity has not often been realized or analyzed, particularly by the
critics of 'medicalization'. Throughout the thesis I have tried to unfold
this complexity and I have tried to specify the ways in which particular
concepts, such as 'treatment' 'inebriety' and 'psychopathy', have been
used in penal discourse, by different writers and at different times. To
try to summarize these arguments at this stage might therefore be counter¬
productive, since it would undermine the point that these concepts have
not been employed in a singular way or with a singular meaning. By way of
conclusion, then, I will confine myself to a few general remarks about
some of the implications of this study for our undertanding of 'medical'
and psychiatric interventions in the domain of crime, delinquency and
social control.
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In chapter one of this thesis I outlined an influential critique -
which has been developed over the last few decades by some sociologists
and legal theorists - of the therapeutic approach to social control. There
are of course dangers in oversimplifying that critique, but bearing this
in mind it seems fair to say that this critique appears to be based upon
an image of the therapeutic approach to social control as an activity
geared towards altering the attitudes and behaviour of deviants with the
objective of inducing deviants to conform to social norms, this alteration
being achieved through the use of medical-scientific techniques which are
in turn based upon an analysis of the delinquent as a mad, sick,
determined being. The analyses of the use of medical concepts in penal
discourse which I have undertaken in this thesis suggests that this image
of the therapeutic approach to social control is inadequate and, in many
respects, inaccurate. I would suggest that the therapeutic approach to
social control is more diverse and quite different from the image
portrayed by its critics.
First, if we look at the objectives of the therapeutic approach to
social control we find that in trying to alter the habits and attitudes of
delinquents it has been concerned to do more than simply induce conformity
to the law and social norms. If we take, as just one example, the
objectives of the rehabilitation hostels advocated - and in few instances
established - for habitual drunkards in the 1960s and 1970s we find that
their aim was not only to ensure the habitual drunkard's conformity to the
law. Nor was the objective simply to turn the habitual drunkard into a
sober person. These objectives were pursued, but other objectives were
- 274 -
given even greater priority. One of the main objectives was to improve the
habitual drunkard's social competence. Of course, the capacity to abide by
the law and to stay sober were considered to be important aspects of
social competence, but other capacities, such as the capacity to hold down
a steady job, to establish lasting relationships with other people, and to
settle into a domestic life-style were considered to be even more
important. A central objective appears to have been to socially integrate
individuals who had been excluded from social associations through a
number of circumstances, mostly psychological, but also social and
economic (cf. Cotterrell 1984: 33).
These objectives - and the other objectives of the therapeutic approach
to social control which I have identified throughout this thesis - should
of course be scrutinized in terms of their desirability and feasibility.
All I am suggesting here is that before this critical task can be
undertaken we need to obtain a better understanding of what the objectives
of the therapeutic approach to social control have actually been. In this
thesis I have tried to contribute to such an understanding by looking at
how those involved in the therapeutic approach to social control have
employed 'medical' categories and concepts such as 'treatment*.
My next paint concerns the methods used to further these objectives,
What critics of medicalization appear to abject to is the use of
'scientific' techniques, such as pharmacological treatments, surgery and
aversion therapy (e.g. Kittrie 1971; Box 1980). These techniques are
objected to on the grounds that they bring about changes in the criminal's
attitudes and habits, whether the criminal desires such change or not (see
- 275 -
chapter one). Whether these techniques are actually capable of producing
the effects imputed to them is itself an issue which deserves to be
examined in more depth. What I have suggested in this thesis, however, is
that when those who deal with offenders talk about 'treatment' they are
more often than not referring to something quite different than
pharmacological treatment, surgery, etc. Often the term 'treatment' is
used to refer to social therapies. The central idea in social therapy is
to put the offender in an institutional environment in which he will learn
the social skills necessary to live in society in a personally satisfying
way and without becoming a nuisance and a burden to others. The
'techniques' recommended for achieving this have been outlined in detail
throughout the thesis and I will not summarize them here. However, an
important point about most techniques of social therapy is that they
appear to be incapable of bringing about changes in the offender unless
the offender voluntarily makes an effort to acquire 'self-control' (see
e.g. chapter three). It is inaccurate to characterize such methods as
'enforced therapy' (cf. Kittrie 1971) since they generally rely upon the
co-operation of their subjects and indeed are incapable of producing
change in those who refuse to co-operate. Once again it is necessary to
scrutinize these methods, however the first task is to understand exactly
what has been advocated in the name of 'treatment'.
To turn, finally, to the changes in the way delinquency has been
analyzed. As we have seen, the critics of medicalization object to the
suggestion that delinquents are sick, mad, determined beings. One of the
points which I have tried to make in this thesis is that although
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proponents of the therapeutic approach to crime have often hinted,
rhetorically, that the delinquent is slightly mad, the actual analysis of
delinquency is often more subtle and complex. Yet again, it is necessary
to scrutinize these analyses and to not only ask whether they are accurate
but to also ask what are their ideological and political effects. The
first task, however, is to describe these analyses correctly.
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NOTES
Chapter 1 - Medical Concepts and Penal Policy
1. It should be pointed out, however, that although there has been a
remarkable lowering of mortality rates and improvement in health since
the early nineteenth century, this has been the result, not so much of
medical interventions, but of changes in habits, better nutrition and
public health measures <Hirst and Voolley 1982: ch.4). These changes
were "effected largely by non-medical personnel and did not depend as
such on modern theories of disease causation" (ibid: 100; cf. McNeill
1979: ch.6). Nevertheless, as Hirst and Voolley point out, there has
been a remarkable advance in the preventative and therapeutic capacity
of medical knowledge and practice since the nineteenth century (ibid:
100).
2. See, for example, Alexander Peddie's theory of the causes of
'dipsomania* (which will be discussed in chapter two) and Havelock
Ellis's account of 'moral imbecility' (chapter five).
3. On this and the following points see Garland (1988), Foucault
(1977a) and Nye (1984: ch.4).
4. In what follows I will consider punishment from the point of view
of its use as a form of social control. It should not be presumed,
however, that punishment is solely, or even primarily, advocated and
used for the purpose of social control. Punishment serves a number of
functions - most notably, retribution - of which social control is
only one, albeit an extremely important one.
5. For analyses of the operational principles of deterrent punishment
see Foucault (1977b: pt.2, ch. 1) and Pasquino (1980: 18-22). For more
traditional, philosophical accounts of deterrence see Honderich (1976:
ch. 3) and Bean (1981: 29-44).
6. Hence advocates of deterrent punishment reached a position similar
to that which 'retributivists' reached, although from a very different
starting point. In the retributive theory, the principle of
proportionality is advocated form the point of view of equity or just
deserts - the commission of a crime is regarded as "creating an unjust
situation which had to be rectified by the imposition of a penalty
roughly equivalent to the pain or suffering caused by the
offence"(Rodman 1968: 197).
7. See Jones and Williamson (1979) for a discussion of the
relationship between elementary education and moral training in the
second half of the nineteenth century.
8. In constructing the following ideal type of the therapeutic
approach to social control, I have tried to reproduce the image of the
therapeutic approach which is suggested by the critique of
medicalization (see pp. 1-2). However, since I am concerned in this
thesis with the inadequacy of the conceptual structure which I have
called the medicalization thesis, rather than simply with the
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inadequacies of specific accounts, I have tried to make a 'best case'
for the medicalization thesis.
9. In fact 'liberalism' depended largely upon the effective operation
of informal social controls - the family, the market, etc. Welfare
states tend to resort to an increasingly formalized range of social
controls to complement and support these informal mechanisms.
10. It should be mentioned at this stage, however, that many of the
criticisms of 'the medical model' are directed solely at physicalist
or biolological theories of delinquency. As I will argue throughout
the thesis, these criticisms are particularly wide of the mark.
11. We might also note here the objection lodged by the American
Friends Service Committee (1981), which argued that the indeterminate
sentence is "systematically discriminatory because those coming from
worse backgrounds are deemed to require longer periods of treatment
than those from more acceptable backgrounds" (paraphrased in Bean
1981: 69).
12. A topical example would be refusal, on political grounds, to
register for the community charge/poll tax.
13. Box's argument here has a close affinity to the claims of anti-
psychiatry. For critical discussions of anti-psychiatry see Pearson
(1975: ch.2), Sedgwick (1982) and Hirst and Woolley (1982: ch. 10).
14. The contradictions of this argument can be seen, in fact, if we
consider the issue of abortion in places where it is illegal. On the
one hand abortion is regarded as a rational choice, and having an
abortion despite its being illegal is seen as a political action, a
refusal to be bound by wrong laws. As Greenwood and Young (1980: 158-
9) would have it, abortion is an innocuous activity which is
transformed into a social problem merely by the irrational reaction of
authority. On the other hand, abortion is regarded as a social problem
caused by the economic hardship engendered by capitalism (ibid).
Chapter 2 - The Inebriates Problem
1. The Habitual Drunkards 1879; The Inebriates Act 1888; The
Inebriates Act 1898.
2. MacLeod quotes Lord Salisbury, the Conservative Prime Minister in
1895, who was one of the chief exponents of the liberal view: "Here
you give power over the liberty of men that you have never given
before. You allow a single judge, without appeal, without a jury on an
occasion obviously vague, obviously incapable of being reduced to a
definite statement - you allow him to deprive a man of his liberty for
two years, practically to confine him to prison. ... My Lords, you
are meddling with edged tools" (Lord Salisbury, quoted in MacLeod
(1967: 235).
3. The eugenics movement will be discussed later in the thesis, in
the chapters on moral imbecility and psychopathy. For more detailed
discussions of eugenics see Garland (1985: ch.5) and Rose (1985:
ch.3).
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4. On the Temperance Movement see Harrison (1971).
5. Unless stated otherwise, material from official publications will
be referenced,
(i) according to the paragragh of the report (e.g. para. 2);
(ii) according to the number of the recommendation (e.g. rec'n. 5); or
(iii) where the reference is to the minutes of evidence of the
inquiry, according to the question number (e.g. q. 533).
6. The term "punitive treatment" was used by Peddie in his evidence
to the committee (q. 954).
7. On the developing concern with recidivism in this period see
Radzinowicz and Hood (1986: ch. 8) and Hye (1984: chs. 2-4).
8. A leading example of such classifications is in Booth's 'Life and
Labour of the People of London', in which a number of clases were
identified, including:
(a) the lowest class of occasional labourers, loafers and semi-
criminals;
(b) casual earnings - the very poor;
(c) intermittent earnings - the poor;
(d) small regular earnings - the poor;
(e) regular standard earnings - above the line of poverty;
(f) higher class labour.
(see Williams 1981: ch.7).
9. It is interesting in this context to note the answer which one
witness gave when asked how long it might take to cure an habitual
drunkard:
"... it depends . . . entirely upon the constitution of the mind; I
have known some people, some of those whom I have given as having
only been a month with us, who have felt so degraded, and their
feelings so lacerated from having been put away from their families
and locked up there, that a month has effected a cure. In other
cases we found that twelve months did not effect it".
(Official Publications 1872: q. 2335)
10. These procedures would have effected the position of those who
voluntarily entered retreats since, we can recall, once they had
entered voluntarily they could then be compulsorily detained.
11. The question of finance often turned upon the nature of the
proposed institutions. If, as was widely presumed, the proposed
reformatories were to be basically punitive in nature then, it was
argued, responsibility for their construction and maintenance should
lie with the state rather than with the local authorities, since the
punishment of delinquents was solely the state's concern: "The
detention of inebriate offenders in reformatories is in part only for
their reformation. In part it is a penal measure, and it seems to us
improper that punishment should be administered by Local Authorities"
(Official Publications 1908: para. 95)
12. Between the 1879 Act - which was an experimental statute designed
to have effect for ten years - and the Inebriates Act of 1898, there
was another statute - the Inebriates Act 1888. The 1888 act was
practically identical, in its provisions, to the earlier statute which
it replaced. There was, however,a change in title. This change was due
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to the fact that it was felt that the term 'habitual drunkard" was
opprobrious; persons who might willingly declare themselves
inebriates, would be unwilling to label themselves as habitual
drunkards (see Official Publications 1908; para. 16, q. 125). The
Departmental Committee on the Inebriates' Acts of 1908 correctly
predicted, however, that "... common use and association will
probably, in time, render the word 'inebriate' similarly opprobrious"
(ibid: para. 16), They thereby identified a recurring problem with
attempts to 'medicalize' deviance: i.e. the medical terms which are
introduced in order to find a more neutral, scientific term for
discussing deviance gradually take on more and more moral overtones,
so that eventually, a new term has to be coined, which in turn suffers
the same fate. Hence terms inebriate' and 'dipsomaniac' were
originally intended as scientific terms, but later became terms of
derision; and much the same could be said about the term 'alcoholic',
which was used to replace the then opprobrious term, inebriate.
13. "The matter was brought up by Lord Herschell in 1892 in connexion
with the wider question of habitual criminals" (Official Publications
1893/4: app. VI, p. 93).
14. cf. the title of a Howard Association publication: ' The Essential
Element of Time, for Reformatory or Restorative Success, especially in
Reference to Habitual Offenders, Drunkards, and Tramps' (1897).
15. Because of pro-active policing by the national Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (JTSPCC), these provisions eventually
provided an important path by which inebriates were sent to
reformatories. By 1908 3,000 persons had been committed to inebriate
reformatories. Approximately 2,600 of these were multiple drunkenness
offenders, while 400 were offenders who were also inebriates. Of these
400, 319 were sent for cruelty to children, "owing to the energetic
action of the BSPCC".
16. It should be pointed out here that 'voluntary' admissions to
inebriate retreats were often, in practice, far from voluntary: "in
many - possibly one might say without substantial exaggeration in most
- cases the application for admission is not a voluntary one. It is
the result of strong pressure brought to bear on the patient by his
friends, and backed by threats to deprive him of supplies unless he
yields to it" (Renton and Yellowlees 1896: 89).
17. See Allen (1987) for a discussion of gender imbalance in
psychiatric disposals in modern criminal justice.
Chapter 3 - Reforming the Inebriate
1. For a discussion of these values, and of the role they played in
Victorian society, see Gray (1977); cf. Thompson (1981).
2. For accounts of moral management see Castel (1983); Digby (1985);
Foucault (1971: ch.9); Hirst and Voolley (1982: ch.9); Rose (1985:
ch.1); Rothman (1971: ch.6); & Skultans (1975).
3. My concern here to point out why certain elements of Goffman's
approach to the study of institutions (in which psychiatric discouse
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is a functioning constituent) cannot be applied uncritically to the
study of inebriate reformatories. It is not passible here to discuss
many central and important aspects of Goffman's account, such as his
re-working of the private/public distinction, or the connections he
draws between mental hospitals and other 'total institutions'. For
more comprehensive accounts and criticisms of Gaffman's work see Hirst
and Woolley (1982: 183-194) and Sedgwick (1982: ch.2).
4. It is, of course, possible that the psychiatric discourse which I
have described is not the same as that which operated within the
American institution researched by Goffman. The main point, however,
is that Goffman doesn't analyse the psychiatric discourse which
operated within the institution.
5. cf. Garland (1985: 3): the study of penal practices "involves
something other than a phenomenological description of the sanctioning
practices, policy formulation and day-to-day decision-making which
take place in modern penal institutions. It requires an exploration of
the framework of assumptions, logics and objectives which supports
these routine operations and allows them to exist as such".
6. This point is also made by Sedgwick who criticises Goffman's
"methodological localisnt' (the term is intended to highlight certain
affinities with methodological individualism - 1982: 63-5).
"His method consists of a precocious sensitivity towards those
elements of social living which involves the face-to-face adjacency
of persons. On all other aspects of the social process, that is to
say, on any institution or happening that receives its meaning from
outside this immediately shared space among individuals within
shouting distance of one another, he is virtually silent . . .
the pursuit of the local and the narrowly interpersonal will not
provide us with enough grit even to digest the logic of the small
scale setting or encounter. The categories we bring to bear in
perceiving and judging the actions of a present other are not
themselves drawn, in the first place, from our exposure to face-to
face situations; thus, the concept of 'illness' . . . while applied
and specified within particular encounters between . . . doctor and
patient, does not derive its principle meaning or force from such
contemporary goings-on, but from an entire history which includes
the development of scientific rationality, the evolution of medical
institutions . . . The interpersonal has, in short, a chronological or
more exactly historical aspect which Goffman overlooks."
(Sedgwick 1982: 63-4)
7. This term is taken from Donnelly's account of the asylum building
programme in the early nineteenth century (Donnelly (1983).
8. Foucault refers to Sellin (1944) for an exhaustive study of this
institution.
9. The Philadelphia model is also discussed by Rothman (1971).
10. cf. Richards' discussion of the work of prison psychologists in which
he argues that: "...we cannot understand prison psychology solely as an
exercise in legitimation, as an ideological suppport for the repressive
apparatus of prison, providing a scientised rationale and justification
for policies and decisions made for reasons quite external to the
activities of pychologists" (Richards 1977: 21).
11. On the links between anti-psychiatry and more 'popular' cultural
criticism, see Pearson (1975).
12. cf. the quotations from Bentham on pages 15-16 of chapter one.
13. The inebriate was often said to be suffering from moral insanity
(e.g. Symonds 1869). One of the features of moral insanity was that it
was the will as opposed to the intellect, which was said to be diseased.
This extremely important notion will be returned to in more detail in my
study of the categories of moral insanity, moral imbecility and
psychopathy.
14. One of the problems involved in the attempt to provide commited
inebriates with profitable employment was the opposition from 'ordinary
business' and 'free labour'. To get around this problem it was suggested
that "some greater attempt might be made to produce goods now
manufactured out of England, and to compete with foreign rather than
English free labour" (Official Publications 1908: pp. 26 & 167). In the
case of women, however - who, we can recall, constituted the majority of
reformatory inmates - there was less of a problem. The domestic work
which was considered appropriate for women presented no threat to free
labour. Domestic work could be useful, and even profitable - e.g. laundry
work - without being seen as a threat by ordinary business and free
labour.
15. However, Foucault goes on to state: "In the asylum, work is deprived
of any productive value; it is imposed only as a moral rule ..." This
may have been the case in the York Retreat described by Foucault, but
it was certainly not the case in the inebriate reformatories where the
emphasis was firmly upon productive labour, as opposed to labour per
se.
16. We might also note here that the temperance movement, whose
approach to the problem of drunkenness was often criticized by the
inebriety reformers, had, as early as the 1830s, argued that one of
the chief causes of intemperance was the fact the pubs were more
comfortable - had a more domestic atmosphere - than working class
houses, which were often more places of work than homes as such (see
Harrison 1971).
17. See the section in chapter two on neglect of domestic duties. We
might also look at this concern with buildings which would be 'light
and airy' in the context of the public health movement of the
nineteenth century, in which such buildings were seen as necessary in
order to prevent the contagion which ocurred in the dark, confined
spaces of the dwellings of the poor. Just as light and airy spaces
could prevent physical contagion, so they were seen as useful in
preventing 'moral contagion' (cf. Pearson 1975: ch. 6).
18. In 1927, long after the principle of strict determinate sentencing
had lost favour among penal policy officials, the idea of the
indeterminate sentencing was still regarded with suspicion, even by
reformers who had helped to undermine the idea of the strictly
determinate sentence. In a Howard Journal (which was a major outlet
for penal reformist ideas) review of J. L. Gillin's Criminology and
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Penology' , it was stated: "On one point we differ from Prof. Gillin
entirely. He advocates the absolutely indeterminate sentence, without
any maximum (p. 711), and this is a power we refuse to give to any
official body; the more, as there seems some danger at the hand, led
by fanatics, appealing to science to give support to their prejudices
and disguised instincts. Thus, any unpopular individual, or even any
helpless minority, might be put away as abnormal, or dangerous to
society. Anti-vaccinators, vegetarians, sunbathers, and especially any
group of sex-life reformers, might easily be classed as 'degenerates'
and shut up where they would cease from troubling. The English people
will never allow the building of a Bastille." (Howard Journal 1927 -
the review was probably written by George Ives).
19. Some witnesses at the 1872 inquiry wanted the maximum to be two
years (Official Publications 1872: 'discussion of amendments')] and
later three year sentences were advocated. The three year sentence
eventually became law.
20. The following statements are typical: "I think there is a popular
impression abroad . . . that there is some sort of specific treatment
for drunkenness; some radical cure. Ho such thing within my knowledge
exists" (Official Publications 1872: q. 2717); I do not think medical
treatment is of the faintest use. All these drink cures, I think, are
pure frauds" (Official Publications 1908: q. 736).
Chapter 4 - Rehabilitating the Vagrant Alcoholic
1. The inebriate reformatories fell into disuse during World War 1.
In part 1 of appendix 1 I have constructed a brief account of the
habitual drunkards problem during the interim period (roughly 1914 -
1960). Tether and Robinson (1986) have summarised the major landmarks
in the modern campaign to establish a treatment system for habitual
drunkards; the relevant excerpt is reproduced in part 2 of the
appendix.
2. Consider the following:
"The proposed structure of this comprehensive treatment system is
the interlocking of medical and social work conceptions, since the
alcoholic... is simultaneously diseased and socially disaffiliated.
The advocates of treatment suggest that it is fundamentally
necessary for psychiatry and social work not to operate in isolation
from each other if they are to fulfill their aims"
(Archard 1979: ch. 1, emphasis added).
3. These terms are taken from Rose (1986: 70-82). The term 'social
therapies' refers to the techniques of resocialisation, developed by
the therapeutic community movement, but also utilized - in various
forms - in other institutions, such as prisons and - as we shall see -
in hostels for recovering habitual drunkards. These will be discussed
in more detail later. 'Behaviour therapy' refers to the systematic use
of sanctions and rewards to readjust malformed personalities.
Behaviour therapy is not confined to harsh techniques - such as
aversion therapy - but consists of a wide range of techniques of
closing the gap between behaviour produced and behaviour desired;
techniques which are employed in a wide range of social practices. The
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term 'therapies of normality' is difficult to define in a short space.
It refers to the myriad of psychological techniques which have
blossomed since the 1960s - particularly in the USA - and which are
designed to change us from what we are, into what we desire to be.
4. On the relationship betwen social work and other professions - and
between social work and other knowledges - see Clarke et al (1980).
5. The term 'the disease concept of alcoholism' is popular in the
literature on this subject, probably because this was the title of E,
M. Jellinek's influential book, published in 1960.
6. The working party's report referred only to England and Vales; see
Moody (1979) for a review of literature on drunken offenders in
Scotland.
7. In the following I have drawn upon the analysis of Clarke et al
(1980).
8. These were 'discovered' during research into the background of
selected groups of habitual drunkards, e.g. people appearing in court
on drunkenness charges, prisoners with a record of drunkenness
convictions, alcoholic patrons at a soup kitchen (see Official
Publications 1971: ch.5; Cook et al 1969: part A). The researchers
compiled biographical details of habitual drunkards and - although
they denied his existence - constructed an image of the typical
habitual drunkard. This was in order to provide a portrayal of the
'habitual drunken offender' as he is, but also to suggest what type of
person becomes such an offender and why: "by what processes and
interaction of causes his life takes that path" (Official Publications
1971: paras. 5.6-. 11). References to these characteristics are
scattered throughout a variety of texts, reports and articles. Here,
in order to avoid being cumbersome, I will confine myself to just one
or two references for each point.
9. It should be recalled that these characterisations were
constructed at a time of relatively full employment.
10. See Light (1986) for a more complete account of the origins and
development of the term 'skid row'.
11. Following the logic of utilitarian theory (see chapter 1), it
could be argued that punishment would not deter the alcohol addict
from drinking. Since the alcoholics's drinking is not controlled by
his will, he cannot stop drinking even though he might be able to
rationally calculate that drinking is not in his ultimate best
interest: "... if these men are alcohol addicts they are unlikely to
be influenced by a fine of ten shillings, or a day's
imprisonment"(Gath 1969).
12. I will discuss this in more detail shortly. It can be noted that
this criticism corresponded to the nineteenth century inebriety
reformers' concern for controls from within rather than exernal
control (see ch.3); this concern was derived, in turn, from the
principles of moral treatment.
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13. This criticism was also directed against 'staff-directed' hostels
for homeless alcoholics; the paternalism of these hostels was seen as
an obstacle to therapy (see Official Publications 1971: ch. 10)
14. The employment of medically or psychiatrically qualified staff was
not sought. The hostels would ideally be staffed by trained social
workers, while secondment from the prison service and from the
probation and after-care service was also recommended. Staff would be
trained to develop:
"(i) An acute awareness of the skid row culture and the vagrant way of
life in large cities;
(ii) A close-knowledge of hostels, the regimes that are passible in
them, the interaction within them, their limitations;
(iii) A general knowledge of casework and groupwork principles,
implying an understanding of personality growth and behaviour
patterns; &
(iv) An understanding of the social and medical aspects of
alcoholism."
15. Rathcoole house was established as an experimental hostel in May
1966. For accounts of its regime see Pollak (1969) and Cook (1971) and
(1975: 15-28). A second hostel, 'Lynette avenue', was opened in 1968
(Cook 1969 & 1971). Hostels for habitual drunkards are discussed more
generally in Official Publications (1971: chs, 10 & 11). On
therapeutic communities see Rose (1986: 70-77), which contains
references to the most important primary sources. See also, Unsworth
(1987: 263 ff).
16. Cook (1975: 23) cites one resident of Rathcoole House as
remarking: "I came here for sobriety not all this responsibility."
17. The reasons for the adoption of this rule are explained by Cook
(1971) & (1975: 17-20).
18. These terms are taken from Gordon (1986).
19. This was not so much out of a committment to a general
environmentalist theory; rather in those cases where habitual
drunkenness appeared to be the product of organic disorder the person
was excluded from treatment.
20. This is a matter of degree rather than a hard and fast
distinction. As we saw earlier, the inebriate reformatory programme
also involved proposals far the surveillance and control of inebriates
outside of the reformatory. The main emphasis in the nineteenth
century was, however, on the estabishment of institutions for the
confinement of the inebriate. By the 1960s/1970s there had been a
substantial shift in emphasis away from the institution.
21. This experiment, which took place in Edinburgh, is described by
Hamilton et al (1978: see ch.7 in particular). The experiment was more
successful when transferred to a psychiatric hospital, where habitual
drunkards were under the care of psychiatric nurses. Hamilton et al's
account is interesting in its discussion of the problems of trying to
deal with habitual drunkards in a setting which operated, to a large
extent, in accordance with a 'medical model'.
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Chapter 5 - Moral Insanity, Moral Imbecility and Penal Policy
1. While I will concentrate on the use of these terms in penal
discourses it is necessary to bear in mind that since the penal and
the social cannot be conceived of as separate and exclusive realms -
they are interpenetrating and interdependent (Garland 1985: viii) - we
should not regard penal and social discourses as separate and
exclusive types of discourse. In fact, this thesis should lend support
to the contention that the penal and the social are intermeshed.
2. On the philosophichal conception of the moral sense, see Raphael
(1973). For a critique of this concept, see Burt (1925: 32 on).
3. See Rose (1985: introduction) for an account of how this
transformation is represented in conventional histories of psychology.
4. See Burt 1925: 34; Donnelly 1983: 137; Walker and McCabe 1973.
5. See, for instance, the case of J. K. in Prichard (1837),
reproduced in Skultans (1975: 183-4).
6. These more general writings included works of anthropology and
ethnology. These were related to a more general project which I will
outline. For a short account of Prichard's more general work, see
Leigh (1961). The following is based upon Leigh's account and upon the
excerpts from Prichard's general work which Leigh reproduces.
7. Hence Prichard, from his starting point of religious doctrine,
reached a position similar - if not quite equivalent - to that of
empiricist philosophers such as Condillac and his psychiatric
disciples, Itard and Pinel. Prichard's belief in the fixed nature in
man, given by God, appeared on the face of it to be directly opposed
to the empiricist belief that all knowledge, ideas and attributes are
the product of experience. Nevertheless, his eventual conclusion was
similar: that mental characteristics were the product of the
individual's environment. The 'Englishman', cut off from a civilised
environment would become a savage, and vice versa. Hence Itard's
renowned attempt to turn Victor, the enfant sauvage into a normally
socialised being (in this case to turn him into a Frenchman) by
creating, around him, suitable environmental conditions, (see Jones
1972: 182; Hirst & Woolley 1982: 43-58; Rose 1985: ch.l; & Malson
1972, which contains a translation of Itard's The Vild Boy of
Aveyron).
8. Relevant excerpts form Maudsley are reproduced in Skultans (1975);
on Tredgold's view on this point see Burt (1925: 37).
9. On the differences between environmentalist theories of evolution,
which saw the environment as having a direct influence upon physical
structure, and the more complex theory of Darwin (and later
Darwinists), see Hirst and Woolley (1982: ch. 1).
10. For those committed to classifying all theories pertaining to
human conduct as either voluntarist or determinist this can only
appear as a contradiction between moral condemnation and scientific
determinism. For some, the very term 'moral insanity' contains such a
contradiction. Some nineteenth century doctors criticised the concept
because it incorporated ethical connotations into a disease
description (see Smith 1981: 114). This criticism was reiterated by
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Critchley in 1951: "For many reasons the term is a bad one, not the
least being the use of the adjective 'moral' to describe a set of
psychiatric phenomena. It is to borrow the terminology of one
discipline to describe another; an intrusion of theology into
medicine" (Critchley 1951: 38).
11. See Donnelly (1983: 71-3). A standard text on these issues is
Walker (1965). See also Foucault led.] (1975) and Smith (1981).
12. See the trial of Neville Heath, reproduced in Critchley (1951),
for a classic confrontation between 'moral insanity' and 'the
M'Naghten Rules'.
13. On these issues cf. Castel (1975).
14. The story of moral insanity intersects here with that of habitual
drunkards. As we saw earlier it was in the same short period - from
the mid 1860s to the early 1870s - that the problem of inebriates
emerged. As I argued in chapter two, the problem of inebriates was
seen as an aspect - and often the most important aspect - of the
problem of the criminal class. For many, the two groups - 'inebriates'
and 'criminals' - overlapped almost exactly. Symonds (1869), for
instance, introduced an article on the inebriates problem with a long
discussion of moral insanity, arguing that "'moral insanity' is close
to 'uncontrollable drunkenness' in the issues it throws up".
15. Maudsley also stated: "It may be said that this description is
simply the description of a very wicked person, and that to accept it
as a description of insanity would be to confound all distinction
between vice and crime and madness" (Maudsley (1874).
16. Importantly though, while mental defectives were considered
incurable, it was thought that most of them could be improved - i.e.
"their lives could be made less burdensome, and their usefulness
increased" - (Jones 1972: ch.8; cf. Rose 1985: ch. 1).
17. See in particular Haynes (1864/5), who presents fifteen
illustrative cases. One of these cases is reproduced in an appendix 2.
18. The biography of moral insanity could also be used as a moral
fable, to illustrate how factors such as being spoilt as a child, or
masturbation, could lead to moral insanity (and eventually to
intellectual insanity) in later years (see Haynes 1864/5, case 1).
19. The following features are more or less present in a large number
of cases illustrative of moral imbecility. For examples, apart from
those in Haynes (1864/5) which I have already mentioned, see those in
Sullivan (1920).
20. See in particular, the case in appendix 2; cf. the case of Pierre
Riviere (Foucault (ed.) (1975).
21. Ellis later rejected atavism as an explanation of criminality
(Ellis 1910: xxiii), but adhered to the general arguments of criminal
anthropology.
22. This is not to say that there was no opposition to the power of
psychiatry in this period. To the contrary, in the second half of the
nineteenth century there was a major movement towards subjecting
psychiatric powers to the rule of law (see Jones 1972, especially ch.
- 288 -
7; & Unsworth 1987: ch.3). However the nature of this campaign should
be clarified. It seems clear that major strategy of legalist
campaigners in this area was not so much to protect lunatics from
confinement, but to protect sane persons from wrongful confinement as
lunatics. Jones (1972) characterises the legalist approach as "piling
safeguard on safeguard to protect the sane against illegal detention .
. ." (ibid: 153, emphasis added).
23. Confinement of the insane had been conventionally justified as being
necessary to ensure the insane person's own security, to protect their
families, and to maintain public order (e.g. Prichard 1837: 205).
24. It is necessary to stress that "the criminal class' was in practice -
if not in theory - defined according to social and behavioural criteria.
Membership of the criminal class was not based upon the possession of
certain mental characteristics, rather it was based upon one's social
status, and in particular upon one's criminal record. The class consisted
of vagabonds, drunkards, mendicants and, most importantly, recidivists.
25. On eugenics, and its implications with regard to penal and social
policy, see Garland (1985: 142-52). On Ellis's views on eugenics in
general, see his 1922 essay, The Individual and the Race, republished in
Ellis (1939).
26. This proposal long proceeded that of East and Hubert in 1939 for the
establishment of a special institution for the reform or containment of,
and research on, abnormal and unusual types of criminal. East and
Hubert's proposal eventually led to the construction, in the early 1960s,
of Grendon Underwood psychiatric prison (see Gunn et al 1978: 19ff).
Chapter 6 - The Introduction of 'Psychopathy' into Penal Discourse
1. From reading the Butler Committee's report one gets the impression
that Pinel and Grohmann were simply describing entities which already
existed: e.g. "Pinel described 'manie sans d61ire'"; ". . . in 1818 in
Germany "moral diseases of the mind" were described . . ." (Official
Publications 1975: para. 5.4, emphasis added).
2. The Butler Committee, for instance, stated that they would give an
account of the origin and development of the concept (as distinct from
the term) of psychopathic disorder. But such an account is not
possible unless it has a fairly clear idea of what the concept - whose
origin is being described - is. But the Butler committee do not even
present a working definition of the concept. Such a definition would
be particularly required in tracing the history of psychopathy since,
as the Butler Committee state, the term 'psychopathic disorder' has
been (and still is) subject to a wide variety of usages (see Official
Publications 1975: para. 5.2).
3. Hence one work on psychopathy, by D. Curran & P. Mallinson, was
entitled "I can't define an elephant but I know one when I see one"
(see Eamon 1986: 216). On the other hand H. Cason compiled a list of
two hundred and two ways in which psychiatrists had defined
psychopathy (see Clyne 1973: 147). Dr. P.D. Scott, one of the leading
writers and practitioners in the field of psychopathy during the 1950s
and 1960s, could offer nothing more precise than a definition of a
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psychopath as "one whose persistently anti-social or a-social
behaviour cannot be primarily attributed to mental abnormality or
psychosis, and stimulates society to treat him" (quoted in Clyne
1973).
4. See Rose (1985: introduction) for a discussion of this way of
thinking about psychology.
5. See Vatson (1988: ch.4) for a discussion; (cf. Black 1966).
6. As the criminologist D.J. Vest put the matter (albeit somewhat
ingenuously): "Men who would be inevitably diagnosed as psychopaths by
some middle-class psychiatrists, on account of their impulsively
hedonistic conduct and seemingly callous neglect of social
reponsibilities, may be looked upon as very ordinary by their own
fraternity. According to the predilictions of the observer, the same
man may be regarded as a heroic freedom fighter, a criminal terrorist,
or an aggressive psychopath" (Vest 1974: 2).
7. Conrad and Schneider (1980). More generally, see chapter one of
this thesis.
8. In the 1870s psychiatry was only beginning to emerge as a
specialty; it is therefore not possible to draw a sharp distinction
between doctors of physical medicine and psychiatrists, at this stage.
Vhen psychiatry did become established as a specialty, its importance
within the prison medical service gradually increased so that by the
late 1940s it was considered the most important part of the prison
medical service (see Gunn et al 1978: ch.1).
9. The term feeble-minded had been used as early as 1876 (Jones 1972:
184) but not in the specific sense described here. For a detailed
acount of the 'discovery' of the feeble-minded, see Rose (1985: ch.4).
10. This, of course, should be understood as a shift in emphasis, not
as a total rupture in schooling practice. Schools had previously been
concerned with the transmission of literacy and numeracy, and they
continued to be regarded as places of instruction and training in
moral and domestic habits. The argument is that the priority attached
to each of these functions was inverted in the second half of the
nineteenth century.
11. For an account of the separate system see Rothman (1971: ch.4). On
the 'birth of the prison' in general see Rothman (ibid) Ignatieff
(1978) and Foucault (1977b). On the late Victorian penal system (1865-
•95) see Garland (1985: 6-18).
12. On this point cf. Garland (1988); & Miller (1986: 39).
13. Designations of feeble-mindedness were often supported by the
flimsiest of psychological evidence. For instance, in 1903-4, the
medical officer at Pentonville Prison declared that forty per cent of
Pentonville's inmates were feeble-minded (Jones 1972: 192). This
opinion was evidenced by the results of literacy tests (ibid). As
Jones points out, the literacy test was a particularly "blunt tool" at
a time when compulsory education had been in operation for so short a
time (ibid). Vhat she fails to make clear is that this 'blunt tool'
was supplemented by other behavioural and social criteria. Being sent
to Pentonville was in itself enough to raise a suspicion of feeble-
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mindedness; and as we have just seen, prisoners were more likely than
others to attract a diagnosis of feeble-mindedness because they were
institutional inmates. The literacy test might have been used as
evidence of feeble-mindedness, but it was not the sale criterion for
designations of feeble-mindedness.
14. And there were also leading theorists who understood the
distinction but didn't regard it as being of great importance.
Tredgold, for instance, - who was one of the leading theorists of
mental deficiency - was of the opinion that cases of moral defect
without intellectual defect were rare (Official Publications 1908b:
qq. 7363 & 7422-3).
15. The commission claimed: "The mental condition of these persons,
and neither their poverty nor their crime, is the real ground of their
claim to help from the State" (cited in Jones 1972: 194).
16. This style of argument is discussed by Garland (1985b: 22-3): ". .
. criminology operated precisely by producing 'special cases' or
categories of individual who should not be subject to the normal
procedures of legal accountability because of their irresponsible or
abnormal characters. However these 'special cases', once established,
had a tendency to extend their domain - and that of criminology - and
we can cite many instances where a special case is established only to
have its special features erased in the name of its subsequent
extension" (ibid: 22).
17. See Official Publications (1908b), @ vol. 38 of the parliamentary
papers.
18. Much of the argument of chapter three, which dealt with treatment
in the inebriate reformatory, would therefore apply here also.
19. Burt writes: "... in theoretical discussions, there is now an
Increasing tendency to adopt to the second (interpretation)" (Burt
1944: 31, emphasis added). It should be noted that these lines were
written in 1925. This confirms my earlier suggestion that the
distinction between the feeble-minded and moral imbeciles was not well
established, except in the highest of psychiatric theory, before the
1913 Act.
20. See also Gunn et al (1978: 14-5) & Gibbens (1966), who both
suggest that the designation 'moral imbecile' was rarely used in
practice. For a detailed account of these issues see Watson (1988:
chs. 4-5).
It might be noticed that the 1957 Commission used the term 'moral
defective' which replaced the term 'moral imbecile' in an amending
statute, the Mental Deficiency Act, 1927.
21. We can include here a third position which, strictly speaking,
should be treated as distinct. In this third position - which was in
its infancy at this stage but would later become of great importance -
the distinction between the intellectual and the moral faculties was
practically refused altogether in favour of a unitary conception of
the mental. In this unitary concept of 'mind' or 'personality', the
'intellectual' and the 'moral' were conceived as interdependent.
Defective morality therefore implied defective intelligence; and
correspondingly, intelligence was conceived as consisting of ability
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to adapt to society as well as possession of cognitive skills. This
was the position of Burt (1925/1944, see in particular chs. 1-2), and
later formed the basis of Henderson's (1939) influential work
Psychopathic States. The distinctive feature of this position was its
focus upon social maladjustment as the key element of mental disorder.
22. From the time of its first publication in 1921 the Howard Journal
has been a major forum for discussion among high grade penal officials
and other penal-welfare professionals. The vast majority of
contributors - especially before the 1970s - were practitioners,
working either within the prison system or in experimental penal
institutions at the boundary of the penal system. This is reflected in
the content of the journal in which theorising about crime,
delinquency and punishment is linked to professional concerns about
the classification of offenders and the improvement (reform) of the
penal system. The Journal's content was, and to a very large extent
continues to be, within the tradition of practice-oriented criminology
described by Garland (1988).
23. It was reported that:
During the last four years 985 mentally defective persons (787 men
and 198 women) have been dealt with under sections 8 and 9 of the
Mental Deficiency Act, 1913 and (a) sent to Mental Defective
Institutions by the Courts instead of being sentenced to
imprisonment, or (b) certified as mentally defective under section 9
and removed to institutions whilst undergoing sentence, or (c) sent
to a 'place of safety' pending the presentation of a petition on
their discharge from prison. (Howard Journal 1926)
Chapter 7 - Psychopathy and Penal Policy
1. See appendix three for a discussion of how the phenomenon of
psychopathy has been explained.
2. On the Hubert-East institution see footnote 26 of chapter five.
3. See the account of East's career in 'Society and the Criminal',
which is a collection of some of East's essays; see also Garland
1988).
APPEffDIX 1
PART 1: The Habitual Prnn)m-rriR Problem. 1914 - 1959
The inebriate reformatory system fell into disuse during the First
World War (Radzinowicz and Hood 1986: 313-5; Gunn et al 1978: 13; East
1949: ch. 3). The most usual explanation for this is that the system
collapsed because of financial and administrative difficulties (Gunn
et al: ibid). Radzinowicz and Hood (ibid) propose a deeper
explanation: the penalisation of inebriety offended public sentiments.
Another explanation is that of the Home Office Working Party report
Habitual Drunken Offenders (Official Publications 1971), which argued:
The Acts were conceived and administered at a time when little was
known about the therapeutic approach to alcoholism, and this must
have contributed both to the deficiencies of the reformatories
themselves and to the doubts felt by the courts about their
effectiveness, (quoted in Radzinowicz and Hood 1986: 314).
After the war, official concern with the problem of habitual
drunkards was relatively low-key. What concern there was came largely
from within the context of prison administration and was restricted,
for the most part, to the problem of managing inebriates who were sent
to prison (see e.g. Morton 1929). Very little interest was shown in
the vast majority of drunken offenders, who were fined; while those
who might be considered as inebriates even though they had never
committed a drunkenness offence, lay beyond the scope of official
concern altogether.
Most of those who addressed the problem of inebriates in this period
continued to stress the need for an alternative form of disposal to
imprisonment. This was the policy, for instance, recommended by J.
Hall Morton, who was a governor and medical officer of H. M. Prison,
Holloway. Morton advocated a threefold classification of inebriate
prisoners: young prisoners, senile alcoholics, and adult alcoholics.
For young prisoners he suggested -
probation with a condition of residence, i.e. placed in a suitable
home for a period of not less than six months and in persistent or
recurring cases . . . twelve months ... I believe that this
treatment of the young alcoholic would have a most beneficial
effect, and that in a short time these girls would give up alcohol.
(Morton 1929: 310).
Senile alcoholics were to be committed "to the Union for at least a
year" (ibid). Adult alcoholics were to be sent "to some sort of colony
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in the country, where they would be employed on the land, self-
supporting". Those that wanted treatment for alcoholism, and who were
prepared to co-operate, would receive it and after a certain period
would be allowed out on trial (ibid).
There were those, . however, who were willing to concede that the
imprisonment of habitual drunkards - while not the most desirable of
disposals - could achieve some good. In their history of prison
psychiatry, Gunn and his collaborators point out that while nineteenth
century prison administrators were preoccupied with the problem of how
to remove 'quasi-criminal' groups from prison, in the post World War I
period this concern gave way to an increasing commitment to a policy
of 'treatment' within prison (Gunn et al 1978: ch. 1). This change is
reflected in discussions of the problem of habitual drunken offenders.
The nineteenth century inebriety reformers had believed,
unequivocally, that prison was not the place for the inebriates. By
the second third of the twentieth century, however, a more modified
view was being voiced. Those who addressed the problem now tended to
agree that while prison was inappropriate for the habitual drunken
offender, there were nevertheless certain benefits to be obtained from
imprisonment. On being sent to prison, the habitual drunkard underwent
enforced abstinence from alcohol and would receive the care and
attention of medical staff; he might even receive some psychiatric
treatment. So while it was still maintained that alternatives to
imprisonment were necessary, it was also conceded that, until these
alternatives were available, 'penal treatment' should still take
place. This more modified view was put by G. Scott, in 1949. While
arguing that imprisonment of habitual drunkards was undesirable, he
conceded that "prolonged sentences might be valuable because of the
enforced abstinence", and that "it is only in prison that they have
any chance of rehabilitation, mental, moral and physical" (Scott 1949:
175-6).
Much later the Home Office Working Party tempered their criticism of
the imprisonment of habitual drunkards, in a similar manner:
As a minimum, a period of custodial care allows for drying out
under medical supervision, accompanied by attention to the physical
deterioration which is frequently present . . . Medical officers,
particularly in large remand prisons, are experienced in dealing
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with problems and complications of this kind. With offenders who are
serving short sentences attention to these physical ills is all
there is time to attempt. But we would stress that the importance of
this attention should not be underestimated. The effect of these
periodic stays in prison on the health of problem drinkers is
significant" (Official Publications 1971: para. 7.13)
PART 2; Ma.1or Landmarks in the Habitual Drunkards Campaign of the
1960s and 1970s
(excerpt from Tether P. and Robinson D. : Preventing Alcohol Problems')
"Fresh attempts in the UK to find alternatives to punishment for the
habitual drunken offender gained momentum during the 1960s and 1970s.
The aims of these efforts were to keep the habitual public drunk out
of prison and to establish alternative facilities for treating and
helping them. Changing penalties for drunkenness, a Home Office
report, and changes in departmental responsibility for the habitual
drunken offender all reflect these aims. The major landmarks were:
* Section 91(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 which provided far
the abolition of the short period of imprisonment which could be
imposed for the offence of being drunk and disorderly. At the same
time, the fine was increased to £50. However, the Act stated that
imprisonment for this offence could not be abolished until
sufficient, suitable accomodation became available for the care and
treatment of persons being convicted of being drunk and disorderly
* The 1971 Home Office report of the Working Party on Habitual
Drunken
Offenders which recommended the establishment of 'detoxification
centres' to which drunks could be taken for care, assesment, and
advice and from where, if necessary, further help and assistance
could be arranged. The working party defined 'habitual' as more than
three convictions in a year and calculated that about 16 per cent of
drunken offenders fell into this category. The report also
recommended the development of other local facilities such as
hostels and advice centres.
* Section 34 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972 which allows the
police
to take public drunks to a place approved by the Secretary of State
as a 'treatment centre for alcoholics',
* In 1973 responsibility for habitual drunken offenders' rehabilita¬
tion was vested in the DHSS although, of course, the police retain
responsibility for enforcing the law. DHSS Circular 21/73 urged
local government and health authorities to collaborate in the
provision of hostels and other services for the habitual drunken
offender. 'Pump-priming' funds were made available for a limited
period to encourage this development.
* The Criminal Law Act 1977 activated the provisions of the Criminal
Justice Act of 1967 regarding the abolition of imprisonment for
drunk and disorderly offenders. Commencement Order (No. 4) came into
force on 1 February 1978. It was argued that 'suitable accomodation'
had become available. Circular 21/73 had led to over seventy hostels
being established. In addition, two detoxification centres had been
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set up under section 34 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1972 and a
third centre was planned.
Despite these initiatives, most public drunks who come to the
attention of the police sober up in police cells, or in A and E
departments. The range of facilities envisaged by circular 21/73
either failed to materialize or, where they did, often failed to
survive the expiry of pump-priming funding.
The attempt to keep drunkenness offenders out of prison has also
largely failed. Although the Criminal Law Act of 1977 abolished
imprisonment for being 'drunk and disorderly' it also increased the
fines for drunkenness offences. In 1977, 2,270 people went to prison
for non-payment of fines. This figure had risen to 2,698 by 1982. In
the following year the figure fell to 2,467 but the trend is once
again upward.
(Tether and Robinson 1986: 285-6)
The legal position in Scotland differs somewhat (see Hamilton et al
1978; Moody 1979; McLaughlin 1985).
APPEHDIX 2
A CASE ILLUSTRATIVE OF MORAL IMBECILITY
(from Haynes 1864/5)
"Case 15.-P.H-, aet. 16. In this case there is a long hereditary
predisposition; his father and paternal grandmother died insane. From
a very early age he evidenced a great propensity to steal, and used to
take things of little or no use to him - these things he used to
secrete. He was sent to a succession of schools, but was obliged to
leave each of them after a while; one in consequence of his being
known or strongly suspected to have appropriated books; another,
because the master of the school expressed his conviction that the
young man was certain to end his life on the gallows; and on different
other occasions no reason was assigned, but it was simply requested he
might be removed. While at these schools he was always thought to have
some deficiency about him, and to be mentally unlike his school¬
fellows, who recognised the fact. When visiting friends he was in the
occasional habit of helping himself to books, especially sensation
novels and railway guides, which constituted his most acceptable
mental pabulum. His intellect is of high order; his correct memory of
dates, places, and times, is extraordinary; he has travelled a great
deal in Great Britain (having a passion for railroads), and knows the
lines running in each town he has visited (and their name is legion),
and the times at which the trains arrive at, and depart from, the
stations, to and from other stations; like Mr. Vyndham, he was fond of
driving trains himself, or of being in the guard's van.
Shortly prior to his admission he had disappeared from his mother's
residence in Scotland, after having, in her name, drawn £200 from a
bank; the next thing heard of him was by a letter sent to his mother
from London stating he had invested the £200 in railway shares along
with £500 he had received from a nobleman for some great service he
had rendered him, the nature of which he would explain on his return.
This statement was entirely without foundation. During his sojourn in
London (where he remained for some time) he devised a plot which, for
refined ingenuity and diabolical cunning, would have made an excellent
foundation for one of those morbid productions, unhappily now so
common, termed - and only too appropriately - sensation navels. The
plan he proposed to carry into effect was to obtain the assasination
of an uncle and cousin, in order that he might, as next heir, inherit
a large estate; he offered £12,000 for the murderers. The police heard
of the plot, an investigation was made and was terminated by the young
man being placed in the Royal Edinburgh Asylum; the adoption of this
course appears to have satisfied the uncle who had reasonably become
very much alarmed, and the police.
I have previously mentioned proofs that his memory is extremely
clear and retentive; to a certain extent he is clever. His judgment of
other persons, and of the motives which influence them, is, in some
respects, very true and rapid, in others obviously and remarkably
deficient. He soon finds out whether a man is conceited, absurd, or a
fool, but does not seem to recognise the fact that any of his fellow-
patients are insane; he does not attach any psychological or
pathological importance to what they do, but speaks of them as "vapid
- 297 -
asses", "foals". He does not consider himself a patient, or to think
that he is looked upon as mentally affected. He seems incapable of
judging whether a man has any emotions or passions - whether he is
generous or selfish, religious or blasphemous, highminded or depraved.
For those who are excited and quarrelsome, or miserable and
misanthropic he has no compassion or sympathy; according to him they
are equally "fools" or "vapid asses".
When questioned about his proceedings in London and asked whether he
was cognisant he had done wrong, he replied he supposed he had; but he
could not be made to appreciate that it was a subject of any import,
to express any regret or to be ashamed of himself. If spoken to about
his plot he does not attempt any defence of his intentions, or to
palliate them, but speaks of them as a matter of course, and
altogether shows a deplorable want of feeling as to what is right and
what is wrong; he seems, in fact, quite incapable of judging at all
between the two. The only apparent check upon his committing actions
which are wrong is, his dread of being found out - not because they
are wrong.
He has always been very gentle and affectionate in his disposition,
especially to his mother, whom he seems to love in the same way as a
daughter might be expected to do. There is very little manliness about
him; he seldom appears to be speaking honestly and in a
straightforward manner; while speaking he often looks at one in a
stealthy, cunning, cat-like manner; with his eyelids drooping; for a
long time (until indeed laughed out of it) he would not play cricket,
and when he plays he is well padded, and avoids every ball at all
likely to hit him; when skating he always pushed a chair before him;
if trying to go at all fast, if without the chair, he was very
uncomfortable, and went with great caution, manifesting the greatest
dread of falling; the approach of a wasp or bee causes him to shrink
and to shriek with a short cry of agonised terror; in any games he
attempts he displays an absolute want of courage. He is very fond of
whist; although told, over and over again that hints are not allowed,
and that tricks must not be looked at after turning them over, he is
constantly winking or nodding at or hinting to his partner, and
frequently turns over the tricks to see what cards have been played;
when detected cheating, and spoken to about it, he says, "lo, its not
a good plan. I see it doesn't da." He seems to lack the boldness of
dancing anything more than a quadrille, while the idea of waltzing
never seems to enter his imagination. At meals he does not think of
the possibility of others liking what he relishes until he has had
enough; for instance, if there were a few strawberries on the table,
he would eat them all unless something else happened to tempt his
appetite. So long as things are done or got for him, he never
considers the trouble which may be entailed on others. When any of his
numerous attempts at deceit are discovered, and he is spoken to about
them, he laughs, and seems to think them good jokes. He said he is
intimately aquainted with a noble duke and other members of the
peerage, whereas the contrary is known to be the fact. It is stated
that soon after he came here he offered a minister a living in England
if he would become an Episcopalian. He also said that in consequence
of his coming here the meals were very much improved.
For some months he has been receiving instruction in mathematics and
kindred subjects, and has made great progress, showing a more than
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average intellect, and this notwithstanding that he is extremely
apathetic about it. If he had a problem to solve, and finds it at all
difficult, he will not exert himself to overcome it, but says it is a
"beastly one," or a "bore," or "ridiculous," and tries by all the
means in his power to avoid it. He is very irregular in his
attendance, making all kinds of frivolous pretences and excuses; one
day he says he could not attend in consequence of a severe attack of
tic (which he never has), another, that his mother is coming to see
him, &c. While at work the least thing suffices to arrest his
attention; if any one passes he jumps up to see who it is, where he
comes from, and whither he goes. He is extremely inquisitive.
He seems totally destitute of the moral sense, or any capability of
distinguishing right from wrong, and never once was known to
characterise any act, although calculated to excite the utmost
indignation in a well-regulated mind, as a thing which was wrong, but
simply as "a bad plan, or "foolish," and that only because it had been
found out" (Haynes 1864/5: 546-8).
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APPENDIX 3
THE SEARCH FOR THE 'ROOTS' OF PSYCHOPATHY
Since the 1920s psychiatrists working on the problem of 1 moral
imbecility' and 'psychopathy' have speculated as to the causes of the
condition. There have been a number of competing explanations. In this
appendix I will suggest that this contest cannot be characterized as
being simply between an organicist approach and a psychological
approach (cf. Ramon 1986), rather there has been a more complex,
multi-faceted contest, involving many distinct, although often
intersecting, approaches to the explanation of psychopathy. It is also
necessary to keep in mind, when considering these explanations, that
those who produced them often had very different ideas about what it
was that was being explained (cf. chapter 7).
Physlcalist approaches
Fhysicalist approaches are based upon the hypothesis that
psychopathic conduct is, in some sense, the product of an underlying
physical abnormality. Such explanations have been made with regard to
all the definitions of psychopathy that I have outlined. It is
important, however, to distinguish two quite different suggestions
which those who have adopted a physicalist approach have made. It is
sometimes implied that psychopathic conduct is caused directly by some
underlying physical abnormality, such as brain disorder or a genetic-
based propensity towards aggressive, anti-social conduct. Much of the
research from the 1930s and 1940s on psychopathy as a product of brain
disorder appears to be based upon such a presumption (see McCord &
- 300 -
McCord 1964: 61-70). However, 'physicalists' have also put forward a
more limited and subtle thesis, viz. that psychopaths suffer from some
constitutional weakness which leaves them unable to learn haw to
behave and to relate to others in a normal way. Hence Frey <1948/9),
an outspoken proponent of biologial explanations of psychopathy and a
forthright critic of environmentalist explanations, suggests that
biological abnormality leads to psychopathy indirectly by making the
person "immune to all normal educational and psychological methods"
(Frey (1948/9). This is extremely important because it implies while
psychopaths cannot be cured (in the absence of any effective technique
of altering their biological make-up) they could be improved if new
educational and psychological techniques, capable of reaching those
with a constitutional predisposition to psychopathy, could be
invented. Educational and psychological methods may not be able to
cure the psychopath, but they might still be capable of morally
educating the psychopath to some degree. This explanation of
psychopathy, although quite different from environmentalist
explanations, is not too far removed from environmentalism in terms of
the remedies it proposes.
In what follows I will try to show that many of those engaged in the
pursuit of physicalist explanations, especially in more recent years,
have often made quite limited claims for their theories. Although in
the 1920s doctors were probably over-confident of their ability to
explain psychopathy in physicalist terms, there has been a gradual
tendency since then, among those involved in research on psychopathy,
not to make sweeping claim about psychopathy being explicable in
solely physicalist terms.1
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Physicalist approaches to the explanation of psychopathy received a
boost in the 1920s as a result of a number of outbreaks of
encephalitis lethargica, more popularly known as 'sleepy sickness'
(see Walker and McCabe 1973: 10 & 211). Sleepy sickness was a virus
disorder which often caused brain damage. In children, an after-effect
of the disease was a propensity to restless, aggressive and
destructive behaviour (ibid: 10).2 Some doctors argued that the
behaviour of children following sleepy sickness was similar to that of
moral imbeciles and psychopaths. In a Howard Journal article titled
'Moral Degeneration Following Sleepy Sickness' Dr. G. A Auden was
quoted as arguing "that moral changes, especially in the direction of
thieving and lying, frequently occur in children after an attack of
sleepy sickness" (Howard Jounal 1926). Biologically-oriented
psychiatrists used observations such as this to suggest that
psychopathy might be explained by organic malfunctionings within the
brain (see McCord & McCord 1964: 27). If brain damage could lead to
'psychopathic conduct' in post-encephalitis children, then perhaps, it
was suggested, brain disorder might be responsible for psychopathic
conduct in general (ibid). This led some researchers into psychopathy
to study the brains of psychopaths.
Research on the brains of psychopaths continued over the next few
decades (see Craft 1960/1; 239-240; Craft 1968). After the Second
World War, the study of the psychopath's brain was furthered by the
use of the electroencephalograph (EEG) (Fabisch 1966). The EEG, which
records the electrical activity of ganglion cells or neurones of the
brain, has been used in research on psychopaths at places such as the
Morthgate Clinic, an observation unit for the assessment of
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psychopathic disorder among juvenile delinquents (O'Connell 1968) and
at Grendon Psychiatric Prison (Butler 1975). However the rationale
behind EEG testing seems to be somewhat different from that which
informed much of the earlier research on the psychopath's brain.
Instead of arguing that brain abnormality causes aggressive conduct
etc., it is simply argued that there may be some correlation between
aggressiveness etc. and abnormal EEG patterns. If such a correlation
could be found it might help to explain psychopathy but it would not
in itself imply a direct causal relation. The rationale behind EEG
testing has been explained by Fabisch:
It might be expected that such facets of psychopathic personality
as physical and emotional immaturity, emotional instability, rapid
swings of mood, and proneness to apparently unpredictable and
explosive reactions might be accompanied by abnormal EEG patterns.
(Fabisch 1966: 85)
This research has indicated that a large number of those labelled as
psychopaths do have abnormal EEG readings (Fabisch 1966; Gibbens
1968). However those involved in such research have often warned
against reading too much into these findings. It has been pointed out
that EEG measurement is a complex technique which produces a mass of
information and that to say that somebody's EEG pattern is abnormal
involves making a crude judgement based upon the most conspicuous
features (ibid). Another problem which has been identified is the
looseness and generality of definitions of psychopathy, a factor which
has led researchers to be circumspect about any statements concerning
correlations between 'psychopathic conduct' and abnormal EEG patterns.
Hence Fabisch states:
Unfortunately, since a simple and unequivocal definition of
psychopathy is not available and since simple and unequivocal
diagnostic EEG patterns do not exist, any attempt at defining
psychopathic states with the help of an EEG is bound to be somewhat
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limited. (Fabisch 1966: 85)
Another attempt to explain psychopathy which we can classify as
physicalist is the 'genetic' approach. Those involved in this research
have tried to discover whether psychopathic personalities differ in
their genetic make-up from normal personalities. A recurring problem
with genetic approaches is that it is difficult to distinguish between
personality traits which are due to genes and those which are due to
early environment (Craft 1960/1). Hence nineteenth century hereditar-
ianist arguments, which were often supported by showing that
delinquency 'ran in the family', have been dismissed by most twentieth
century students of the role which genes play in determining
personality (see Craft 1966b). An alternative approach, which has been
developed since the 1930s, is the twin study. By studying the
personalities of twins separated at birth, researchers have tried to
determine how much of personality is determined by genes and how much
by environment (Craft 1960/1). Many of those involved in such research
have, however, made it clear that the task is an enormously difficult
one and that there is insufficient evidence to sustain a simple
genetic theory of psychopathy (ibid; Craft 1966b).
Clinical-psychological approaches
In the 1920s attempts were made to explain the causes of psychopathy
in purely psychological terms. I will refer to these attempts as
clinical-psychological approaches, in order to distinguish them from
social-psychological approaches which I will discuss later. The
clinical-psychological approach aimed to find some stable psychic
characteristic which correlated with psychopathy. To this end, ethical
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or temperament tests were devised. In order to appreciate the
significance of these tests it should be pointed out that around about
this time there was a marked increase in the popularity of
intelligence testing. In the 1920s the idea that intellectual ability
(and hence intellectual defect) could be precisely measured with
intelligence tests became widely accepted among psychologists (cf.
Rose 1985: ch.5). However, attempts to devise equivalent 'ethical' or
'temperament' tests - or tests capable of measuring 'moral sense' -
met with little success (see Watson 1988: ch.4). Nobody could devise a
test which was capable of measuring 'emotional attitude' or of
discriminating between those whose emotional attitude was normal and
those in whom it was abnormal. Ethical tests were devised, but those
whose conduct was indicative of psychopathy often passed them. Hence,
in 1926 one prison medical officer stated:
I am at a loss to discover any method of localizing the moral sense.
The condition has from the point of view of examination, no clinical
entity and the signs and symptoms of such a mental state cannot be
demonstrated apart from social behaviour. The cases that, on the
evidence of past conduct should perhaps be regarded as moral
imbeciles actually give on examination no ground for the assumption.
They can pass all the ethical tests to which we can submit them, and
it is only on the conduct side that they fail. The whole position is
one of emotional attitude, and too often this is not revealed to the
public gaze. (Rees Thomas, quoted in Watson 1988)
Forty years later psychologists were still unsuccessful in their
attempts to devise tests which would enable them to "disentangle the
psychopath" from other psychiatric groups (see Black 1966).
A note on tie contribution of psychoanalysis
Psychoanalytic explanations of the phenomenon known as 'psychopathic
behaviour' are extremely complex and it is not possible for me to
outline them in the space available here.3 Instead I will confine
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myself to a few general remarks about the impact which psychoanalysis
has had upon the understanding of psychopathy. First, although some
psychoanalysts (especially Glover 1960, section 4) have defended the
concept of psychopathy, and have tried to explain the phenomenon in
psychoanalytic terms, orthodox psychoanalysis has tended not to use
the concept, preferring to use its own psychoanalytic categories to
explain the conduct and attitudes which others refer to as
psychopathy. There is no simple intersection between psychoanalytic
categories and the category of psychopathy. Many psychoanalytic
categories - such as 'instinct-ridden character' (ibid: 135-6) bear a
striking resemblance to 'psychopathy', but there is no simple fit
between the two categories. Nevertheless psychoanalysis contributed to
explanations of psychopathy in a more general way. Some of those
involved in the study and treatment of psychopathy 'borrowed* certain
concepts from psychoanalysis in order to explain the phenomenon.
However, in the process, the borrowed concepts were generally
reformulated and simplified. A central example concerns Freud's idea
that there was no adult neurosis without an infantile neurosis (ibid:
132-3). This formula was often extended to character disorders so
that, in the hands of Glover, it became "no adult 'pathological crime'
without 'infantile pathological delinquency'" (ibid). Psychoanalysis
therefore helped to focus attention upon the links between childhood
troubles and adult psychopathy. However, as we shall see, many of
those who studied this link tended to study it in a somewhat non-
psychoanalytic manner. Instead of focussing, for instance, upon the
development of libido, there was a tendency to focus exclusively upon
the child's early 'social' environment
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It is important not to overstate the contribution of psychoanalysis
to explanations of psychopathy. As I shall try to show,
psychoanalytic-oriented explanations of psychopathy often owed more to
older ideas about the interaction of the environment and character
(such as those surveyed in earlier chapters) than to orthodox
psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis added a new gloss to these ideas, and
probably enriched them to a certain extent, but the ideas were not
themsleves derived directly or solely from psychoanalysis.
Socia1-psychological explanations
In the early 1920s, shortly before the epidemics of sleepy sickness
occurred, a series of brutal murders were committed by youths (Howard
Journal 1922). Many of these murders were practically inexplicable;
there were no obvious motives and the youths involved were not
suffering from any recognised form of mental illness. For the author
of an article in the Howard Journal, these murders were the product of
"obscure obliquities, moral and mental, of which science tells us
little" (ibid), nevertheless, this author put forward a tentative
explanation: the murderers were the victims of involuntary childhood
neglect (perhaps combined with a constitutional weakness of mind)
which occured as a result of the Great Var. The murders could not
therefore be blamed solely on the youths who committed them, rather
the whole of society was implicated in the crimes:
The only thing we do know is that in each case we have a weakling
who has been subjected to stresses greater than he could withstand .
. . These youths, with all their darkness of mind, are the final
product of a world at war; their crimes are our crimes, for they are
the result of involuntary neglect during the formative years of
their childhood; and we slay them for our sins."
(Howard Journal 1922: 79)
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So shortly before the phenomenon of disruptive and aggressive
behaviour following bouts of sleepy sickness was interpreted as
evidence for a physicalist explanation of psychopathy, this series of
brutal murders was interpreted as a sign that the child's early
environment could be a major cause of later immoral and brutal
behaviour. The two approaches were not as radically opposed as they
might appear to be. The 'environmentalist' approach was not
necessarily opposed to the suggestion that 'psychopaths' differed in
their constitutional structure from non-psychopaths. To the contrary,
a weak constitution might explain why some victims of child neglect
turned into brutal murderers, while others led a normal life. But a
weak constitution on its own could not explain psychopathic conduct.
To use more modern terminology, a weak constitution might 'pre¬
dispose' one to psychopathy, but the child's defective early
environment was the main cause.
In the 1930s an explanation of this type was suggested, with
specific reference to psychopathy, by R. D. Gillespie (1930).
Gillespie employs a number of psychoanalytic ideas. He argues, for
instance, that many psychopaths behave as they do because they want to
be punished, an argument which Freud had made some years earlier with
regard to criminals (Freud 1916). Gillespie also sounds psychoanalytic
when he suggests that since the child is the father of the man, the
childhood delinquent is the father of the adult criminal (Gillespie
1930: 23). This meant that the roots of psychopathy were to be found
by looking at the delinquent's upbringing and parental management,
rather than by examining the psychopath's physical body. For Gillespie
mast pscyhopathic personalities, like mast mental illnesses, were the
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product of environment: "Symptoms which were once thought to lie in
the physical body are now recognised as stemming from the patient's
past environment" (ibid: 23). Gillespie approaches the child's
upbringing in a more 1socipl" way than orthodox psychoanalysis. For
Gillespie the child's environment consists of the social relations
immediately surrounding it, social relations which could be altered if
only attempts were made to do so. On the other hand, Gillespie did not
tend to use the term environment in a 'macro-social' way. Although he
sometimes used the term to refer to social conditions in general he
usually employed the term to refer the child's more immediate
environment, i.e. its mother and others - such as schools - directly
responsible for the upbringing of the child (ibid: 26). Gillespie's
main argument was that faulty training and upbringing were the main
cause of psychopathy. So the mother who spoilt or neglected her child
constituted a bad environment and was therefore in danger of turning
her child into a psychopath (ibid).
Before examining this idea further it is important to note that
Gillespie did not believe that all cases of psychopathy could be
explained in this way. Gillespie argued that a majority of cases were
environmentally caused; he accepted that some cases of psychopathy
were the result of inherited or congenital causes (ibid: 26). This
'concession' to the physicalists actually plays an important part of
Gillespie's argument. Gillespie's argument was that since most aspects
of psychopathic personality were the product of faulty upbringing,
they could be altered through corrective training:
. . . the majority of psychopathic personalities acquire important
parts of their unstable disposition as the consequence of faulty
training and environment. To that extent they can be re-educated and
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reformed. (Gillespie 1930: 26)
By implication, those few whose unstable disposition was mostly the
product of congenital abnormality were beyond reform. This supplies
Gillespie with a simple method of distinguishing between predominantly
environmental and predominantly heredity cases. All cases should be
subjected to corrective training; if this was successful then the
condition was clearly the product of "mother's spoiling", if
'treatment' was unsuccessful then it was likely that the condition was
physically-based (ibid: 26). This argument is remarkable in that it
inverts the conventional relationship between diagnosis and treatment;
diagnosis was to depend upon the outcome of treatment, rather than
vice versa. Ve might also note that this meant that psychopaths were
to be classified as 'constitutional psychopaths' or 'social
psychopaths' by reference to the failure of penal and socialization
practices.
The process by which faulty upbringing could create psychopathic
personalities was addressed by many writers on psychopathy during the
1930s and 1940s. However, before looking at some of these it is
important to note that many of them did not completely rule out the
possibility that physical or constitutional factors could play an
important role in producing the psychopath. Just as 'physicalist'
explanations were not radically opposed to environmentalist
explanations, so environmentalism did not wholly exclude physicalist
accounts. The difference between these two types of explanation was
often one of emphasis, rather than a sharp opposition.
J. R. Rees (1933) argued that many of the features of criminality or
psychopathy (Rees' makes little or no distinction between these terms)
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could be seen in the young children. However, young children soon
became socialized; they developed more social attitudes, emotions and
conduct, and therefore found it relatively easy to adjust to society.
But some children never developed in this way - even though they may
have developed in every other way, including intellectually - and
hence remained, emotionally and behaviourally, at the level of the
child. Either 'abnormalities in temperamental make-up' and/or a
difficullt environment could be the cause of this failure to develop
normal emotions and values. Either the psychopath's temperamental
make-up leaves him unreceptive to socializing influences or the
socializing influences are themselves absent or defective.
The comparison of the baby with the criminal, which has been made,
is illuminating and contains a great deal of truth. The infant in
its earliest days is completely ego-centric, self-loving and
indulgent. Its main objective is the attainment of the things which
give it pleasure, and it has not arrived at any social values or
sense of its place in the community. Granted a so-called normal
environment, the infant begins to grow up and in so doing becomes
increasingly socialised as time goes on. Abnormalities in
temperamental make-up and difficulties in environment will certainly
render this process of social adjustment more difficult . . .
(Rees 1933: 30)*
A similar analysis of psychopathy is presented by Henderson who
regarded psychopaths as -
. . . people who psychobiologically have remained at an immature,
individualistic, egocentric level, who are determined to get their
own way irrespective of the cost, who fail to grow up to any sense
of reality. . . . Their emotional development and their judgement and
forethought have not kept pace with their ideational component. . . .
Their higher inhibitory control mechanisms are in abeyance and they
are dominated by their emotional instincts.
(D. K. Henderson, quoted in East 1949: 128-9)
The references to 'immaturity' and 'failure to grow up' imply that
psychopathy results from a failure in the development of the child, a
theme already explored by Rees. However, in reading Henderson's
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argument it is also useful to recall another idea about 'development'
which was once seen as relevant to the analysis of delinquency: the
development of civilized man from primitive man (see ch. 5). For
Henderson's 'higher inhibitory control mechanisms' we might substitute
'moral sense'. Those persons in whom the moral sense remains
uncultivated are in a state similar to that of the savage - "they are
dominated entirely by their emotional instincts" (empahasis added).
The instincts which lead us to act aggressively and
individualistically are controlled, in the civilized man who has learnt
to control his aggression and to curtail his pursuit of selfish
desires where the cost of this pursuit to the community is too great.
The psychopath is a person who is constitutionally unable to learn
self-control.
The theme (which we might denote the child-adult/savage-civilized
theme) has appeared in numerous accounts of psychopathy and was not
confined to any one usage of the concept or to any one explanatory
school. For instance, East (1949), drawing upon an article on
'character' by A. F. Shand,s argued that there were three stages in
character development: (i) the instinctive level, represented in the
animal; (ii) the emotional level, represented in the child; and (iii)
the sentiment level, represented in the adult. East argued that the
psychopath was between stages two and three; his character development
had either ceased at this stage, or else he had regressed (ibid: 130),
Craft (1962: 49 & 1966b) makes explicit reference to this theme by
comparing the psychopath to the wild boy of Aveyron. Whitely (1968)
described the psychopath as emotionally immature and infantile and as
"primitive, egocentric and id-like".
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The link which had been drawn between problems In child development
and later delinquency led a number of researchers to focus attention
upon the problem of delinquency among children who were evacuated
during the second world war. (Rendell 1943; Vills 1945). This research
was concerned with the effect which early separation from parents had
upon the child's future behaviour. After the war Dr. John Bowlby
<1945/6) undertook his research into the "childhood origins of
recidivism", once again focussing upon the affects of early separation
from parents and unsettled upbringing. Moving forward to the 1950s, we
find Scott, in his paper 'The Psychopath' <1958), drawing upon
research on the development of the child's personality in order to
explain the role played by various factors in causing psychopathy.
While not denying the importance of 'constitutional' or
'physiological' factors, Scott argued that no understanding of
psychopathy was passible until personality development was understood
<Scott 1958: 7). For Scott, the main shaper of personality was the
early relationship between the child and those who cared for it. He
argued, therefore, that although environmental factors were an
important contributory factor in many cases of psychopathy, a bad
environment was seldom the direct cause of psychopathy. Environmental
factors were most likely to lead to trouble when 'acting in the
presence of' a "predisposition" to psychopathy <ibid). A
predisposition to psychopathy - or 'latent delinquency' - was
determined by "long continued faults in the relationship between the
child and those who care for it in early life" <ibid). 'Emotional
neglect', particularly as a result of institutional upbringing, was,
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therefore, an important cause of a predisposition to psychopathy, but
so too was 'over-indulgence' (ibid).
All of these writers emphasised, as did Gillespie (1930), the
importance of correct child-rearing as a means of preventing
delinquency and psychopathy. It is perhaps not surprising then that
when, in 1966, Dr. Michael Craft wrote a paper on ' The Causation of
Psychopathic Disorder' he devoted considerable attention to
alternative forms of child-rearing and, more generally, to alternative
forms of social relations (Craft 1966b). Craft reviewed various
theories about the relationship between genetics and personality and
presented the familiar argument that although genetic traits had some
influence, they did not determine personality. For Craft, 'upbringing'
- and in particular parental absence - had a far more direct influence
upon personality; the cases of Victor and other ' enfants sauvages'
were cited in support of this view (ibid; cf. Malson 1972). Craft also
cited a study by Anna Freud of concentration camp children. Freud had
argued that in comparison to London children, children who had spent
their earliest years in Nazi concentration camps were "highly
impulsive, self-centred, aggressive and demanding" (see Craft 1966b:
67-8). The clear implication is that these children were already
presenting some of the personality traits found in psychopaths.
However, "given several months of careful and sympathetic adult
attention . . . they turned fairly rapidly towards the behavioural
patterns expected from London children of the same age and sex . . ."
(ibid); thereby, not only proving that psychopathic traits were the
product of the child's early environment, but also establishing the
benefits of early intervention. Craft also reviews a wide range of
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research undertaken in the 1940s and 1960s on institutionalized and
deprived children paying particular attention to the work of the
Gluecks', published between 1950 and 1962, on the factors which lead
to juvenile delinquency. The general thrust of this research was that
"maternal neglect, lack of maternal affection, over-indulgence,
parental mental illness, paternal disinterest, and over-affection,
were all associasted with adverse personality traits in children".
(ibid: 69)
Craft then went on to consider community-rearing of children in
order to see whether "it is any more successful in preventing
psychopathy from developing" (ibid: 70-71). Here Craft considered work
such as Eaton's Culture and Mental Disorder, which was based upon a
study of the Hutterite sect of 8,000 people in north America. The
Hutterites child-rearing practices, like their social relations in
general, were strict and disciplinary, but communal: each child was
entitled to its "ration of love and affection, and indeed if it is
asked for love, then any adult is expected to give it without demur"
(Eaton, quoted in Craft 1966b: 71). Among the Hutterite's there was a
virtual absence of delinquency and a complete absence of psychopathic
disorder (ibid). On the other hand, Hutterite children were immature
in other ways and lacked the 'independence' typical of normal American
adolescents.
Craft uses this to information to move beyond his immediate concern
with the affect of community patterns of child-rearing upon rates of
psychopathy to suggest a more general theory about the relationship
between modern culture and delinquency. He suggests that psychopathy
is a side-product of the individualist and materialist ethos of modern
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society. The implication is that in a more communal, less
materialistic society there would be less delinquency and fewer cases
of psychopathy, but that we would also lose the benefits which
individualism and materialism have brought us. Hence Craft commented
(on a paper by the social anthropologist Margaret Mead on community
child-rearing):
She appears to feel, perhaps even with Freud, that personality
distortions, neuroses, and other community misfits, are the price
one has to pay for the excessive stimulation and materialistic and
educational demands of Western Civilisation, together with the
dependence on exclusive mother-child relationships arising from the
typical Western family. She feels that the defusion of parent-child
relationships allowed by Samoan society also allows a gentler and
more amiable mode of community life, which probably has fewer
community misfits, but fewer strong men of action and invention.
(Craft 1966b: 72)
Psychopathy as a communlcation problem
A more recent contribution to the quest for an explanation of
psychopathy is the argument that psychopathy can be seen as a
communication problem. Those who have explained psychopathy in this
way have generally had the modern idea of the psychopath - as a cold,
emotionless disordered personality - in mind. It has been suggested
that such psychopaths live in a world of their own, with its own
moral rules, values, logic, etc. and that it is therefore impossible
to communicate with the psychopath from the standpoint of the dominant
morality. Trying to communicate with the psychopath is therefore like
trying to communicate with a person who, at the level of feelings,
speaks a different language. The psychopath doesn't appreciate
society's rules, even though he is capable of understanding them in
the cognitive sense. This helps to explain why the psychopath is
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seldom Influenced by punishment, punishment is directed at the
immoral, whereas the psychopath is amoral.
Nor did either remonstrance or punishment make the slightest
difference to him. One reformatory head, who tried to reason with
him, said: 'He'd listen to you politely enough, and even make
appropriate responses, but you never felt any of it was really
going in. In fact, you hardly felt that you were in contact with him
at all, it was as if somebody had cut the telephone wire'.
(Howard Jones, quoted in Clyne 1973)
Botes
1. Frey (1948/9) is a significant exception.
2. These epidemics had an important impact upon penal policy in
that they led to calls for an amendment to the definition of 'moral
imbeciles' contained in the Mental Deficiency Act 1913 (see Craven
1927). The 1913 Act had defined 'moral imbeciles' as
"persons who from an early age display some permanent mental defect
coupled with strong vicious or criminal propensities on which
punishment has had little or no effect." (Section 1)
Since there were now several hundred children with "permanent brain
damage and anti-social traits which could not be said to have existed
from an early age" it was suggested that this provision be amended to
allow for the confinement and treatment of these children (Walker and
McCabe 1973: 211). This suggestion was accepted and in the Mental
Deficiency Act, 1927 moral imbeciles were defined as persons
"... in whose case there exists mental defectiveness couples with
strongly vicious or criminal propensities and who require care,
supervision and control for the protection of others." (Section 1)
3. For an account of psychoanalytic explanations of psychopathy see
Glover (1960: 132-147).
4. We might note the similarities between this and nineteenth
century theories of moral insanity; criminality is the product of a
failure to develop one's moral sense.
5. This was an article in the 1937 edition of Encyclopaedia
Britannica. Shand was also the author of Foundations of Character
(1914).
APPEBDIX 4
METHOD AMD STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The purpose of this appendix is to explain the structure of the
argument presented in the thesis. In the appendix I will try to
explain why a case-study approach was adopted and why the particular
examples were chosen for study. I will also present an analysis of the
concept of "discourse", as it is used in the dissertation, and I will
state why I find this concept useful in analysing penal thought,
policy, institutions and practice.
THE CASE-STUDY APPROACH
The subject of this thesis - the shift within penal discourse from
explicitly moral representations of crime and penal intervention to
representations in which explicitly judgemental terms are mixed with
the more subtle morality of medical language - is hardly a novel one.1
What I try to do - which is relatively novel - is to examine, in close
detail, the way in which medical terminology is actually used in penal
discourse. Instead of aiming for a single, comprehensive explanation
of the rise of psychiatric approaches to crime, I explore the complex
details of medical-penal discourse. In doing so I argue that
generalizations - such as 'scientific progress', 'the development of
humanitarian sentiments', or 'the medicalization of social control'
are inadequate for accounting for how medical concepts began to be
used in penal discourse, the meanings which they carried, or the
practical effects of their employment.
These purposes cannot be achieved by attempting to tell the story of
medical concepts in penal discourse as a continuous narrative
(structured by a few general themes) which uses specific medical
concepts as illustrations. Rather, it is necessary to start at the
level of the particular, looking in detail at the use of specific
medical concepts. This, is seems to me, can be best achieved through a
case-study approach. By focussing upon a few, key concepts and
examining their use, within penal discourse, in depth, we can begin to
understand both (a) the specific, unique, aspects of each concept's
use (why it was adopted, what meanings it carried, what its practical
effects were); and (b) the general aspects which tend to emerge again
and again wherever medical concepts appear in penal discourse.
THE IJEBR1ATES STUDY
I came across the so-called *medicalization of deviant drinking'
while doing research for an earlier essay on nineteenth century
criminological writing on drug addiction (Johnstone 1985). The
concepts 'inebriety', 'dipsomania' and 'alcoholism' are interesting in
this context since they raise questions concerning the 'boundaries'
between morals and medicine. Getting drunk has long been condemned on
ethical grounds. This condemnation was given greater force in the
nineteenth century when the drinking habits of the lower classes came
to be seen as an obstacle, along with other lower class recreations,
to the construction of a fit and disciplined labour force and self-
supporting families (Harrison 1971; ch. 2 of this thesis). Hence
drinking and drunkenness clearly fall within the domain of moral and
political problems. At the same time 'drunkenness' is also a
physiological state on which doctors can claim some sort of authority
to speak (Conrad and Schneider 1980, ch.4). There is, however, a short
gap between describing the effects of alcohol upon the body and mind
and moralising about drinking alcohol, a gap which nineteenth century
doctors found fairly easy to cross back and forth. For these reasons,
these concepts seemed to me to be rich in their potential for a study
of the use of medical concepts in penal discourse.
A little more investigation revealed that the problem of 'habitual
drunkards' or 'inebriates' was a central one for penal reformers in
the second half of the nineteenth century. The 'inebriate' was the
subject of a number of official inquiries, a multitude of articles,
and a specialist journal. In addition, specialist institutions were
constructed for the punishment and reformation of inebriates (see
ch.3). This level of concern is interesting in itself, given that most
'habitual drunkards' were petty offenders, who generally received
short sentences of imprisonment. Vhy such an apparently 'unworthy'
group should be regarded as constituting such a important problem by
'men of science' itself seemed interesting.
This concern with inebriates emerged alongside the problem of
drunkenness and intemperance in general. Surprisingly, there was very
little contact between the two concerns. This alerted me to the fact
that the concern of penal reformers with inebriates (a specific social
group) was rather different to, and more specific than, the mare
general concern with intemperance among the population in general (see
ch.2). There seemed, therefore, to be a very specific problem
requiring explanation: i.e. how inebriates came to be constituted as a
specific category, requiring specific investigation and specialist
institutions, and how they (and their 'treatment') were conceived and
represented.
The fact that institutions were constructed for the treatment of
inebriates also allowed me to develop another central theme of the
study. A central idea behind the study was that in order to understand
the impact of psychiatric ideas upon criminal justice it is necessary
to concentrate not just upon ideas about criminals and the causes of
crime, but also upon ideas about penal intervention and institutions.
It seemed to me that psychiatric thinking on penal intervention had at
least as much impact upon criminal justice as had psychiatric thinking
about crime. The discourse on inebriates and habitual drunkards turned
out, in fact, to be as much if not more concerned with questions of
penal and reformative practices and the nature of penal institutions,
than with the nature of inebriety and alcoholism.
MORAL ISSABTTY. MORAL IMBECILITY AID PSYCHOPATHY
This second case study started out as a study of how the concept of
'psychopathy' was used in penal discourse. Here I will explain why I
saw the concept of psychopathy as important, and then state why I
extended the study to include 'moral insanity' and 'moral imbecility'.
The concept of psychopathy is central to relations between criminal
justice and psychiatry (and more generally between morals and
medicine). It seems to denote, simultaneously, ideas of madness and
badness. The term is generally used to denote behaviour which is so
persistently erratic that it can be read as a sign of madness,
irrespective of the fact that other signs of madness are absent. The
term can be placed, therefore, exactly on the boundaries between
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morals and medicine (a fact which helps to explain the controversy
which has always surrounded the concept and the excitement which the
topic of psychopathy raises). This is even more evident in the case of
'moral insanity' , a precursor of psychopathy, which makes clear
reference to both the language of ethics and the language of
psychiatry. This status of 'psychopathy' - at the boundaries of morals
and medicine (and, I might add, at the boundaries of lay and
scientific understandings of crime) - made it ideal for studying the
interpenetration of the legal and the psychiatric.
The concepts of 'moral insanity' and 'moral imbecility' can be
regarded as precursors of 'psychopathy' since, not only are the
concepts closely related in their meaning, but also, there is a clear
historical link between the concepts (see ch.6). It seemed a logical
step, therefore, to extend the study of 'psychopathy' backwards, to
look at the use of the concepts of moral insanity and moral imbecility
in penal discourse. This proved interesting in itself, and also
allowed a greater understanding of 'psychopathy', since many of the
issues raised by the use of the concept of 'psychopathy' had been
raised more sharply in relation to 'moral insanity'.
Extending the study to include 'moral insanity' and 'moral
imbecility' was useful in another way; it allowed me to explore the
issue of how medical concepts came to be introduced into penal
discourse. By studying a series of concepts, I could look at the
reasons for one concept being rejected and another being adopted. This
led, in particular, to the development of two related themes. First,
that medical concepts tend to be introduced into penal discourse as
much for their persuasive value as for their explanatory value.
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Secondly, that medical terminology is often superimposed upon
administrative categories; classifications which are made for non¬
medical reasons, are often represented as classifications founded upon
medical knowledge.
STTOYIIG IPEAS THRQTOB REAPING DISCOURSE
In order to explain why I used the term 'discourse' in the
dissertation, and what I mean by it, it is necessary to reflect, more
generally, upon the nature of the study.
At its most general the thesis can be regarded as a contribution to
the history of ideas. More specifically, it can be seen as a history
of psychiatric ideas about delinquency, delinquents, penal
intervention and penal institutions. However, the study differs from
conventional histories of ideas in a number of respects. In the
context of this discussion, the most important difference concerns the
type of idea which the thesis examines.
The thesis does not focus upon the lofty philosophical ideas, or the
leading psychiatric and criminological theories of the day. Rather,
its focus is upon more 'humble' ideas concerning the management and
control of delinquents and of groups of persons who are are at risk of
becoming delinquent. These ideas are the product, not so much of
theoretical reasoning by 'thinkers' (whose concern might be to produce
definitive theories of crime and punishment), but of practical
reasoning by practitioners, whose concern is to understand how
delinquents can be better managed and reformed. Hence, the ideas on
delinquency which I look at are not so much ideas about the essential
nature of delinquency, but about the habits and background of
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delinquents and about how delinquents can be disciplined and
'moralized'. These are ideas which are useful in deciding how
delinquents can best be dealt with. And the ideas on penal
intervention which I look at are not so much 'big* ideas about the
right to punish, rather they are practical ideas about the best way to
punish (or treat) various types of delinquent, about how punishment
can be used more effectively so that it acts as a moralizing, rather
than a brutalizing, force, about how penal institutions can be
reformed so that they can be more efficient and effective, and its
deleterious effects reduced. Vhat I am concerned with then is
practitioner's understandings of their professional tasks. I am
concerned with practitioner's understandings of what they, and their
colleagues, are doing and are trying to do. I am concerned with the
ideas which inform penal practice and - since it is difficult to see
how practices can be described without reference to practitioner's
accounts of what they are doing - with the ideas which constitute
penal practice. A study of these ideas, I would argue, can reveal as
much (if not more) about the underlying 'rationality' of the penal
system, than would an examination of more lofty ideas on crime an
punishment.
The next question is that of how we can reconstruct these ideas. How
do we account for practitioner's self-understandings of their
professional tasks. One possible approach might be a psychological
one; we might use psychological techniques in order to understand the
thought patterns of psychiatrists. A more simple and, I would argue, a
more useful approach is to simply analyse the 'writing' of these
practitioners. Practitioners express their views in a number of
settings: including evidence before inquiries, reports, short articles
in 'practitioner's journals (such as the Howard Journal) and books.
This writing provides the most direct access to the way psychiatrists
understand their professional tasks (no doubt this could be
supplemented by other methods). I use the term 'discourse' to refer to
these communications between practitioners and from practitioners to
others (such as politicians, administrators, and the public). The
analysis of 'penal discourse' then is an analysis of the underlying
rationality of the penal system through a study of the words which
practitioners use to explain, describe and justify their professional
tasks.
References
Harrison B. (1971) see main bibliography
Johnstone, G. (1985) Values in Criminology M.Sc. Dissertation,




(1834) Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on
Prevailing Vice of Drunkenness, pari, papers, vol. 8.
(1872) Report of the Select Committee on Habitual Drunkards, pari,
papers, vol. 9.
(1893/4) Report of the Departmental Committee on the Treatment of
Inebriates, pari, papers, vol. 17.
(1895) Report from the Departmental Committee on Habitual Offenders,
Vagrants, Beggars, Inebriates and Juvenile Delinquents (Scotland),
pari, papers, vol. 37, Cd. 7735.
(1908) Report of the Departmental Committee on the Inebriates' Acts,
Cd. 4438.
(1908b) Report of The Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the
Feeble-minded (a.k.a. The Radnor Commission), cd. 4202, pari,
papers, vol. 39.
(1957) Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental
Illness and Mental Deficiency cmnd. 169, London: HMSQ.
(1971) Report of the Home Office Working Party on Habitual Drunken
Offenders, London: H.M.S.O.
(1972) Department of Health and Social Security, Final Report of the
Joint Working Party on Homelessness in London, London: DHSS.
(1975) Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (a.k.a,
the Butler Report) cmnd. 6244.
B. Other References
Allen , F. (1973) 'Criminal Justice, Legal values and the
Rehabilitative Ideal' in Murphy, J. (ed.) Punishment and
Rehabilitation, California: Vadsworth.
Allen, H. (1987) Justice Unbalanced: Gender, Psychiatry, and Judicial
Decisions, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
Archard, P. (1979) Vagrancy, Alcoholism and Social Control, London:
Macmillan Press.
Arnold, A. (1969) 'Alcoholism in Prison: Pentonville' in Cooke et al
(eds.) (1969).
- 326 -
Arcm, R. (1965) Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. 1,
(translated from the French by Howard, R. & Weaver H.)
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Balch, R. (1975) 'The Medical Model of Delinquency' Crime and
Delinquency, Vol. 21. pp. 116-130,
Bankowski, Z. (1989) 'The Rule of Law and Participatory Models of
Legal Process' paper presented at the 1989 British Criminology
Conference, Bristol.
Bean, P. (1976) Rehabilitation and Deviance, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
Bean, P. (1981) Punishment, Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Black, D. 'Psychological Methods' in Craft, M. (ed.) Psychopathic
Disorders, Oxford: Pergamon.
Bawlby, J. (1945/6) 'Childhood Origins of Recidivism' Howard Journal,
Vol.7, Ho. 1.
Box, S. , (1980) 'Where have all the Haughty Children gone?' in
Hational Deviancy Conference (ed.), Permissiveness and Control: The
fate of the Sixties Legislation, London: Macmillan.
Branthwaite, R. (1907/8) 'Inebriety: Its Causation and Control'
British Journal of Inebriety, vol.5, Ho.3.
Bucknill, J 'Review of G. L. Chesterton's Revelations of Prison life',
Journal of Mental Science, Vol.3.
Burt, C. (1925/1944 - 1st & 4th edns.) The Young Delinquent University
of London Press.
Butler (1975) - see Official Publications (1975)
Carlen, P. (1986) 'Psychiatry in Prisons: Promises, Premises,
Practices and Politics' in Miller, P & Rose, H. (eds.) The Power of
Psychiatry, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Castel, R. (1975) 'The Doctors and Judges' in Foucault (ed. ) (1975).
Castel, R. (1983) 'Moral Treatment: Mental Therapy and Social Control
in the nineteenth Century', (translated from the French by Peter
Miller), in Cohen, S. 8s Scull, A. (eds.) Social Control and the
State, Oxford: Martin Roberson.
Clarke, J., Langan, M. & Lee, P. (1980) 'Social Work: The Conditions
of Crisis' in Carlen, P. & Collison, M (eds.) Radical Issues in
Criminology, Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Clarke, M. (1975) 'The Impact of Social Science on Conceptions of
responsibility' British Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 2.
Clyne, P. (1973) Guilty but Insane: Anglo-American Attitudes to
Insanity and Criminal Guilt, London: Helson.
Cohen, S. (1979) 'The Punitive city: Hotes on the dispersal of Social
Control' Contemporary Crises, Vol. 3.
- 327 -
Collison, Jt. (1980) 'Questions of Juvenile Justice' in Carlen, P. &
Collison, M (eds.) Radical Issues in Criminology, Oxford: Martin
Robertson,
Conrad, P. (1975) 'The Discovery of Hyperkinesis: Notes on the
Medicalization of Deviant behaviour* Social Problems, Vol. 23.
Conrad, P. (1981) 'On the Medicalization of Deviance and Social
Control' in Ingleby, D. (ed.) Critical Psychiatry: The Politics of
Mental Health, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Conrad, P. & Schneider J. (1980) Deviance and Medicalization: From
Badness to Sickness, St. Louis: Mosby.
Cook, T. (1969) 'Existing Facilities' in Cook, T., Gath, D. & Hensman,
C. (eds.) The Drunkenness Offence, Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Cook, T. (1971) 'The Rathcoole Experiment', app. I of Official
Publications (1971).
Cook, T. (1975) Vagrant Alcoholics, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Cook, T., Gath, D. & Hensman, C. (eds.) (1969) The Drunkenness
Offence, Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Cotterrell, R. (1984) The Sociology of Law London: Butterworths.
Craft, M (1960/1) 'Psychopathic Personalities: A Review of Diagnosis,
Aetiology, Prognosis and Treatment' British Journal of Criminology,
Vol.1, No.1.
Craft, ML (1962) 'The Treatment of Adolescents with Personality
Disorders' Howard Journal, Vol.11, No. 1.
Craft, X. (1966a) 'The Meanings of the Term 'Psychopath'' in Craft, M.
(ed. ) Psychopathic Disorders, Oxford: Pergamon.
Craft, K. (1966b) 'The Causation of Psychopathic Disorder' in Craft,
M. (ed.) Psychopathic Disorders, Oxford: Pergamon.
Craft, K. (1968) 'The Criteria of Admission to a Velsh Psychiatric
Hospital' in Vest, D. (ed.) Psychopathic Offenders, University of
Cambridge, Institute of Criminology.
Craven, C. (1927) 'The Young Offenders Report', Howard Journal, Vol.2,
No. 2.
Critchley, M. (ed.) (1951) The Trial of Neville George Clevely Heath,
(Notable British Trials series) London: William Hodge & Co.
Davey, Dr. (1859) 'On the Relations Between Crime and Insanity'
Journal of Mental Science, Vol. 5.
DHSS (1972) - see Official Publicatoins (1972).
Digby, A. (1985) 'Moral Treatment at the Retreat' in Bynum, V. et al
(eds.) The Anatomy of Madness, Vol. II, London: Tavistock.
Donnelly, X. (1983) Managing the Mind: A Study of Medical Psychology
in Early Nineteenth Century Britain, London: Tavistock,
- 328 -
Donzelot. J. (1980) The Policing of Families (translated from the
French by Robert Hurley), London: Hutchinson.
d'Orban, P. (1969) 'Habitual Drunken Offenders in Holloway Prison' in
Cook, T. , Gath, D. & Hensman, C. (eds. ) The Drunkenness Offence,
Oxford: Pergamon Press.
East, N. (1949) 'Psychopathic Personality and Crime' in Society and
the Criminal, London: HMSQ.
Edwards, G., Hawker, A, Williamson, V. (1966) 'London's Skid Row',
Lancet I, pp. 249-52.
Ellis, H. (1910) The Criminal, 4th edn. (original pub'n. 1889),
London, Walter Scott & Co.
Ellis, H. (1939) Morals, Manners and Men, London: Watts.
Fabisch, ¥. 'The Electroencephalograph' in Craft, M. (ed. )
Psychopathic Disorders, Oxford: Pergamon.
Foucault, M. (1971) Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in
the Age of Reason, (translated from the French by Richard Howard),
London: Tavistock.
Foucault, M. <ed.) (1975) I Pierre Rividre, having slaughtered my
mother, my sister, and my brother . . . (translated form the French
by Frank Jellinek) University of Nebraska Press.
Foucault, H. (1977a) 'About the Concept of the "Dangerous Individual"
in Nineteenth Century Legal Psychiatry', (translated from the French
by Baudot, A. & Couchman J.), in Weisstub, D. (ed.) Law and
Psychiatry, Pergamon Press.
Foucault, M. (1977b) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison,
(translated from the French by Sheridan, A.), London: Allen Lane.
Foucault, X. (1979) The History of Sexuality: An Introduction,
(translated from the French by Robert Hurley), London: Allen Lane.
Freud, S. 'Criminals from a Sense of Guilt' in The Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14, London: Hogarth.
Frey, E. 'Biology and Juvenile Delinquency' Howard Journal, Vol.7,
No. 4.
Gardner, A. 'Science Approaches the Lawbreaker' Howard Journal, Vol 2,
No. 3.
Garland, D. (1985) Funishment and Welfare: A History of Penal
Strategies, Aldershot: Gower.
Garland, D. (1985b) 'Politics and Policy in Criminological Discourse:
A Study in Tendentious Reasoning and Rhetoric' Int. Jnl. of the
Sociology of Law, Vol. 13.
Garland, D. (1988) 'British Criminology before 1935' in Rock, P. (ed. )
A History of British Criminology, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- 329 -
Garland, D. & Young, P. (1983) 'Towards a Social Analysis of Penality'
in Garland, D. & Young, P. (eds.) The Power to Punish, London:
Heinemann.
Gath, D. (1969) 'The Male drunk in Court' in Cook, T. , Gath, D. &
Hensman, C. (eds. ) The Drunkenness Offence, Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Gibbens, T. (1966) 'The Development of Forensic Psychiatry' in Klare,
H. (ed.) Changing Concepts of Crime and its Treatment Oxford:
Pergamon.
Gibbens, T. (1968) 'Psychopaths in Mental Hospitals' in Vest, D. (ed. )
Psychopathic Offenders, University of Cambridge, Institute of
Criminology.
Gillespie, R. (1930) 'The Service of Psychiatry in the Prevention and
Treatment of Crime' Howard Journal, Vol.3, No.l.
Glatt, M. (1964) 'Crime, Alcohol and Addiction' Howard Journal,
Vol.11, No.4.
Glover, K. (1960) The Roots of Crime, London: Imago.
Goff, D. (1969) 'The Legal Position in the USA' in Cook et al (1969).
Goffman, E. (1961) Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental
Patients and Other Inmates, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
Gordon, C. (1986) 'Psychiatry and the Problem of Democracy' in Miller
P. & Rose, N. (eds.) The Power of Psychiatry, Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Gould, S. (1978) 'The Criminal as Nature's Mistake, or the Ape in Some
of Us' in Ever Since Darwin, London: Burnett Books.
Gray, R. (1977) 'Bourgeois Hegemony in Victorian Britain' in
Bloomfield, J. (ed.), Class, Hegemony and Party, London: Lawrence
and Visehart.
Greenwood, V. & Young, J. (1980) 'Ghettoes of Freedom: An Examination
of Permissiveness' in National Deviancy Conference (ed.),
Permissiveness and Control: The fate of the Sixties Legislation,
London: Macmillan.
Gunn J., Robertson G. , Dell. S. & Vay, C. (1978) Psychiatric Aspects
of Imprisonment, London: Academic Press.
Hamblin Smith, K. (1924) 'The Medical Examination of Delinquents',
Howard Journal, Vol.1, No.3.
Hamilton, J., Griffith, A., Ritson, B. & Aitken, R. (1978)
Detoxification of Habitual Drunken Offenders, Scottish Home and
Health Dept.
Hart, H. (1968) Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford, Open University
Press.
Harrison, B. (1971) Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question
in England 1815-1872, London: Faber & Faber.
- 330 -
Haynes, S. (1864/5) 'Clinical cases Illustrative of Moral Imbecility
and Insanity' Journal of Mental Science, Vol. 10.
Henderson, D. (1939) Psychopathic States, Sew York: V. V, Norton & co.
Hirst, P. & Voolley P. (1982) Social Relations and Human Attributes,
London: Tavistock.
Honderich, T. (1976) Punishment: The Supposed Justifications,
Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Howard Association, The, (1897) The Essential Element of Time, for
Reformatory or Restorative Success, especially in Reference to
Habitual Offenders, Drunkards and Tramps.
Howard Journal (1922) 'Criminal Youths' Vol.1, No.2.
Howard Journal (1926) 'Moral Degeneration Folawing Sleepy Sickness',
Vol. 2, No. 1.
Ignatieff, M. (1978) A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the
Industrial Revolution, London: Macmillan.
Ingram-Smith, N. (1969) 'Prospects for the Future in the Community' in
Cook et al (eds.) (1969),
Jensen, O. (1979) 'The Mask of Psychopathy' in Veisstub, D. Law and
Psychiatry, Vol.2, New York: Pergamon.
Jones, K. (1972) A History of the Mental Health Services, London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Jones, K. & Williamson, K. (1979) 'The Birth of the Schoolroom'
Ideology and Consciousness, No. 6.
Kelynack, T. (1904/5) 'Medico-Legal Aspects of Inebriety', British
Journal of Inebriety, vol. 2.
Kittrie, N. (1971) The Right to be Different: Deviance and Enforced
Therapy, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.
Lasch, C. (1980) 'Life in the Therapeutic State' New York Review of
Books, Vol. 27, No. 10.
Laycock, T. (1862) 'The Antagonism of Law and Medicine in Insanity,
and its Consequences' Journal of Mental Science Vol.8.
Laycock, T. (1868) 'Suggestions for Rendering Medico-Mental Science
Available to the Better Administration of Justice and the More
Effectual Prevention of Lunacy and Crime' Journal of Mental Science
Vol. 13.
Leigh, D (1961) The Historical Development of British Psychiatry,
Oxford: Pergamon.
Lewis, A. (1974) 'Psychopathic Personality: A Most Elusive Concept',
Psychological Medicine, Vol. 4.
- 331 -
Light, R. (1986) 'Policing Skid Row: Criminal Justice and the Habitual
Drunkard* Policing Vol.2, Ho.2..
McCord V. & McCord J. (1964) Tie Psychopath: An Essay on the Criminal
Mind, Princeton, NJ: Nostrand
MacLeod, R. (1967) 'The Edge of Hope: Social Policy and Chronic
Alcoholism 1870-1900', Journal of the History of Medicine, July
1967, pp. 215-245.
McLaughlin, P. <1985) 'Police Management of Public Drunkenness in
Scotland' British Journal of Criminology Vol.25, No.4.
McNeill, V. Plagues and Peoples, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Malson, L. (1972) IVolf Children, (translated from the French by
Fawcett, E. et al) London: NLB.
Maudsley, H. (1870) Body and Mind, London.
Maudsley, H. (1874) Responsibility in Mental Disease, London: King &
Co.
Maudsley, H. (1879) The Pathology of Mind, London: Macmillan.
Miller, P & Rose, N. (1986) 'Introduction' to The Power of Psychiatry,
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Miller, P. (1986) 'Critiques of Psychiatry and Critical Sociologies of
Madness' in Miller, P & Rose, N. (eds. ) The Power of Psychiatry,
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Moody, S. (1979) Drunken Offenders in Scotland, Scottish Office.
Moran, R. (1980) Medicine and Crime: The search for the Born Criminal
and the Medical Control of Criminality' in Conrad & Schneider
(1980).
Morton, J. Hall (1929) 'Alcoholics in Prison' Howard Journal, Vol.2,
Mo. 4.
Neustatter, V. 'Problems of Probation with a Condition of Residence at
a Mental Hospital' Howard Journal, Vol.8, No.4.
Nokes, P. (1967) The Professional Task in Welfare Practice, London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
lakes, P. (1976) 'Personal Responsibility and the Assistant Governor',
Howard Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1.
Nye, R. (1984) Crime, Madness, & Politics in Modern France: The
Medical Concept of National Decline, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.
O'Connell B. (1968) 'The Vork of an Observation Unit for the
Assessment of Psychopathic Disorder' in Vest, D. (ed.) Psychopathic
Offenders, University of Cambridge, Institute of Criminology.
- 332 -
Pasquino, P. (1980) 'Criminology: The Birth of a Special Savoir',
(translated by Colin Gordon) Ideology and Consciousness, No. 7,
Autumn.
Pearson, G. (1975) The Deviant Imagination: Psychiatry, Social Work
and Social Change, London: Macmillan Press.
Peddle, A. (1860) 'Dipsomania: A Proper Subject for Legal Provision',
Transactions of The National Association for the Promotion of Social
Science, pp. 538-46.
Peddie, A. (1872) 'Suggestions for Legislation in Scotland for
Habitual Drunkards', paper handed in to the Select Committee on
Habitual Drunkards, see Official Publications (1872).
Pittman, D. & Gordon, C. V. (1958) The Revolving Door: a Study of the
Chronic Police Case Inebriate, Glencoe: Free Press.
Police Orders (1921) in the Howard Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1.
Pollak, B. (1969) 'Rathcoole House - An Experiment in Rehabilitation'
in Cook et al (eds) (1969).
Prichard, J. (1837) A Treatise on Insanity and Other Disorders
Affecting the Hind, Philadelphia: Haswell, Barrington and Haswell.
Prichard, J. (1847) On the Different Forms of Insanity in Relation to
Jurisprudence, London.
Prins, H. (1980) Offenders, Deviants or Patients?, London: Tavistock.
Prins, H. (1986) Dangerous Behaviour, the Law, and Mental Disorder,
London: Tavistock.
Radzinowicz, L. and Hood, R. (1986) A History of English Criminal Law
and its Administration from 1750 - Vol. 5, London: Stevens & Sons.
Ramon, S. (1986) 'The Category of Psychopathy' in Miller P. & Rose, N.
(eds. ) The Power of Psychiatry, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Raphael, D. (1973) 'Moral Sense' Dictionary of the History of Ideas,
Vol.3, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Rees, J. 'The Causes and Cure of Crime: From the Psychologist's
Standpoint' Howard Journal, Vol.3, No,4.
Reiner, R. (1985) The Politics of the Police, Sussex: Vheatsheaf
Books.
Rendell, L. (1943) 'The Handicapped Child' Howard Journal, Vol.6,
No. 3.
Renton A. & Yellowlees, M. (1896) 'On recent Proposals Regarding
Habitual Drunkards and Other Offenders', Journal of Mental Science,
Vol. 42.
Richards, B. (1977) 'Psychology, Prisons and Ideology: The Prison
Psychological Service", Ideology and Consciousness Vol.2.
Rieff, P. (1966) The Triumph of the Therapeutic, London: Chatto &
Vindus.
- 333 -
Robertson. C. (1860) 'A Case of Homicidal Mania, Without Disorder of
the Intellect' Journal of Mental Science, Vol. 6.
Rodman, B. (1968) ' Bentham and the Paradox of Penal Reform' Journal of
the History of Ideas, vol.29.
Rose, I. (1985) The Psychological Complex: Psychology, Politics and
Society in England 1869-1939, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
Rose, H. (1986) 'Psychiatry: The Discipline of Mental Health', in
Miller, P & Rose, N. (eds. ) The Power of Psychiatry, Cambridge:
Polity Press.
Rothman, D. (1971) The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and
Disorder in the New Republic, Boston: Little Brown & Co.
Rubington, E. (1967) 'The Half-way House for the Alcoholic' Mental
Hygiene, Vol .51, No.4.
Rush, B. (1948) 'Plan for an Asylum for Drunkards to be called the
Sober House' (originally published in 1810), reproduced in Corner G.
(ed.) The Autiobiography of Benjamin Rush, Princeton University
Press.
Salmond, J. (1920) Jurisprudence (6th edn.), London: Sweet and
Maxwe11.
Scott, G. (1949) 'Alcoholism and Criminal Behaviour' im Radzinowicz L.
& Turner, J. (eds.) Mental Abnormality and Crime, London: Macmillan.
Scott, P. (1958) 'The Psychopath' Howard Journal, Vol.10, No.l.
Sedgwick, P. (1982) Psycho Politics, London: Pluto Press.
Sellin, T. (1944) Pioneering in Penology
Silkin, S. (1969) 'Foreword' to Cook, T. et al (1969).
Skultans, V. (1975) Madness and Morals: Ideas on Insanity in the
Ninteenth Century, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Snell, H. (1959) 'The Prison Medical Service', Howard Journal, Vol.10,
No. 2.
Snell, H. 'Prison Service Establishments and Psychopathy' in Craft, M.
(ed. ) Psychopathic Disorders, Oxford: Pergamon.
Sullivan, V. (1924) Crime and Insanity, London: Arnold.
Smith. R. (1981) Trial By Medicine: Insanity and Responsibility in
Victorian Trials, Edinburgh University Press.
Symonds, J. (1869) 'What Legislative Measures Might be Proposed to
Deal with Cases of Uncontrollable Drunkenness?', Transactions,
National Association for the Promotion of Social Science.
Szasz, T. (1972) 'Bad Habits are not Diseases: A Refutation of the
Claim that Alcoholism is a Disease', Lancet 2.
- 334 -
Taylor, F. (1966) 'The Henderson Therapeutic Community' in Craft, M.
(ed. ) Psychopathic Disorders, Oxford: Pergamon.
Tether, P. & Robinson, D. (1986) Preventing Alcohol Problems, London:
Tavistock
Thompson, F. (1981) 'Social Control in Victorian Britain' Economic
History Review, 2nd series, Vol. 34, No. 2.
Thomson, J. (1867) 'The Effects of the Present System of Prison
Discipline on the Body and Mind', Journal of Mental Science, Vol.12.
Thomson, J. (1870) 'The Hereditary Mature of Crime' Journal of Mental
Science, Vol.15.
Thomson, J. (1871) 'The Psychology of Criminals* Journal of Mental
Science, Vol 16.
Unsworth, C. (1987The Politics of Mental Health Legislation, Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Walker, H. (1965) Crime and Insanity in England, Vol. 1, Edinburgh
University Press.
Walker, 1. & McCabe, S. (1973) Crime and Insanity in England, Vol. 2,
Edinburgh University Press.
Watson, S. (1988) The Moral Imbecile: A Study of the Relations between
Penal Practice and Psychiatric Knowledge of the Habitual Offender,
Ph.D. thesis, University of Lancaster.
West. D. (1968) 'Psychopaths: an Introductory Comment' in West, D.
(ed. ) Psychopathic Offenders University of Cambridge, Institute of
Criminology.
West, D. (1974) 'Criminology, Deviant Behaviour, and Mental Disorder',
Psychological Medicine, Vol. 4.
West, D. (1988) 'Psychological Contributions to Criminology' in Rock,
P. (ed.) A History of British Criminology, Oxford: Clarendon.
Whitely, J. (1968) 'Factors in the Treatment and mangement of
Psychoapths' in West, D. (ed.) Psychopathic Offenders University of
Cambridge, Institute of Criminology.
Williams, K. (1981) From Pauperism to Poverty, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
Wills, W. (1945) The Barns Experiment,
Woottan, B. (1959) Social Science and Social Pathology, London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd,
Young, P. (1980) 'Punishment and Social Organization' in Bankowski, Z.
& Mungham, G. (eds.) Essays in Law and Society, London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul.
Zola, I, (1972) 'Medicine as an Institution of Social Control',
Sociological Review, Vol. 20.
